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CONTENTS OF VOL. XXIII.

No. LXXXIX.

Article | Page

I. INTUITIVE IDEAS, AND THEIR RELATION TO KNOWLEDGE, ... 1

BY REV. JOHN BASCOM, PROFESSOR OF RHETORIC, WILLIAMS COLLEGE.

II. CONVERSION — ITS NATURE, ... 48

BY REV. AUSTIN PHELPS, PROFESSOR AT ANDOVER.

What is the Nature of that Change which Man needs to render him an Object of the Divine Complacency, . 50

III. POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY, ... 73

BY REV. GEORGE N. BOARDMAN, BINGHAMTON, NEW YORK.

IV. THE CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC CHURCH, . . . 108

BY REV. W. W. ANDREWS, WETHERSFIELD, CONN.

Organization, ... 127
Doctrines, ... 133
Worship, ... 145

V. NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS, . . . 160

Voices of the Soul, ... 160
Wayland's Moral Science, ... 161
The Life of John Brainerd, ... 163
Dexter on Congregationalism, ... 165
Froude's History of England, ... 168
Smith's Dictionary of the Bible, ... 170
Hedge's Reason in Religion, ... 171
Büchsel's Ministerial Experiences, ... 172

Article Page

Life of Horace Mann, ... 172
Life and Letters of Frederick W. Robertson, . . . 173
Whately's Essays, ... 173
Guthrie on the Parables, ... 174
M'Cosh's Intuitions of the Mind, ... 174
Bascom's Philosophy of Rhetoric, ... 174
Boehm's Reminiscences, ... 175
Gillett's History of the Presbyterian Church, . . . 175
Stevens's History of the Methodist Episcopal Church, . 176
Grout's Zulu Land, ... 176
Angus's Bible Hand-Book, ... 176

No. XC.

I. HISTORY AND THEOLOGY OF THE REFORMED PROTESTANT DUTCH CHURCH, . . . 177

BY ELBERT S. PORTER, D.D., EDITOR OF CHRISTIAN INTELLIGENCER, NEW YORK.

Statistics, ... 185
Government, ... 187
Educational Institutions, ... 190
Benevolent Institutions, ... 192
Genius, Culture, and Worship, ... 193
Customs, ... 198
Theology, ... 200

II. OUR PLACE IN HISTORY, ... 211

BY REV. JULIUS SEELYE, PROFESSOR IN AMHERST COLLEGE.

III. THE STUDY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE, . . 235

BY REV. R. P. DUNN, D.D., PROF. IN BROWN UNIVERSITY, PROVIDENCE, R. I.

IV. THE CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC CHURCH, . . . 252

BY REV. W. W. ANDREWS, WETHERSFIELD, CONN.

Its Relations to the Existing Churches, ... 252

V. BRÜCKE'S PHYSIOLOGY OF SPEECH, . . . 257

BY LEWIS R. PACKARD, PROFESSOR IN YALE COLLEGE.

Article Page

VI. REGENERATION—THE WORK OF GOD, . . 286

BY REV. AUSTIN PHELPS, PROFESSOR AT ANDOVER.

The Change of a Human Heart is the Work of God, . 286

VII. MARTYRDOM, IN THE APOCALYPSE, . . . 309

BY THE LATE REV. B. F. HOSFORD, HAVERHILL, MASS.

VIII. NOTICES OF RECENT GERMAN PUBLICATIONS, 333

FROM OUR GERMAN CORRESPONDENT.

Christian Ethics, ... 333
Philosophy of Religion, ... 338
The Mosaic Account of Creation and Natural Science, . 340
Christian Evidences, ... 342
The Immaculate Conception, ... 343

IX. NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS, . . 345

Bushnell on Vicarious Sacrifice, ... 345
Fisher's Supernatural Origin of Christianity, . . . 347
Reminiscences of the Life and Times of Gardiner Spring, . 348
The Works of Philip Lindsley, ... 348
Pond's Lectures on Pastoral Theology, ... 348
Murphy's Commentary on the Book of Genesis, . . 349
Hengstenberg's Commentary on the Gospel of John, . . 349
Stevens's Centenary of American Methodism, . . . 350
Stevens's Women of Methodism, ... 350
Mill's Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, . 350
Buck's Massachusetts Ecclesiastical Law, ... 352

No. XCI.

I. THE ORIGIN OF THE GOSPELS, ... 353

BY REV. J. ISIDOR MOMBERT, D.D., LANCASTER, PA.

II. THE BIBLE DOCTRINE OF DIVORCE, . . . 384

BY REV. JOSEPH TRACY, D.D., BOSTON, MASS.

Article Page
III. CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAMISM, ... 406

BY REV. GEORGE F. HERRICK, MISSIONARY OF THE A. B. C. F. M.

Some Account of the Relation of Islamism to Christianity in its Origin, ... 408
Mohammed's early Acquaintances with Christians; his Journey to Syria, ... 408
Mohammed's Knowledge of our entire Scriptures derived mainly through Jewish Sources, ... 409
References to Old Testament History in the Koran, . 410
References to New Testament History in the Koran are less numerous and less in detail, ... 412
Christians warned against Extravagances in Religion, 413
The Koran at first regarded as concurrent with, and auxiliary to, the Scriptures, ... 414
The Foundation Truth of Islamism borrowed from Jews and Christians, ... 415
Glance at the Development of Islamism as a Religion, . 416
Inception of the new Religion in Mohammed's Mind, 416
Mohammed assumes a Divine Commission, and makes a Compromise between Good and Evil, ... 417
The first Successes of Mohammed, ... 418
The Religious System of Mohammed, ... 420
Mohammedan Sects, ... 424
The present Relation of Islamism in Turkey to Christianity, 427
The practical Acquaintance of Turks with Christianity derived through the corrupt Oriental Churches, . 427
The present Attitude of Mohammedans in Turkey in relation to their own Faith and Material Reform, . 429
Attitude of the Mohammedans of Turkey toward Protestant Christianity, ... 432

IV. UTILITARIANISM, ... 435

BY REV. JOHN BASCOM, PROFESSOR IN WILLIAMS COLLEGE.

V. LIFE OF THE PATRIARCH CYRIL, ... 452

BY DR. A. G. PASPATI, CONSTANTINOPLE.

VI. THE INSTRUMENTALITY OF TRUTH IN REGENERATION, ... 485

BY REV. AUSTIN PHELPS, PROFESSOR AT ANDOVER.

Article Page

VII. BIBLICAL NOTES, ... 515

BY H. B. HACKETT, D.D., PROFESSOR IN NEWTON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

Where was Candace Queen? 515
The Situation of Emmaus, ... 516
Dispute respecting Capernaum, ... 518
Place of Bethabara in the Harmony, ... 519
The "Quarries" near Gilgal, ... 521

VIII. NOTICES OF RECENT GERMAN PUBLICATIONS, 522

FROM OUR GERMAN CORRESPONDENT.

IX. NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS, . . . 528

No. XCII.

I. THE ORIGIN OF THE GOSPELS, ... 529

BY REV. J. ISIDOR MOMBERT, D.D., LANCASTER, PA.

II. THE ANCESTRY AND EDUCATION OF THE ORATOR AESCHINES, ... 565

BY PROF. JAMES R. BOISE, ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN.

Family Connections of Aeschines, ... 566
Early Education of Aeschines, ... 579
Aeschines as Actor, ... 582
Aeschines as Secretary, ... 589

III. CITATIONS FROM THE NEW TESTAMENT BY THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS, ... 593

BY REV. WOLCOTT CALKINS, PASTOR OF CALVARY PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH.

IV. ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS BOTH NECESSARY, IN THEIR PROPORTION, TO TRUE REASONING, 603

BY REV. LEONARD WITHINGTON, D.D., NEWBURYPORT, MASS.

V. THE SYSTEM OF THE FOUR CONJUGATIONS IN LATIN, A CLASSIFICATION OF IDEAS SIGNIFIED BY THEIR CHARACTERISTIC VOWELS, 634

BY JAMES P. FRENCH, M.A., ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI.

Article Page

VI. HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY AS RELATED TO DIVINE AGENCY IN CONVERSION, . . . 645

BY REV. AUSTIN PHELPS, PROFESSOR AT ANDOVER.

VII. PROFESSOR HERMANN HUPFELD, . . . 673

(TRANSLATED FROM THE "NEUE EVANGELISCHE KIRCHENZEITUNG," MAY 19, 1866.)

VIII. THEORIES IN REGARD TO THE NATURE OF THE WILL, ... 679

Cortès' Essay on Catholicism, Liberalism, and Socialism, . 679
Hazard's Freedom of the Mind in Willing, ... 681

IX. THE TOPOGRAPHY OF JERUSALEM, . . . 684

BY REV. SAMUEL WOLCOTT, D.D., CLEVELAND, OHIO.

X. NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS, . . 696

Keil and Delitzsch's Commentary on the Books of Samuel, 696
Delitzsch's Commentary on the Book of Job, . . . 696
Whedon's Commentary on the Gospels, ... 696
Lange's Gospel according to Mark, ... 696
Van Oosterzee's Gospel according to Luke, . . . 696
Fairbairn on Prophecy, ... 697
Williams's Prophets of Israel and Judah, ... 697
Man's Age in the World, ... 697
Agassiz's Structure of Animal Life, ... 698
Moon's Elijah the Prophet, ... 698
Thompson's Holy Comforter: His Person and Work, . 698

INDEX, ... 699

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

INTUITIVE IDEAS, AND THEIR RELATION TO KNOWLEDGE.

BY REV. JOHN BASCOM, PROFESSOR OF RHETORIC, WILLIAMS COLLEGE.

THERE has been a steady and increasing tendency in modern philosophy to recognize ideas in our mental furniture not arising from experience, but necessary to it. These, whether known as convictions of common sense, as regulative, or as intuitive ideas, must always play an exceedingly important part in mental and moral philosophy. Their acceptance or rejection at once defines the radical tendencies of any system of mental science, and enables us easily to predict its leading conclusions.

In the conflict which has attended their recognition and establishment little opportunity has been offered for the careful determination of these ideas, their number, their relation to each other, and their relation to science. It is to these points that we shall direct our efforts in this Article; and, as the task is both a difficult and a broad one, we shall be pardoned if we omit altogether, or pass hastily, much that might well be said; if we treat with little discussion or exposition those ideas more generally recognized as regulative; and do not repeat and apply to succeeding ideas proof of the same general character as that given

under preceding ones. We shall also be pardoned if our success in enumerating and defining these intuitions of the reason is but partial.

It would certainly be simpler to refer all our knowledge to experience and reflection than to assign a portion of it to the intuitive power of the reason. But this cannot be done, as there are ideas, and those everywhere present, which find no explanation in perception, nor in the judgments which spring therefrom; ideas which are presupposed by all experience, and without one or other of which no single assertion can be made; ideas which are necessarily present, and bear with them, therefore, a sense of necessity totally different from the contingent notions given by experience. For these three reasons we are forced to the recognition of a distinct intuitive faculty: first, because there are present to the mind certain ideas which are not perceptions nor the generalizations of reflection; second, these ideas are necessarily prior to experience, since no one of its judgments can exist without them; and third, they come to the mind with an impression of immediate and inherent necessity not found in its other convictions.

As first among these ideas, we shall mention that of existence. There is no judgment more naked, simple, and fundamental than this of existence. All later judgments proceed upon and contain it. That something is, either as an object of sensation or apprehension, either in permanence or in transition, is the incipient, the anticipatory idea, which brings all matter before the mind.

The first and the least object in any external or internal sense, in sensation or in consciousness, gives occasion for a judgment. Of any quality, as hardness, color, odor, we may say, It is. In this judgment we have two ideas, yet the mind has received but one through perception. It itself has supplied a second, and of the two framed a judgment. We have thus the first product of thought, a phenomenon included under its appropriate idea. Existence is a primary, simple, and inevitable notion, but by no means a

sensation. All sensations might be enjoyed or suffered without the mental exposition of any one of them in the assertion, This quality is. Herein the mind finds the external, the not-self; herein it finds itself, and goes on to accumulate all those phenomena which it is afterwards to investigate. It thus makes the fundamental proposition of all inquiry, Something is, and prepares the way for the later inquiries, What is it? and How is it? The notion of existence is as complete as it is instantaneous. We may inquire into the object of which the affirmation has been made, and enlarge our ideas concerning it, but in the end there is no more fulness to the idea of existence than when at the outset we said, It is.

A second notion by which the mind guides its inquiries concerning things now, by the idea of existence brought before it, is that of resemblance, — agreement and disagreement. This is applicable to all the properties, relations, and modes of being which belong to things, and rules the mind in marking every shade of agreement from perfect sameness to complete diversity. The idea of likeness or unlikeness is not gained by the comparison of two objects. The comparison only serves to show how far this idea is applicable, but would itself never have been instituted without the prior notion of resemblance, nor, if instituted, could have issued in a new idea alien to the mind's previous action. How is comparison to proceed which has not the idea of resemblance to guide it? What is comparison but the application of this idea? How is a process which has nowhere contained it suddenly to result in it? General notions are not thought out, for how is that thinking itself to advance which produces them? They are not seen or felt, for they are not sensible qualities. They are present as intuitive ideas to give form to the mind's first judgments on their appropriate subject-matter. The determination of the sameness or diversity of the phenomena before the mind is a first effort for their apprehension. They may be experienced without apprehension, but the instant this is

sought for the mind brings to the task this idea of resemblance; by it separates these objects of the senses and thoughts, throws them into classes, and makes them the sources of knowledge.

Under the idea of resemblance is included that of truth. Truth belongs to propositions, and to these alone. An affirmation which corresponds with facts is true. The mind judges the agreement of the idea contained in a proposition with its own idea of what exists either as thing or principle in the world, and, according to the harmony or want of harmony, regards the statement as true or false. Truth is thus an agreement of ideas; the one contained in language, the other in existence, and a true proposition is one in which this conformity of assertion with fact is found. Of the specific agreement, truth, the mind judges under its general notion, resemblance.

A third idea of the reason which comes as a law to perception and to the subject-matter of thought, so far as derived from perception, is space. Space is a notion restricted to material existence. Indeed, that it is force, perceptible force, occupying space, is an essential characteristic of matter as opposed to mind. Only through such a force does matter become cognizable, sensible. Localized in its first manifestation to the senses, it remains to all later perception occupying space; ceasing to do this, it ceases to exist. Existence and non-existence are for it but appearance and disappearance in the field of space. This idea, then, is regulative of perception, and of thought only as it is conditioned to perception. We need not dwell on this notion. It is among the most universally accepted of the intuitive ideas. Much has been affirmed of space, as its indivisibility, which is only true of it when combined with another intuitive idea, that of the infinite. Simple, indefinite space, as a notion, is prior and necessary to all definite knowledge of limited portions of it termed extension. Only with this guiding notion can the mind run before and direct its perceptions in their measurements, or understand those

results which presuppose this idea. The extended body is first comprehended by the notion of space, and then its dimensions are taken, as events are first conceived in time, and afterward their period and duration defined. An inch, a foot, a yard, presuppose more than an inch, a foot, a yard, — a space wherein they lie, and without which they cannot be present to the mind. We do not deny the perception of the inch, — the inch-long body, — but of the space beyond the inch, wherein it is held and whereby it is explained.

Fourth among the ideas which regulate apprehension, and intimately associated with that of space, is number. This involves two subsidiary ideas, unity and plurality. These are not distinct conceptions, but different phases of the same idea, number. The first form in which this presents itself is that of unity. The mind regards an object as one, and in that act not only reaches unity, but also sets it over against that plurality which it explains, and by which it is explained. These two ideas, applied in the apprehension of objects, contain the full idea of number, and under this developed category of thought the mind proceeds in a large class of judgments.

The mind establishes its divisions on a great variety of principles, but whatever it has once separated in perception or in thought, thereby comes under the idea of number, let the character of the unit be what it will.

A fifth idea, inclusive of a new class of phenomena, is that of time. This is to successive what space is to co-existent phenomena; yet, more inclusive than the latter, it is equally applicable to the external and the internal. That which exists as matter establishes itself to the senses through space occupied; that which modifies its mode of existence explains itself to the mind through time occupied. Change marks a transfer in time, and is only possible in conception through the prior notion of time. Change presents itself through the succession of mental states. In the departure of any sensation or thought there is present the explanatory

idea of time; a past moment bearing away the receding thought, a present moment bringing the new idea.

The same change which involves the notion of time also brings to light, in its explanation, the sixth regulative notion, that of cause. Change presents itself to the mind as the product or manifestation of a force. There is an inevitable reference of that which arises to some efficiency from which it has arisen. Change is the result, the proof of power, and power cannot spring from a void. The mind does not, cannot so conceive it; but is ever seeking to explain it under the category of cause. The world is not comprehensible as a series of unconnected phenomena, with no other relation than that of succession. Such a supposition at once sweeps away a whole class of inevitable and pregnant judgments, and by so much destroys knowledge, invalidating the idea on which it proceeds.

It is involved in this notion of cause that the cause and effect are perfectly commensurate, each defining and measuring the other. Any unlikeness or disparity between them is apparent, not real, arising from our ignorance of the nature of one or both. Any inadequacy in the cause to secure the entire effect, in kind and degree, would leave the mind burdened with the same difficulty as that which compelled it in the first instance to assign to every effect a cause. It is not merely a cause, but an adequate cause, which the mind demands. Any, the least, balance in the effect beyond the cause is an absurdity. The determinate, fixed character of causes, both in the nature and amount of their action, is the essential idea for all reasoning in this department. Gradually to narrow down the causes of the most varied and manifold effects, as some development theories do, into a few simple, physical, or perchance vital, forces is in defiance of the very idea which enables us to reason at all concerning physical connections. It is not more absurd to deny a cause of given effects than to deny an adequate cause; nor can any period of time serve to develop a germ beyond its first, its intrinsic force.

As efficiencies and effects, weighed each with each, are exact counterparts, and as the latter are frequently visible while the former are uniformly invisible, we estimate the force by its manifested results. As each effect is in turn a cause, it might seem that, if it were open to the senses in one relation, it would also be in the other. This is not so. A ball suffers a blow, and is thereby made the recipient of a force. Its subsequent motion reveals the extent and character of this force, but the power by which it can now become a cause, and impart a kindred movement, is no more open to observation than before. If a series of balls are in contact, they successively become mediums of force with no opportunity of judging that force till the last of the series manifests it in motion. The mind weighs the effect as the exact equivalent of the cause. This is the very substance of the idea, that which makes it regulative of judgments.

These six ideas — existence and resemblance, space and number, time and cause — rule matter; assigning form to all material judgments. We thus determine that a thing is what it is, where and when it is, and its relations to the objects about it, thus exhausting every internal and external predication concerning it. The ideas here coupled are intimately related. Existence finds its chief significance in its resemblances; space, in its numerical relations; time, in its sequences of cause and effect. The first two assign the definite fact and character of existence; the second couplet gives the most abstract and unconditioned relation of things; and the third furnishes the law of all movement, of all change.

It may be thought that we should add a seventh regulative idea, the common category of relation. We have not done so, because we regard it as a generalization, the abstract expression for various specific dependencies. Color is not a regulative idea, but a quality abstracted from any and all of its specific forms. Specific relations are involved in the idea of cause and effect, time, space, resemblance;

or rather, these all may serve to establish each its own connection between objects, and therefore the notion of relation may be generalized from them. If it be said that number and existence are also involved in the notions of cause, time, resemblance, and should therefore be treated as generalizations, not as regulative ideas, we answer: they are indeed present, but as antecedent, necessary ideas for the apprehension of the phenomena under consideration. We first apply the notion of existence as preparatory to that of resemblance; but we do not first observe a specific resemblance, and then generalize the notion of existence involved therein. Cause and effect, however, as a specific relation can be understood without any prior general idea of relation, as red can be seen without an antecedent notion of color. From specific connections we reach the general notion of relation which they have in common, but only with the complete idea of number can we comprehend its first application. Relation is ever covering very different connections; number, existence, are always identical ideas. They are as completely contained in each as in all of the phenomena to which they apply.

The intuitions of which mention has now been made are all applicable, though not exclusively, to things, to perception; but those of which it remains to speak are the formative ideas of thought alone.

The first condition of thought, of intellectual action, is consciousness. We cannot conceive thought or feeling in any of their forms without this regulative idea. Thought, of necessity, arises in consciousness, as much as things in space, or events in time. This consciousness is not itself an action, but that in which the mind apprehends all its action. Spiritual existence is separated from physical in the fact that consciousness is the regulative idea of the one, and space of the other. The difficulty that has always been met with in defining consciousness confirms this view. Consciousness is involved in the very nature of all thought, is that without which it cannot be. It is not a faculty, nor

the action of a faculty, but an antecedent idea which alone makes knowledge possible, or the fact of knowing comprehensible.

We know not that consciousness has ever been looked on as a regulative idea, and many may even consider its reference to these intuitive conditions of thought ridiculous. More consequences flow from it than we can here stop to point out, and more objections will arise to it than we shall pause to answer. We shall be satisfied for the present if we can give reasons sufficient to secure for this reference consideration. The mind cannot know without knowing, nor feel without feeling, which means that consciousness must accompany its acts. Now the very knowing is not consciousness, nor the very feeling consciousness, yet neither the knowing nor the feeling can exist without it. This is the condition of those without which they cannot be, yet it passes beyond them through successive acts of knowing and of feeling, standing in the same necessary relation to all, and unexhausted and unaffected by any.

Nothing can exist without some form of phenomena cognizable by some actual or supposable powers. Such existence would utterly lack proof, and be equivalent to non-existence. Matter establishes its existence by special phenomena. If it ceases to occasion phenomena of any character at any point whatever in space, it ceases to exist. Mind, on the other hand, proves its existence as mind by acts of mind; that is, acts appearing in consciousness. The rise, progress, and pause of intellectual action are wholly in this field. To occupy space with sensible properties is the proof and the very nature of material existence; to occupy consciousness with mental acts is as much the proof and nature of spiritual existence. The conscious life of the spirit is its life, its only life. If no phenomena appear in consciousness, there is no testified, spiritual existence; and a spiritual life which in no way manifests itself is as inconceivable as matter with no property whatsoever. If an unconscious, that is an untestified, spiritual existence is

possible, the beginning and end of spiritual life become chimeras, utterly incapable of determination by any set of cognitions, since the mind may remain unknown to itself, much more to others. Such a soul might pass an eternity in complete syncope. The question is not whether the spirit can lay aside this or that form of action, but whether it can lay aside all forms of action. Suppose this to be done, and the spirit yet to exist; that existence must have a form, — as there must be a method, a manner, to everything that is, — and consciousness having now disappeared, no form remains but that of sensible properties; yet this form excludes it from the spiritual and identifies it with the material. In short, the only manifestations of spirit are mental states; these therefore cannot be wholly excluded and their spiritual subject yet remain, though devoid of all attributes. This is to suppose existence itself an entity. Nor does it follow thence that the spirit is a mere series of conscious acts, any more than that the apple or marble is a simple series of sensible properties.

Consciousness, then, is the regulative idea of spiritual existence. It is the very nature of thought and feeling that they can only take place in the conscious life of a spirit that thinks, and therein knows what it thinks.

We of course distinguish in this discussion between that consciousness which at the instant attends all knowing and those acts of memory and attention by which we retain and consider the phenomena of mind.

The second intuition we mention in this second class is beauty. Beauty is not a sensation, an organic impression, nor yet the result of reasoning, but a simple, primary idea. It is not, like the notions of space, existence, called forth by the mere presence of an object, and affirmed as the very condition of that presence. It is only as certain relations of the object, interior or exterior, are apprehended, that the mind judges it beautiful. It is a quality, not of matter, but of the forms and relations of matter. An intellection — that is, an object interpreted by the intellect — must pre-

cede every intuition of beauty. Only as thought is contained in objects do they become beautiful, and only as this emotional thought is regarded by the beholder as an intellection are they pronounced beautiful. Beauty, then, is a regulative idea, not directly of things, but of them indirectly in the relations in which they stand — in the sentiments which they utter. The marks, the results, of emotional thinking appear in the structure of objects about us, and thence springs the category of beauty. This idea, therefore, may arise at different periods in different minds, according to the antecedent progress which prepares for and requires it.

So is it with the third intuition, right. Actions are not right to the senses. Only when apprehended in their relations and results by the intellect do they give occasion for this judgment.

This notion governs action; but it governs it by giving a law to thought. The mind finds an imperative within itself by which it is constrained to some actions and restrained from others. Plans, conceptions, as they arise within the thoughts, are judged, and before they issue in action have the approval or disapproval of the moral sense. The very notion of right involves that of obligation. There is in it no reference to a higher authority or ulterior reason. The duty it affirms it arms with full authority, and gives to disobedience a rebuke it cannot evade. This is the nature of the idea, otherwise it is not a primary idea, but referable to that ulterior notion from which it derives its power. To seek back of this idea for its authority is to destroy its integrity and simplicity. It thus ceases to be a regulative notion.

As much effort is still made to reject right as a primary idea, we dwell for a moment on the proof. Says a popular and widely-accepted writer on ethics: "Conscience is that function of the moral reason by which it affirms obligation to choose primarily the good, and secondarily the right, from its apprehended relation to that." The theory pro-

posed in the work from which this extract is taken is but another phase of that which makes happiness ultimate, since blessedness itself is but a peculiar variety of happiness, — is holy happiness. We are to seek holy happiness. Why this form of happiness more than any other? Because it is holy happiness. But what is it, peculiar to holy happiness, which makes it obligatory? What answer can be given but this: It arises from doing right. The obligatory character, then, of this form of happiness as contrasted with others is obtained from the right, and is a consequence of it. Hence blessedness, the alleged ultimate, no longer remains so, but gives place to the right, the real source of obligation.

Or, again, how can the right afford happiness, if not itself obligatory? If it defines no line of action there can be no approval, no satisfaction, in accepting it, since, according to the supposition, there is no duty to accept it. If there is no law, there is no obedience, no reward, no blessedness. The sense of right is not a taste or an appetite that can be fed on its object, and thus impart pleasure. Grant that a larger share of other independent enjoyments may be reached through obedience to the right; that fact merely does not impose obligation. If so, then the pursuit of happiness is of itself obligatory, and we stand on the oft-repeated doctrine that enjoyment alone is the ultimate motive of action. The right thus sinks into mere sagacity, and, as a distinctive idea, is lost in the explanation we have brought to it. The word "blessedness" does not aid the theory, since the instant it is sought hereon to rest a peculiar claim, the discarded idea of an ultimate right must reappear to support it.

Nor is there any opportunity to unite the idea of right and the pleasure springing therefrom, and make them the conjoint sources of authority. No conceptions are more readily distinguishable than right and its consequences, and if either is the source of obligation, it makes the supposition of a second imperative lodged in the other super-

fluous. If the consequences of the right act reflexively on it to impart obligation, that is sufficient; or if the right by its own nature imposes duty, this is equally sufficient. We may try to extract the obligation of right from the enjoyment it confers, or we may explain the enjoyment by the prior duty met; but we have no occasion for any union of the two methods. The only synthesis of the cart and the horse is to have the one before the other, whichever way we may insist on arranging them.

The fourth intuition by which our judgments are controlled is that of liberty. This combined with the notion of right gives rise to responsibility; or more accurately, freedom is the condition which, giving play to the right, suffers it to be obligatory. These two ideas, therefore, are regulative of the larger share of judgments which pertain to rational moral action, and give it its essential characteristics. There is no primary idea which demands more careful protection from false analysis and destructive explanation than this of liberty. The sequence of motives and volitions is somewhat allied to that of cause and effect, and the external world in its necessary connections has been a prolific source of analogies subversive of freedom. Indeed, the very language of controversy, tinctured throughout by physical notions, has often begged the point at issue. Force, influence, connection, dependence, are all words explained by physical relations, and when applied to motives and volitions must be utterly severed from the ideas which gave rise to them; or, as already involving necessity, they compel us to reach it as the result of faithful analysis. If freedom is, it is perfectly unique, and so must the words be in their application which are to deal with it and unfold it. Standing alone amid necessary relations and fast-bound things, we cannot reason from these up to it, nor from it descend to them, otherwise than by departure and difference. It is our first question, Whether there *is* any such thing, any such notion, as liberty? and not, Whether there *can* be such a notion, explicable and comprehensible on

previous grounds? From the very nature of the idea, it refuses explanation, rejects comprehension under logical necessary formulae. To force these explanations upon it, is to pre-affirm that there is no such idea. For the naked fact of its existence we must take appeal to the universal language, judgments, and actions of men, even to those very philosophical discussions which have striven to destroy it. The obstinacy with which the notion of liberty returns again and again for consideration, after all destructive analysis, shows the original, native character of the idea.

A further intuition, qualifying the mind for apprehension, is that of the infinite. This is not to be confounded with the indefinite. Many things are to the mind indefinitely small, or indefinitely great, beyond its measurement; they do not thereby become infinite. The universe, in the number of its suns and satellites, may utterly elude the mind's grasp, and yet remain as strictly finite as if composed of a single system. Space, on the other hand, in which the universe is contained, from the nature of the idea, eludes, not merely actual measurement, but the very notion of bounds and limits. The indefinite arises from the embarrassed action of the mind, its inability to apply its numerical measurements, and bring its processes to a precise conclusion. The mind soon begins to waver in its conception as the variety and number of the objects presented increase, and, though seemingly borne a long way on by numbers, it is yet reminded how indefinite is the idea back of these abstract symbols. When at length these fail it, confused by unmeasured magnitude, there is left the impression of an object indefinable in its greatness. There is nothing to preclude its division or multiplication; but, in either case, it is equally beyond the mind's grasp.

This confusion of the mind's action occurs in the handling of indefinitely small as of indefinitely large objects. There is no assignable limit to subdivision. A point without breadth can impart no breadth by its multiplication; but a point of any conceivable breadth may be subdivided, as the

mind knows no limit to this process any more than to the reverse one of multiplication. Thus by the indefinite application of these two processes, to which all material existence is subject, there arise, above and below, evanishing points, beyond which the mind can no longer distinctly manage its own action, or handle the subject-matter. These points of vague apprehension, attended as they are with the conviction that the same steps by which we reach them should bear us further, arise as the unavoidable limits of restricted mental vision. The sight of the eye cannot start from the centre of its own retina, nor yet pass the misty horizon. Only intermediate spaces are traversed by it. Even so low a sense as that of smell handles matter, so to speak, in a more subtile form than can the mind. Instruments reach an estimate so nice as to elude the conception and make the senses waver. That we cannot reach the atom which God actually takes in making a universe, arises merely from feebleness of perception.

The infinite, on the other hand, is a wholly separate idea, set over against the finite, whether definite or indefinite, measured or unmeasured, and is reached at once, aside from all aggregation. The infinite is incapable of increase or diminution, equally beyond division or duplication. Space cannot be bisected. Extend the dividing plane as you will, it must lie wholly within space. It is without a periphery, without a centre, without relation of parts. Absolutely homogeneous and unlimited, it cannot be made the object of any discriminating, separating assertion. We can subtract nothing from it, as this process would suppose it capable of diminution, and open to a remainder. Remaining void of things, it is a void to thought. All our affirmations must pertain to centres or to limits established within it by creation or by thought. The notion of the infinite often first arises in connection with space; here is one of its earlier applications. The consideration of the universe forces the conception on the mind; but it may spring up at any moment in connection with most finite objects.

The instant the mind seeks a judgment, an explanation under this category, the appropriate regulative idea is present.

The notion of the infinite also accompanies that of time. Time forever anticipates the event, anticipates the thought. Push backward or forward, as we will, we approach no barrier. The idea, indeed, here receives a new modification. It is reached in regression and progression alone, for these are the only directions in which time, from its very nature, suffers the application. Time is sometimes said to be bisected by each moment, divided into two parts, each infinite. This use of the term is not correct. The infinite involves the removal of bounds not in one direction, but in all directions in which the subject under consideration is capable of receiving them. Time future and time past are not infinite. Each starts from a bound, and though it runs to no farther goal, it yields but one of the needed constituents of the strictly infinite.

Infinite power includes every degree and variety of power, not that all measurable degrees and varieties exhaust the infinite, but that all lie within it. Many things are not subjects of power. Whether infinite or finite, it has no relation to them. A test irrelevant to the idea is involved in the demand that infinite power shall modify either the axioms of mathematics or morals. These arise under independent ideas, which condition all the manifestations of power, themselves unconditioned.

The idea of the infinite as applied to power includes that of the absolute. Infinite power is unrestricted power. Power in the material world is restricted in two directions, by that on which it acts, by that from which it is received. It is single in kind, finite in degree, and affected by the reaction of that which suffers it. Infinite power, on the other hand, remains unexhausted, unmodified by any form of action, and is conditioned to no particular effect. It is absolved from all dependence, and equally from all reaction. Infinite power comes forth from nothing earlier or fuller

than itself; gives rise to nothing which can displace or diminish itself. It is the compass of all things; allows nothing behind, before, aside from itself in any way to modify its action. The infinite, thus receiving no action, and suffering no reaction, is the absolute.

A cause and a first cause are notions quite distinct. The one cannot be reached through the other. The second overlooks the essential idea of the first. A cause is also an effect implying the existence of a prior cause. It is a link in a chain, and that an endless chain, till some other notion intervenes to sever and terminate it. A cause is of necessity finite as it follows a prior cause, and gives way to a subsequent effect. A first cause, on the other hand, must be infinite. If finite, it is dependent, and no first cause. If it is a first cause, it is independent, absolute, infinite. A first cause is an unfortunate expression. On neither side is there any analogy between it and a cause. It is no more conditioned to a consequent than to an antecedent. It is wholly a distinct idea involved in that of the infinite. Forgetfulness of this often leads to a fallacious statement of the *a posteriori* argument for the existence of God. A totally unwarranted leap is made from a cause to a first cause. The one idea is made to displace the other without marking the fact or rendering a reason for it.

The notion of the infinite arises later than our other intuitive ideas, and finds its occasion in the efforts of the mind to comprehend the phenomena about it. No longer content with the details of explanation, it proposes to itself the problem of the origin and relation of all things, and therein transcends the finite, and rests in the infinite. The mind may travel a weary way through satellites, suns, and systems, but at length it transcends all, encloses all in the blank stretches of unlimited space. Thus with the forces and causes of the world, it brings them forth from, and returns them to, the infinite force of God. So, and so only, can the mind of man comprehend the universe, and rest at the goal of thought. The idea of an Infinite One is as

necessary for the comprehension of the finite workmanship about us, as is the idea of a cause for the explanation of a given effect. The mind's action is the same in kind, and equally just in transcending the finite and contained, in search of the Infinite and Uncontained, as in pressing back of each event in pursuit of a cause. The two processes are distinct, though analogous, and each valid by its own intrinsic necessity.

The infinite, from its very nature exclusive of those judgments formed under minor regulative ideas, admits but qualified, positive assertion, and is chiefly treated through negative judgments. Does it follow thence that the very idea itself is negative? and that, however constrained the mind may be to accept the notion, the whole conception is to it, not merely an inadequate, but a delusive symbol?

If the notion be simply negative, then, as a distinct intuition, it falls away and becomes merely a blank, set in thought over against the real, the finite — the empty margin wherewith we limit the page of knowledge. The idea of non-existence is the complement of the idea of existence. Neither is intelligible without the other; each is the bound of the other, and both, as implicitly contained each of each, are but counter statements under one notion.

Do the finite and the infinite stand in this relation? Is the one idea by immediate implication already in the other? Contradictories, though they may explain, do not necessarily contain each other. The notion of black is not given in that of white; nor of sour in that of sweet; nor of discord in that of harmony; nor of foul in that of fragrant.

The affirmative or negative forms of propositions do not affect the elements of which they are composed — the matter, the concepts of the thought remain the same; the predicate and subject remain identical in their constituents, the connection between them only being reversed. Every affirmative judgment implies the possibility of a corresponding negative one, at least, so far as the forms of thought are concerned. No more or different ideas are requisite

for a negative statement than for the correlative affirmative one. There is no new notion, but merely a new connection in a negative word or copulative.

Not thus is it with opposite or contradictory ideas. These are each positive and distinct, though the supplements of each other. The same sense prepares us for the perception of discord as of harmony; yet it might stop short with either of them, and the other remain a distinct sensation to be experienced when the one has been given. Thus is it with the contradictory ideas of vice and virtue. The same intuition renders them both, and one quickly follows the other, but is not its mere negation. An act that is not vicious is not therefore virtuous; nor an act that wants virtue of necessity vicious. Because two ideas exclude each other in express contradiction, it does not follow that one is the mere absence of the other.

Negative prefixes often express much more than simple denial. In the word "non-existence" we have a purely negative concept. By its application the thought is vacated; the notion of existence previously attached to some object is removed. This is all that a strictly negative judgment can do. It puts nothing in the place of the cancelled conception, and leaves the mind occupied only with a naked denial. Many negative concepts do much more than this. The words "unholy," "unmerciful," "impure," convey postive notions, though under a negative expression.

Nor is this less true when the affirmative and negative expressions divide between them all objects to which they apply. Material and immaterial are words of this kind; they are equivalent to material and spiritual. The word immateriality, as much implies the presence of spirituality, as the absence of corporeity. So also is it, in the reverse form, with the word "inanimate." It is not, therefore, to be concluded from the negative form of a word that the concept it covers is not positive.

These remarks are applicable to the words "finite" and "infinite," terms expressive of distinct contradictory ideas.

A denial of all finite forms of existence, serves merely to sweep these away, and puts nothing in their place. No new idea is in this way reached; we have simply set over against existence, non-existence; a negation of precisely the same breadth as the previous existence.

If we take the term "finite" as already established in the mind, it may be said that this involves the infinite. Equally does the infinite include the finite. In the genesis of ideas, there is nothing in the nature of the case which makes either of these ideas the necessary antecedent of the other. As correlatives, they lie co-ordinate in the mind, — they indifferently give rise the one to the other. Right and wrong, father and son, cause and effect, are examples of correlative yet distinct ideas. Either conception expressed in these couplets being present, the occasion and limitation of its fellow are also present. We know a thing as finite because we are capable of the idea of the infinite, as we entertain the notion of effect through our idea of cause. Finite things may be apprehended without recognizing them as finite, and to do this implies a mind therein open to the supplementary notion of the infinite.

The infinite is not so much opposed to any one finite thing as to the sum of all finite things — the finite, and this finite the mind has never by observation or exhaustive conception taken in. It has reached it, as it has reached the infinite, at a leap. Some things definite, many more indefinite, and the whole indefinitely large, is all that experience can give. But this indefiniteness in which the labor of observation is lost, swallowed up, is not to be confounded with the infinite, but is only the unmeasured element contained in the finite, the field of experience. The finite and infinite, as true correlative ideas, exist in the mind as notions contradictory, but equally positive and real, reached by an immediate, an intuitive power. We might as well derive the notion of wrong from an observation of facts, and make the right its negation, as to abstract finiteness from finite things, and make the infinite its denial. In each

case the two correlative ideas stand forth together in the same light.

The ground now passed over is this: Simple negation merely removes the notion present: negative concepts are frequently affirmative in matter; contradictory and correlative ideas are more than the negation one of the other, each is equally positive, and neither is independent; the finite and the infinite are correlatives each involving the other, and neither reached by observation; the definite and the indefinite alone are the products of experience; the finite and the infinite are the results of intuition.

That the infinite is a positive, though inexplicable notion, is also shown in the very manner in which we deny of it exposition. The finite and the not-finite do not simply mean the finite and vacuity, nonentity, but the finite and the only remaining form of existence, the infinite. If the infinite, the not-finite, were mere vacuity, the idea would be just as plain and explicable as that of the existing finite. A negative predication would as fully compass the one thought as a positive the other. Non-existence is surely as intelligible as existence, nothing as comprehensible as something, and if the idea of the infinite were allied to these, all difficulties would disappear. When, however, we deny all finite relations of the infinite, we do it, not as compassing the idea by these negatives, but as excluding that which is impertinent and contradictory; the notion itself is still left unsearched out. If, however, we have no idea of the infinite, how can this be? How can we deny anything of it? Our denials are not those of non-existence. They must, therefore, be those of non-agreement; but these can not be made without some notion of that to which they appertain. In disclaiming an attribute or concomitant we imply some knowledge of that to which it is affirmed to be irrelevant. If, then, the infinite is a mystery, it is therein more than a negation, and if a positive idea, we can deny nothing of it without some intuition of its nature.

Nor should this relation of our intuitions to our other

forms of knowledge any longer perplex us, since it again and again recurs, and we successively establish these notions by denying of them the explanations so assiduously forced upon them.

It is not true that no affirmative statements can be made of the infinite. It is nearer the truth that no other idea will receive and respond to so much investigation; suffer without exhaustion so much explanation. No judgment can, indeed, stretch entirely across the infinite, or perfectly expound it, in any direction whatsoever; but this does not prevent the notion becoming fuller, ampler, more profound, every day, as our knowledge expands within it.

If the mind were really unable to know of the infinite, to form in this direction positive and instructive, though restricted ideas, it would be in vain that the fulness of infinite attributes, that God, should be revealed either in work or word. Revelation would be completely and hopelessly impossible, since neither the whole nor any part of that whole could be given. It serves no purpose to urge that all representations of God are admittedly anthropomorpheous. On this supposition of the unintelligibility of the infinite, they are not only insufficient and partial in form, they are false in essence: they convey no truth, and open up no path of light. They are not great truths partially stated, but notions whose confusion alone disguises to man's weak eye their falseness.

Equally invalid is the position of those who urge that our symbols of the infinite are all illusory, and yet that we are compelled ever to shift, to correct, enlarge, and deepen them. Whence this compulsion? We cannot discover the fallacy or partiality of a notion, back of which there is no fact or knowledge whatever. It matters not what may be the poetic idea of a fawn or of a griffin. There is no reason why it should be changed, since it is a fictitious, arbitrary idea, and therefore suffers no modification by any investigation or progress of thought. If man's idea of the infinite — substituting for the abstract quality its great embodiment

— casts off successively this and that statement as too partial, in this there is revealed a guiding knowledge under which the process goes on. Fancies, aside from all principle, suffer no such growth, much less compel it.

Why is any symbol of the absolute deemed false? why are successive conceptions exploded with much subtilty of reasoning, if after all there is no positive notion of the absolute? Such a fact would render this criticism not merely invalid, but absurd. We cannot expose a given idea of the infinite as invalid, and at the same time say that we have no idea of the infinite, any more than we can affirm in the same breath this is not a just notion of a griffin; there is no notion of a griffin. The destructive, not less than the creative, movement involves the validity of the idea.

Nor do we escape by making the infinite the object of faith simply. There is no province of faith removed in its objects wholly beyond apprehension. This in some measure must precede belief. Our intuitions must furnish faith an object, otherwise it finds nothing on which to lean. Faith is, indeed, broader than explanation, since all objects of intuition do not admit of logical development; yet it is not, therefore, broader than apprehension, than proof, than that for whose existence and character we have the legitimate and established testimony of our faculties. Faith does not blindly dredge for its objects at invisible depths, able with irrational instinct to anticipate the mind, and dispense with its light. If the infinite is lost to the reason, it is lost to faith also. We can have no revelation, either natural or supernatural, since we have now no power to receive it, and not being intellectually received it cannot be religiously rested on. We cannot believe on Him of whom we have not heard.

Revelation presupposes the possibility of at least a modified presentation and apprehension of God and his attributes. Without this it is a nullity as much to the heart of man as to his intellect. It deludes with unsubstantial types and visionary symbols. Revelation and nature alike antic-

ipate and prepare the way for an inquiry into the infinite, and therefore presuppose it to be valid. This search must, indeed, be subject to the limitation of all reasoning. The logical expansion of one element must not be suffered to overpass the bounds of another. The regulative idea under which the inquiry proceeds must remain entire, sheltered from a ruthless and blind logic, ever struggling to transcend its own conditions.

It may be said, if it is granted that there can be no revelation without a valid idea of the infinite, we do not by this necessity show the idea to be possible. Is there not, however, proof of the presence of the idea in the fact that, when men have, as they imagine, logically banished it, they seek instantly to restore it. Chase the notion as often and as far as you will, it instantly returns, and the discussion reopens to-morrow with all the zest of to-day. Herein is seen the necessary and universal character of the idea, that seven times confuted, it is unconfuted still. So was it with right and liberty. The pertinacity of ideas which criticism presupposes, and destroys only to restore, shows that they have the criteria of rational intuitions, and stand attested in the rank of essential truths. It is the gleam we have caught of their real nature which gives them this power.

The criticism which annuls the idea of the infinite, overlooks its very nature,—that it cannot be expounded within relations, as those of space or time, beyond and above which it was in the beginning placed. The notion of the absolute cannot afterward be embarrassed by the dependencies of cause and effect, since confessedly it is beyond these. Our philosophy, no less than our religion, has accepted the fact, that there is no likeness of God in the heaven above, or the earth beneath, or the waters under the earth. Let it not, therefore, forget this concession, and struggle to unfold a truly transcendent idea under the necessary and limited relations imposed by the ideas of time, space, cause, or finite things.

But it is said, admittedly, then you cannot conceive the

Infinite, cannot know Him. We cannot conceive Him, we can know Him. The two words carefully employed are not co-extensive. The one implies explanation, construction; the other may mean simple apprehension, naked intuition. This direct knowing, independent of all exposition is the knowledge claimed of the Infinite. It is no refutation to affirm that He is not known logically in relations and resemblances, for this is not asserted. The denial must go further, and show that we have no inexplicable, intuitive ideas, or, at least, that this is not one of them. The word "force" brings a notion to the mind which it is impossible to conceive, to imagine, and, in this limited sense, to know. To deny in all such cases knowledge, any valid knowing, throws us at once back on a new philosophy, and sets aside the highest faculty in our triple intellectual constitution.

Cut off from a conception of God, are we cut off from an increasing knowledge of God? We answer, No. We may expand and multiply the attributes bound up in the Infinite, while at the same time we remove the restrictions, the dependences, the finite forms of each of them. Investigation thus enlarges without destroying our idea. While the infinite rejects the finite, brought forward as a measure, it contains it as a fact. Infinite space not only lies about, but stretches through, the universe, and in the magnitude of thought grows with our knowledge of the latter. Infinite power is inclusive of all forms and degrees of finite power, as infinite goodness contains in its full span all human virtue. While a part does not contain the whole, nor a limited section express the curve, they each labor on, under and toward the complete idea, and are only occasions of error when we expound the whole by them. The infinite is the inexhaustible field of thought, the ultimate comprehending idea, itself incapable of comprehension. On this condition alone does it perform its office, that we know of it as certainly as we know it not, — that we know all as within it, nothing as measuring it.

That the reason gives us positive yet inexplicable ideas

may also be urged from the difficulties which spring from every other statement. If we claim that all knowledge is subject to the laws of logical comprehension, that there is nothing in consciousness which is not there to be apprehended, through distinction, relation, succession, there remains to us but one of two alternatives. We may strive to think of the infinite as subject to these conditions, and thereby cancel the notion; or we may deny that the infinite is a subject of knowledge, and thus reach the same result.

Having done this, we shall endeavor in vain to regain our ground through faith. Nothing must remain nothing, for the one set of faculties as much as for the other; or we must impart to feeling the power of perceiving, and thus open up a new intellectual department. Says an eminent author, struggling with these difficulties: "The contradiction which is utterly inexplicable on the ground that the infinite is a positive object of human thought, is at once accounted for when it is regarded as the mere negation of thought." Again: "The infinite from a human point of view is merely a name for the absence of those conditions under which thought is possible." Yet, before the lecture in which these passages are contained is completed, he is constrained to affirm: "It is our duty to believe that God is infinite." Can this be our duty, if the only idea we attach to the word "infinite" is negative, absence, nothingness? Philosophy has suffered much embarrassment from supposed axioms too quickly taken. We cannot grant the postulate, that all apprehension is logical in its form. The word "omnipresence" is not a blank, a mere idle counter, though in striving to expound the idea, we find it an enigma, fruitful of contradictions.

The perplexities which skirt the margin of thought, hemming it in with impassable shore-lines, have been supposed to arise from the subjective laws of mind, from forms of thinking more limited than the objective matter of thought. The mind is thus regarded as trammeled by its own inherent limitations, as reaching outlooks over ground not

its own, through its straitened forms of comprehension. This insolubility seems rather to arise from the nature of things. So far as explanation is applicable, it may, and does, slowly proceed. There is no barrier cutting off comprehensible matter from logical solution. So far as we know at all, we know truly. Our faculties render things as they are, logical or extra-logical, conceivable or apprehensible, and there is a distinction in faculties because there is a prior distinction in the matter furnished to their action.

The idea of the infinite, then, though positive and inclusive, does not admit of that complete and comprehensive statement which constitutes science. We cannot find out the Almighty to perfection. The formula for our best assertion here is: This and something more. He who at last eliminates the unknown element from the equation, fails in the very fulness of his labor, banishes the idea whose measure he has striven to take, and becomes the victim of his too bold and eager thought.

The idea conditional of mental existence is consciousness; those ideas conditional of mental action are beauty, right, and liberty; while the notion inclusive of all things, bringing its explanation to all, is that of the infinite.

We here close the list of regulative ideas. We have discussed them with large and unwilling omissions, and consequently with a fulness at single points that may seem disproportionate. It remains to point out their relation to knowledge.

Some of the intuitions themselves suffer such expansion, can by definitions and axioms be so deductively unfolded, as to be the sources of sciences strictly demonstrative. Geometry and logic afford the best illustrations. These sciences arise under the notions of space and agreement respectively, and independently of experience furnish a series of conclusions involved in the very nature of the premises. Here are found our most complete and peculiar forms of knowledge, giving most exclusive and unrestricted

play to our logical faculties, and least of all casting light on the methods of inquiry in other departments.

The presence and action of thought in matter alone renders it the subject of thought, apprehensible by mind, inviting and rewarding study. Mere physical existence under certain phenomena may furnish material for sensation, while the notions of existence, space, and consciousness are requisite to transform this sensation into a rational perception. Something is somewhere perceived; each distinct part of the sentence arises under a new regulative idea. But simple, single perception is a mere starting-point, and gives no movement to mind. This is reached only through a perception of diverse and changing things, involving the two new ideas of number and time. But mere change is as meaningless as mere existence, exhibits no action of thought, and furnishes no subject of apprehension. Something more is necessary to arrest thought. This must be furnished by arrangement, — the introduction of some principle of order among the phenomena, either as observed in space or in time. It may be that of resemblance, or of cause and effect. Without the first of these there is no work of mind in matter; no power in mind to apprehend the unordered properties and relations of matter, brought into the harmony of no plan.

Definite arrangements in space or in time are recognizable results of thought, and afford a basis for inquiry, either backward for the cause, or forward for the object or end. A distinct result implies a distinct force; that which is orderless may be referred to accident, but that which begins to show an idea demands a determinate law in the forces at work. The mind, therefore, is at once arrested by order, because of the inference involved in it of defining force. This is equally true whether the product be a sphere, a crystal, a plant, or an animal. There is in each of these the indication of a distinct specific cause, and this clue of thought the mind can take up.

But a limited order may be the result of accidental con-

ditions. A stream may, in the eddy of a jutting point, pierce its bed of limestone with a cylinder, and wear into spheres the included pebbles. This action the mind discerns, yet finds it removed but one step from the list of fortuities, because of the fortuitous character of the cause. A world full of such half-accidental, half-causal products, like the grotesque results of crowding, heaving ice, or drifting snows, might yield a transient interest, but could afford little food for thought, since its conditions are lost almost as soon as found. There is no permanence of causation, no series, no connection of forces. Such events are thrums cut from the weaver's pattern; the inch-long yarns may be plucked one by one, but they lead to nothing.

The order, then, through which the world in all its parts becomes the subject of apprehension, is that instituted in the line of definite, enduring forces. Without such forces there can be, I will not say no order, but no complete returning order; no results repeating themselves in a coherent plan. The very idea of accident implies the existence of order. If all things are fortuitous, the word "fortuity" has no application, since the idea of design to which we oppose it has nothing anywhere answering to it. If there is no light, there can be no state known as darkness. An accidental event is not one without a cause, but one not designed through its cause. Permanent causes must be before we can have accidents; that is, an undesigned result of their action. So, too, the one notion implies the presence of the other in the mind.

But the permanent forces securing order — an order which can only show itself in those resemblances of things and agreements of action by which we understand the world — must include design. Otherwise, our notion of cause and effect is not met. The cause must be commensurate with the effect, or it is no adequate, that is, no cause. Now, the effect includes permanent, recognizable order, design; hence the force through which it is reached must contain the same element, design. Thought is the exclusive

phenomenon of mind, and to make matter contain it without the ministration of mind is to reject the very rudiments of knowledge — the distinction of one thing from others by its diverse powers.

Thought understands only what thought has done. If there is no work of thought in the world, there is no thought to be evolved from it, nothing to be understood in it. It can at best be only a chance field of striking and grotesque disorder, seeming occasionally to mimic a work it never reaches. To eliminate plan, order, from the cause, and yet to seek it in the results, is contradictory to a necessary idea.

If, then, the mind begins to understand the world only through order; if it can proceed only through extended and permanent order, shown in the agreement, concurrence and dependence of phenomena; if these connections are those of thought, it is evident that the world is fully apprehended only through the idea of causes — causes working toward an end, and therefore rationally. Resemblances are the steps through which the mind discerns the presence of a self-consistent force, the progress of matter toward order. In themselves they are of secondary importance, except as they interpret this ultimate plan — reveal the existence and nature of causes, and the lines of action in which they lie.

It is not an irrational, but a rational cause whose action provides the conditions of science. The fall of a tree, as it crushes its way through its fellows, produces a variety of effects, but no order, no science, while the action of the vital force in its trunk did both. But if reason is wrought into, belongs to, all the forces which give science, then science involves the same inquiries which reason makes. For what end? and, By what means? In these two directions of first and final causes investigation must proceed, and at these two ultimately transcend the physical world.

The steps through which the mind, with slow and regular

approaches, reaches and pushes to a complete answer these two inquiries, the ends for which and the means by which all order is secured, are many and laborious, affording numerous solutions of intermediate problems, and rewarding inquiry with a constant increase of power. Progress toward a full and ultimate answer to these questions which are ever drawing, ever impelling the mind onward, is effected through a careful study of resemblances, the establishment of agreements in properties and forces, by which their nature and dependence are defined. These pursuits, aside from their relation to further knowledge, give scope to the reasoning faculties, disclosing that rational element which makes the world first a subject of thought, and afterward an object of influence. Yet, let it be remembered, none of these minor efforts of knowledge, by which facts are discovered and classified, would be entered on, were it not that, from beginning to end, there is implied, in each new resemblance brought to light, each fact of order disclosed, the presence of a harmonizing, and, as harmony is the result of thought, thoughtful power, the nature and extent of whose action the mind takes pleasure in tracing. Mind inquires into the action of mind, into orderly forces, and into these alone, and agreement which is accidental and transient soon ceases to give pleasure. Though the inquiries latent in the mind in the outset are often those answered last, they are constantly present to lend satisfaction to each step, and impel to the next. The mind does not rest on simple resemblances; it wishes to know their causal ground, and it is only because this inquiry is suggested by them, that it takes any more scientific pleasure in agreements than disagreements, in a defined effect than in a fortuitous circumstance. All that opens up a deeper connection, that bears the mind a step further back, is pleasurable. Here the eager eye directs itself.

The facts of the world being scientifically, that is, fully and accurately known, we have therein reached and defined those causes which realize this order. Order is

sought into only as a product containing thought — containing causes to be revealed by it.

But the mind, unable to rest in a mere series of causal connections — a manifold and multiplied effect; an ever increasing premise; a growing argument not yet discharged in a conclusion — seeks under the new notion of the infinite, the absolute, to issue all, and start all, in an intuition of the reason. This is a valid beginning; for the mind must begin, if it begins at all, in its own intuitions, its own axioms. Physical inquiry, having united all phenomena in the laws of a universe, is impelled by the same impulse which has pushed it thus far, to reach, under a new regulative idea, that absolute whose action it has thus far traced. So fully do the natural sciences rest on connections rationally apprehended, that, pausing in the one direction with the absolute, they push on in the opposite direction with the inquiry: Why this concurrence; toward what ulterior end is mind herein working? In answering this question, we transcend the physical and pass into the moral, and agents which were seen to issue from a rational source are seen to return and issue in it. Thus on either side, above and below, events spring from mind for mind; they go forth of purpose to a purpose, and man rests in this their double reference.

A universe spans the chasm between first and final causes, stretching from abutment to abutment, and feeling, through every connection backward and forward, the support of each. The word of God returns to him, but not void.

The regulative ideas previously given are eleven: six of these are involved in the apprehension of physical phenomena; four in mental phenomena, while one, the infinite, is necessary for the ultimate explanation and reference of both. The ideas of existence, number, space, and time are conditional to physical phonomena, with or without order, chaotic or cast into a universe. No external confusion, if in any measure apprehensible, can dispense with these ideas.

Resemblance and cause are the two ideas under which disorder passes into order. Here all the scientific connections of the physical world express themselves. The mind may, indeed, prior to all inquiry into facts, analyze its own ideas, may unfold from the intuition of space the minor intuitions of geometry. This, however, is only to increase the volume and solvent power of the original idea; to bring forth the mind's instrumental furniture wherewith it starts in the estimation and measurement of facts. This work still remains, and is only complete when we understand the agreement of phenomena through the forces at work.

We wish now to mark more fully the progress and completion of scientific thought in the physical world, that we may see the order and limit of knowledge, and the faculties disciplined. The observation of resemblances, and the fixing of these in common nouns, is a first step of thought, and of language, its inseparable instrument. Language, the condition and medium of the mind's action, fails from the outset to be scientific, because of the accidental nature of many of the resemblances which it marks, and because these have no accurate and uniform relation to each other. Its first distinctions originate in immediate convenience, not in the demands of thought. The resemblances which best meet the purposes of science are those which are most broad and permanent. Except as we find differences and agreements, radical and lasting, there is no opportunity for classification; for these when defined in reference to each other are its basis. Those differences are most important which are most deeply and intimately connected with the nature of the object. Color, even when unchanging, is felt to be of little importance, because so slightly indicative of controlling forces. The mind seeks after the more enduring resemblances, as these indicate the distinct, abiding nature of the causes at work. Those resemblances which measure and define force are chiefly desired. The forms of flowers, as nearer the vital force, advance us much beyond their

color. We neglect the last and pursue the first on account of their deeper connection with causes. To complete our work, however, we must know all points of permanent agreement, since these jointly define the common force which occasions them.

It is not the mere resemblance, but resemblance springing from similarity of forces, that the mind accepts as a step in the progress of thought. The pebble, the child's ball, and the rain-drops are round, but the fact affords no interest to the mind, since the form in each case is due to a distinct, disconnected cause. The rain-drop and the earth are spherical, and we note the fact with profit as indicating identity of action in the cohesive power. We establish an agreement between plants through the spiral arrangement of the leaves, but not between the cochlea of the ear and the shell on the ground of similar convolutions; nor between the coil of smoke and that of the vine.

Resemblances, then, are of scientific importance in proportion as they involve the agreement or identity of forces; those which do not imply this are rejected; those which do are sought out; and thought passes from the resemblances of things, of effects, to the nature and agreement of causes. By the word "agreement" we mark the harmony of forces, as opposed to the resemblance of things.

Each inorganic thing may be regarded as a storehouse of permanent forces or properties. We inquire into things for the practical reason that we may know what can done with them—what forces, mechanical or chemical, are at our disposal; for the scientific reason that we may know what is done by them, how they act as the recipients or the sources of force in the order about us, and how this order has come down to them, and is to be transmitted through them.

We often look upon a finished work, a completed thing, as the quiescence, the repose, of force. We ought rather to regard it as the balance of active forces, a balance constantly liable to disturbance, and hence to new phenomena.

The inorganic world is the storehouse of the more stationary powers — is relatively in stable equilibrium. We come, therefore, to oppose things to forces, as if the first were wholly inert, the second alone active. It is evident, however, that we are only interested in things on account of the peculiar nature of the forces of which they are either the source or the medium. Science wishes to know the smallest number of elements into which the physical world can be resolved; that is, things which possess underived, original properties or powers. Therein are the materials of creation. It is evident that the inquiry into things is not a blind satisfaction of knowing, no matter what is known. If this were the case, the mind would take pleasure in the delineation of each pebble on the beach, each leaf in the forest, each cloud in the heavens. Individual differences have little interest for the mind, and specific agreements occupy it, because the last define the force productive of a common result, while the first only yield the traces of transient causes. Classification, then, throughout the inorganic world, inquires into the nature of things, into those properties which mark the permanent forces lodged in them, enabling them to contribute to the order of the world.

This is yet more manifest in organic, in living products. Here is present a force whose very existence can often be maintained only by exertion. Equilibrium may be found in the germ, but this broken, the forces of life press on through an orbit of growth, or, failing of this, perish. While, therefore, there are moments of rest, that is, of balanced action, organic products retain their character chiefly through the exertion of a power that impels them through a series of changes, perfect suspension being, as in mechanics, the loss of force.

The resemblances, then, by which organic products are classified must extend to a series of phenomena, since thus only can the power at work be defined. The identity of living forces is sought, and all that reveals this is of value.

We are not dealing with resemblances for their own sakes, but for the agreement of forces which they indicate. The fronds of frost on a window-pane and ferns in a forest afford a resemblance, but one of no moment so long as we discover no identity of forces. Species afford the radical division of organic products, because they rest on an identity of vital force, an inherent difference.

When we pass from things to the laws which arise from their mutual dependence — which are the result of their several properties acting with and upon each other, we plainly deal only with forces. Attraction, under its two forms of gravitation and cohesion — the condition of all mechanical force, — arises from no resemblance between things, but itself constitutes the fundamental agreement in all ponderable matter; that is, all matter. Substances agree in exerting this force, and so interlock themselves in the symmetry of a universe. This agreement furnishes through weight a steady unit, and reduces to the mathematical accuracy of its own action all exertion of strength. So, also, it defines the proportions under which chemical elements unite in compounds. Here investigation pertains to a force identical in all its relations, and thus able to introduce order into mechanical and chemical phenomena. So is it in all physical inquiry seeking into the laws of dependence; these arise amid the diversity of things, through the steady harmony of the forces exerted, and this harmony discovered in its extent and manner is science. Whether mechanical, chemical, or vital phenomena are under consideration, all changes are sought into, as impressed on them through some form of force, producing a change of place or of nature, or of both, in satisfaction of a definite end. We overlook all things in our investigations which are not the agents of definite forces which they serve to reveal. The world is understood, but it can only be understood through permanent forces. There can be no law of change even, without identity in the properties of things through which it is wrought. Permanent things indicate

permanent forces, and permanent forces alone can give rise to law. All that is fixed in the effect is fixed in the cause; and if there is fluctuation in the forces at work there must be confusion in the result. The permanent laws of the inorganic world are the results of equally permanent properties; nor can a kindred distinctness and stability in the organic world rest on any other basis. If forces are here in a continual flux, nothing but disorder can arise from them.

All physical science, then, issues in cause and effect. A classification of effects is a classification of causes, and this measurement of causes expounds the order of phenomena. The mind is satisfied, as it is able to unite the present to its past causes and future effects, and see the relation by which it is interlocked in the chain of events. Geology may push this inquiry indefinitely backward, but it rests everywhere on the same relation of causes, unfolds everywhere causal dependence — the only dependence of things.

No cause, as a cause merely, is apprehensible. Explanation consists in referring it to a further cause; that is, in resolving it into an effect. Effects are the visible manifestations of causes, and these last are intelligible only as they pass into intelligent effects. The mind cannot reach or measure them prior to all results. Such an act of measurement, if possible, would only be an estimate of the latent effects yet hidden in them. We test the power of muscle only when it pulls on the spring, or of steam as it presses the piston-head. In acts like these, causes first become sensible — subjects of experience. Force is phenomenal, and therefore an object of perception, not of intuition. It comes under the idea of cause, but is not itself given or defined by that idea. To suppose that actual force is intuitively reached would imply that the subject-matter of an idea is given in the idea, and would dispense with the necessity of experience. Even an ideal force can be reached only through certain ideal effects, which it is supposed to be able to accomplish.

Since we conceive and measure causes through effects alone, the more simple and apprehensible these are, the more obvious seems the cause. Thus accurately measuring the result of mechanical power, we seem perfectly and intuitively to comprehend it; we seem to anticipate that two forces when combined should reach the same result that would be secured by their separate action. This clearness, however, arises from the simple, definite character of the effects; measuring causes by effects, we transfer the apprehensible nature of the one to the other. If, on impact, the body receiving the blow uniformly moved at right angles to the line of action in the body bestowing it, this fact would give a nature to force, and, adjusting the idea to the results, we should be conscious of no absurdity.

The facility with which we understand mechanical action may be the source of mischief when we pass to more complex problems. Chemical effects are so diverse from mechanical ones that we cannot at once attribute them to simple force, productive of change in place. Yet we are tempted to regard such an explanation as the only complete one. The mind accepts with reluctance the notion of a new force as indicated by new phenomena, and struggles to explain them under the old idea. The same tendency recurs in passing to organic products. We strive to force on the phenomena, novel in their forms, the explanations derived from mechanical or from chemical power. We are slow to receive a new cause as revealed in new results. This desire for simplicity, while it is in part a just scientific tendency, arises also in part from ignorance, from the feeling that what is known must be the measure and type of that remains to be known — from the superior conviction all that attaches to mere familiarity. Thus the mind with difficulty unites to the word "force" any other than its primary, mechanical idea, and would fain explain fragrance in the rose, sweetness in the orange, thought in the brain, under the analogy of the power that drives a ball from point to point.

As, however, we never understand causes, it would seem that we should separate and define them solely through their effects, and as long as these remain irresolvable into each other, the same diversity should be attributed to the forces from which they arise. Many errors must spring from an effort to press the new under the old. It is the temptation, not only of indolence, but of that deductive power which shows its ingenuity in reaching the broadest conclusions from the most limited premises. If every new thing were diverse, then no explanation would be possible, nor is it any more called for if each new thing is identical in its forces with the old, and there is nothing diverse. For the most limited explanation, we must have diversity of application in the same force; for fuller combination and comprehension, diversity of forces. Complexity cannot arise from absolute simplicity.

Having no intuitive knowledge of causes, we can wisely define them only through an inquiry into effects. Any conjectural treatment, except as tested by these, is altogether unsafe. The first faculties called into play by science are those of observation, seeking a complete classification of things and events, and interpreting through them causes and causal connections Induction precedes deduction. A hasty and sweeping deduction is attractive, but exceedingly insecure. The precise character of the phenomena and their extent being settled, we have the existence and the nature of the cause. Deduction may now trace the results of an established force through the field of its action, and thus realize the advance which was virtually made in the previous steps. Nothing but observation itself can lay down the laws of safe induction, and in each case tell us when we have so far analyzed results and reached agreeing phenomena as to be able to refer them to one force.

The powers which science first disciplines are those of observation, by which we seek permanent agreements, and define intrinsic character and qualities. Coincidently and

later it trains those reasoning powers by which we expand our laws and harvest our conclusions. Minds of great logical power, and the consequent aptitude of expansion, delight in the deductive process, and prematurely enter upon it. This tendency may also be increased by the safe and rapid conclusions of pure mathematics. The mind, unfolding from a few axioms and definitions the wealth of geometric problems, and finding its progress safe and prosperous, wishes to move with the same royal stride through the physical sciences. Such labor results in vortices, pre-established harmonies, antagonistic forces, and the magnificent machinery of a creation strictly subjective.

Observation, on the other hand, is well-nigh impotent without the anticipatory theory, the guiding idea, the completing deduction. Observation and reflection are only fruitful as wedded. Like negative and positive poles, they must create and maintain each other; either will be dissipated as the other is lost. We observe resemblances, we reflect upon, or to, causes. The circle of mental action is complete when we have passed from agreements to causes — woven the material furnished by observation into a complete and firm fabric under the swift shuttle of thought.

There is evidently no pause in the pursuit of forces, however far we may trace them through their successive manifestations. The last source of power which we thus reach is itself phenomenal, looking back to a further explanation, and incomprehensible the moment we cease to regard it as not less an effect than a cause. Here, then, the mind must transcend the phenomenal by its own power, by the reserved idea of the absolute, and upon this thought of its own furnishing rest its labor — the otherwise unending chain of its sequences. What we understand, is nature everywhere linked in causal dependence; what under the intuitive faculties of the mind we comprehend, is a universe resting in the hand of its Maker.

When we pass from physical to intellectual phenomena,

there is present in their very apprehension a new idea, that of consciousness. What space is to physical phenomena, is consciousness to those of mind, the field in which they occur. But this is not the only idea superseded. Cause and effect, the link of physical connections, is replaced by choice. A mechanical force secures its effect directly, without intervention; a desire secures gratification through the medium of the will. A motive tends to a given course of action, but that tendency waits on the will for confirmation, or to be set aside. From this source comes the efficiency which makes effectual the impulse. In involuntary actions a direct causal connection is established; but in voluntary actions the will is a source of power, itself constrained by no power, and hence these facts come under a new idea, that of freedom.

Liberty is said to be proved by consciousness. We are conscious of being free. So also we refer our knowledge of all mental states to consciousness, and say that we are conscious of this thought or that feeling; yet we have regarded consciousness simply as a regulative idea. Nothing more can be contained in this language, then, that all thought, from its very nature, is known to the person whose it is; only thus it becomes thought. The expression, the testimony of conscionsness, would, if strictly insisted on, convey the idea of a faculty bearing witness to certain facts of experience. Yet such a notion is plainly not to be entertained, and the words referred to are to be regarded merely as a convenient expression. When we say that men are conscious of choosing, we mean that the act of choice, like the other acts of mind, is known to the mind, and known for what it is, an act of choice. The idea under which this act arises and is explained is that of liberty.

Choice differs from cause and effect, not only in the very nature of the connection, but in the fact that the one moves toward the power, the other from it; the one is attracted, the other repelled; the one is conditioned on the future,

the other on the past. When we inquire into the phenomena of mind we seek the objects of desire, of pursuit, as in those of matter we search for the efficient force. We here inevitably institute a search for final causes, and as legitimately as for first causes in the field of physics. The world is understood in its double relation backward and forward only through them both. In a choice between the two questions, mind is more interested in the end proposed than in the means by which it is pursued. Both inquiries, however, are necessary; and every want of the intellect is satisfied by the final reference of each effect forward to the choice, and backward to the efficiency of the only creative power, mind. All human work is adequately explained in the two questions: What purpose does it accomplish? and How does it accomplish it? And the same queries alike meet the wants of mind as it surveys the broader works of God.

We are bound down to the investigation of simple, physical connections only by that positive philosophy which would keep out of view the personal element which pervades all the order of the world, and lifts it into the solution of a rational product.

The Absolute must be the Alpha and Omega of exhaustive science. We find no pause in the pursuit of causes till we pause in Him; no end or motive to the thoughtful movement of a universe till we reach it in Him.

By discovering creation to be orderly we discover it to be rational; by discovering it to be rational we make necessary the inquiry: For what end? and here the circle of thought returns to God and the end he proposes.

Starting with liberty as the regulative idea of spiritual action, we find in the choice between motives occasion for prudence, wisdom, right. Without liberty, none of these can be. If there is but one necessary way there is no opportunity for wisdom or for right action, since these involve comparison, choice, and nothing is open to discussion or selection.

We hear much of the nature of things, as if certain underived properties belonged to them, giving rise of necessity to a measure of order. The notion is not merely atheistic, it is destructive of the great distinction between the rational and irrational. If nature is only seemingly the product of thought, if order is in any measure an interior necessity, and not wholly brought into it by the reason of God, it is evident that the distinction between mind and matter is so far obliterated, and that the latter is capable of establishing, nay, does of itself establish, certain leading lines of order. We are thus compelled to decide again, whether mind alone is the source of thought, and matter its mere recipient. But this being conceded, we may not afterward forget the fact, and refer essential points of order to the nature of things, as if in ultimate analysis we reached things, and not reason, as the source of fixed principles.

Nature is the recipient, not the source of order, and is only rational in its action as reason has wrought in it.

The boundaries of choice are those of wisdom, and no way or method is wise which has not, at some time in some intellect, had an alternative. But the moment we have choice we must have principles for its guidance, and these are furnished by the diversity of means and ends. Wisdom is a correct choice of ends, prudence, of means; while right is an intuition of that which is rational in action. Conscience is the voice of reason enforcing its own authority — the half instinctive grasp of the soul after its own good. That which affords pleasure we may or may not do; that which has in it the highest reason, the right, we must do, or sin against reason. The imperative of right is the effort of reason for self-preservation. Right in the outset, direct, instinctive in its judgments, more and more discloses its rational element, and becomes the law of life by which man is united to the Absolute Reason, by which the soul discovers and assumes its proper life. Wisdom concurs with the right as embracing it. Wisdom takes the wider survey. Right is the self-asserted authority of reason in its conflict

with passion and appetite. Wisdom tests and harmonizes all claims in view of ultimate results; brings the reason that is in the right clearly out, and thus enforces its more practical and dogmatic claim. Right is a guide just at hand, wisdom often comes later with her approval.

It has been a favorite result of logic to subject the will to motives, and to construct the law of liberty under the analogy of that of cause and effect. We would rather regard the notion of liberty as fundamental, and make necessity arise from the fact that the will has already passed on the phenomena concerned; that these, thereby removed from the region of choice, are henceforth subject only to executive force. The root of necessity lies in the will, which, having chosen, impels, compels results by an efficiency to which there is no longer an alternative; countermethods having each and all been rejected. Necessity. does not explain liberty. Liberty gives to events that impulse of volition which makes them necessary. He commanded and it stood fast. Nothing is so eternally sure as righteous volition.

The genesis of force can only be referred to that which is personal, spiritual. That which is physical is already conditioned, already a measured power, and can not transcend itself. It has come under the law of causation, which admits no genesis of forces, but only the expansion and expending of those already realized. The real generation of power, its ultimate reference to choice, can only take place in persons. Only thus will the mind cease its pursuit of successive causes by the resolution of an effect into a choice, and the solution of this under the notion of liberty.

It is the supernatural, then, that gives rise to the natural; the personal and free that defines and settles the impersonal and necessary, and there can be no more fundamental perversion of thought than that of subjecting spirit, reason, to the laws and forces of which it itself has been the source.

The two ideas of liberty and law complement and define each other. In a mind dwelling on liberty alone, the idea

may become that of fortuity, chance, lawlessness, an independence of reasons and motives. The moment, however, we look at the results of choice we find them to be fixed laws. Liberty has brought forth necessity. What in realization has now become cause and effect, as conception was already connected in rational relations. The coherence of reasons — of reason — arises from the very root of order in the mind itself. Choice does not act on chaotic material and impart order, but on motives, plans — the proffers of reason, spread out in coherent ideas. The organizing work of thought goes before liberty without coercing it.

The absolute will comes at once under the guidance of of the absolute reason, and the interior harmony of complete attributes never suffers it to depart therefrom. The finite will finds the motives, the open ways of action, given to it in its own constitution, and the circumstances which surround it; and in this restricted field only limited results are placed at its disposal. The liberty which remains to it in these choices is as far removed from chance as necessity. Necessity denies the balance of motives — the possibility of any other than the resulting choice. Chance denies the power of motives, — that these affect the result; liberty recognizes all the motives as motives, and is, for that reason, governed by none of them.

A wayward, irrational choice does, indeed, tend to anarchy, but does not arise from it. The will is conditioned to those motives which appear in the orbit of the rational and physical nature which encircles it, and, therefore, can admit no confusion not contemplated as possible in assigning it its endowments and conditions. The will suffers constraint without coercion through motives. The waywardness of liberty is lost when we contemplate the connection of choice with motives, and the dependence of these on physical causes.

Starting, on the other hand, with force, we shall sink into the fatalism of necessary connections, till we learn to break the chain, throwing in, ever and anon, the links of voluntary action.

In the conflict between the two regulative ideas, respectively, of matter and mind, causation and liberty, the former has more frequently overpowered the latter, and carried the mind into fatalism, than been overpowered by it and left the mind exposed to the fortuities of chance Fortune and fate are ideas which bear witness to the alternate victory of these opposite and complementary ideas, law and liberty. Both recognized and rightly limited, there is room for matter and mind, for nature and God; either lost, but one hemisphere remains to the light. Liberty, personality, the condition of rational activity and the source of necessity itself, is, in the conflict of philosophy, the sun that rules the day; while physical law, with its fixed and ever returning limitations, is the moon, that, with a little reflected light, governs the night — the horizon of mist and darkness pressing close upon the mind.

In this complementary relation of law and liberty is seen, in part, the relation the sciences bear to each other in the discipline of mind. The physical, empirical sciences, through resemblance reaching causation, are the fulness, the complete satisfactiou of this ruling idea of the physical world. Sciences of classification, passing into those which treat of the complex facts of the world in their productive forces, have developed the unchanging character of law, till this idea, to the exclusion of mysterious, supernatural, and fortuitous causes, has taken possession of the physical phenomena of the world. Here the movement must pause or imperil all.

Science again starts under the same method of observation and induction from a new point, that of mind. Here it establishes liberty, the power of originating movement. It then proceeds to trace the inter-dependence of these distinct classes of phenomena under their respective ideas. Historical and social events and states come under its explanation, and it marks the influence of the physical under the government of a power which transcends it. There is neither complete implicit causation, nor yet absolute arbi-

trary liberty. Permanent forces are at work under the modifications of choice, and thus, on both sides, the full resources of the mind are called out. Having traced separately, matter under its law of force, and mind under its law of liberty, we mark the concurrent action of material and spiritual agents, of necessary and free forces, suffering neither to disguise or overpower the other, and therein possess the amazingly complex fact of human life. Two forms of knowledge equally valid, two fields of inquiry equally necessary and secure, complement and complete each other, hushing the conflict of extreme claims on either side.

But all this, as limited, finite, dependent, we refer to an Infinite Spirit, the source of power, and thus apprehend God without comprehending him. Unable independently to investigate this immeasurable fulness, this Infinite, which the mind through the very necessity of thought has cut free from all formulae of logic, we turn to comprehend, by the compass of its relations, the finite before us. From the will of God it sprang; by the will of God it remains; to the will of God it bends its way. There is no comprehension of what is bound backward to a thoughtful source, forward to a thoughtful end, aside from the mind of God. Herein, also, there is not a passage through, not a compass round, but an adequate approach to the nature of God, where the affections and thoughts alike must rest.

In all this we reach no "universal, unchangeable, eternal law." This would be the absorption of mind in matter, the loss of freedom in force. We reach rather a free spirit, ruling all things under its own reason. Mind thus triumphs over matter, finds itself the image of God, and the key of the world.

By the demonstrative sciences, the logical, instrumental powers of the understanding are strengthened. By the physical sciences is secured that accuracy of observation by which through substantial, permanent resemblances, we reach, define, and discriminate causes whose action gives laws, and thus knowledge, power. In the study of philos-

ophy we discipline those intuitive faculties by which we rise in the last stages of explanation to liberty, and to that Infinite Personal Power by which we overshadow and enfold the universe. In the balance of these, we find safety, and in the excess of any, the anarchy and overthrow of thought.

While law, the idea of cause, towers in the one realm, and gathers into itself all explanation, liberty rises into no less prominence and authority in the other, the spiritual region, and from thence lets fall its mandates on the subject-world of matter, creating that law which so fills the fancy of one-eyed science.

ARTICLE II.

CONVERSION — ITS NATURE.[1]

BY REV. AUSTIN PHELPS, PROFESSOR AT ANDOVER.

It was an exaggeration, yet one which contained more of truth than of hyperbole, in which a late writer affirmed that the most characteristic thing this world has to show to other worlds is a scaffold on the morning of an execution. It is true that to a holy mind the distinctive idea in the condition of this world is that of *guilt*. It is not dignity; it is not beauty; it is not wisdom; it is not power: it is *guilt*. It is not weakness; it is not misfortune; it is not suffering; it is not death: it is *guilt*.

Any thoughtful observer, therefore, must believe that this world needs to be changed, in order to become the dwelling-place of God. No historian, with any just conception of man, as he has been and is, on the theatre of nations, doubts this. No philosopher with any knowledge of God, as he is, doubts this. No man, with any honest insight into

[1] A Discourse preached in the Chapel of Andover Theological Seminary.

his own heart, doubts this necessity of change, to fit man for the presence of God. A seraph hovering over the field of Solferino could scarcely feel a more appalling conviction of this necessity than any individual sinner feels when his own heart and the idea of God are revealed to his conscience side by side.

Such has been the general belief of the race. They are the few maniacs who have denied it. The great religious systems of the world have been founded upon the conviction that man must be changed. Be the gods what they may, man must be changed, to be at peace with any deity. Our blinded and sickened race has sought to change itself by most laborious and cunning devices. Remorse has been the equivalent of genius in its inventions. By baptismal rites, by holy anointings, by branding with mysterious symbols, by incantations of magic, by sacred amulets, by ablutions in consecrated rivers; by vigils and abstinences and flagellations, and the purgative of fire; by distortions of conscience in rites of which it is a shame to speak; and by that saddest of all human beliefs, which would doom a human spirit to migrate for millions of years through metamorphoses of bestial and reptile existence, — man has struggled to change himself, that he might be prepared to dwell at last under the pure eye of God. Even those fools who have said in their heart, there is no personal God, have drifted unconsciously in their speculations upon a caricature indeed, and yet a resemblance of this very faith in man's need of a change to make him worthy of the divinity which is within him.

It is impressive to observe how Pantheism, in its wildest freaks, is dragged towards a doctrine of regeneration. The idea haunts it. It speaks in language which a Christian preacher need not refuse in describing the phenomenon of conversion. Its apostles tell us of a certain stage in individual history at which the soul must awake and "bestir itself, and struggle as if in the throes of birth"; that it must "wrestle with doubt, or cower trembling under the

wings of mystery"; that it must "search heaven and earth for answers to its questions"; that it must "turn in loathing from the pleasures of sense," under its "irrepressible longings after the good, the true, the beautiful; after freedom, immortality." They tell us of the tumult and torment of this "crisis of internal life." They profess to inform us how the soul may make its way out of this chaos of distress into a "noble, perfect manhood"; how, as one has expressed it, the soul may "once more feel around it the fresh breath of the open sky, and over it the clear smile of heaven; how the streams of thought may again flow on in harmony; how content is to be regained with one's position in the system of things; how all fear and torment are to give place to blessedness; how love is again to suffuse the world, and over every cloud of mystery, to be cast a bow of peace."

Thus, I repeat, the idea of regeneration haunts philosophy in its most impious departures from God. With a God, or without a God, philosophy cannot get away from the sense of the necessity of a change in man to fit him for something to which he is predestined. Put into the language of any philosophy on this subject the two ideas of the Holy Spirit and of sin, and a Christian preacher may adopt the whole of it in his delineation of conversion.

This necessity, therefore, of some great, critical, formative change in man, may be assumed as a truth on which the mind of the race is substantially a unit. On this theme, as on many of the first principles of religion, the wanderings of the human mind from God are forever checked by oceanic currents which draw it inward, and compel it to sail along the coast of truth, never far or long out of sight of the mainland.

WHAT, THEN, IS THE NATURE OF THAT CHANGE WHICH MAN NEEDS TO RENDER HIM AN OBJECT OF DIVINE COMPLACENCY?

To answer this inquiry will be the object of the present discourse. Our dependence upon the word of God for the answer is immediate and absolute. Philosophy, inde-

pendently of the scriptures, has taught the world almost nothing with regard to it. Even theological standards, uninspired, have added nothing to the wisdom of an awakened conscience in a child, except as they have translated the declarations of the word of God. We all wish to know, on a subject like this, not so much what philosophers or theologians have believed as what God has said.

I. It will be instructive, then, to recall briefly certain of the representative passages of the Bible which set forth the nature of conversion.

Commencing with that class of them which the text[1] so forcibly exemplifies, we may observe it to be one of the favorite methods of inspiration to represent religious conversion by the change which occurs in natural birth. One can almost feel the fascination of the calm, subdued authority with which our Lord taught to his timid pupil the paradox of regeneration: "Except a man be *born* of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." "Except a man be *born* again he cannot see the kingdom of God." "That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit." Birth of body — birth of soul! The one stands over against the other, as if for the sake of reflecting each by its resemblance to the other. Then, to check the astonishment excited by the seeming extravagance of his speech, he adds: "*Marvel* not that I said, Ye must be *born* again." "Marvel not" — this is no cause for dumb amazement; it is but one of the rudiments of truth. Art thou a master in Israel, and knowest not this thing?

A similar boldness of imagery is manifest in that class of passages which represent religious conversion under the figure of a change from death to life. As if birth from non-existence were too natural an emblem to express the whole truth of the anomalous change effected by regeneration, we hear an apostle exclaiming: "Awake thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead." "You hath he quickened, who were *dead* in trespasses, and sins." Another, in

[1] John iii. 3.

the assurance of a regenerate experience, declares: "We know that we have passed from *death* unto *life*." Conceive what intensity of significance this metaphor must have had to those of the apostolic age, in which the miracle of resurrection from the tomb was a reality in current history, a fact of common fame!

A similar vividness of contrast is preserved by a third class of passages, which express conversion by the figure of passing from *darkness* to *light*. What is the force of such language as this? "Ye are a chosen generation;" he "hath called you out of darkness into his marvellous light." "Ye were sometimes darkness." Not *in* darkness only, but darkness itself. Night was the symbol of your very souls. "But now are ye light in the Lord." Not *in* light, merely, but light itself.

"Holy Light — offspring of heaven, first-born."

The noonday is the emblem of your being. Among the most beautiful of the scriptural titles of the regenerate, are these: "children of the light," "children of the day," "saints in light." Some of the most stirring exhortations to renewed men are founded upon this contrast in nature! "Cast off the works of darkness, put on light" — "we are not of the night" — "have no fellowship with the works of darkness" — "what communion hath light with darkness?"

The force of such language is not diminished by a fourth class of passages, which speak of conversion under the figure of a change in the most central organ of physical vitality. "A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you." "I will take away the stony heart." "I will give you a heart of flesh." "Make to you a new heart." A new heart! To this day, what words of wisdom have we learned by which to express a regenerate state more intelligibly or more vividly than by these, which we breathe into the prayers of our children?

But perpaps the climax of the daring imagery of the scriptures on this subject is exceeded in a fifth class of passages, of a literal force, which represent God and Satan

as the sovereigns of hostile empires; and the change which man undergoes in conversion as a transfer from the one dominion to the other. Paul did not scruple to affirm his commission to preach a gospel which should "turn men from the power of Satan unto God." "The power of Satan!" This was no fiction of a distempered brain, in an age when demoniacal possession was a common and an acknowledged form of bodily affliction. "The Father hath delivered us from the power of darkness, and hath translated us into the kingdom of his dear Son." "The power of darkness!" This was no feeble image to the thought of an Oriental people, whose faith had filled the night air with demoniac spirits. "In time past ye walked according to the prince of the power of the air. But God, rich in mercy, hath quickened us, hath raised us up, hath made us sit in heavenly places, in Christ Jesus." "Walking according to the prince of the power of the air!" This was no mysticism and no hyperbole to the ancient faith, whose angelology peopled the elements with spiritual intelligences, some of whom swayed the atmosphere malignantly. "The kingdom of Christ" — "the kingdom of the dear Son" — "heavenly places in Christ Jesus"! These were conceptions of unutterable meaning to minds whose only ideal of government was that of absolute empire, and whose thought of obedience was wrapped up in that eternal idea of *loyalty*, in which self is forgotten, and the sovereign of the realm is all in all.

These passages may suffice as a specimen of the methods by which religious conversion is described in the style of inspiration. Yet no possible selection of proof-texts could be the strongest evidence of the scriptural doctrine of regeneration. The climax of proof of such a doctrine is that it pervades the system of biblical teaching. It is one of the constructive ideas of inspiration which are not so much here or there, as everywhere. It is pervasive, like the life-blood in the body. It is like caloric in the globe. If a tortuous exegesis evades it in one passage, it is inevi-

table in the next. Expel it from a thousand texts, and it remains in secret implications all along the interval pages between them. Wrench it away from every text in which theologians have found it, and its echo still reverberates from one end of the Bible to the other. We can get rid of it, only by flinging away the system of revelation in which it breathes — everywhere present, everywhere needed to complete the symmetry of truth, and everywhere imperative as an oracle of God.

II. Our chief inquiry, therefore, should be: What does this language mean in which we are taught man's need of a change to render him a friend of God?

In reply, we may observe: The scriptural emblems of conversion represent a change of *character*, as distinct from any variety of change by ceremonial observance. No single conception of religious conversion is more forcibly suggested by the Bible than this — that it is a reality, and not a form. If the sole object of the scriptures in their teaching of this doctrine had been to prevent mistake on this point, and to reprove the proneness of the human mind to degrade religious experience into religious form, their language could scarcely have been more happily adjusted to its object. With this volume in our hands, we do not know how to reason with men who exalt ceremonial ordinances or formulae as substitutes for a change of heart. We must rank among the tokens of intellectual disease, we must regard as a degradation in a civilized mind, that taste which leads one to protrude a Christian baptism, or the imposition of consecrated hands, or the profession of a Christian creed, or communion with a Christian church, or the reception of the Lord's supper, in advance of that work of God's Spirit by which a sinner is born again. It seems like solemn trifling to debate on such a faith. "How readest thou?" is the only query by which we can suggest the remedy for the sickliness of such a mind. To the law and to the testimony! If the scriptural idea of regeneration be definable in any particular of its versatile exhibition

here, it surely is so in this, that the change it portrays is independent of external form or symbol. It is an event in spiritual experience. It is a change in the man. The man — the vital, the immortal part of him — feels the change. He lives it. When we pass from this substance of the thing, to consider forms, ordinances, creeds, professions, as distinct from the thing, as its substitutes or its superiors or its constituents, we descend from realities to mimic playthings. These incidents to a religious life lose their significance as symbols even. They are symbols of nothing. They are a forgery and a mummery.

In the nature of conversion there is nothing that we know of which should forbid its occurrence in a disembodied state. If we could know that probation encloses the intermediate state of the departed, we might conceive of regeneration in all its majesty, as experienced in that land of pure spirits. Without a form to signalize it, without a whisper to proclaim it, there would be joy in heaven. When, therefore, men degrade the dignity of this change to that of an appendage to a ritual; when they overlay its simplicity by imposing upon it burdensome and intricate ordinances; when they overshadow its delicate spirituality by building around and above it even the scriptural symbols which express it, we only speak the uniform language of the Sacred scriptures and of common sense, when we catch the tone of an apostle and say — "we do not know whether we have baptized — Christ sent us not for this — lest the cross of Christ should be made of none effect."

A second feature to be observed in the scriptural theory of conversion is, that it is a change of character, as distinct from a *constitutional* change. John Randolph, in a letter to a friend, written at a time when his mind was agitated by religious inquiry, speaks of a volume which he had then before him, and in which it was affirmed, he says, "that no man is converted without the experience of a miracle." "Such," he continues, "is the substance" of the author's

faith: A man "must be sensible of the working of a miracle in his own person. Now, my good friend, I have never experienced anything like this. I have been sensible, and am always, of the proneness to sin in my nature. I have grieved unfeignedly for my manifold transgressions. I have thrown myself upon the mercy of my Redeemer. But I have felt nothing like what this writer requires." "It appears incredible that one so contrite as I sometimes know myself to be should be rejected entirely by infinite mercy." Yet "I fear that I presume upon God's mercy. I sometimes dread that I am in a far worse condition than if I had never heard God's word."

This extract illustrates the method in which minds not accustomed to the technicalities of a theological dialect will often interpret and misinterpret unguarded or confused speech respecting the doctrine of regeneration. It is the legitimate interpretation of any language which degrades conversion from the level of a moral change to that of a change in the constitution of a soul. I say "degrades conversion"; for what do we mean by a constitutional change? As applied to a spiritual intelligence, a constitutioual change is a change either in its essence, or in its susceptibilities, or in its executive powers. But a change in either or all of these is, in respect of the ends of moral government, of less profound significance than a change of character.

The world has been very slow in learning that miracles are not the grandest disclosure of Omnipotence. In the material world there are more sublime displays of power than those of miraculous dignity. The siderial universe swayed by the forces of law, is a nobler work of God than that in which he said: "Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon; and thou moon, in the valley of Ajalon." In the animal creation there is a grandeur of divine working which no miracle has stamped upon it. The government of animal nature, by laws which make it as true to God's will, as the line of a bee in its flight, or the swoop of an eagle from its eyrie, is a more illustrious expression of the divine mind,

than the piling up of the quails in the wilderness two cubits deep.

So, in the world of mind, law is itself a more majestic thought than that of the suspension of law. The government of an intelligent universe under the law of moral freedom exhibits a more imperial reach of God's power than the government of such a universe outside of that law. The government of finite mind, speaking anthropologically, is a more august achievement than the creation of that mind. The idea of *character* is an advance upon the idea of *nature*. Character in a soul, conceived of as an effect of God's working, is a more sublime product than the make of that soul. Do you conceive of moral character as a something in the constitution of a soul, like the grain of a piece of wood? By such a conception you abase the soul itself, for the purpose of moral government, to a level with a piece of wood. Do you define to yourself depravity as a viciousness ingrained in the very build of a spirit, like the gnarl of an oak? By such a definition you precipitate the spirit itself, for the ends of moral government, to a level with the gnarl of an oak. Do you imagine gracious affections as inserted into the very nature of a man, as one would infuse a new gas into the atmosphere? By such a fancy you degrade the man himself, for the intents of moral government, to a level with a gas in the atmosphere. Do you describe regeneration as an act which impregnates a sinner's being with a new power, as you would magnetize a piece of steel? By such a description you drag down a sinner's being, for the objects of moral government, to a level with a piece of steel. Omnipotence can no more rule the one than the other by a moral system.

Is it, then, to be supposed that such conceptions as these underlie the scriptural emblems of that change which a sinner needs to render him an object of God's complacency? There is in these emblems a height and a depth, a length and a breadth, of significance which such thoughts of regeneration and its surroundings in the system of truth do

not fill up, and fill out, and fathom to the bottom. By the side of such emblems these thoughts appear sensuous and materialistic. Nothing but a literal interpretation of the language of these emblems can bind them to the sphere of constitutional phenomena. The instant we leave their literal force, — that is, the moment we conceive of them as *emblems* of truth, — truth is buoyant within them. It springs up above the sphere of merely creative power, into that of moral empire, where God makes flexible to his will the immense populations of intelligence and of liberty which fill the universe with his own image. There, man is a man, and not a manikin. A sinner is a sinner, and not a wretch only. He is responsible, self-acting, free; responsible *because* self-acting, self-acting *because* free, and free because otherwise moral government over him is a fiction. Conversion being thus a change in the character of a free sinner, *regeneration*, in respect of its moral solemnity, is something other and more than *re-creation*. It belongs to another and a loftier plane of Omnipotence.

If anything more than the natural interpretation of the scripture were needed to establish this view, — that conversion is a change of character, as distinct from constitutional changes, — two very simple facts would corroborate this as the *necessary* interpretation of the scripture.

One is, that Christian experience proves no other than a change of character in conversion. Conversion is an experience. It is one of the most ancient and one of the most modern facts in the mental history of this world. Consciousness has taken cognizance of it in unnumbered hearts. Real life has proved it by innumerable tests. Yet no regenerate man knows anything of a re-creation of his nature, or a multiplication of his powers. No Christian is conscious of new faculties. None exhibits such in common life. A converted man thinks, reasons, remembers, imagines now; and he did all these before conversion. A regenerate heart feels, desires, loves, hates, now; and it did all these before. A new-born soul chooses, resolves, plans, executes; and it

did all these before. The chief subjects of thought are changed — they are revolutionized. The prime objects of love and hatred are changed — they are transposed. The supreme inclination of the affections is changed — it is reversed. The *character* of the purposes is changed — it is transformed. In these respects, indeed, old things are passed away, and all things are new. But beyond this neither consciousness nor observation testifies to any other change. No other could add to this any weight of moral significance. The man could have been, so far as we know, no *more* a Christian, no *more* an object of complacency to God, no *more* at peace with his own conscience, if regenerating grace had been a solvent of his nature, and had reduced it to its elements, and reconstructed the man by an improved process of creation.

The other fact is, that the unregenerate man cannot be made intelligently to feel the reasonableness of God in making salvation dependent on any other change in a sinner than a change of character. The way of salvation is urged upon the acceptance of men, in the Bible, as a reasonable way. God lays open the whole subject, as our Lord did to Nicodemus, as one which is susceptible of reasonable defence. It is to be presumed to be capable of *seeming* reasonable to an unregenerate mind. The revelation of the mind of God on the subject is addressed to an unregenerate world. Its appeal is to the good sense of men — that sum total of the intellectual virtues equipoised and symmetrical. "Marvel not" — "Come, let us reason together" — "Are not my ways equal, saith the Lord?" — "What more could I do to my vineyard that I have not done in it?" — "O fools, and slow of heart to believe." — Such is the tone of inspiration in exposing its great organic truths to the test of reason.

But the theory of the necessity of any other change in a sinner than a change of character, as the condition of salvation, does not bear this scrutiny of the good sense of men. A sinner's conscience does respond to it reasonably; his

reason does not respond to it conscientiously. Therefore it does not deepen his conviction of guilt intelligently. If he reasons consistently upon it — and some minds will reason consistently here, to their own hurt — if he reasons consistently upon it, the inevitable inference from it seems to be that he has no responsibility respecting his soul's salvation until regeneration has been performed upon him. I cannot rid myself of a sense of sin; guilt seems to burn within me, like an unearthly fire; yet in *reason*, with this view of conversion, I cannot see myself to be any more responsible for sin than for my shadow. I *feel* guilt to be my character, and the whole of it; but in *reason*, upon this theory, it seems to be my organism only. I feel the burden of sin as if *I* were its creator, and yet in *reason*, with this conception of it, it seems to have been born with me by no act of mine. Then by whose act? I *feel* the unworthiness of my depravity; I am speechless as if I deserved to be damned for it, and yet in *reason*, with this view of it, the very marrow of my bones seems to be as much responsible for it as the immortal part of me. Then, when by *reason* I pursue the phantom which yet I *feel* to be no phantom, where do I find its last refuge? Where is the *crime* lodged of originating the thing for which I am damned? Yet shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?

That is an awful antagonism — it seems irreverent to conceive of it — in which a sinner's conscience and reason are thus arrayed in conflict, the one condemning him, the other accusing God. It is more than a "conflict of ages." Under the theory before us, it would be the conflict of eternity. Unregenerate mind in the agitations of such unnatural warfare, with unregenerate passions boiling over under the inevitable sense of injustice, cannot be reasoned with. You might as well reason with Vesuvius. That soul can be made to feel helpless, hopeless, reckless; but in *reason*, that will be the helplessness, the hopelessness, the recklessness of a *victim*, not a *sinner*. We may silence the

victim. We may overwhelm him with arguments which *he* cannot answer. We may overawe him with learned and abstruse conjectures. We may teach him what the wise men have recorded of the pre-existence of souls; and *his* soul may be troubled because he cannot disprove it. We may discourse to him of his personality in Adam, his participation in the Fall, his taste of the forbidden tree; and he may be speechless because he cannot conceive of it, and because if he should speak, he could only say: "This is my infirmity, that I cannot remember Eden; it is not so much to me, even, as a dream when one awaketh." We may expound to him the "federal representation," and the "imputation of sin"; and, for the moment, *he* may impute it as a sin to his soul that he cannot help shuddering at the shock which that conception gives to the conscience with which *Adam* has endued him! We may weigh him down with theologic definitions and qualifications and distinctions, and may back these up with authorities and catechisms, till, through his sheer bewilderment at our prodigious learning, his faith may be held bound by our dogma, like mercury compressed in a globe. But the instant the theologic weights are taken off, the globe flies open, and the prisoner springs out into the free air. Once more in his right mind, his faith falls back to the logic of the common sense, and he feels as John Randolph did, that, on such a theory of depravity, if regeneration means anything, it means that conversion is a miracle. *He* has no more to do with it than he had with his birth. Then the eternal conflict in his nature — conscience on this side, and reason on that side — breaks out with redoubled rage. Conscience thunders "There is no peace saith my God to the *wicked*." Reason flings back in defiant answer, "There is no peace saith *my* God to the *victim*."

The doctrine of a constitutional change in conversion is seldom, if ever, consistently preached. It cannot be thus preached by a man who is intent on results in real life. I may hold it as a theorem, but I cannot preach it. I may

defend it as a thesis among theologians, but I cannot press it home upon men from the pulpit. I cannot preach it to careless sinners. I cannot preach it to awakened inquirers. No man can preach it to an audience of anxious men who are seeking after God. No man can preach it in a revival of religion. There is something which stifles it in the very atmosphere of the place in which earnest men have come together, to ask what *they* must *do* to be saved.

One preacher of distinction in our own country, during the early part of the present century, who thought that he held this view of regeneration, very consistently acknowledged that he could not preach to impenitent men in a revival of religion. He could preach, and as some of his published discouses prove, with great power to professing Christians on themes of Christian experience, but he could not preach to unregenerate hearers at a time when they felt salvation to be a present business, and the business of an emergency. On one occasion, when invited to preach at such a time by Professor Stuart, then a pastor in New Haven, he declined the service, and, with tearful eyes, assigned as his reason that his preaching was not adapted to the demands of such scenes as he had witnessed there. He could not adjust to them his views of the nature of a change of heart. A revival was an emergency for which no provision was found in his theory of the way in which the gospel should be preached to unregenerate men. Was not such a confession the strongest possible corroborative evidence that he had mistaken the doctrine of the scriptures?

We cannot err, then, in adopting as one of the first principles of revelation on the subject of the new birth, that it is a change of character, as distinct from constitutional changes in the soul. It is a change in that, and only that, for which conscience *and* reason, reason *and* conscience, hold a man responsible, as for a thing of his own originating and his own nurturing.

A third feature in the scriptural doctrine of conversion is, that it is an *intelligible* change of character, in distinction

from a mystical change. Some doctrines of the scriptures are so clear that their very perspicuity is their vindication. A statement of them amounts to proof. Other doctrines are so mysterious that statement and testimony are all the evidence we can have of their truthfulness. We can reason upon them no further than to observe that their statement is not internally a contradiction, and that the testimony which supports them is authoritative. But there are other truths in which the mysterious and the intelligible are so interwoven that to an unpractised eye they may seem inseparable. Such a truth is that of regeneration.

On the one hand, what God's working in the change of a sinner's heart is, as distinct from the effect of that working, in other words, what regeneration is, as distinct from conversion, who can tell? We know scarcely more of the interior of the work of God in regenerating a soul than we do of the mechanic power in creating a soul. The dynamics of the phenomenon elude all our philosophy. When Coleridge said: "By what manner of working God changes a soul from evil to good, how he impregnates the barren rock with gems and gold, is to the human mind an impenetrable mystery in all cases alike," he uttered only what every thoughtful mind feels. Thus our Lord taught to Nicodemus, The wind bloweth where it listeth, but the whence and the whither ye cannot tell; so is every one that is born of the Spirit. But this is very far from affirming that the change itself, the result of God's working, is an enigma. A change of character, in itself considered, is one of the most intelligible of historic facts. It is like a transparency in the sun. It has the simplicity of contrast. It is like a change from "yes" to "no," from "no" to "yes."

Yet an inquiring mind sometimes suffers confusion from permitting the mysteriousness of the methods of regeneration to overspread the chrystalline character of the fact of conversion. The idea seems often to be entertained that this change itself is the great secret of Christian experience. An unregenerate mind cannot know *what* it is, any more

than *how* it is. It appears, in the view of some minds, to bar the entrance to the church, like the watchword of a brotherhood, to which, from the outside, none can be initiated. Said one, in deep anguish, to a pastor, "I do not understand it. I do not comprehend what I must do, or what I must be. I seem to myself to be doing all I can do. I am not conscious of hostility to God. I long to accept Christ and him only as my Saviour. What more is requisite to give me the peace which others feel, I do not know. The mystery of the thing shuts me in. Yet guilt weighs upon me like the hills. I feel as if I were buried alive."

The state of mind expressed in this language is, in more respects than one, unnatural and unscriptural. It is not an experience to which men are ever exhorted, or invited, or intimidated, in the Bible. But the point of its erroneousness which demands notice here is that of its confounding a change of heart with the divine methods which induce the change, and conceiving the one to be as enigmatical as the other. This is like confounding light with the voice which said: "Let there be light." An inquiring sinner wrongs his own soul, and distrusts the Saviour's heart towards him, when he lingers in dumb anguish before the cross, hoping that he shall by and by understand the subject of conversion, and thus be *enabled* to become a Christian. To a sinner in the condition which I here imagine, there is nothing further to be understood in order to his salvation. There is no abyss of mystery to be fathomed. He has the truth, and the whole of it. How does our Lord address Nicodemus in this condition of purblind anxiety? He chides him, as one would a child whose knowledge was needlessly beneath his years. Art thou a master in Israel, and knowest not these things? These emblems of conversion, too — what boldness of contrast pervades them all! When we mean to express an idea with indubitable clearness, we seek the aid of contrasted images. We have no difficulty in distinguishing ice and fire. We never mistake the fall of thistledown for the tread of an elephant. Nothing else reveals

midnight like a flash of lightning. So the inspired mind paints the reality of a change of heart by depicting the two states of character between which the change occurs. It is from non-existence to being; from a heart of stone to a heart of flesh; from darkness to light; from death to life; from the empire of fiends to the kingdom of Christ. There is a meaning in such intense symbols of the truth which is meant to be as intensely understood. An unregenerate mind can understand them. No other difference exists between regenerate and unregenerate perception of the truth in them than that which divides the knowledge of experience and the knowledge of theory on all other subjects. A sinner — an unregenerate sinner — a sinner who feels his own desert of hell — the chief of sinners — may come before God with none but reasonable fears, none but intelligent convictions, none but manly yearnings after peace, and in conscious helplessness may ask of God, "What shall I *do* to be saved?" It is a reasonable inquiry. God will not mock him in the answer. God will not say to him, "It is a mystery: it is the great secret of the universe. Thy destiny is unsearchable by thy dim eye. Be still, and know that I am God. Go thy way for this time; when I have a convenient season I will call thee with an effectual calling. Go — go thy way." Sinners often treat the Saviour thus; he is never so merciless to them.

Certain couplets in a very precious hymn, expressive of the sinner's last resolve, though they are true to a sinner's desponding experience, still are not worthy, because that experience is not worthy, of the riches and the freedom of God's grace. "I'll go to Jesus":

> "I'll to the gracious King approach
> Whose sceptre pardon gives;
> *Perhaps* he will command my touch,
> And then the suppliant lives.
>
> "*Perhaps* he will admit my plea,
> *Perhaps* will hear my prayer!"

There is no "perhaps" in God's promises. There is no

stammering speech in God's invitations to an inquiring sinner. There is no hesitancy of love in God's offers of regenerating grace. More honorable to the truth as it is in Jesus is the language of the very next hymn in our collection:

"Just as I am — without one plea,
But that thy blood was shed for me.
Just as I am — and waiting not.
Just as I am — though tossed about
With many a conflict.
Just as I am — poor, wretched, blind.
Just as I am — thou *wilt* receive,
Wilt welcome, pardon, cleanse, relieve.
Because thy promise I believe;
O Lamb of God, I come."

The fourth feature in the scriptural view of the nature of conversion is, that, in distinction from every variety of secondary change, it is the most *radical* change of which human character is susceptible. This conception of the radical nature of conversion is involved in all the scriptural statements of its necessity, and specially in the scriptural metaphors by which it is symbolized. Indeed the conception with which the inspired mind appears to have struggled most sturdily under the poverty of language, was this of the greatness of the change. What else is signified by the frequency with which the inspired thought forsakes literal speech, and falls back upon such startling and unqualified metaphors as the creation of light; the resurrection from the dead; the mysterious and unknown change of birth; and translation from the realms of the prince of the power of the air? Sane minds do not employ such emblems of thought recklessly. We cannot suppose inspiration to prompt extravagant speech. This is but the sobriety of human dialect, crowded with and struggling to encompass the magnitude of divine thought. Scriptural utterances on this subject exhibit the same evidence of the conflict of truth with the feebleness of language — I had almost said

the impatience of truth at the imbecility of language — which we find in the scriptural modes of representing the being and majesty of God. Truth, in the one case as in the other, seems to weigh down the most elastic tongue, and to exhaust the most voluminous vocabulary, and to search through the inventions of the most creative imagination, and to pass from one emblem to another, from one kingdom of resemblances to a second, till, by the mysteriousness of its drapery, we are compelled to feel that the naked truth, as appreciated by the mind of God, surpasses our reach of expression. We can only exclaim: "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard it." We cannot define the greatness of the change in literal speech, otherwise than by pronouncing it the most profound, so far as we can know, that human nature can experience.

What the birth of the body is to the consciousness of the mind that inhabits it we do not know; but, for its significance to the moral government of God over the mind, it cannot be so momentous a change as that mind's conversion. What disembodiment at death is to the experience of the spirit which thus goes out into an unexplored eternity we cannot conceive; but, in respect of the solemnity of moral government, it cannot be of such magnitude as the regeneration of that spirit. What the resurrection of the body is to the history of the soul which has been again enrobed in it we cannot conjecture; but, in its relation to the moral government of that soul, it cannot be so elemental a change as that soul's conversion. Such physical transformations and transitions can be hints only, and feeble hints, of the spiritual phenomenon which transcends them.

Let us, then, for our practical instruction, observe several mental and moral changes with which conversion is often confounded. Observe briefly, that a change of external deportment is not the chief result of regeneration. No matter how pervasive that change may be, it can bear no comparison with religious conversion. When a man who has been addicted to sensual vice becomes a sober man, a

chaste man, an industrious man, a good citizen, a kind father, brother, son, there is a notable change. It is a real change in character. It is a change for which a man deserves to be respected. But that is not a change which fills up the language of the scriptures in designating the translation of a man into the kingdom of God. In other words, conversion and reformation are not synonymous.

Again, no increase of seriousness of mental habit is synonymous with religious conversion. A young man often experiences, as the natural result of expanding intellect, an increase of thoughtfulness. When he was a child he thought as a child; now he has put away childish things. Manly thought awakens manly sensibility. He acquires some sense of the reality of life as a conflict. A certain dignity of character is formed, which is as natural a growth of manhood upon the stock of youth as the addition of a cubit to the stature of an infant. It is indeed a valuable change, a change necessary to success in life, a change which will command respect, as it deserves respect; but it is not conversion. No growth of earnestness is synonymous with that new birth which a soul experiences under the regenerating act of God.

Further, the abandonment of any single passion does not constitute conversion. Such a change as this often occurs as the fruit of increasing years. Often the effect is to mellow a man's character, by substituting for a turbulent vice one more mild and comely, and yet a vice as deeply seated, as odious to God. Warren Hastings, after his ambition had burnt itself out in India, realized the favorite dream of his youth, by returning to spend his old age in the homestead where his ancestors had lived in luxury. Here was a change indeed. It must have involved in some sort a change in character. It was an abandonment of a fiery passion for a harmless indulgence of an aged man's love of repose. But this obviously is no such change as the word of God portrays by the emblem of the dawn of light on a benighted wanderer.

Once more, conversion is not the development of character by natural germination in the heart. Character often undergoes a change by which qualities long concealed spring to light under a change of circumstance. Traits of generous manhood, the germs of which have been repressed, shoot up thriftily under improved discipline. Energies which have slumbered are roused by emergencies. No man knows the compass of his own nature till it has been distended by some great sorrow or great opportunity for achievement. Such facts in life tempt us to self-conceit respecting the hidden nobleness of man. Much of the religion of literature is founded upon the idea of concealed virtue. A divinity is imagined to dwell within us, and to be awaiting only the incitement of occasion or the felicity of circumstance to develop itself in all that man should desire or respect in character. Yet no such change as this can be the complement of the scriptural conception of that revulsion of character which is no *less* than resurrection from the dead. What a satire on developed goodness in man is expressed in the tone of the scriptures towards the best embodiment of the natural virtues! Breathe into Nature's good man the most comely of her graces; educate in him the most refined of her sensibilities; develop in him the most magnanimous of her impulses; fashion in him the most docile obedience to her teachings; nurture in him the most elegant and placid of her tastes; so that to the silken judgment of the world, his character shall seem to be a paragon of beauty — "fair as a star when only one is shining in the sky"; yet if that fascinating being — that young man of whom it shall be said that Jesus, beholding him, loved him — has not been changed by the washing of regeneration and the renewing of the Holy Ghost, the honest eye of God sees him as a naked soul in bondage to the prince of the power of the air.

If the scriptural dialect on this subject means anything, it must indicate that conversion is a change which brings into existence a character which had no being before.

Does not birth introduce to a new existence? Is life only a development of nonentity? Is vitality a germination of the life of a corpse? Is light a growth of the midnight? Is the kingdom of God a superstructure upon the kingdom of Satan? If development, growth, germination, are the things in which regeneration exhibits itself, we need no such emblems as these to express it. They are out of character and out of place. They are untruthful. The scriptures are full of puerile extravagances and grimaces of diction. There is no propriety in recognizing two classes of mankind, such as the scriptures separate by a gulf of fire. There are no such beings as sinners and saints, — enemies of God and friends of God, — natural men and spiritual men, — men who are in darkness, and men who are in light, — men who are dead, and men who are alive, — men who are in God's kingdom, and men who are in Satan's kingdom. These are unreal and unjust distinctions. Men are all of one class. They differ not in kind, but in degree of character. Here, then, we have a large and varied class of descriptions, uttered by the Spirit of God of men and to men, to which among men we find no counterpart in reality. But one half of the Bible is apposite to this world. Is this credible? The development, then, of an existing germ of holiness is not the scriptural idea of a change of heart. In other words, no process of self-culture can be equivalent in its fruits to the divine act of regeneration.

The radical nature of conversion may be still further illustrated, by observing for a moment a principle which we often lose sight of in meditation upon this theme, but which lies at the bottom of all genuine notions of man as a subject of government. It is that character itself has *fixedness*. In the profound and ultimate sense in which we employ the term to indicate what a soul is as a subject of moral government, character has an element which approaches immutability. Character, good or bad, once formed, tends to perpetuate itself. Once *in* it, a soul

grows *to* it, and rises or sinks with it. The necessity of creating a character is the most transcendent privilege, and at the same time the most appalling peril, of a moral being. The law of perpetuity is deep-laid in its very nature. By this law a moral being tends to be always what it has been and is. It is this which renders guilt so fearful. The law of guilt is to perpetuate guilt. "Once a sinner, always a sinner," expresses the tendency of fallen mind.

A truth is enveloped in those forms of expression which eminent and holy men have often used to express depravity, when they have spoken of "a sinful nature"; of "a depraved constitution"; of a "helpless corruption"; of "inability to repent." Much as these modes of expression are misconstrued, and much as they need qualification, there is still a truth in them. The use of them often indicates the struggle of a pious heart to express that truth. They are not without resemblance to some of the forms of scriptural phraseology. They have their counterpart in the common usage of men in figurative speech. The truth they express is that of the natural fixedness of character in a sinner's heart. On the principle of the tendency of all character to perpetuate itself, a sinner's character is fixed. What he has once made it, its tendency is to be forever. That it will be forever, unless the power of God be interposed to reverse it.

True, we do not conceive of this as an invincible tendency. It exists by no compulsory law. It asserts, therefore, no fatal authority. It is not a destiny. We do not reason upon the laws of character as we reason upon the laws of matter, or even as we reason upon laws of intellect, as intellect only. Character, in the ultimate conception of it as a moral phenomenon, is unique. It is not a metal; it is not a mind. It has laws of its own. Its laws are but the expression of the human mind which creates it, as the laws of light are an expression of the divine mind which created that; as the laws of intellect are an expression of the infinite Intelligence in whose image it is made. When, there-

fore, we apply the term "nature" to character we cannot mean by it the same thing as when we speak of the "nature" of silver or the "nature" of memory. We must not confound the laws of character with the emblems of these laws, which we sometimes seek for in the laws of matter and in the organic laws of mind. Matter and mind are God's creation. Human character is man's creation. The creative power is as absolute in the one case as in the other. God rules finite character not by creation, but by government. He governs it as *character*, not as the wind or as the springs of the sea.

Yet, after all, such is this imperial will of man, by which it is his privilege and his peril to be what he will, that a pressure towards immutability grows out of its nature and accumulates with time. Once bent one way, the spring coils itself that way forever. Once set in the chosen mould, the compound indurates into granite. Such is character in the ultimate notion of it. A creation by man's own act — a free creation — a creation which *can* be reversed — yet, once in being, it *tends* to deathless being, like that of God. It is a start on a journey into eternity, in a direction from which, but by God's interposition, no traveller returns. It is in the light of such a conception of the awful immortality of character that we must judge of the radical nature of its change in conversion.

It remains, then, to observe, that there is but one change of character conceivable which shall meet all the peculiarities affirmed of religious conversion. It is the change from sin to holiness. It is a change from absolute sin to the first dawn of holiness in the soul. It is that unique change which has no parallel and no adequate similitude, in which an intelligent mind, a free mind, a self-acting mind, a mind which has intelligently, freely, of its own will, abandoned God, is led for the first time in its moral history by Almighty grace to return, and *give itself* to God. For the first time, then, a sinner appreciates God. For the first time he loves God. For the first time he chooses God.

For the first time he enjoys God. For the first time he is born of God. For the first time his life is hid with Christ in God. God, *God*, GOD, is the one being to whom his soul mounts up, and in whom he enters into rest. He may be flooded with joy unspeakable, because he is engulphed in the blessedness of GOD.

ARTICLE III.

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY.

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THE science that has for its object the laws of wealth must have many relations to a gospel intended specially for the poor. The names of Chalmers, Whately, and Wayland suggest to every mind an association of Political Economy and the Christian Ministry. The sermons of the period of the American Revolution show that the pulpit has heretofore in stirring times considered the public weal as properly coming under its survey. The essays of such men as Dr. Palmer, Dr. Thornwall, Prof. Hodge, called forth by our civil war, show that those who expound the laws of God consider it their right at least, no doubt their duty, to expound also the principles of civil government. The clergy of our land have never, to any considerable extent, relinquished the right to advocate such social virtues as temperance and the observance of the Sabbath, nor will they, until they expunge the decalogue from the Sacred scriptures, cease from their efforts to suppress profaneness and licentiousness. Still it may be questioned whether they have not left these works too much to occasions and transient excitements, whether they have sufficiently considered that the godliness which they preach has the promise

of the life that now is, as well as of that which is to come. Domestic comfort, the supply of physical want, the use of worldly wealth, might have been made themes of popular discourse far more frequently than they have been, since in their connection with practical morality they force themselves upon the consideration of one who fills the office of both pastor and preacher.

It will be the aim of this Article to state some of the advantages to be derived by the Christian minister from the study of political economy; also some of the advantages which his profession gives him for the pursuit of this science. Our purpose will not require a collation of the various definitions of political economy; it will be sufficient to say we use the term in its broadest sense, as the science of wealth, meaning by wealth not merely that which has exchangeable value, but that which contributes to man's temporal weal or well-being.

I. It will be in place to begin with a few remarks on political economy as an intellectual discipline. The members of the clerical profession have generally recognized the importance of occasional intellectual exercises, undertaken for the purpose of retaining the culture of the mind at its highest elevation. For the promotion of such an end no science is superior to political economy, while none is so nearly related to the great subjects on which the preacher of the gospel dwells. There is no science that makes a larger demand upon some of the best qualities of mind; as, the comprehension of a mass of facts; the ability to distinguish between the important and unimportant, the relevant and irrelevant; the ability to keep the eye on some one central truth of a discussion, distinguishing it from all its counterfeits, and recognizing it under any of its Protean forms; the courage to lay aside all previous notions, and abide by a fair conclusion; the intellectual integrity that accepts a demonstration, though at first startling. If we add to these the patience of contemplation, and the continuity and consecutiveness of thought

which the investigations call forth, we shall have before us qualities of mind which the preacher especially will consider desirable. Indeed the style of the pulpit is becoming more and more germane to that which would be adopted in popular discussions of political economy. Sermons that have an aim at some useful result, that produce conviction by argument, while they sway the mind by a moral power infused into them, are recognized as best meeting the wants of a parish. And since religion extends its claims into the realm of morals, and absorbs its principles as being subordinately religious, no department of morals will be found more truly in accord with the proper aim of the pastoral office than the science before us.

Moreover, there are still open questions in the science, on which those who desire it may have opportunity for the full exercise of all their powers, and in which valuable results will be rewarded with the gratitude of the world. For instance, the discussion still rages as to the wealth or poverty of the earth. Is population likely soon to outstrip the resources of nature, so that the earth will be too strait for her numerous family? Are the richer and more productive soils the first or the last to be brought into use? How are we to interpret the decrease in the value of capital as civilization advances? Do the three per cent paid for the use of capital in Europe and the ten per cent in Illinois show that relatively labor is more important in old countries, and so wages are really higher, or that capital and its universal concomitant, labor, represented by wages, are becoming of less and less value together? These questions, and those of free-trade and the currency, are subjects on which any one is at liberty to try his skill.

Political economy furnishes some of the best illustrations of the truth that in intellectual operations the battle is not always to the strong. The pulpit would do well to take note of the fact, and remember that he is the best reasoner who selects his premises best, not he who handles them most resolutely. Ricardo's theory of rent may be taken as

an illustration. The world knew what rent was before his day, indeed, but no one seems to have separated it from everything else, and to have adequately defined it, as the difference of income from lands that simply pay for tillage and those that pay a surplus. Another example will be found in the happy solution by Say of a problem connected with over-production. He showed that a glut was not caused so much by the superabundance of articles of one kind, as by a scarcity of articles of other kinds. The remedy of the evil is therefore in larger production. Products remain unsold because there are none of another kind to exchange for them. It seems very easy to see this and to say it, and to deduce from it: That the general prosperity is the prosperity of each one; that imports do not indicate a decrease of production; that consumption does not of itself promote commerce, but production is its only possible foundation; all these seem very natural observations, when they are stated; but to hit upon them was the difficulty. The subject of free-trade furnishes another example of the necessity of looking at the right point in the discussion of a question. As men began to make progress in moral science when they looked for virtue in the will, and in intellectual science when they examined the understanding for the laws of thought, so have they advanced, though they have not completed the work, since they began to look at trade to see how it should be most free. The freedom of one man may be a tax upon another, and then a tax upon himself. Suppose the producers of cotton themselves export all they raise, those who would otherwise manufacture the article are compelled to resort to production, and so by competition reduce its price. This amounts to a tax upon both parties. Does not, then, the protection of labor to such an extent that *finished* products shall be exported really secure the freest trade? We do not discuss the question, but merely desire to show how eminently this science calls into exercise the student's sagacity and skill.

II. Natural theology is illustrated by political economy.

The first thought perhaps will be, that the comfort of the human race for the past six thousand years does not throw any very favorable light upon the goodness of God, if indeed it serves to establish our faith in his existence and government. Do not ages of darkness and lands which are the habitation of cruelty point to a malignant ruler of the world? Or, do not ages of disorder teach that there is no God? Political economy will not, more than any other science, assume to teach why men were not created angels, nor why they were allowed to sin, nor why the fulness of time required four thousand years before the coming of Christ. But, assuming these to be truths, and assuming that courage and wisdom on the part of the people, and wisdom and virtue on the part of rulers, would have rendered human life one of comparative happiness, we may trace many indications of a beneficent Providence in the well-being of men, particularly in the successive improvements in the condition of humanity in the successive ages of history.

Let the question be: How do the laws of wealth, or we should prefer to say, how does the well-being of man in this life, illustrate the existence and government of God? The Christian religion, as a part of history, takes its place among other events and institutions as occuring in the providence of God. If Christianity were only a cunningly devised fable, its effect on civilization and human happiness would be the same, and the deist would still recognize in it a power for good or evil in the social world. Now, if we were speaking of the value of the sun, we should not begin with its chemical effects in photography, nor in speaking of the value of the Christian religion would we speak first of its effects as a cause in nature; but in a subject like the present, incidental effects, tending to elevate society in temporal enjoyment, are worthy of notice. The deliverance of the sixty million slaves of the Roman Empire, and the continuance of freedom to their descendants for thirty generations are results which entitle Christianity to a place

among the temporal blessings of mankind. The Christian religion did not prevent the decay of the nations to whom it was first preached, nor did it set an impassable barrier to the incursions of the Northern tribes; there were other causes at work not under the control of Christianity, but the new religion did alleviate the horrors of those days of confusion; the mother church sung the requiem of the old civilization as it expired upon the coast of the Mediterranean, and she learned the rougher speech of the incoming barbarians, that she might also sing the cradle-song of the new. And though "Alaric and his Goths" may seem an intractable infant, still the gentle teachings of Christianity have secured us a better civilization than did the influences that surrounded the heroes of old, such as bore their fruit in refined but pugilistic Greece.

Another source of human weal, which is older than Christianity and more extensive than Judaism, is the Sabbath. The father of political economy, Adam Smith, without regard to its religious associations, acknowledges that it is indispensable in social life. Man's constitution seems to have an inborn necessity of a weekly holiday. Were he only an animal compelled to observe the day of rest he would praise God, as unintelligent nature praises him, in the enjoyment of his rest, in the physical comfort it bestows, in the health it preserves, in the life it prolongs. But the intellectual and moral man finds the holiday a restorer of vitality and vigor to the mind, and a power that regenerates the moral aspirations. The divine goodness in the appointment of the day is the more obvious, in that the rest subtracts nothing from the labor of the world. Experience shows that the poor man cannot afford to lose the day of rest, and those who are pressed with urgent duties cannot spare the exhilirating and clarifying effect of a Sabbath on their mental faculties. Indeed God has given man one seventh of his time for leisure, making, if efficiency were the *only* measure of time, the six parts really more than the seven.

Again, design and supreme skill on the part of the Author of social life are exhibited in the mutual dependence of the different classes of the community upon each other. If we were to say, man's nature is such that his self-love compels him to support others in order to gratify himself through them, we should only say, God compels the rich to support the poor. This is seen in all grades of society. The successful man, — the favorite of fortune, — in times of semi-barbarism is a landlord, whose lands must be tilled, and whose dignity demands a pompous retinue of servants to be sustained at his own expense; in the advance of civilization and wealth, he is a merchant or importer, who competes with the landlord in the number of his dependants; and in more refined life, when barbaric pomp becomes childish, and households are depleted to the numbers necessary for service in a community governed by law, he is the gentleman, the scholar, or the man of taste, whose gratifications are in libraries or works of art, whose servants are the cultured brain of the author, and the skilled hands of the artist, the mason, and the architect. In either of these instances the man who sets in motion the instruments of self-gratification causes them to affect himself only by aiding, if not sustaining, an army of men necessary to the result.

The facility with which all men find a place in every state of society is one of the marvels in the government of God. Occasionally all the foundations of society seem to be broken up, and the entire mass of the population seems a sea of molten metal, but in a moment it begins to crystallize, and whatever the new form may be, almost every particle of the old material is demanded by it. It is strange how rapidly, beginning on the instant, society settles itself after any commotion, and how impossible it is to leave any large class of the population unprovided for. The happiness of the vast majority of the world is not, indeed, what we could wish, but extreme suffering is generally due to improvidence and indolence.

An irresistible proof of the divine goodness is found, again, in the wealth treasured up of old for the good man, by the Creator of the earth. The beds of coal formed at a period long before the creation of man; the beds of salt deposited in what are now inland regions, when the ocean seemed to have promise of eternal sway over all the globe; the oil flowing out of adipose rocks, and the various metals in their mines, all indicate a paternal providence in the supply of the future wants of the children of God. Man in entering on his inheritance finds that some one had beforehand gone through all its departments and made ready for him. And there is occasion to observe that a wise providence has ordered as well the discovery and use of wealth, as the preparation of it. Any one who studies the history of the old world, and aims to catch the spirit of its civilization, will be impressed with this idea, that neither the aims of the higher classes nor the aspirations of the populace indicate a readiness or a fitness to rise up and take possession of the world, and use it for the good of man and the glory of God. None but a Christian civilization could ever make any claim to the kingdom of all the world; none has ever gone before whose right it was. But, from the first, the outreaching of Christianity, and the duties imposed upon it, have been no dim prophecy of its universal sway. Its prevalence in the Roman Empire was early and on the whole easily achieved. But when its warfare seemed to have been accomplished it was found only to have begun. It had no sooner obtained sway in the warmer climates around the Mediterranean than its very existence compelled it to disciple the inhabitants of the colder climates of the north. But is the restless mind of the Northman susceptible of being moulded by civilizing and Christian influences? And if so, can the church, without being unfaithful to her Lord, suffer those who still remain in the harsher climates of the north, above the Danube and around the Baltic, to remain in ignorance of the way of life? The long struggle of the church with barbarism

in the Middle Ages had hardly answered these two questions before another, apparently more difficult, arose; viz. Can northern regions — the hills of Scotland, the bleak coasts of England, the frozen plains of Norway — sustain a Christian civilization, if once it is planted there? Can the institutions of Christianity, with the indispensable institutions of learning, be supported in these realms of poverty? This question was answered, and as soon as it arose, in the wonderful providence of God. The perfecting of the mariner's compass, and the discovery of America by Columbus, put Christianity in possession of both the Indies; while the enterprise of the restless Northmen in commerce and manufactures put the Anglo-Saxon, Dane, and Norman, still in his own bleak home, in possession of the products of the tropics. Yet these events would not have secured the civilization of the North but for an event that followed immediately upon them, — the use of coal, — which first imports, as has been said, a tropical climate into the north, and then, as a power in manufacture, affords the means of exchange. The production of raw materials is now of less account than their manufacture, and the steam-engine, used as yet mostly in cold climates, gives the skilful mechanic or the capitalist an actual advantage over the possessor of the most fertile soil.

There are other events that no less strikingly than those now noticed show the ordering of Providence. The multiplication of cheap books, not when slave-holding Greeks had leisure to spend the day in the market and hear and tell the news, but when an industrious populace had won for itself a warm fireside for the leisure of the evening, will be recognized as being no accident. Again, this position of the people, by modern civilization dissociated from the lord or knight, will also be admitted as occurring in the good providence of one who has the higher laws of wealth all at his own control. Truths like these, it seems to us, ought to impress not only the clergyman, but that class of economists who so much bemoan the poverty of the world; who fear

that the rapidly increasing family of the human race will soon exhaust all supplies and be left to starve. We think the past is something of a warrant that in the future God will be beforehand in the supply of his children's wants. Sooner than believe that man will freeze when the mines of coal are exhausted, we will believe that he will then have learned to burn water. And when we see the vast regions of the earth's surface appropriated to productions the least profitable, who can fear that the Almighty will be obliged at last to resort to the suggestion of the devil, to command that "stones be made bread"?

III. The preacher ought to study political economy, so far at least as to form clear ideas of the nature of exchangeable value, and of the meaning of the word "property." His office lays upon him the duty of speaking at times of such things; he may, for instance, be called to warn his hearers against worldliness; to speak of wealth with disparagement; to inveigh against the luxuries of the times, or the self-indulgence of the lovers of pleasure; he may perhaps be led to speak of the use which might be made of the money that is wasted in intemperate or foolish gratifications; he may declaim against the wastes occasioned by war, and the oppression of the poor through the increase of taxes; he may call upon his own people to deny themselves for the sake of aiding some object of benevolence; it is proper at times that any of these things should be the theme of remark from the pulpit. But the nature and uses of money are of so subtile a character that he is liable to entertain crude notions on such topics; his philosophy may be wrong, the common sense of his hearers may rebel against his teachings, and practical men may smile at the immaturity of their instructor. Every man, at least every teacher, ought to know that a state of civilization which has most wants to be gratified, whether the supply go under the name of the necessaries of life, the comforts, or the luxuries, is the highest state, provided the wants are founded in nature, and not unnaturally developed. Every preacher of right-

eousness ought to promote such a state of civilization. It will increase the expenses of living, but it will also increase wealth, for, since wealth consists of the means of supplying want, the more numerous the wants are, the larger is its possible amount. There is no such thing as property absolute; it is the want that transforms dead matter into property. Even Chalmers, whose great mind seems to have been subject to some great prejudices, appears to have labored under a mistake here. He says, the manufacturing of gloves, for instance, adds nothing to the wealth of the realm, for if there were no gloves to be bought there would be just the same amount of property, which would be expended in some other way. He seems to have considered or assumed that the barest necessaries of life were the constituents of wealth. But if gloves are wanted, and the wearer will pay for them, they are not only property, but they increase property. The men employed in making them are not in the ordinary conditions of society wanted for anything else, nor is the material used; therefore the world is the richer by the worth of these products. If we throw aside gloves, shoes, hats, etc. from the articles of use, and bring ourselves to want nothing but food, we have not concentrated the same amount of property into this one article that was before diffused through all our supplies, but we have merely annihilated property. Suppose the desire for food could be reduced one half, so that bread without meat should be its supply, the bread would cost no more than it does now — just the labor of raising it. Add the demand of meat, and you raise animals fit for slaughter to property, and double the wealth of the world. Add, again, the demand for clothing, and you make wool, cotton, and silk property; and so every additional want lays the foundation for an increase of wealth. The want of anything, if the want is founded in nature and is permanent, raises the means of its supply to the dignity of a possession, and possessions constitute the wealth of the world. The preacher may not, then, indiscriminately inveigh against

luxuries, for the sum of wealth cannot be too great, if well used, and luxuries are the only foundation of large wealth in any community. The real object of attack from the pulpit is the combination of ignorance and selfishness with wealth. The man who must dispose of a large income, and who knows nothing of books, nothing of art, nothing of sympathy with those in want, is the one who needs advice from the pulpit; he is *too* rich. But so long as laborers are in excess, and employment is sought, which is the case in almost all countries, there are no legitimate and honorable wants that may not properly be supplied, and their demand increases the wealth of the community. The clergyman has no right, then, to present a gospel that does not permit, we do not say demand, the culture of all the tastes with which God has endowed man.

When the pastor of a church calls upon his people to deny themselves for the sake of objects of benevolence, he will certainly prefer to address those whose culture has led to an appreciation of books and the higher gratifications of intelligence. Self-denial will be more probable in such a community, while it will be immensely more to the advantage of the cause which is pleaded. A curtailing of luxuries in such a community, a saving of the money otherwise to be paid to the artist or architect, will add far more to the contributions of any *religious* assembly than a curtailment of the gratifications of the palate or of the grosser appetites. We should bear in mind, when we declaim against the multitude of demands and the tendencies to indulgence, and portray the beauties of the simple life of nature, that the refinements of culture are all that make wealth, in any considerable amount, possible, and of course large contributions to objects of benevolence possible. Poverty is not the cause of wants being few and simple, but the result. The cause is narrowness of mind and lack of culture. In all grades of culture, however, with the great majority of the people, large benefactions must generally be with self-denial. And there is no more beautiful

exhibition of the effect of Christianity on the heart than this, enduring privation for the sake of those in want. Here Christians in all parts of the world are essentially in the same condition, and are equally called upon to deny themselves for Christ's sake. The child denying himself some article of food, the man a tour of travel, the family a horse and carriage, are alike instances of self-sacrifice, and perhaps equal instances of that virtue. On the other hand, we should remember if nature and social habit did not make the things dispensed with objects of desire, the self-denial would result in no pecuniary profit to those who are to receive aid.

IV. Political economy sets in a very clear light some important truths respecting the nature of wealth, on which the preacher, and perhaps the pastor, may insist with great force. He should show wherein it differs from exchangeable value. He ought to teach that wealth does not consist of the abundance of personal possessions merely, but depends on the state of society in which one lives, and the state of mind with which one receives the bestowments of Providence. The most valuable things we possess have no exchangeable value. Air, water, sunlight, cost us nothing. There are many sources of enjoyment that a certain state of society makes essentially free to all. Security of life and property, the privilege of the public worship of God, a rudimentary education for children, the use of public libraries, are among the things of value, which a community may bestow at almost no cost to the individual. While the preacher should exhort men gratefully to appreciate the natural wealth which God bestows, he may also exhort them to be generous to the world in the communal wealth which an advanced civilization renders possible. And he may here set himself against a tendency, perhaps an instinctive tendency, to hoard property for future generations, instead of using it for the good of the present generation. A sermon on serving one's generation by the will of God may often be in place. The direct opposite of this is serving a future

generation according to one's own will. The duty of bequeathing to a community enterprise and public spirit, together with furnishing the poor with employment, is not so much dwelt upon as it might be. What is the best method of disposing of a large estate? Shall it be left to the oldest son, that one dignified establishment may be made certain? Shall a father struggle to gather an estate so large that his children shall have nothing to do? Shall he invest it with such securities as to make it an absolutely safe support for his family without causing them trouble? or shall he also have a regard to the community in which he lives in the settlement of his estate? Shall he try to bequeath to his posterity a thriving, industrious, happy peasantry, whose labors his successors in business may turn to good account as he has? The question is a far more serious one than we have been accustomed to suppose. The best inheritance for a child is the industry and virtue of the community in which he lives. If he has tact, with the advantages which wealth would give at the outset, he is abundantly secured for life; if he has not tact and mental capacity his father's skill will hardly suffice for him through life, certainly cannot be the dependence of his children. Men who amass fortunes have a right to transmit their estates to their children; but they will do well to trust the community with some claim on their estates, i.e. the right to labor for wages; for in another generation those who hold the property may be compelled to choose between paying wages and paying a poor-tax.

It is a still more important duty of the clergyman to impress upon the people the idea that wealth depends largely upon individual virtues. A discontented soul is inherently poor. Envy, jealousy, suspicion, pauperize all they touch, for there is nothing in nature that can allay them. There are certain qualities of character which are indispensable to the enjoyment of the gifts of God; there are also certain habits of life which are necessary to the comfort of the mass of the population; these the

preacher may be expected to inculcate upon his hearers. For this reason both Chalmers and Whately considered political economy an almost necessary part of ministerial education. Chalmers lectured to his pupils on the science, and afterward published a somewhat extended work on what might be called the Relation of Political Economy to Pastoral Theology. His treatise seems to us to have had too little reference to religion as a source of, and a substitute for, wealth; still it sets forth some truths with great force, and is abundantly worthy of study. His views have not the same applicability in this country that they have in the British Islands, but a brief notice of them will be in place. He has ever before him the fear of excessive population. The wretchedness, ignorance, base pleasures, vice, and crime of a swarming and unemployed peasantry are to him objects of intense disgust. He looks to the clergy to save the world from them. The minister of the gospel is to elevate the morals of the people, elevate their tastes, multiply their demands for the luxuries of life, and so restrain the people from the degradations of poverty: "Next to the salvation of their souls, one of our fondest aspirations in behalf of the general peasantry is, that they shall be admitted to a larger share of this world's abundance than now falls to their lot. But we feel assured that there is no method by which this can be wrested from the hands of the wealthier classes. It can only be won from them by the insensible growth of their own virtue. Each several clergyman who labors piously and conscientiously in the home walk of his own parish, helps forward this great consummation, till, by means of a universal blessing, peace and plenty will become alike universal throughout the families of a regenerated world."[1]

Chalmers has one simple principle from which he starts in his speculations: the human race unrestrained will increase in population just as far as the supply of food allows. "The increase of population keeping pace with the increase

[1] Political Economy, p. 359.

of food" is ever the burden of his discourse. The world is then in danger of overpopulation, and its only salvation is a check upon the increase of the men and women in it. The want of the world is not more food, but fewer eaters. Distribution of wealth, division of church lands, transformation of hunting parks to wheat-fields, abolition of taxes, free importation of corn, — all these would effect no permanent good, because the population would at once increase to the full extent that the supply of food would permit, and then live in the same destitution as before. Poor-laws are a curse to those assisted by them, because they remove restraint; and, in general, systems of public charity only give a stimulus to population. A compulsory provision for the poor "releases the people from all care or concern about the consequences of their precipitate matrimony."[1] Even if the earth produced a thousand-fold, the evil would be the same, the relief would be only temporary. "There is a point beyond which if human beings were multiplied a serious inconvenience must be felt from the mere crowding and compression of their excessive numbers. This is obvious enough should it take place within the limits of any separate locality, but it would be as sorely and severely felt, if in virtue of a production of food *ad libitum*, it did take place over the whole surface of the globe. The human species would then become as sordid and miserable as those maggots appear to be who swarm on some mass of hideous corruption. The herrings that accumulate and condense in the western bays of our island are said to push the outskirts of their shoal upon the beach. And better surely that there should be such a limitation in the powers of the land, and such an utter incompetency in human art to multiply beyond a certain point the means of subsistence, than that the great human shoal should be protruded at its extreme margin into the sea, and serve for food to the fishes there waiting to devour them."[2] The great demand of the human race therefore is some interposing power to take its stand

[1] Political Economy, p. 316. [2] Ibid. 370.

as a check upon population, to restrain it from the possible sum it might reach if left to be limited only by the lack of food. The only adequate power of restraint is education and virtue, or in a word, the idea that "man does not live by bread alone"; while there is no man who occupies a position that enables him to oppose so efficiently human degradation, and the causes of human degradation, as the minister of Christ. Chalmers's fears seem to us to be trouble borrowed from a very distant future, for all the present population of the globe could probably stand so as to be visible at once to one on the summit of Mt. Holyoke; nor do we believe that man's moral dignity is in the realization of any such promised Utopia as this: "That men with the glorious arch of heaven above their heads, and with an ample platform beneath them should walk forth in largeness and liberty, the privileged denizens of nature." Still the duty of the clergy is most impressively set forth in this work of Chalmers. It is the office of the preacher to throw around men the restraints of virtue and culture, to open before them "a reach of perspective to distant consequences, whether on this or the other side of the grave," to teach the solemn duties of those responsible for the support and education of the young, and to lead the human race into its inheritance on earth as well as in heaven. But we would have the well-being of men laid upon a deeper foundation than that proposed by the great divine of Scotland, for he confesses that he expects the conversion of but few, while he believes comfort and enjoyment possible for the many. We should prefer that the clergy should be deeply impressed with the truth that their profession is the only one that conducts the mass of men to the enjoyment of this life, because it establishes this enjoyment on a right state of heart towards God. They ought to believe, and to maintain firmly, that (if we may adapt the language of Bacon) the kingdom of heaven is the foundation of the kingdom of this world.

It might at first be presumed that so elementary a ques-

tion as, whether we should "seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness," had been long settled, but the discussion of it still continues. We heard a professor from West Point, in an address on education, say, that the physical man was to be first developed, then the intellectual, afterward the moral and religious traits were to be added. A certain Frenchman has sent out to the world a series of plates representing the progress of humanity. He begins with the child as a physical organism of flesh and bones; then presents us the same with a half-scared, half-wondering, look, and informs us that here the child, or humanity, is in the religious stage. We afterward have the same person calm, self-possessed, with conscious strength, proud, but self-subdued, and are informed that now man has arrived at morality. Buckle, in his History of Civilization, accounts for the poverty and wretchedness of Scotland in the past centuries by the attachment of the people to religion. "Of all Protestant countries," he says, "Scotland is certainly the one where the course of affairs has for the longest period been most favorable to the interests of superstition." The consequence was, that the people giving the first place to worship, or as he would have it, to priest-craft, were sadly deficient in all the comforts, not to speak of the elegances, of life. He states his views thus: "The Scotch, during the seventeenth century, instead of cultivating the arts of life, improving their minds, or adding to their wealth, passed the greater part of their time in what were called religious exercises." Mr. Buckle, however, had little knowledge of religion, and set it in *opposition* to the world, or worldly good, while it should really be made the *foundation* of man's temporal well-being.

This question has of late appeared upon a fairer field than the pages of Buckle or the engravings of a French artist. Our Boards of Foreign Missions have been called to face the question: Does religion precede wealth and culture, or do wealth and culture precede religion? To give the question a practical form: Shall the missionary be first

a farmer, carpenter, blacksmith, then a preacher of righteousness; shall he be first a school-master, tailor, physician, then a preacher of righteousness; or shall he first preach Christ and him crucified, then add these other things? The question is not new; it comes up in one form or another everywhere, both in civilized and barbarous life. How is it to be answered? The Boards of Missions have found the answer given in the word of God to be the correct one, viz. the kingdom of God precedes the kingdom of the world.

A mere glance at history will show us that the great mass of men, in their godless lives and in the unchristian pursuit of wealth, have not as yet been in possession of the kingdom of this world. On this point nothing more is needed than a reference to such works as Prof. Edwards's Essays on Slavery, and the preliminary portions of Thier's History of the French Revolution. But without reference to history we may see that such a result is inevitable. If we grant that a certain class actually attain, without the aid of religion, the enjoyments which this life affords, still so large a class are excluded from them that the failure in the case is almost total. Wealth centres in few hands when men pursue it as the chief good. Let men by mere competition regulate the distribution of wealth, and the production of it will soon be at the disposal of those who are favored by fortune. Were men equal in skill, the possession of capital gives such advantages that the statement of the spiritual truth, "to him who hath shall be given," would hold good in temporal things. The lands of England are held by a few hundreds of individuals, and the number is still decreasing. The wealth of almost all our cities and towns is massed in the possession of a few persons or corporations.

Now this distribution of wealth extrudes two classes from the enjoyment of the world — the rich and the poor. Those who have beyond their power to use well are as really enslaved as those who sell their bodies to others on

condition of being kept from starvation. It is related of one of the millionaires of the land, that, on being congratulated on his great wealth, he inquired of his friend, 'if *he* would be willing to have the care of such a property for his board and clothing;' the reply was such as the absurdity of the question required; "but," said the man of fortune, "that is all I get for my trouble." The remark assures us it was not all; but it indicates most clearly the truth, that there is a limit to man's ability to use property; there is a point beyond which gains are burdens. And it should be noticed, too, how very soon many of those who have acquired wealth reach that position; in other words, how little capacity the vast majority of men have for using property. The tailor, the architect, the mason, the painter, the statuary, get a support indeed from the spendthrift, while the world has the pleasure of a laugh, and garrets become museums; but if there is not much to be regretted in this, still it is to be regretted that in spending their property the young should be obliged to spend even more prodigally their health, their nervous energy, and all their valuable qualities of mind and heart. Thus on reflection it will appear a sober truth that men are generally able in personal gratifications to spend but very little money well.

But these remarks refer to comparatively few. The herd of the human race is found at the opposite extreme. The vast majority of mankind in every age have probably been too deeply sunk in poverty and its consequences to permit predicating of them either wealth or happiness. The mass of mankind occupy a kind of social dead level, at one extremity of which you find the vicious man, whom you blame, at the other the slave, whom you pity; while the intervening space is crowded with wretches whose lives are, directly or indirectly, made a burden either by vice or enslavement. Reports from brothels leave on the mind a more thrilling picture of woe than of guilt; the dens of drunkenness exhibit more than an adequate punishment, as

our human weakness thinks, for the sins there committed. The children of the streets in large cities, who go astray as soon as they are born, move our pity more than our anger. Thus, in the realms of crime, unhappiness seems more prevalent than guilt. And if we look upon those classes that suffer with comparative innocence,—enslaved negroes, bought and sold, enslaved women, not bought and sold, enslaved men in the power of landlords or manufacturers, —we shall find such misery that, if one doubts at all the doctrine of divine punishment, he doubts whether hell does not belong to this world.

A mere glance will show that the distribution of wealth has hitherto generally been such that a majority of the people have been deprived of even the comforts of life, and the number has probably always increased as wealth increased. The majority are excluded from the kingdom of the world at any time, and this majority increases as civilization advances. Subjection of the world has been taking it from the many and placing it in the hands of the few.

The question will at once suggest itself: Is religion a remedy for these evils? Does it teach the rich how property may be used wisely, and the poor how it may be acquired? It is no doubt a perfect remedy, though in many cases a severe one; some have contemplated it, and turned away sorrowful, for they "had great possessions." The rich man who is the true follower of the Apostle Paul is not only rich but poor also, for he feels the wants of all those for whom Christ died. His fortune is ever a pittance in view of the necessities of all his brethren, and while he relieves the wants of suffering individuals, he can but long for larger means to meet the wants of suffering humanity. Religion gives to man's heart what it has been said God gave Shakspeare's brain, many sides, and he feels the joys and sorrows of the human race. His capability of using wealth is multiplied a thousand-fold, for the wants of others address him as his own. It might be added his enjoyment of wealth, i.e. his real wealth itself, is correspondently in-

creased, for before it consisted in the supply of his own wants, now it consists in the supply of the wants of all.

Religion is also the remedy for poverty; it is the first necessity of the poor man in his wretchedness. His destitution has two causes, or rather one cause in two forms, the want of the Christian spirit in himself, and the same want in those possessed of wealth. He needs for himself, first of all, the morality, the animation, the hope, the expectation, with which the Christian religion endows our race. These qualities of mind and heart in himself would remove the main evils of poverty. Wretchedness is usually the result of desperation, recklessness, improvidence, and then crime. Of these, want is both the cause and the effect; but if as effect it were removed by the gospel of Christ, the evil would be essentially remedied. But religion in its effects upon both the rich and the poor would, beyond a question, remove the woes of humanity so far as political economy takes them into consideration. The principles of the gospel would, through industry and fair distribution of profits, throw men back upon God for a support. If there were then poverty and wretchedness, they would be fairly charged upon nature, upon the field from which profits are reaped, not upon the laborers on the field.

Whether God and nature are too niggardly in their bestowments to support the human race is a question which it would as yet be idle to discuss in this country. It need only be said, complaints are out of place till industry, prudence, and a general regard for the rights of men take the place of indolence and oppression. England may not complain of lack of food so long as her soil remains a hunting-park, lying waste as the sporting-ground of a landlord. France, Spain, Italy may nôt complain so long as starvation follows only idleness and oppression, and waste lands increase as the people die of famine.

But this topic would be incomplete if we neglected to notice that religion itself constitutes wealth. A soldier's

life is perhaps the most bare of comforts, to say nothing of the luxuries, the gentleness, the geniality of a cultivated home, of any respectable life with which we are acquainted. Yet the army has furnished the world with some of the most lovely exhibitions of Christian character. And any life of hard service may afford the same wealth, if religion has her perfect work. "Godliness with contentment is great gain." Contentment is only trust in God, and whatever bestows this makes the world rich, while nothing else can supply all want, and remove all *fear*. The world at large cannot lay up much goods for many years; its wealth must always be in its reliance on a Father above, its system of finance, one of credit, with God as the debtor. The mass of the world's wealth must always be its faith in its providential Ruler. And if the earth actually bears in its bosom the supply of mankind for the coming years, and if God is surely to give each year's supply as the year comes, then the world is rich in its ever-continued possessions and its faith in God. Horace professes himself content to draw from a small heap, if only he can get enough. But Christ requires no conditional trust in God; he commands us to "take no thought for the morrow."

V. Thus far we have only attempted to show how political economy may be of service to the clergyman; we turn now to notice how he may himself do service to the science. There are some questions which he may answer more correctly than those who make the science itself the only object of their investigations. The student of the word of God can bring an answer from revelation to some of the topics that have long perplexed the thinkers of the world; and if the solution thus derived seem less philosophical than the scientific faculty desires, it is too valuable, and too well confirmed by experience, to be passed unnoticed.

1. The foundation of society, for instance, is a topic on which theology furnishes political economy with the most satisfactory explanation. Physical and intellectual philoso-

phers have not sought more diligently for the atom of matter than social philosophers for the atom of society. What is matter made of? Can you reach the ultimate particle by division; or is there a substratum to which qualities are added; or is there a force which makes a substance appear? These questions are like those that demand the ultimate in the organic forms of the social and political world. Do you reach the ultimate particle by division? Do you find the ultimate in an ideal organization existing potentially from the first, and actually as men come into being? These questions were asked ages ago, and various replies have been given. One of the most popular is that of Sparta, of Louis XIV., of Hobbes, — The *state* is the unit, the ultimate particle, the original object of creation. The Leviathan of Hobbes makes mankind, combined in the state, as truly one by external pressure as Edwards's theory of original sin makes them one by internal constitution. The theologian makes men one in body and soul through propagation; the philosopher makes them one by the principle, "might makes right," and so makes truth. The leviathan devours his enemies and absorbs his friends; by this process the whole race is made a unit, for in the end the weaker leviathans must all fall victims to one devouring monster. Sparta, in a practical way, gave the same solution to the problem. Men, women, children, slaves, cattle, were the property of the state, or constituent ingredients of the state; the state being the unit, the atom. Separate from it, individuals had no existence; within it, those who endangered its safety, or failed to add to its power were to be sloughed off — the helots, if too numerous; children, if too weak. The godless and inhuman tyranny of Sparta long ago sufficiently answered the question: "Whether the state was made for man or man for the state." The result of repressing individuality and internal social relations should have satisfied every one. No state has left poorer monuments than Sparta. She was laconic when she lived; her epitaph is equally laconic now she is

dead. Yet Sparta has admirers. It would not be difficult to show that Chalmers and the economists who agree with him are a kind of Christianized Spartans. Later states have taken larger views of the true end of national organizations, and have introduced some moral elements not found in the Peloponnesian civilization; but imperial Rome and imperial France have both demonstrated the unnaturalness of the leviathan theory.

Another reply to the question: "What is the atom of society?" is found in both ancient and modern republics. They consider the unit as the individual man. The state is the balance of parties, which all indeed must support, but support for convenience' sake, while the individual is the possessor of rights, and the atom of the structure. The results in this scheme, it must be confessed, are far more agreeable than in the other case; as much more as Athens is more beloved than Sparta, republican than imperial Rome, the Franks who won the name, than the minions of the emperors of the French, who have done their utmost to eradicate the generous nature, of that people. But the individuality of the human race does not build a state; indeed it is the contradiction of society. Individuality is the segregating, selfish, centrifugal force that dissipates society; it has ever been found necessary to restrain it. No government ever was in fact a perfect democracy; it cannot be the true definition of man, that he is a born ruler. There is something stimulating to the intellect in a system which throws every man upon himself, but it must be with the detriment of morality, for morality is social — a department of manners. The universal tendency to constitutional governments in these modern times is evidence that the world now admits neither of these radical views of the structure of society.

Certain philosophers have suggested another solution of the problem: "What is the foundation of society?" They would define man as a money-maker, or a comfort-seeker, or a happiness-absorber, and make the atom of society — the

indivisible unit — to be such a collection of persons, as can make the most money with the least work, or enjoy most with least effort, or as can get most bread by least sweat of the brow. Perhaps, however, they would insist that so much prominence should not be given to mere material possessions, and so would say that the atom of the social structure is that collection of individuals that can, for body and mind, get most food with least fatigue.

Political economy accepts this end of life, but, as treated by most authors, rejects the means proposed for its attainment, and really proposes no theory as a solution of the social structure. The present tendency seems to be (for no author can treat of such themes without *implying* some theory) to combine the system of *individuality* and *selfishness* with the *results* proposed by communism. It implies therefore that selfishness, or self-seeking, is really the highest social good — enlarged, comprehensive self-seeking is public benevolence. This, however, would make the advance of society an accident, would indeed annihilate society as we understand the term. What we want is some social system which shall make self-seeking and the social good, not accidentally consistent with each other, but actually the same thing, that shall make man the social being identical with man the individual. At this point the student of the word of God may make some suggestions which ought to be of value to those who speculate upon the social problem. God has established two social organizations on earth, — the family and the church. These two, however, are one, for the church is, so far as political economy contemplates it, the family of God, and all its members are brethren. The family then is the atom of society if we take the word of God as our teacher. How the larger social systems are to be built up of these atoms is indeed a problem still to be settled, but one step of advance is made; no system that disregards the family can be correct; and no system that does not make use of the principle demonstrated in the family relation, viz. that men properly

associated find individual and social interests identical, can be relied upon as sound. The combinations of men into societies of greater or less extent would, we suspect, be found a matter of less difficulty than would at first be supposed, if only the relation established by God were sacredly regarded within its range, and made a model in all advance from it. The church has from the first aimed at, and to a large extent secured, the good which communism proposes. And national governments have so much that is negative in them, and so little that is positive, that they cannot be oppressive so long as they sacredly respect the family relation. But this point will be noticed again. It need only be remarked now that in some way the family relation does lie at the foundation of happiness in life, even if the connection between the two cannot be discovered. A reference to the preceding topic of this Article will exhibit this truth. It was there remarked that the kingdom of God is the foundation of the kingdom of the world. If this is admitted, that the actual weal of the world is based on its spiritual welfare, then the kingdom of God comes between man and his temporal interests.

The simple question then rises: How do men enter the kingdom of God? The question is not, by what act of divine power, nor by what act of the individual, but from what state of life do they most naturally and most readily embrace the religion of Christ. There can be no hesitation as to the answer, the family is the nursery of the church. It is almost impossible to bring into the church of God those who have not been brought to the door of the church by the influence of the household. The apparent exception to this statement which the Sabbath-school presents in reality confirms the view, for the Sabbath-school is a confession of this most painful truth, that multitudes of children, need other parents than those who in nature hold that office. It will not be questioned that revivals of religion bring very few converts into the church who have not

before been brought in contact with the church by the family. If the wayward and profane have at times certain surgings of the religious emotions, there is but little hope that these will attain the equable flow of personal godliness unless the mind and heart have by early culture been prepared for a religious experience.

2. Another question on which the clergy have a right to speak, and in the solution of which they occupy a vantage-ground, relates to the aim of governments. Is the world governed too much? Are the intents of government essentially negative, having in view the protection of the people against evils, or do they propose also to promote interests by positive legislation? Is government to leave the poor to take care of themselves, leave feeble interests to take care of themselves, or is its office that of protection and support to the needy? There can be no doubt that the main source of human wealth and comfort is in private enterprise and individual industry. Any philosophy that teaches the young that the government is not the chief almoner of blessings; that it has very little to do with the really positive enjoyments and attainments of mankind; that it plays but an insignificant part in human life, is to be hailed as a friend, and commissioned to its important work. Still we must not hold that governments are ordained simply to prevent wrongs; they have interests also to promote. Could legislation prevent every possible wrong, that might answer its end; but the only practical means of effecting this is by making sure certain necessary interests of the people. Recent legislation in favor of homesteads, in favor of widows, in distribution of bounty-lands, indicate a recognition of the duty here referred to. Without an attempt to decide the question, Whose servant governments are, there is to us something repulsive in the thought that it should disregard the social relations which God has established, and should consider itself as simply the minister of cold justice. It may without injury rise to a higher level at once, and

stand as the protector of interests without which society cannot exist. We lose much in defining the province of governments by losing sight of the fact that there is a self-seeking which is also benevolence, that there are social interests which are identical with personal interests. But political economy is attempting now to establish itself on the principle that self-seeking will secure the best result through checks upon itself, not by being identical with seeking the good of others. It holds that commercial war is the natural state of man, i.e. competition is the natural state of business. Political economy teaches, or is attempting to teach, that the world will be best provided for, when every man provides for himself as best he can; that justice is best promoted by each man's making sure of his own rights. But the question is: Are men able to fight each other in this way, and all with success — is there a victory for every man? Is it not true that there must be some superintending power, protecting the weak, repressing violence? Is infinite war the same as peace,—every man's holding every other in place the same as every one's leaving every one untouched? Does infinite selfishness amount to the same thing as infinite benevolence? Morality and virtue are confessedly the highest or cheapest good if they can universally prevail; but inasmuch as they can only be imperfect in their influence, are we to enforce them by law, or are we to adopt infinite vice as the same thing as perfect virtue, and so set each man's injustice to act as a guard against any injustice towards himself? Is all legislation a mere carrying out of this principle, so that the murderer is hung, not because righteousness requires it, but because self-protection requires it? And, to carry the matter out perfectly, is a man to contend for the gratifications of self at the present moment in opposition to the self of any other time? Is he to say, of all times, *now* is the most important, only the pleasures of the present hour must not vitiate the pleasures of the present hour by giving occasion to fear for the future?

Perhaps the clergyman is in a better position to view this question than any other man, and the word of God aids him to a reply to the question, though it be one of social economy. It is supposable, indeed, that the poor and needy should contend with the strong, and appeal from physical to moral means to carry on a contest; and the poor man might declare that he and his family would starve rather than degrade themselves and degrade labor by working for inadequate wages; and so the man in power, the possessor of wealth, might have his choice between starving his neighbors or paying them fairly for their work. But this is only a supposition. The world is not peopled by heroes; men do work for such wages as they can get, and live uncomfortably if they cannot live comfortably. There is thus always a large class of the population who depend for the comforts of life on the virtue, benevolence, or justice of their employers; and the clergyman will demand a somewhat higher grade of these qualities than the mere man of the world. He will remember that the family is the atom of society; that whatever crushes that pulverizes it, reduces it to individuality and to selfishness — is sin against God. He will remember that the church cannot exist without the family, that national existence even depends upon it, and therefore that its rights must be sacredly guarded. While therefore he will, with Chalmers, teach the parents providence, and throw around all the restraints of duty, he will also claim that there is a morality for the rich, for the employer, that they may not wantonly crush the instincts of the poorer classes, and doom to single life, aimless, dreary, ending in suicide perhaps, those who are dependent upon the daily wages they receive. Nor will the clergyman be satisfied when those to whom he preaches are barely sustained in life; there are some moral qualities indispensable to the family which extreme poverty destroys. Not to speak of the wanton laceration of the family and the profaning of its sanctity which is seen in connection with slavery, there are families to be found in every land

in which fathers and mothers are obliged to labor till their muscles are knotted and their bones misshapen, till weariness is ingrained in the very tissues, till the feeling of fatigue is general and continuous, till patience is gone, till complaint, sighing, fault-finding have settled down upon the family circle like a blight; and these are in reality families no longer. When the children who are so unfortunate as to survive infancy are driven out by taskmasters, while they should still be at play or at school — when they are obliged to *earn* the bread they *eat* — the house is a slave-pen, the household has no ties that can characterize it as a family. When children show in their countenances an unnatural maturity, are wrinkled with age, and especially are prematurely old in sin, are unnaturally vicious, because they can find no diversions but in crimes against nature, then they are not really members of a family, and, practically, there is not any way open for them into the kingdom of heaven, the family of God.

The minister of Christ looking upon men in such condition as this, asks himself: Is there no protection for this class of the human race; are they to be left to themselves, and to the "tender mercies" of their employers? He will see that often there are men who with the utmost kindness furnish the poor with labor, who most benevolently care for them; but he will certainly sometimes see that the employer, driven by competition to afford his products at the lowest price, and yet resolved to make his own profits the highest possible, heartlessly sets the poor man's wages at the smallest amount. Such a view will disclose a meaning which the inspiring Spirit intended, if the apostle did not, in the text: "The wages of sin is death." A bare look at humanity shows that death is its doom if not reward. The race dies constantly, not from old age, but dies out from the distemper of poverty and consequent crime. The less favored ones are living briefly in wretchedness, and dying hopelessly; those extruded from the inner circle of privileges — the extremities of humanity, as it were — are fall-

ing constantly the victims of a wasting consumption that seems to be devouring the outskirts of the race; children are thrown into the arms of death at birth; man, hardened and debased, dies blaspheming his God; woman, wronged, crushed, in despair hurls herself unbidden to the bar of her Judge, and so death is the awful wages we receive for our work. The human race hardly increases in numbers; does not at all improve in morals, except where the Saviour of the world rescues a people for himself. He who preaches the gospel to the poor will have no doubt, in view of such facts, that governments, and all social institutions, are to be based on positive virtue, on morality, not on selfishness, not on each man's ability to take care of himself. He will have no hesitation in deciding that legislation in favor of the poor, in the form of poor-laws, or as the compulsory support of free schools, is only the legitimate increase of the wages paid by the employer; it is the wages due to the family over and above that due to the individual.

3. Another question on which the clergyman may render aid to political economy, is that of the *worth* of man. The Calvinistic theology is altogether tame in its depreciation of human dignity. The speculative divine has indeed made man damnable; but the social economists have made him contemptible. Those who judge man by what he is worth in this world, consign him to oblivion with the most perfect unconcern; even Chalmers deemed it best to admit but few human beings to enter life on this planet, but thought that God could furnish other worlds if he would have the race multiply to any great extent. But those who begin with the theological view of man's worth must hold that each man possesses in himself that which is of more value than all the world, that the soul is above all exchange; that therefore existence is of itself a blessing, if the right use be made of life; on the other hand, if life be abused, its privileges wasted, its possessor does not deserve simple annihilation as a worthless creature, but endless punishment for his guilt. He who holds to the view we have

before presented, that religion is the foundation of wealth, believing that God and nature are not yet proved to be too niggardly to support the population of the earth, will see happiness in the earthly life, and blessedness in the future, possible for all that are born into the world. The mere political economist, on the other hand, regarding only temporal well-being, knowing no means of making comparative penury consistent with a life of happiness, fearing the multiplication of the species, looks upon the floods of humanity arriving, wave after wave, upon the shores of this world with consternation, and asks: What can we do with them? — they must starve, they must steal; how shall we get rid of them? He can think of them only as destined to grow up in vice, without a generous sentiment; and, with gratitude to God for the diseases of children, he says: blessed be diphtheria and canker-rash, which sweep away these infant culprits before they begin to show what they are. There are many profound thinkers, who have speculated on the condition of man in society, who would have written Coleridge's "War Eclogue" as a Christmas carol, and would have congratulated the world on the truth of the words put into the mouth of slaughter:

> "He came by stealth and unlocked my den,
> And I have drunk the blood, since then,
> Of thrice three hundred thousand men."

One of this class is to be found in Chelsea, near London. He shuts his eyes to the future, and with a laugh and a groan and a sneer looks on the wretchedness of the present, and says: Nothing in the future can be much worse. Carlyle sees millions of men in bondage, living like brutes, dying without hope; he says: "Let them be thankful; it is the right of the lazy to have masters, and to be driven to their work." He sees nations groaning under tyranny, and says: "The groan of agony is music to the well-balanced mind; what would these wretches do if there were no one to keep them in order; they are unhappy indeed, but none

of us knows his blessings till they take their departure." He sees our own land ablaze with civil war; in the joy of his heart he says: "It is the dirtiest chimney that has been on fire for a long time; by all means let it burn." Our own gentle Emerson also sees in men only bubbles on the ocean of being, for a moment appearing, on the surface, then bursting and vanishing, of too little value to be saved.

Those who believe in a future life and in a legitimate happiness in this world, rising from the expectation of future blessedness and in an atonement for the lost, may find a possible relief for these woes of humanity. But political economy of itself promises but very partial and doubtful relief; if in this life only we have hope, the speculations to which we have referred must be admitted as sound and conclusive. In the light of revelation, however, we may declare these theories to be false, and under the influence of Christianity we may see that the crimes and immoralities of which political economy has such dread are only the legitimate fruits of heathenism and infidelity. The morals of heathenism, of infidelity, of a heathenized (Romish) Christianity, we grant, are deplorable; but must we of necessity consider them the misfortunes incident to humanity, or the evil results of falsehood, combined with the guilt of men who yield to temptation? Mere economists condemn men because they fall below a certain grade of comfort and respectability, but the Christian rejects a man as worthless only when he falls below the capability of salvation by the atonement; he holds that if one is susceptible to the influences of the Christian religion, he is not yet to be given over to disease and the sword, and says, give man first the religion of Christ, and see if he will not make good his claim to a place in the world. The propriety of this view has been abundantly established; the capability of receiving the religion of Christ is generally a test of one's capability of emerging from drunkenness or debauchery, or any form of corruption into which he may have descended. The experience of the boards of foreign

missions is to the same effect. Religion has, in the order of nature, the first place in the heart, and if it cannot be received, the things that in the providence of God are to be added to it cannot be received. All observation agrees with that of one who wrote ages before Adam Smith: "I have not seen the righteous forsaken, nor his seed begging bread." Those who hold that man's happiness begins with peace with God, agree with the philosophers, that the mass of men are now practically fallen below salvation; i.e. the members of crushed families, those who have never been subjected to the influence of the relation between parent and child, and those who have banished it, are actually, not to speak of possibilities, beyond the reach of religion. Religion, however, differs widely from political economy in this, that it looks forward with hope, political economy with fear. It sees salvation for all in the grace of God, and has no fear in trusting God's command to the earth to bring forth abundantly. The fear of the social philosophers is mainly as to the future; they see destruction coming because of the poverty of the earth; the follower of Christ sees it already come because of the sin of man. The latter sees man's ruin in himself, the former in the circumstances in which he is placed.

ARTICLE IV.

THE CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC CHURCH.

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[This is the Fourteenth of the Series of Articles representing the peculiar views of different theological sects or schools.]

EVERY great movement of God in the church is known by its conformity to the principles laid down in the New Testament, and by its suitableness to meet the necessities of its own time. He will never depart from the fundamental laws of Christianity, and, holding the times and seasons in his own hand, he will do at each epoch its proper work.

The history and claims of the body of Christians known as the "Catholic Apostolic Church" will be best understood if we first briefly review the facts connected with the origin and progress of the Christian dispensation.

After the death and resurrection of our Lord and his ascension into heaven (acts by which humanity, assumed by the Son of God in his incarnation, was redeemed and glorified), he sent down the Holy Ghost to form his body, the church. He had gathered materials for this during his earthly ministry, but the living organism first came into existence on the day of Pentecost, through the descent of the Comforter. That which distinguishes the church from the faithful who lived before the incarnation is its oneness with Christ Jesus as raised from the dead and exalted into glory. This is a condition of spiritual dignity and blessing which was unattainable until manhood had first been glorified in the person of the Son of God.

The oneness of the church with Christ is such as no symbols or analogies can fully express; but the figure of the body, so often used by Paul, sets it forth more adequately than any other. The Head and the members

together form one divine organism, the Christ mystical of the old divines, so framed as to be God's instrument for carrying forward his work of salvation in the earth. Jesus does from the heavens by his church, through the Holy Ghost, what he did personally when in mortal flesh. Then he was the Apostle (Heb. iii. 1), the sent one of the Father, entrusted by him with authority to be the founder, legislator, and ruler of his church; the Prophet (Luke xxiv. 19), anointed with the Holy Ghost to reveal the mysteries of God; the Evangelist (Luke iv. 18), sent to preach the gospel to the poor, and to unloose the bonds of the curse; and the Pastor (John x. 11), whose office it was tenderly to watch over and care for the little company that followed him.[1]

And, in order that what he thus began in his own person might be continued in his church after his departure, he gave these four ministries, according to Paul's explicit statement in his Epistle to the Ephesians: "And he gave some apostles, and some prophets, and some evangelists, and some pastors and teachers; for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ; till we all come in the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ." He could not cease to act as the ruler over his house, as the revealer of divine mysteries, as the proclaimer of the gospel of the kingdom, and as the loving shepherd of the sheep; and he therefore constituted this fourfold ministry, by which he could perpetually fulfil his functions as Head of the church. He had called the Twelve to be apostles while he was still upon the earth, that he might by his personal teachings

[1] It is worthy of consideration whether the fourfoldness of the Gospels may not be best accounted for on the supposition that they were framed by the Holy Ghost to set forth the Lord's work under these four forms of ministry. They do most strikingly exhibit, Matthew, the apostolic wisdom and authority, John, the prophetic penetration and insight, Mark, the evangelist activity and toil, and Luke, the pastoral love and gentleness, of Jesus.

train them for their future work. And, soon after his ascension, the vacancy which had been made by the apostasy of Judas was filled by means of the lot (the Holy Ghost, who was to make known his will during his absence, not having yet come); and the apostolic college stood complete on Pentecost, ready to receive the promised endowment of the Comforter.

The church thus came into existence *as an organized body*, having in its twelvefold apostolate a ministry of divine appointment entrusted with the spiritual oversight of the whole company of the disciples. The nature of their duties and the range of their authority appear from the statement in the second chapter of the Acts, that the disciples "continued steadfastly in the apostles' doctrine and fellowship, and breaking of bread, and prayers."[1] It belonged to their office to teach the doctrine of Christ, to maintain the unity of his church, to provide for the right administration of the Lord's supper, and to set in order public worship.

At the time that the apostles received their endowment through the descent of the Holy Ghost, the prophetic gift came also into manifestation. The essence of this is *supernatural utterance in the power of the Spirit*, according to the statement of Peter: "For prophecy came not at any time by the will of man; but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost" (2 Pet. i. 21). Apostleship and prophecy were the two great forms of divine manifestation in the church, answering to the second and third persons in the Godhead, by whom, in the wonderful economy of redemption, the invisible Father is revealed. The Son came forth from the bosom of the Father to declare him, and to govern the creation for him; and it is the office of the Spirit to take the things of Christ, and show

[1] From the use of the article in the Greek before each of these nouns it is clear that they all stand in the same relation to apostles. Fellowship (or communion), breaking of bread, and prayers, equally with doctrine, were committed to them.

them unto men. Apostles were the representatives of the incarnate and glorified Son, by whom, while personally absent, he guided and ruled his flock; and prophets were the special organs of the Holy Ghost, through whom he conveyed light and revelation in supernatural utterance to the church. Hence it was that God set, "first, apostles; secondarily, prophets"; the apostolic office being the higher, because Jesus is the Head, to whom the Spirit consents to be subordinated in the work of redemption. Rule by Christ, and endowment by the Holy Ghost, are the substance of all that God can do for his church.

There is no mention of any other office or ministry until the appointment of deacons. They were the representatives of the people, as the apostles were of Christ; and their functions were not so much of the Head to the members as of the members to the Head and to one another. When apostles had first conveyed grace and blessing from Christ to their disciples, and had trained them in the knowledge of his ways, there was need of an office through which the spiritual life and activity of the people should find expression, and by which the work of the Lord should be helped forward. The church first receiving from her Head in the heavens, through his ministers, should then give back to him the response of thankful and obedient service. The diaconal ministry was at once the proof that the people had profited by the husbandry of God and the organ by which they co-operated with him. Deacons were the foremost men of the flock, chosen by it to be its leaders, as those in whom the grace of God was most eminently seen, and who would be both examples of righteousness and the efficient promoters of every good work. They were the hands of the people stretched forth to help the apostles in their labors, by relieving them of the care of the poor, assisting them in the administration of the sacraments, and seeing that the great principles of Christianity were faithfully carried out amongst the flock in the ways of practical godliness.

Election by the people was the essential feature of the diaconate, as appointment by Christ was of the apostolic office. As the Lord chose his own ministers in whom he was to be represented as the Ruler, so the Christian congregation chose those who were to act for it, and through whom the spiritual powers of the body were to be drawn forth and made serviceable to the Head. Deacons were therefore permanent office-bearers in every church.

As it was impossible that apostles should take the personal oversight of the separate congregations, it became necessary that they convey authority to others to do it for them. The first ministers of local churches (apart from deacons) were elders or presbyters, whose office it was to teach doctrine, administer sacraments, and have the spiritual charge of the people. There was a plurality of these in every fully organized congregation, for we read of the elders in Jerusalem (Acts xi. 30; xv. 4); of the elders whom Paul and Barnabas ordained in every church (xiv. 23); and of the elders who came from Ephesus to meet Paul at Miletus. At a later period, as we see from the epistles to the seven churches of the Apocalypse, there was a further development of ministry, and an angel (a chief pastor or bishop) was set over each of the principal congregations. These separate or local churches were bound into unity by the all-embracing jurisdiction of the apostles, with whom were associated prophets for revealing the mind of God, and evangelists (like Timothy) for the carrying forth of the gospel.

Some years after the church thus began to be framed Paul was called to be an apostle. This was occasioned by the refusal of the Jews to receive the grace of God sent to them by their crucified Messiah. If his people of the seed of Abraham will not become the body of his Son, he will turn to the Gentiles, and take out his election from among them. Saul of Tarsus, although a Jew by birth, was also a Roman citizen, and therefore *legally* a Gentile, and so a suitable instrument for transferring the blessings of Chris-

tianity from Israel to the nations. This remarkable transaction, by which an apostle was called and separated to his office, without even the knowledge of Peter and his brethren, proved that the number of the apostles was not to be limited to the first twelve; that the Lord's personal presence upon the earth was not necessary to the appointment of an apostle; that to have been with Christ during his public ministry was not an indispensable qualification for the office, as in the case of Matthias; and that no man, or number of men — not even apostles themselves — could appoint to it.

Paul was pre-eminently the apostle to the Gentiles, as Peter was to the circumcision. He was not called to fill a vacancy, but to be the beginning of a new and distinct apostolate. Although in Christ Jesus there is neither Jew nor Greek, the twelve had a special mission to the Jews, for the order of God is "to the Jew first, and also to the Greek"; and they stood in a special relation to them, as is shown by the promise that in the age to come they "shall sit on twelve thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel." In this promise Paul had no part, but his peculiar work was to gather out the church from the Gentiles, and prepare her as a bride for the return of the Lord from heaven. How important a place he held in the development of Christianity appears from this, that he was the great teacher of the church by whom, more than by all the other apostles, the mystery of Christ was opened. His epistles have been the chief storehouse of doctrine for all generations. All the deepest truths concerning the eternal purpose of God in Christ Jesus, redemption from sin through his blood, the nature of the church as his body, with its sacraments, ministries, and endowments, the resurrection, and the hope of his coming and kingdom, are set forth by him with incomparable fulness and power. And his great practical aim, especially in the earlier years of his apostolic ministry, as the Epistles to the Thessalonians show, was to urge the church

onward to that spiritual perfection which must be her adorning for the marriage.

But the church would not go on as Paul so urgently desired, and the punishment was the postponement of the Lord's return, and the loss of the apostolic office. It was with her as with Israel of old. After the giving of the law at Mt. Sinai (which answered to the Christian Pentecost), a few months would have sufficed to take the tribes into the promised land, and their forty years of wandering in the wilderness were the fruit and chastisement of their unbelief. So the church refused to press forward with joyful confidence into the kingdom which her Lord had promised to bring with him at his coming, but shrank from the holy and searching discipline by which she must be purified from sin, and became entangled in the lusts of this world. Paul saw very early the workings of the spirit of apostasy, and thus expressed his fears to the Corinthians: "For I am jealous over you with godly jealousy; for I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin to Christ; but I fear, lest by any means, as the serpent beguiled Eve through his subtlety, so your mind should be corrupted from the simplicity that is in Christ." That which he feared came to pass. The serpent prevailed the second time, and the church fell from her heavenly standing. The marriage must be deferred, for the wife of the Lamb would not make herself ready.

This failure of the church to follow Paul in "pressing toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus," and so to prepare the way for her Lord's return, was in analogy with all the preceding dispensations. God has always suffered himself to be defeated at the first, that the weakness and instability of the creature might be fully manifested, and the glory of the final victory be given to him alone. He does not abandon his purpose, but he allows it to be temporarily frustrated by the sin of man. This has been the law of his actings from the beginning of the world.

When it became clear that the church would not then be made ready for her Lord's coming, the apostolic office was suffered to cease. Apostles were "stewards of the mysteries of God," entrusted with the riches of his house, as Eliezer in the family of Abraham, for the adorning of the bride whom he would give to his Son; and if they could not prepare and present her to the Lord, their great work had failed.[1] Inferior ministers could teach what was necessary to personal salvation, and so keep the church from extinction until the time when God's purpose could remain unfulfilled no longer.

The death of the apostles left the church without any visible bond of unity. There remained a multitude of separate congregations, each with its own threefold ministry of angel, elders, and deacons, but without any higher ordinance to bind them together as co-organized members of one body. The inevitable result, though greatly checked for a time by the bloody persecutions which followed the apostolic age, was animosities and strifes and divisions, which there was no adequate authority to restrain and heal. The need of some means of effecting unity was strongly felt, and men could not but long for it in proportion as they had the Spirit of Christ; but instead of crying to God to restore to them what they had lost, they resorted to devices of their own to supply the want. The first step, gradually and almost insensibly taken, was to enlarge the jurisdiction of the bishops by giving them the rule of large districts, each containing many churches. The effect of this was well-nigh to change the nature of the episcopal office from the care of souls to the oversight of congregations, and to rob the smaller churches of the blessing of a resident chief

[1] This implies no fault on the part of the apostles, but of the church. Nor was their work a failure, except in a relative sense. They laid broad and deep the foundations of Christianity, and gave to the church a faith and order and worship which have never been wholly lost. But it is none the less true that the apostles to the circumcision failed to bring the Jews into the obedience of Christ, and that Paul failed to lead the Gentile church to the stature of his fulness.

pastor by committing them to the charge of elders or deacons. And as this did not suffice to produce unity and harmony, inasmuch as the bishops would quarrel among themselves, metropolitans and patriarchs were constituted, following therein the civil divisions of the Roman Empire, that the number of supreme judges might be lessened, and there be a nearer approximation to a central authority.

When the rending of the church by heresies made it plain that episcopal authority was insufficient to hold it together, the next step was to call in the aid of the civil power. After the conversion of Constantine, he was made *a quasi-apostle* (ὁ ἰσαπόστολος) through the unfaithfulness of the bishops to their Master in the heavens, who had promised to be with them to the end of the world, and who could not but be grieved that the powers of this world should be allowed, and even invited, to usurp his place. It was the beginning of that subjection of the church to the state which has been the fruitful source of spiritual weakness and corruption in all countries and in all ages. That the kings of the earth should be suffered, in return for their protection and patronage, to hold the bride of Christ in vassalage, and to give laws in his house, is that sin of adultery for which Babylon is to be burned with fire.

It needed not the experience of many centuries to prove that no supremacy of worldly rulers in the church could constrain her to "keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace." If the emperor was orthodox, heresy was punished by fire and sword; if he became Arian, the orthodox bishops were hunted from their dioceses when the blandishments of wealth and power were ineffectual to seduce them from the faith. This was eminently true in the Eastern Empire, and it is, perhaps, a just retribution that the church within its borders has for many ages been in helpless bondage to the antichristian rule of Mohammed.

In Western Christendom a different method was gradually resorted to, and a grand but false solution of the problem of church unity was wrought out by constituting the

bishop of Rome the vicar of Christ, and investing him with absolute ecclesiastical and spiritual authority. There was a twofold error in this. It substituted the pastoral ministry for the apostolic in the rule of the universal church, and it wrongfully filled a place which the Lord would have remain vacant till his return — that of Head of the church upon the earth. Strictly speaking, the place is not vacant, for he has not ceased to be Head, although now personally absent for the fulfilment of his priestly ministry in the heavens. He is, and must ever remain, the universal bishop, and he delegates the office to no man during his absence, that the church may the more keenly feel her incompleteness without him, and cry to him to hasten his return. Apostles were not substitutes for the Head; they were as the right hand by which the Head put forth his power, and guided his flock. And it was a mark of their office that they continually testified of the absent One, and sought to prepare the way of his return. The usurpation of this place of headship by the Roman pastor tempted the church to forget that she was a widow. She thought the kingdom had already come, for here was a priest sitting on a throne. This forestalling of the glory of the age to come, when the true Melchizedek, King and Priest in one, shall reign, opened the way for the greatest abuses. The church grasped at dominion before the time, and her heavenly mission as a witness to her absent Lord, until whose coming again she was to be a stranger and pilgrim in the earth, was changed into the fleshly enjoyment of the kingdom without him. The future dispensation ceased to be an object of hope, because it was anticipated and usurped in the present. The glory of the millennial age was caricatured by the building up of a polity of worldly power and splendor, in which Rome counterfeited the heavenly Jerusalem. The sacraments were materialized, and almost all great spiritual truths were changed from objects of faith into images of sense. This robbing the Lord of his prerogatives as Head of the church by giving them to a man, led

on to the dishonoring of the blood of his cross by joining other mediators to him, and ascribing to the intercession of his mother and his saints an efficacy which belongs to the sacrifice and mediation of our great High Priest alone.

It was clearly impossible that the return of the Lord could be prepared for under such a system. There could be no lively longing for it, for had he not set his vicar in the earth with all royal rights and spiritual endowments, by whom his kingdom should be established? And the dogma that the church was infallible (another anticipation of the future glory) closed the door against repentance, and so against recovery, for which repentance must ever prepare the way. The Reformation was necessary to shatter a system which so presumptuously anticipated, and so skilfully counterfeited, the future kingdom; and so mightily was it helped forward of God that it broke off from the Roman communion one third of the churches which had submitted to the spiritual sway of the pope. It was mainly a protest against usurpation. It said to the bishop of Rome: "Thou art *not* the head of the church, and these saints whom thou hast canonized are *not* mediators between God and man." It vindicated for Christ the sufficiency of his sacrifice to make atonement for sin, apart from all merit of the creature; and for every man the liberty of access to his cross for pardon and peace. It also put into the hands of the people the open Bible, and so made it possible for God to lead them forward into the more full knowledge of his will.

But the Reformation was not itself the perfect work which must precede and prepare for the second coming of the Lord. It was a powerful and effectual protest against error, but only a partial recovery of truth. It denounced and rejected the usurped authority of the bishop of Rome, but made no effort to regain the apostolic office, the only divine ordinance for the rule of the universal church. The result was antagonisms and strifes and schisms without end. In many cases the power of the papacy, which was at least ecclesiastical, was replaced by the power of kings and par-

liaments, who had not even the semblance of right to interfere with the faith and worship and discipline of the church. In resisting and casting off an unlawful spiritual dominion, the Reformers almost inevitably rushed into the opposite extreme, and magnified unduly the rights of the individual as against the law of the body, fostering thereby the spirit of rebellion, and sowing the seeds of rationalism, which springs from the abuse of private judgment. The recoil from superstition led to irreverence, and the worship of the reformed churches, from the too indiscriminate rejection of the ancient rites because of their profanation, became barren and unedifying. The intellectual element predominated over the spiritual, and controversy took the place of devotion. The Reformers were not, indeed, as the Roman Catholics claim, lawless subverters of the faith, for they retained the scriptures, the creeds, and the sacraments; but their great work was to break down a false system which blocked the way of recovery, rather than to rebuild the church after the divine pattern, for which the time had not yet come.

The greatest triumphs of the Reformation were won within its first half century. The Church of Rome soon rallied, and, mainly through the extraordinary skill and energy and self-sacrifice of the Jesuits, prevailed to stay its progress. To this the disgraceful quarrels of the Reformers, and the glaring defects of the new religious systems largely contributed. So long as they were merely assailants they were irresistible, for it was impossible to defend the corruptions of the Church of Rome. But when they attempted to provide substitutes for the old forms and institutions, their failure was as striking as their success had been. They were broken into a hundred parties, each of which framed a polity for itself, such as the opinions of its leader or the force of circumstances required, and often with as little reference to the letter of the scriptures as to the traditions of the past. Nothing could be more Babel-like than the confusion into which the Reformers came both as to church order and doctrine. There was little agreement

as to the meaning and efficacy of sacraments, and great neglect and disorder marked their administration. It was not possible, nor would it have been a blessing, to bring the whole Western church to accept the results of the Reformation, mighty a work of God as it undeniably was. There were too many precious things left behind in Rome to be finally abandoned and lost. She bore a witness to great truths which Protestantism overlooked or rejected. The unity, visibility, and spiritual authority of the church; the dignity of worship; and the importance of the holy eucharist, as well for intercession with God as for the nourishment of the faithful, were kept *as ideas* in the minds of men, in spite of all the errors and abuses into which she fell in her efforts to realize them.

The Reformation and the Roman Catholic reaction were both followed by religious stagnation, only temporarily broken by such movements as Puritanism and Methodism in England, and Pietism in Germany. The hopeless antagonism in which these great divisions of the church lay interlocked, generated a spirit of indifference, and finally of unbelief, in respect to Christianity itself. For a long time this worked noiselessly within the existing forms of social and ecclesiastical life, but at length, about the year 1792, it broke out into open manifestation in France as the avowed and implacable enemy of God and his anointed Son. It was a new form of wickedness which then burst upon the gaze of the affrighted world. Christianity had been fearfully corrupted by the sins of former generations; it was now utterly abolished. A great nation in the very heart of Christendom rose up to break God's bands asunder, and to blot out the name of Christ from the earth. And for a little while the Lord's authority seemed utterly overthrown, for every symbol of his presence and every memorial of his acts were swept away. It had been foretold that wickedness should come to its height in the last days, and antichrist, the rival and mockery of God's incarnate Son, be revealed; and when this terrible manifestation of

impiety broke forth, and was soon followed by the fiery splendors of Napoleon's godless career, many were roused to the study of the prophetic scriptures to find out what these great and unparalled events betokened. The French Revolution opened the way for a new epoch in the history of the church, as it also introduced a new order of things into the social and political condition of Christendom. It was not the end of the dispensation, as many good men thought, but it was the beginning of the end. It was the first shock of the last earthquake. God suffered this premature outbreak as a revelation to the church and the nations of the elements of evil that were working in the midst of them, and as the first note of the trumpet of alarm that should announce the coming of his Son; and then he bridled in the tempest, and restored to society somewhat of its ancient order, that men might have a season of tranquility for the mighty work of preparation that was needed.

Among the first tokens of reviving life was the evangelical movement in the church of England, which was a protest against "the form of godliness without the power," and was marked in its earlier stages by deep sincerity and spiritual earnestness. About the same time the scriptures began to be circulated with new zeal, and the missionary spirit to be kindled; and the foundations were then laid of many of those great religious societies through which the church, in the absence of divine ordinances, has sought to fulfil her work as the teacher of the nations. Rudely awaked out of sleep by the awful convulsion, she grasped the weapons which were nearest at hand, to drive back the foe whose features of terror were now for the first time plainly seen.

Along with this increase of religious zeal and activity was a deeper unfolding of doctrine. Not only were the prophetic parts of the Bible studied with unwonted earnestness to learn what light they threw upon the perilous time to which the church had come, but the central mystery of the incarnation, the constant theme of the great Christian

Fathers, began to emerge from its long neglect. The hope of the coming and kingdom of Christ, which shone so brightly in the apostolic age, dawned again on many hearts; and the truth that Jesus is the baptizer with the Holy Ghost, was seen to contain in it rich promises of spiritual power and endowment for the church. These three great parts of the Lord's work, that which he did in our fallen flesh, that which he is now doing in sending the Comforter for the forming and energizing of his body, and that which he is to do in the age to come when he shall be revealed in his glory, were set forth from the pulpit and the press by many of God's faithful servants (and by none more powerfully than by Mr. Irving, a Presbyterian minister of the church of Scotland) about the beginning of the second quarter of this century.

The importance of prayer for the outpouring of the Holy Spirit began also to be deeply felt, and the heart of a minister of the church of England, the Rev. J. Haldane Stewart, was moved to press this duty upon Christians of every name. He wrote a tract specially referring to the promise in Joel, "I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh,"[1] which was widely circulated in England and on the Continent; and pious people of all denominations met together to pray for its fulfilment. In the year 1830, the answer to this cry

[1] In the appendix to the tract he gave a form of prayer to be used, of which the following words are a part: "Remember thy covenant, O Lord. Hast thou not said, 'I will pour out my Spirit on all flesh?' ..... O grant that thy Holy Spirit may enlighten our understanding. May he 'guide us into all truth.' ..... Grant that the bishops, pastors, and all ministers may be filled with the gifts and graces of the Holy Spirit. ..... Revive thy work in all parts of thy church. ..... May thy people be of one heart and of one mind. ..... 'O that thou wouldst rend the heavens, and come down; that the mountains might flow down at thy presence.' ..... 'Put on thy strength, O arm of the Lord.' Confound the works of darkness; utterly abolish the idols; destroy the dominion of Satan throughout the world. ..... Remember thine ancient people, the Jews; thy promises to Abraham and Isaac. May Jew and Gentile be 'one fold under one Shepherd.' ..... May the whole earth be filled with thy glory. May every knee bow to the name of Jesus, and 'every tongue confess that he is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.'" Mr. Stewart did not, however, look for anything supernatural, nor did he receive the "gifts" when they came.

for the Holy Ghost was vouchsafed, although, as has so often been the case in God's dealings with men, in a way very different from what most looked for. A young woman in Scotland, Miss Mary Campbell (a sister of Isabella Campbell, whose Memoirs were widely circulated almost forty years ago), a devout member of the Presbyterian church, who had been praying for the restoration of the gifts of the Spirit, was made to speak in supernatural power in tongues and prophesying. Not long after, the same power came upon two brothers and a sister named Macdonald, residing at Port Glasgow, persons highly honored in all the region around for their simplicity of character and holiness of life. These spiritual manifestations naturally attracted much attention, and in the summer of the same year several gentlemen, who, with one exception, were members of the church of England, went down from London to make personal examination of the facts. Being convinced by what they saw and heard that it was a true work of the Holy Spirit, they, on their return, in concert with others who believed their report, established meetings at each other's houses to pray for the restoration of the gifts of the Comforter. It was not till April of the following year that any supernatural manifestation took place, and then in a lady of the Episcopal church under the pastoral care of the Rev. Baptist Noel. But during the course of that year (1831) several other persons, both in the church of England and among the Presbyterians and Dissenters, received the same gift of spiritual utterance.

These utterances were in the twofold form of "tongues and prophesyings," which differed in this, that the latter were in the living language of the people, who could understand them and be edified by them, while the former were ordinarily unintelligible both to the speaker and the hearers, being a mode of communication between God and the spirit of the person thus used by the Holy Ghost, which transcended the powers of the understanding. "He that speaketh in a tongue, speaketh not unto men, but unto

God; for no man understandeth him; howbeit, in the Spirit he speaketh mysteries. But he that prophesieth speaketh unto men to edification, and exhortation, and comfort. He that speaketh in a tongue edifieth himself; but he that prophesieth edifieth the church" (1 Cor. xiv. 2–4). The utterance in a tongue was also a sign of unbelief and unpreparedness to hear all that God wished to say, which compelled him, as it were, to use unknown forms of speech. "Wherefore tongues are for a sign, not to them that believe, but to them that believe not; but prophesying serveth not for them that believe not, but for them which believe" (1 Cor. xiv. 22). Such utterances by a sober-minded and honest man, proved that his organs of speech were used by a power other than his own, and so was a call to men to listen to the words of the Holy Ghost, whose presence was thus betokened.

The burden of the prophetic utterances was the speedy coming of the Lord to set up his kingdom in the earth, the judgments about to fall upon Christendom, the sorrow of God over his scattered and desolate flock, his love which still lingered and longed to save, the humiliation and glory of Christ, and the necessity of a work of recovery and rebuilding in the church to prepare his way. Much light was thrown upon the dark places of the scriptures, especially the typical and prophetical parts; the Holy Ghost thus bringing out the treasures of wisdom and knowledge which he had hidden under the facts and institutions of the Old Testament, and showing the bearings of all former revelations upon the church at the end of the dispensation. Many most searching words were also spoken for the edifying of individuals, by which the thoughts of the heart were revealed, the conscience cleansed, and the spirit filled with the life and joy of the Lord.

These spiritual manifestations, accompanied by many works of divine power, such as the healing of the sick in answer to prayer, or by the word of faith, continued with increasing frequency and fulness until the close of the year

1832, when a new and most important step in the progress of the work was taken. Almost from the very first there had been much said in the prophetic utterances of the need of *a body*, which pointed to the recovery of all the ministries which God had set in the church as the body of Christ. And when the reality of the prophetic gift had been fully established by the experience of almost three years, and its inability, also, by itself to lead the church onward to perfection, the office of apostle which, in its full development and proper form, had been in abeyance since the death of John, was again revived. The apostolate to the Gentiles, of which the beginning and pattern were seen in Paul,[1] was restored, in order that the work of presenting the church as a chaste virgin to Christ at his coming, which Paul was compelled to leave unfinished, might be taken up and carried to its completion. And as the mind of God concerning him was expressed to the church by the Holy Ghost speaking through prophets at Antioch (Acts xiii. 1–3), so now it was by the same voice of prophecy that his will that others should serve him in the same office was made known. It is the Comforter, the Spirit of Christ, who, in his absence, calls men to the ministries of his house; and all who believe him to be speaking again by the mouths of men, as he did of old, will have no difficulty in receiving those on whom he puts the name of apostle, and in whom they discern the grace of God. It is true that the Lord Jesus Christ, and not the Holy Ghost, is Head of the church, and a call to office through a prophet is not, therefore, creative and constitutive, but only *reveals* the purpose and will of God. *Authority* within the sphere of the creation is given by the Father and the Son (with whom, *in Godhead*,

[1] Paul speaks of himself (1 Cor. xv. 8) as one prematurely born, an ἔκτρωμα; not one born after the time, but one born before the time. This may be true of him in a double sense: as a Jew, converted before his nation, by the personal manifestation of the Lord, as they also will be at his second coming (Zech. xii. 10); and as an apostle to the Gentiles, called to that office too soon to see its completion at the end of the dispensation.

the Spirit is one), and for this reason the word of prophecy, as we see in the Epistles to Timothy, simply designated to office, and was effectuated by ordination, as the act of the Lord through his ministers. But in the case of apostles no ordination is possible. It belongs to the nature of their office that they be sent immediately by Christ: "As my Father hath sent me, even so send I you"; "Paul, an apostle, not of men, neither by man, but by Jesus Christ and God the Father who raised him from the dead." The laying-on of hands at Antioch was not for consecration, but for *separation* ("Separate me Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto I have called them"); for dismissal with the blessing of the church from their special ministries there, to enter upon a higher service to which not man, but God, had called them. Matthias was not ordained, but *numbered* with the eleven.

In the case of an apostle, the call of the Holy Ghost is God's witness to the fact that a divine appointment has been made. It was on this ground that a member of the church of England, a layman who had previously fulfilled no ministry, was received as an apostle in those congregations in which the revived gifts of the Spirit were exercised. Others were afterwards, from time to time, called to the same office, until, about the middle of 1835, the number was completed, and a twelvefold apostolate was again seen in the church. They were then solemnly separated in an assembly of the churches to their appropriate work, and commended, with imposition of hands and words of blessing, to the grace of God.

One of their first acts subsequently to this, was to prepare a testimony of what God was doing, which in January 1836 was presented to the bishops of the church of England and Ireland, and to many of the clergy; and in 1838 a larger testimony was presented to the rulers in church and state throughout Europe. In these documents the evils pervading society in all Christian lands were traced to their true spiritual source—the departure of the church from God;

the hope of the Lord's coming was held up as the only promise of deliverance; and the recovery of the original structure and endowments of the church was testified to as already begun, in preparation for the approaching kingdom of Christ. At this time the movement was confined chiefly to Great Britain and Ireland, but it gradually extended itself into other countries, especially North Germany; and there are now congregations in almost every land where liberty of worship is given by the laws.

Such is a brief history of the origin of the body known as the "Catholic Apostolic Church."[1] It will come next in order to speak of its organization, doctrines, and worship, and of the relations in which it stands to the rest of the Christian church.

Organization.

The whole company of the baptized are regarded as constituting the church, which is one and visible, — the one vine, the one temple of God, the one body of Christ, the one bride of the Lamb. But as it must of necessity exist in separate congregations, there arises the distinction between the church catholic or universal and the local church embracing the faithful within a limited district. We have already seen that when it came into existence as

[1] They do not lay claim to the name "Catholic Apostolic" as exclusively their own, but they use it as the proper designation of the one body of Christ, of which they are an organic part, and they refuse to be called by any other. They do this on the ground that it is wrong to affix to the church the name of an eminent leader, like Luther or Calvin or Wesley; or one founded upon some feature of church polity, such as Episcopal, Presbyterian, or Congregational; or one derived from some peculiar doctrine or rite, as Baptist or Free-will Baptist; or one expressing geographical limitations, such as Roman, Greek, Anglican, or Moravian. The essential characteristic of a thing should be expressed by its name, and the church has for its three chief features, *Unity*, as the only organism of which Christ is the head; *Catholicity*, as having a universal mission; and *Apostolicity*, as sent by Christ into the world, even as he was sent by the Father. It is a significant fact that this name, adopted in the Nicene Creed, has practically everywhere been changed, as into the *Roman* Catholic, the *Greek* Orthodox, the *Protestant* Episcopal, or something still narrower and more sectarian.

an organized body on the day of Pentecost apostles were the only ministers, and that they were not circumscribed in their authority by any territorial boundaries, but were entrusted by Christ with rule over his whole flock. As the church grew by the carrying forth of the gospel, distinct congregations were necessarily formed in the different cities of the empire, but they were all under the jurisdiction of the apostles. An apt illustration is furnished by our own political structure, in which there is a central government for the whole country as one, while each state has its own separate yet similar institutions.

Apostles are ministers in the universal as distinct from the local church, and now, as in the beginning, they are the ultimate tribunal by which all questions of doctrine and discipline are to be decided. They are the representatives of Christ in the highest functions of rule, by whom he gives true and effectual guidance to his people, and brings forth his commandments in living forms suited to the circumstances of the time. They ordain to the ministry those who have been called thereto by the voice of prophecy, and lay hands on the people for the conferring of the gift of the Holy Ghost. They prescribe the order and appoint the forms of divine worship, and have the general oversight of the churches in all that pertains to their spiritual well-being.

With apostles are associated prophets, whose office it is to be used of the Holy Ghost for the giving of light on the scriptures, for the calling of men to the ministry, and for the revealing of the mind of Christ to his church in whatever form — of rebuke, or consolation, or illumination — her present necessities may require. But they do not act upon the revelations which they are the instruments of bringing forth; their work is done when they have given utterance to the word which the Lord speaks by them; and it belongs to the apostles to discern its meaning, and to put it to its right use. These two ministries (so often joined together in the New Testament, Eph. ii. 20; iii. 5; 2 Pet. iii. 2) answer to

the two cherubim of the tabernacle from which God spoke in commandment unto the children of Israel (Exod. xxv. 22); for they constitute the perfect spiritual instrumentality by which he makes known his will to his church.

Evangelists are used in preaching the gospel of the kingdom wherever the way is opened; their mission being, not so much to draw men to Christ by presenting to them the rudiments of Christianity (a work everywhere going on in the church), as to announce to those already believing in him his speedy coming, and God's way of preparation for it. Their work is typified in the servant who was sent forth *at supper-time* (at the end of the dispensation) to say to them that were already bidden, "Come, for all things are now ready" (Luke xiv. 17).

The principal local churches are each under the care of an angel, or chief pastor, who constitutes the link of communion between his own flock and the apostles. There are also those having the pastoral gift and form of character who are not set over congregations, but are used by the apostles as their helpers in matters more immediately pertaining to the care of souls.

There is thus a fourfold ministry in the church universal, by means of which the grace and blessing which are in Christ Jesus, are conveyed to his people. This is not an arbitrary or temporary division of offices, but it grows out of the unchangeable constitution of man, in whom there is a fourfoldness of character answering to these forms of ministry. Strength and firmness of will guided by wisdom qualify for rule; and they find their highest expression in the apostle. Imagination, which soars into heaven and glances swiftly over the earth, discovering hidden analogies and subtile meanings in all things, lends an enchantment to human life; and when filled with divine light it is the gift and mark of the prophet. The understanding, the faculty which adapts means to ends, and draws conclusions from premises, enables man to reason with his fellow-man; and it should be seen pre-eminently in the evangelist, whose

work it is to address arguments and motives to awaken faith, and to lead to repentance. The affections, which are the strongest bond and the greatest solace of our earthly life, should abound in the pastor, whose duty it is to carry the consolations of Christ into all the regions of human sorrow, and to minister the remedies of the gospel to all spiritual maladies.

All these intellectual and spiritual powers are found, though in very different degrees, in every man; and Christianity addresses itself to them all, and seeks to call them forth, and to transfigure them into the glory of Christ. This it does most effectually by forms of ministry based upon, and adapted to, these natural diversities of character. Through the rule of the apostle order is brought into the church, and men are taught how to exercise authority in meekness, and to yield obedience in the spirit of Christian liberty; through the spiritual utterances of the prophet the imagination is kindled, and lifted up into a heavenly sphere, where it feels the presence and beholds the glory of the living God; through the reasonable and quickening word of the evangelist the understanding is convinced and the conscience cleansed; while the love and sympathy of the pastor shed peace and joy into the hearts of the sorrowing, and give strength to the weak and fainting spirit.

This fourfoldness of ministry is also brought out in the local church, in so far as circumstances permit. In every fully organized congregation there is a body of elders; and as Christ, the Angel of the church universal, has under him a fourfold ministry of apostles, prophets, evangelists, and pastors, so the angel of every church, by whom he is represented, should have the same four forms of ministry in his elders, some of whom should be associated with him in the rule of the flock, while by others the prophetic, evangelist, and pastoral ministries should be exercised. The local church thus becomes an image in miniature of the church universal, having the same fourfold channels of the grace of God.

The deacons are chosen by the people, and ordained by the apostle, or by the angel of the church in which they are to minister. Their office is to assist in the public services of God's house, especially in the holy eucharist; to be the counsellors of the people in worldly difficulties, and in the application of Christian principles to every-day life; to minister to the wants of the poor; and, as there may be need, to preach and to baptize. They are assisted by under-deacons as the necessities of the congregation may require.

There are also deaconesses who perform like services for the female members of the flock, and render assistance to the ministers in the spiritual oversight of families, and in the visiting of women living alone, or so situated as to make the labors of their own sex more suitable.

Those who are most eminent for gifts in every congregation are thus brought to serve God in some of the various forms of ministry which he has ordained; and in order that all the energies of the willing-hearted may be profitably exerted, the deacons and deaconesses organize and direct the labors of those who offer themselves for any service within the church, or for the help of the poor and perishing without. In this way the churches may be kept both from stagnation and from self-guided individual enterprises, and become as a well-ordered host for the waging of their holy warfare.

This is in substance the polity of the "Catholic Apostolic Church," and it will be seen at a glance how far it conforms to the New Testament, and what points of agreement it has with the principal ecclesiastical systems now existing. With the church of Rome, it provides a centre of unity for all Christendom; but it does this, not by the rule of a bishop, but by a college of apostles. With the Episcopal churches of Greece and England and America, it has the threefold ministry of bishops, priests, and deacons; but in place of enormous dioceses, which make true Episcopal oversight an impossibility, it gives this ministry to every church which can sustain it by its tithes and offerings. With Presbyteri-

anism, it has pastors, elders, and deacons; but it gives to elders the authority to preach and to administer sacraments. It agrees with Congregationalism in recognizing the local church when completely developed, as having all forms of ministry within itself, and as not subordinated to any confederacy of churches; but it differs from it in having a bond of unity in apostles entrusted by Christ with the rule of his church universal.

The leading features of this polity are plainly in harmony with the great movements and tendencies now beginning to show themselves in all parts of the church. Everywhere there is a longing for unity, and a striving to restore intercommunion between divided churches and separated brethren. The exaggerated extent of dioceses is acknowledged, and successful efforts are making to bring them more nearly to the primitive pattern. The want of a true diaconate (which, except in name, scarcely exists throughout the larger part of the Christian church) is felt and admitted, and there is a movement among the Episcopalians to make the office something more than a mere stepping-stone to the priesthood. The order of deaconesses is also re-appearing in many quarters, and bands of charitable women are organized for labors of mercy among the poor and the afflicted. The office of evangelist is taking form in missionary bishops, in preachers detached from the pastoral charge, and devoted to labor for the conversion of souls, and in state agents[1] whose duty it is made to visit the churches of a district, especially those which are feeble and languishing, and rouse them to Christian fidelity. There is a loud call, also, for an increase of laborers in the Christian field, and it is proposed to use laymen, or men who have not received a regular academic training, and who need not be wholly separated from secular employments, as has been already extensively done in the case of colporteurs. These acknowledged necessities seem to be met by a polity which gives to the universal church the apostolic ministry with

[1] As in the Congregational churches of Connecticut.

its helps of prophets, evangelists, and pastors; and to the separate churches, angels, elders, deacons, and deaconesses, thus making large provision for the spiritual wants of the people, and calling into orderly exercise all the gifts of the Holy Ghost bestowed upon them.

It will come next in order to speak of

Doctrine.

It was one of the most important of the apostolic functions in the beginning to teach *the truth as it is in Jesus;* that is, the truth as revealed in the incarnation, life, death, and resurrection of the Son of God. The first explicit statement of Christian doctrine was made by Peter on the day of Pentecost, when the apostles received their endowment, and began their work. It was mainly a testimony unto Jesus of Nazareth. It affirmed him to be a man born of the seed of David to sit on his father David's throne, and commended unto the people by mighty signs and wonders which God had wrought by him; but a holy man, whom God would not suffer to see corruption when wicked men had put him to death, but brought his body from the grave and his soul from hades, and exalted him to sit at his own right hand as Lord and Christ, until his enemies should be made his footstool. From this glory of the throne of God he had sent down the Holy Ghost, whom he had received of the Father, to convey to his disciples the fruits of his victory and reward.

In this short sermon we have the germ of all Christian doctrine. Almost every article of the creeds, explicitly or by implication, is contained in it. His sonship in the Godhead, his human nature as born of the house of David, his unspotted holiness, his death according to the divine purpose, yet by the responsible hands of wicked men, his resurrection, his ascension, his investiture with all power and authority, his sending the Spirit to dwell with his church during his absence, and his coming again for the overthrow of his enemies, and to sit on his father David's throne, and

fill the earth with his glory — all these fundamental truths were set forth by the apostle in this his first sermon. If to this we add his reply on the same day to the multitudes: "Repent, and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost," we have, substantially, the contents of the great Catholic creeds.

The apostles did not themselves, so far as appears, draw up any summary of the Christian faith, but taught the truth, orally and in their epistles, as the necessities of the time demanded. While they lived there was no need of creeds, or dogmatic statements elaborately prepared, for they were a living tribunal to whom all questions as to the faith could be referred. But after their departure, when there was no longer any centre of unity and authority to the church, and no apostolic power of dealing with heresies, there was a necessity for symbols, as watchwords by which those who held the ancient faith might be known to each other, and to serve as bulwarks against the encroachments of error. Of these there are three which have been most generally received in the church, those called severally the Apostles', the Nicene, and the Athanasian. With the single exception of the clause "Filioque," which teaches the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son as well as from the Father, and has never been received by the Greeks, they may properly be called the Creeds of the Universal church. They were all retained by the Reformers as expressing the "Faith once delivered to the saints," and transmitted by unbroken tradition. Other creeds have been added to these, either by way of explanation, or to supplement their supposed deficiencies; and there are Protestant sects which have rejected them, in whole or in part, and put others in their place. But whatever may be the merits or demerits of the Roman Creed of Pope Pius, or of the Thirty-nine Articles of the church of England, or of the Presbyterian Westminster Confession, or of the Lutheran Confession of Augsburg, they cannot be regarded as the common symbols of Christendom.

One of the duties of the restored apostles has been to teach the doctrine of Christ. There were two sources from which it was to be derived, the scriptures and the traditions of the church. In respect to the first they hold to their plenary inspiration, as given by God to be an authoritative standard throughout all generations. They teach from the scriptures, they commend them to the study of all the faithful, and they cherish in the churches the gift of prophecy, by which the living interpretation of the Spirit is given, and light is continually shed upon the written word.

In respect to the traditions of the church they believe that the Holy Ghost has been present with it according to the promise of Christ, and has preserved in it a witness to the truth. Whatever its corruptions and errors may have been, God would not suffer, and has not suffered, it to make shipwreck of the faith, for that would have involved the failure of his work of redemption. They have adopted, therefore, those three creeds which best deserve the name of catholic, and have appointed them to be used in the services of the churches. The candidates for baptism must give their assent to the Apostles' Creed, which is also recited before God by all the people in the daily worship, morning and evening. The Nicene Creed[1] forms a part of the service of the eucharist, which is celebrated every Lord's day. And the Athanasian Creed is solemnly said on the four great feast days of the Christian year, Christmas, Easter, Pentecost, and All-Saints. Nor do they use any other confessions of faith. They regard these as setting

[1] In respect to the clause "Filioque," they say, in a note at the end of the Office of the eucharist: "The Creed in the above office is set forth in the form used in the churches in the West. The churches in the East use the Creed in the form in which it was left by the Council of Constantinople. It does not follow that these two great divisions in the Christian church are irreconcilably opposed on the doctrine involved in that clause, which the Western churches affirm, and which the Eastern churches abstain from affirming; and until a competent authority shall pronounce thereon, it seems unreasonable that either form should be universally imposed."

forth the fundamental doctrines of the Christian religion, and whatever more is necessary in the way of exposition or defence is left to the office of the living teacher. They thus show their unity with the one church in all the ages of its history, and do the work of Elias, in "turning the heart of the children to their fathers."

But while they have promulgated no novelties, and have added nothing to the authorized statements of the faith, they have given great prominence and fulness of exposition to the incarnation, as the centre-point of God's dealings with his creatures, and as the root of all the doctrines peculiar to Christianity. It was the Father's purpose from eternity that his Son should be made man, and as man be the Head and Ruler of the creation. Manhood was predestined to be the nature which should be taken into indissoluble union with the Godhead, and so have the precedency of all other forms of created being. All things were made not only *by* Christ, but *for* him; that, as the Incarnate One, he might possess, rule over, and bless them forever. This was "the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord" (Eph. iii. 11), in reference to which the whole plan of the universe was framed. The Son of God might have become man, had there been no fall and no need of redemption, in order to bring the Godhead into full manifestation, and to lift up the creation in him into the closest and most blessed union with the Creator.

The fall was not necessitated, but permitted, to show that all goodness is in God, and that the creature is, by itself, weak and unstable; but when this had taken place, and the devil (in whose rebellion against the divine purpose concerning the pre-eminency of man in the man Christ Jesus, sin had its origin) had brought sin and death into the world, God's purpose was not at all changed, but a painful, perilous work was laid upon his Son. Not only was the earth, the Son's promised inheritance, in the hands of a usurper, but the nature which he was to take was in ruins. Adam, by his disobedience (which, in virtue both of his

natural and his federal headship, was the sin of the race), had made a wreck of humanity; and the Son must lay hold of it as he found it, a marred and broken thing, lying under curse, in order that he might restore and rebuild the ruin, and accomplish in it the Father's eternal purpose.

By being born of a fallen mother, he took the nature of his brethren, and became one with them in all the infirmities and necessities of their condition, so that he could be "tempted in all points like as we are"; but being conceived by the Holy Ghost, he was without sin, original or actual. The problem, "Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean?" was thus solved; and in fallen humanity One appeared who was holy from the first beginnings of his human existence. Being thus born into the race to bear its liabilities and burdens, and, though personally innocent, to be dealt with by God as responsible for all its sins, his first work was to honor his Father by a life of faith and obedience, thereby magnifying the law which Adam by disobedience had dishonored. Becoming man under all the conditions of weakness and bondage into which sin had brought mankind, he did the work of man with the faculties and instruments appointed for man, never once calling in his Godhead power to his help, but receiving from his Father, in whom he trusted, the grace and strength which he needed. And when he entered upon his public ministry, it was through the anointing of the Holy Ghost (Acts x. 38) that he spake the words and did the works of God, giving therein the first example of the baptism of the Spirit.

Having thus made fallen manhood to be the spotless image of God, and to glorify him at every point wherein man's sin had brought upon him reproach and dishonor, the next great step in his work was the yielding it to death as a holy sin-offering for the iniquities of the whole world. As the law consisted of two parts, the commandment and the penalty, so the Lord Jesus, having rendered perfect obedience in the common nature of man, did then endure in it the sentence of death which for transgression had been

pronounced upon it, and thus made atonement for all the sins which ever had been, or ever should be, committed in it, restoring it to the favor of God, and opening the way for its eternal glory. His death was the complete fulfilment and exhaustion of the curse, and brought reconciliation and peace to all men. It was not the literal endurance of the torments which the elect would otherwise have undergone, nor was it merely a governmental transaction exhibiting God's regard for his law, much less a simple manifestation of his sympathy with sinners, or an example of holy martyrdom for the truth; but it was a strictly vicarious and expiatory sacrifice, and it made atonement for the sins of the whole world.

His death was followed by his resurrection, which was the re-uniting of soul and body, according to the law of man's original creation, but under far higher and more glorious conditions. His soul was brought back from hades (Acts ii. 31), and his body was energized with a new and immortal life; and he rose from the dead the new man, the second Adam, "the first-born among many brethren," the Head of that glorious company which shall be kings and priests unto God, and shall forever fill the universe with his praise. As his death was the consummation of the curse, so his resurrection was the complete and perfect emancipation of manhood from it, and the entrance of man, in his person, upon a new and immeasurably higher and more blessed career. It was also the beginning of the redemption of the material creation, of which his body formed a part, and so gave assurance of the final deliverance of the earth from the curse.

The next act in his history was his ascension, which was not merely the return of the Son of God to the Father who had sent him, but the exaltation of man to a place of honor and dominion which man had never occupied before. Manhood was seated in the throne of God. A man was made Lord of all. The true King was then crowned, by whom God shall forever rule and bless his creation. Then began

to be fulfilled the words of the Psalm: "Thy throne, O God, is forever and ever: the sceptre of thy kingdom is a right sceptre. Thou lovest righteousness, and hatest wickedness: therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows." The crucified Jesus, as Peter taught on Pentecost, was made both Lord and Christ; Lord, by receiving from the Father all authority and power; Christ, by the anointing of the Holy Ghost. Both were acts done upon the man as the reward of his obedience unto death, and as his investiture and endowment for his eternal work in manhood. He was also, upon his ascension, constituted the "Priest after the order of Melchizedek," the Priest sitting on a throne (Zech. vi. 13), and entered upon his offices of intercession and worship.

Having thus been set in his true place as the Head and Ruler of all things, his first work in this his state of exaltation was to send down the Holy Ghost to form his body, the church. Now that he had achieved the victory in his own person by redeeming manhood from the curse, and glorifying it at the right hand of God, he would convey to his faithful followers whom he had left upon the earth, and to all who should believe their testimony concerning him, the fruits of his triumph, so far as they could receive them this side of the resurrection. The purpose of God, as shadowed out in the Adam and Eve of the first creation, embraced a church which should be the bride of his Son, one with him in the closest and holiest unity, partaker of his life, and sharer of his glory. But the church could not be formed until Jesus had been constituted Head by resurrection from the dead, and ascension to the Father's right hand. It was true while he was upon the earth, that "the Holy Ghost was not yet given, because that Jesus was not yet glorified." But when he had taken manhood from under the power of death, and seated it in the heavenly places, he could send the Spirit to do in man, and for man, what could never be done before. He had two gifts to bestow as the fruit of his perfected work, which had never yet been be-

stowed — his life and his anointing. It was a new life which he received when God raised him from the dead, and *that* life he imparts by the Holy Ghost to them that believe on him, who thus become members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones. The church is the company of those who are made alive with him by a second birth, of which his own birth out of the grave was the pattern and the efficient cause; for regeneration is resurrection begun in the spirit, as resurrection is regeneration embracing the body. And as he, when risen, was anointed with the Holy Ghost to qualify him for his future work as God's King and Priest, so he gives the same anointing to those who are regenerated with his new life.

The Spirit, by whom every divine operation in man is effected, is invisible and works invisibly; but it is God's good pleasure to use both men and material things as the instruments of his operations. This is according to the analogy of the structure of humanity, in which the material and the spiritual are wondrously united, the body being the vehicle and organ of the soul, and the soul being the life of the body. To this law of manhood our Lord conformed in his incarnation, by taking both parts of it into union with the Godhead; and, although they were separated in his death, they were redeemed and reunited in his resurrection. He has therefore ordained sacraments in his church in which there are both "the outward, visible sign and the inward, spiritual grace"; the Holy Ghost working by means of material things used by men in accordance with Christ's commandments. Baptism,[1] in which water is the element,

[1] Infant baptism is retained as being according to the analogy of all God's past dealings with his people, in embracing children with their parents in his covenants; as sustained by the all but unanimous teaching and practice of the church; and as not contradicted by the letter or spirit of the New Testament, which takes nothing away from the privileges of former dispensations, but adds new blessings to them. The incarnation, by which infancy and childhood were sanctified, and all the relationships and bonds of our humanity made more strong, is an additional reason for receiving into the fold of Christ by baptism, those of whom he said: "Suffer little children to come unto me, and forbid them not; for of such is the kingdom of heaven."

is the sacrament of regeneration, or the ordinance for conveying the new or resurrection life, according to the Lord's word: "Except one be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." And the Lord's supper is the sacrament for the nourishing and strengthening of the life thus imparted, the elements used being bread and wine, which are made in consecration by the operation of the Holy Ghost to be (spiritually and really, because *dynamically*, but not by any change of substance) the body and blood of Christ.[1] The instrumentality for conveying the gift of the Spirit is, according to the same general law, the laying on of apostles' hands, the Lord using those in whom he acts as the Head and Ruler of his church to fulfil his office as baptizer with the Holy Ghost.

Nor does the use of ordinances for the effecting of spiritual operations at all conflict with the truth of an "election according to grace," who are "predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will"; for all God's acts are as real as his purposes are sure; and as the death of his Son atoned for the sins of many who will finally perish, so there are true operations of the Holy Ghost in many who are not "kept by the power of God, through faith, unto salvation." The Father has an election whom he has given to his Son, and whom he will keep unto the end; but it is none the less true that his love for all men was manifested in the cross of Christ, and that his Spirit is truly present and operative in the ordinances of his church, although in many who receive them no fruit shall be perfected. The limitation of God's mercies to the elect, and the denial that he has an election, are errors equally great, but in different directions. His *purpose* to save does not embrace all whom

[1] It must be kept in mind that the Christian sacraments are ordinances for conveying spiritual blessings which did not exist before the incarnation. Until Jesus died and rose again, there was no new life to be bestowed. There was faith and righteousness on the earth, but no membership in Christ, and no possibility of feeding on his body and blood. What the ordinances of the law prefigured, the ordinances of the church effect and convey.

he *desires* to save. For one end of his dealings with men is to manifest the exceeding sinfulness of sin and the instability of the creature; and as he suffers himself to be disobeyed and rejected by those whom he has created, so does he suffer his Son to be trodden under foot by those whom he has redeemed, and his Spirit to be grieved and quenched by those who have "tasted of the heavenly gift, and been made partakers of the Holy Ghost." The redemption of the world is as real an act of God as its creation, and the movements of the Holy Ghost are never absent where the Father and the Son are working. And it is, step by step, against these threefold mercies that the sin of man is suffered to shew itself. Beginning with the transgression of his ordinances as the Creator and Lawgiver, it reaches a higher stage in "denying the Lord that bought them," and attains its consummation and climax in that sin against the Holy Ghost for which there is no forgiveness. This triple form of sin shows the wonderful power of the will of man, in setting itself against all motives and influences, and in effecting his destruction, although created in God's image and redeemed by the blood of his Son, and made partaker of the heavenly life by the renewing of the Holy Ghost. The heathen dishonored God as revealed to them in the ordinances of nature; the Jews rejected him as manifested in the crucified Jesus who gave his life a ransom for their sins; but the greater guilt of the Christian church will lie in driving the Spirit from his dwelling-place by her pollutions, and turning like "the sow that was washed to her wallowing in the mire."

But while he lets it thus be seen how far the human will can go in resisting his grace, he does not fail to accomplish his unrevealed purpose concerning that determinate number that shall make up the mystical body of his Son. In that "eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord," the members were embraced as truly as the Head. They were chosen "*in him* before the foundation of the world"; "predestinated unto the adoption of children

by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will"; and those who were thus "predestinated to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren," he calls and justifies and glorifies (Rom. viii. 30). There is an unrevealed and inscrutable region of the Father's purposes in respect to persons, in which his own personality and freedom of will are displayed. Christ himself hung upon that will, and reverently acknowledged it as supreme in sovereignty, and as having depths which even he, the Incarnate One, could not explore. After all that he reveals, the Father still reserves something to himself. What he reveals is a part of his eternal purpose, and all that he does by his Son and his Spirit is in harmony with that purpose; but he does not disclose all his secrets, nor can we, from anything wrought in the visible, form an infallible judgment as to who are written in the Lamb's book of life. The company of the elect is a narrower circle than that redeemed by the blood of Christ, narrower even than that engrafted into Christ by the Holy Ghost.

The apostles have put forth no dogmatic statements on these points, and what has now been said is not to be received as authoritative, but as expressing, in the judgment of the writer, the general spirit of their teachings. Their aim is not to teach abstract systems of theology, but to give the living evolution of the truth according to the present necessities of the church, and especially to show the actings of God towards his creatures in the work of redemption, according to the mutual relations of the persons in the Godhead. They preserve to the will of the Father its high and unsearchable prerogative as the originating and determining cause of all things, and the basis of all stability to the creation, while they give the widest range to the work of the Son in redeeming, and to the work of the Spirit in influencing and sanctifying, humanity, and guard, as against fatalism, the moral freedom and responsibility of man. The various and (apparently) antago-

nistic aspects of the truth in respect to these high doctrines are thus practically reconciled by each being held in its own place, while the scientific solution of such problems, if one be possible, is left to the domain of philosophy.

One important part of the truth of election, as taught by the restored apostles, respects the ends for which the elect are chosen in the purposes of God; viz. to be for the blessing of those to whom a lower place is given in his great scheme. Thus, the Jews were elected to be the most honored of all nations through their relation to Christ, their kinsman according to the flesh, not to the exclusion of all others from the favor of God, but that in them all the families of the earth might be blessed. And the church is an election, taken out from both Jews and Gentiles, to be the body and bride of Christ, that with him she may dispense the benediction of God to the whole creation. All the saved are not of the church, as all the people of a realm are not the wife of the king. It is a peculiar honor and dignity to which she is called, of being the helper to Christ in his eternal work of administering rule for his Father over all creatures.

The gathering of this elect company began with the descent of the Holy Ghost on Pentecost, and ends with the second coming of the Lord, when, taking his church to himself, by raising the holy ones from among the dead and changing the faithful from among the living, he will proceed to set up his kingdom in the earth. He will first restore the twelve tribes of Israel to their own land, and reorganize them as a nation, and then, by their instrumentality, he will visit all the families of the earth with his salvation. There will be a threefold constitution of things during the millennium. The Lord and his church in the glory of the resurrection shall inhabit the "new Jerusalem, which cometh down from God out of heaven," and has its seat upon the earth, or in close proximity to it; the restored and reconstituted nation of Israel shall be next in rank, holding the central and metropolitan place among the

nations, and by this twofold ordinance of divine rule, the church dwelling with Christ as in the holy of holies, and the Jews occupying, as a kingdom of priests, the holy place, all the families of mankind, like the dwellers in the outer court, shall be made to see the light and rejoice in the deliverance of God.

This shall be the order of things during that period of a thousand years described by John; but at the expiration of it there shall be an outbreak of rebellion among the nations in the four corners of the earth, that is, those outside "the camp of the saints and the beloved city," instigated thereto by Satan, then loosed from his prison-house; which having been put down by divine judgments, the general resurrection takes place, and the last judgment ensues. Satan is shut up forever in the lake of fire, into which a portion of mankind, the beast and the false prophet, had been already cast, and the final and eternal order of things is established, including the everlasting punishment of the incorrigibly rebellious, and the everlasting reward of the righteous in their various gradations of honor, together with the complete redemption of the earth from every stain of sin, and its establishment as the glorious dwelling-place of Christ and his church, and as the royal centre of the universe evermore.

Worship.

The worship of the "Catholic Apostolic Church" is founded on the twofold principle that it should be in accordance with the holy scriptures, and that it should gather up into itself every pure and precious thing which has been developed in the church in all past ages through the guidance of the Spirit of Christ. Two facts are assumed as fundamental—the paramount authority of the Bible, and the continued existence of the church as the body of Christ and the temple of the Holy Ghost. No system of worship can be at once pure and catholic in which these are not reconciled.

Worship should be scriptural in two respects, as being conformed to the principles laid down in the New Testament, and as being the antitype and fulfilment of the figures of the law. Strictly speaking, Christian worship is not so much the worship of God *through* Christ, as the worship of God *by* Christ, whom he has appointed to be the great High Priest in the heavens, and the Head of a body on the earth. He is the one Mediator and Advocate, constituted such by the Father's word when he raised him from the dead (Heb. v. 5); and he alone has liberty of access in his own right to the throne of the Majesty on high to make intercessions for men. The sacrifice which he offered on the cross is the basis of all true worship, for it is the source of all the blessings which God will ever bestow upon the redeemed creation. And his work as High Priest is to appear in the presence of God for us, pleading the preciousness of that sacrifice, and asking for the sake of it grace and mercy for all for whom he died. The three things which make intercession prevailing, meet in him; first, the acceptableness of his person, as God's well-beloved Son; second, the value of his offering, even his own body and blood; and third, the grace and power of his intercessions through the anointing of the Holy Ghost. These constitute him the one true worshipper, in whom worship in its highest form began when he ascended into heaven, and was saluted by the Father as the Priest after the order of Melchizedek, and by whom, as the Head of the creation, it shall ever be continued.

But his church, as being one with him, shares in his priestly character, and takes part with him in his priestly work. She is *a holy priesthood* (1 Pet. ii. 5), because her Head is a Priest. She is to do at the altar on the earth what he is ever doing at the golden altar before the throne. Nor is she to do this merely in imitation of him, as in the copying of a model; but it should be his one work, whether done by himself personally in the presence of God, or through the members of his body on the earth, in whom he

dwells, and whom he energizes by his Spirit. The worship of the church is in its essence one with the worship which the Lord himself fulfils in the heavenly places, because of the unity subsisting between him and his members through his assumption of their nature, and their being lifted up into the participation of his glory.

Now there are two things which he does as our great High Priest—*appear for us* in the presence of God, and *speak for us* into the ear of God. His appearance as *a Lamb as it had been slain* (Rev. v. 6), that is, in the body in which he died, and which, since his resurrection, still bears the marks of the nails and the spear, is the perpetual memorial of his cross, which he thus ever brings to his Father's remembrance; and it is on the ground of the sacrifice offered once for all in his expiatory death, and continually commemorated by him, that he presents to God his intercessions for his church, and for all men. It must be remembered that our Lord himself does not *repeat* his sacrifice, "for then must he often have suffered since the foundation of the world; but now once in the end of the world hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself" (Heb. ix. 26). "Knowing that Christ, being raised from the dead, dieth no more; death hath no more dominion over him" (Rom. vi. 9). That death upon the cross by which the sin of the world was blotted out must ever stand alone in the history of the creation, a transaction never to be acted over again; which is, indeed, neither possible nor necessary; not possible, because he could die only in the fallen and accursed nature in which now he no longer abides; and unnecessary, because by thus dying once he made a true and sufficient atonement for the sins of all men. The Lord's high-priestly work in the heavens is to *present himself* unto God as the abiding memorial of his death, and on that foundation to fulfil his office of intercession.

These two things, in substance if not in form, are also the duty of the church. The first she is enabled to do in the celebration of the holy eucharist, in which bread and

wine are made, through the operation of the Holy Ghost, and by the Lord's commandment, to be his body and blood, and thus become at once the vehicles of his living presence and the memorials of his finished sacrifice. These the church should solemnly present to God, even as Jesus presents himself in his own person in the heavenly sanctuary, thus as it were recalling to the Father's remembrance the precious death of his well-beloved Son as the only ground on which prayer can be acceptably offered. This is her great priestly work at the altar on the earth, and is the root of all her other priestly acts. The celebration of the eucharist is, therefore, her principal act of worship, as being the solemn commemoration of that sacrifice which opened the door for all true access to God. In this holy sacrament she has, in the body and blood of Christ, the spiritual equivalent of his personal presence to offer unto the Father.

In the doctrine of the eucharist as thus taught by the restored apostles, two errors are rejected into which the church of Rome has fallen, and the corresponding truths which Protestantism has overlooked, are put in their place. The elements do *not* cease to be bread and wine after consecration, as the Roman Catholics teach; nor is the eucharistic sacrifice a *repetition* of the death of Christ. As in the mystery of the incarnation the Godhead did not absorb into itself the manhood of Jesus, but each nature remained distinct with all its properties unimpaired, notwithstanding their unity in his person; and as in the work of regeneration, by which man becomes "a new creature in Christ Jesus," the old humanity still remains unchanged in substance; so the elements of bread and wine are not *transubstantiated*, or changed into the material substances of flesh and blood, which would contradict the testimony of the senses, and the word of Christ and his apostles; but, continuing as they were in all their physical properties, they are made, by the invisible working of the Holy Ghost, to be the containers of a new power, viz. the living law and substantiating principle of our Lord's manhood. The

consecrated elements are his body and blood, not phenomenally, or in a way that could ever be an object of the senses, but as a spiritual reality. Nor is the act of consecration in any sense a *renewing* of the death of Christ. He is not sacrificed afresh, for he is at the right hand of God in the glory of the resurrection, beyond the possibility of dying again. All that the church can do is to *commemorate* the sacrifice made once for all when he poured out his life upon the cross as our great sin-offering, although she does this with the sacramental mystery of his body and blood.

And as the church offers this spiritual sacrifice as a holy priesthood, the ministers by whom she does it must be priests. There is a great inconsistency in claiming a priestly character for all the members of Christ's body, and denying it to those by whom the highest spiritual functions are fulfilled. The offering of a bloody sacrifice by the slaying of a victim is not the only, nor the necessary, work of a priest; if it were, the priesthood of our Lord would have expired with his death, and he could never have been made a High Priest after the order of Melchizedek; that is, a priest sitting on a throne. In the strictest sense, he entered on his priestly office after his resurrection from the dead and his ascension into heaven (Heb. v. 5, 6); for he must fulfil this ministry in the presence of God. The offering was *prepared* by his expiatory death crowning his life of spotless obedience, and this work, in which no one but himself could have part, is ended forever. But his priesthood is eternal, for he will never cease to *present* unto his Father the offering which was perfected upon the cross, as the ground of the acceptance of all supplications, prayers, and intercessions whatever. In this work of commemorating his sacrifice he calls his church to participate; and the ministers to whom he gives authority to consecrate the elements of bread and wine to be his body and blood, and with them to "show forth his death till he come," are priests, because they fulfil his functions who is a Priest. There can be but one priesthood, and the source and sustaining power of it

are in Christ; but he lifts up his church to share with him in every one of his offices.

In the system of worship now restored by apostles the eucharist has the central place. It is celebrated on the forenoon of every Lord's day, and gives the key-note to all the services of the week. In the institution of this sacrament the Lord took bread and wine which had already been set apart for the sacred use of the passover, and having given thanks (1 Cor. xi. 24; x. 16), he blessed them, and gave them to his disciples, saying, "Take, eat, this is my body given for you"; and, "This is my blood of the New Testament given for many, for the remission of sins." In doing this he laid down the unchangeable law of the eucharist, and defined the number and the order of its essential parts. There must be the offering of bread and wine for God's use that they may be afterwards consecrated; this must be followed by an act of thanksgiving; the elements which have been already separated for this holy purpose, must then by an act of consecration be made to be the body and blood of the Lord; and when thus consecrated they must be partaken of by the people. So much our Lord plainly did, or commanded to be done, and the church should do nothing less. She may surround these essential parts with subsidiary and helpful rites, and may develop more fully what is given as in the germ; but she may not omit nor pervert them.

In the eucharistic service as celebrated in the "Catholic Apostolic Church," the first thing (after the invocation in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost), is an act of confession and absolution in order that the people may come to the holy sacrament cleansed from sin, and so may not eat and drink unworthily. This is followed by a prayer for grace "duly to celebrate these holy mysteries," and by the anthem Gloria in Excelsis, which is suited to this part of the service from its mingled joyous and penitential character. The next act is the reading of the holy scriptures in the twofold form of epistle and gospel, according to the

principle laid down by Paul, that every creature of God is good, and not to be rejected, being received with thanksgiving; *for it is sanctified by the word of God and prayer.*" In the full service these are read by two assistants; for while there is but one celebrant, to show that mediation is by one Lord Jesus Christ, there is another truth to be symbolized; viz. that there is a twofold procession of grace from God, answering to the two persons in the Godhead whom the Father sends forth for the salvation of men — the Son and the Holy Ghost. This truth finds its fullest expression in apostles and prophets, but it is also indicated in the use by the angel of the church (who in this service represents Christ the great High Priest entering alone for us into the presence of God) of two whom he sends forth to read, one the epistle, as the preparatory portion; the other the gospel, the very substance and heart of the scriptures. After the gospel, a homily is preached,[1] and then the creed is said or sung by the celebrant and the people, as the response of their faith to God's holy word just read in their hearing. Thus far, the services have been introductory, as designed to prepare the hearts and minds of the worshippers for the solemn rite about to be celebrated. But we have now come to a part which is implied in the Lord's act of taking bread and wine which had already been set apart for the use of the passover. The elements for the service of the altar must, according to the due form and order, be provided out of offerings previously made; and it is, therefore, at this stage of the service that the offertory takes place. As it was when Melchizedek, the priest of the Most High God, brought forth bread and wine for the refreshment of Abraham and his men, that Abraham gave him tithes of all; so it is in connection with the holy eucharist, in which the true Melchizedek feeds his church with his body and blood in the use of the same material elements, that the faithful most

[1] Sermons, properly so called, are disconnected from worship, and are appointed at other hours, both on the Lord's day and during the week.

fittingly bring up to him through whose sacrifice and intercession all blessings flow that portion of their income which God has in all ages reserved to himself. The seventh of our time and the tenth of our substance are the Lord's; and it is suitable that on the day which he claims as his own, and in the celebration of that ordinance in which he brings forth to his church his richest gifts, she should give to him his tenth, as the glad acknowledgment of his rights as the proprietor of all things. The tithe is paid to God as a debt, due from all alike, rich and poor; but in addition to this, the people bring up their offerings (Mal. iii. 8) according to the measure of their wealth and liberality. These are solemnly dedicated to God in prayer, and his blessing is besought that "they may be used for his glory and the welfare of his church and people."

The bread and wine are next brought up and placed upon the altar, with prayer that God would accept his people and their gifts; and this is followed by the thanksgiving (the *Sursum corda* of the oldest liturgies) in which all his greatest acts of mercy from the creation of the world down to "the most blessed communion of all saints in these holy mysteries," are gratefully recounted, closing with that lofty ascription of praise, the Trisagion, and Hosanna in the Highest. The Lord's Prayer is next said by the celebrant, and then comes the solemn act of consecration, in which he not only prays God "to bless and sanctify" the bread and the cup, but himself, as clothed with the authority and representing the person of Christ, also blesses them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, at the same time beseeching him to send down his Holy Spirit, and make them to the church the body and blood of his dear Son. This is in obedience to the Lord's command, "Do this" — do what I have done, bless the bread and the cup — "in remembrance of me;" and also in recognition of the truth that all spiritual blessing and change and transformation are effected by the Holy Ghost.

The church thus receiving from her Lord, in a sacramental

mystery the gift, of his body and blood, does not proceed instantly to feed upon them, as a too literal following of his example might seem to require, but first presents them to God as the true memorial of the precious sacrifice of his cross, and pours out her heart unto him in prayers and intercessions for all men. It must be remembered that our Lord, when he instituted the supper, had not yet entered upon his work of intercession as he now fulfils it before his Father, for his offering was not fully prepared, nor had he been clothed with his high priestly vestments by resurrection from the dead. His abstaining from prayer after he had consecrated the bread and the cup, may have been an intimation that he must first ascend into heaven with his perfected sacrifice before he could, in the fullest sense, plead it with the Father. But there is the germ of the prayer of oblation in his words: "This is my body *which is given for you*" (Luke xxii. 9) — given *to God* for you, given *now* for you; which words imply that he did at that time, by an act of his spirit, if not with his lips, present it unto his Father in behalf of his disciples. But it needs no argument to justify the church in reverently pausing before she feeds upon the heavenly food, to "show forth" (καταγγέλετε, 1 Cor. xi. 26) her Lord's death by making mention of it unto God, and then praying with great fulness of comprehension and minuteness of detail for all for whom the sacrifice of the cross was made. This was done in many of the earliest liturgies. After the prayers for the living, thankful mention is made of those who have departed in the faith of Christ, and God is besought to "keep them in rest and peace until our common perfecting in bliss in the day of the glorious resurrection." This is done on the ground that the dead and the living are one in the body of Christ; that all who have fallen asleep in him abide in his peace and joy in virtue of his intercession, in which his church upon the earth is honored to have part; and that they wait to be perfected, even as he was, by receiving the incorruptible body. Prayer is not offered for them

to deliver them from purgatorial fires, but that they may continue in that holy rest into which they have entered, and that the day of their redemption from the grave, and of their investment with the power and glory of the kingdom, may be hastened. These prayers, which end with a petition that God would speedily send his Son to take his church to himself, are followed by the communion, and the whole service is finished by the singing of the Te Deum.

Besides this great central act of worship on every Lord's day, there are services every morning and evening throughout the week, which are the spiritual antitypes of the daily morning and evening sacrifices of the law. These are at 6 A.M., and at 5 P.M., that the day may be begun and ended with acts of holy worship. The principal parts of these morning and evening services are, first, confession of sin with absolution, followed by a prayer of dedication, foreshadowed in the slaying of the lamb of burnt-offering, the sprinkling of its blood, and the consuming of its divided parts upon the brazen altar; second, the reading of the scriptures, together with the reciting of the Apostles' Creed as a brief summary of the faith, the spiritual meat (or meal) offering of the Christian church, the fine flour mingled with oil being a type of the word of truth read with the unction of the Holy Ghost; third, the singing or chanting of a psalm taken in order from the received version,[1] the antitype of the drink-offering, which was of wine poured out, wine making glad the heart of man, as song is the utterance of gladness; fourth, prayers, in the fourfold form of supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks (1 Tim. ii. 1), answering to the incense compounded of four ingredients (Ex. xxx. 34) which was burned upon the golden altar; fifth, a brief ministry in the morning by the angel of the church on some edifying topic, in the hearing of the congregation, but for the special benefit of the elders,

[1] Besides the psalms and anthems taken from the scriptures, a small collection of hymns, mainly taken from the best ancient and modern sources, is used in the various services.

who, at the evening service, give forth, each in his turn, in a few well-chosen words, their meditations on the same topic during the day. This was prefigured in the trimming of the lamps of the golden candlestick by the high priest in the morning, and the lighting of them in the evening; the candlestick being the type of a church (Rev. i. 20), and the seven lamps representing the sevenfold eldership — the angel and the six elders associated with him in rule — God's ordinance for spiritual light. The services are closed by the singing of the hymn Benedictus (Luke i. 68–79) in the morning,[1] and the Magnificat (Luke i. 46–55) in the evening.

The essential difference between these daily services and the eucharist is, that in the latter the angel of the church represents Christ entering into heaven for us as the one Mediator, and obtaining a hearing from God in virtue of his one sacrifice on the cross, and so fulfils the service mainly alone; while in the former he represents him as worshipping in and by his church. In the one case, the Head is seen fulfilling that high-priestly ministry which belongs to him alone; in the other, the church, as his body standing under him, is chiefly seen, giving utterance through all her organs of ministry to every feeling of penitence, and faith, and joy, and sympathy with the sorrows of men, and longing for the salvation of God, which the Holy Spirit would kindle within her. The evangelist, in the introductory service, reminds the people of their sins, and of God's mercies in Christ, and so prepares them for the confession, and afterwards, as one whose duties make him acquainted with the outward relationships of men, presents those petitions which respect their necessities in the various conditions of life; the pastor, as best knowing their transgressions and failures, offers the confession, in which the congregation joins, and the supplications, which are the cry

[1] At the close of the morning prayer there is a communion service, the reserved elements on the altar being used for the purpose, that, according to the Lord's own prayer, his people may receive, in a higher than an earthly sense, their daily bread.

of the miserable for succor; the prophet reads the scriptures that, if it please God, words of light and edification may be spoken by him in spiritual power, and also expresses to God the thankfulness of the church for all his mercies, as one in whom the Holy Ghost, symbolized by the oil of joy, should work most freely; the elder, as having the guardianship of doctrine and sharing in the authority of the angel, leads in the reciting of the creed, and offers the more spiritual forms of prayer; and the angel gathers all up in one act of true and proper intercession, which he presents to God in the name of his Son, our great Mediator and Advocate.

The great acts of God in the work of our redemption are commemorated in special services at Christmas, Easter (including Good Friday), Ascension, and Pentecost, in observance of the principle on which God commanded the Jews to celebrate the passover and the other great feasts of their year. Saints' days are not observed; but there is a service on the first of November, the All-Saints day of the ecclesiastical calendars, for the giving thanks to God for his mercies to his church and people in all generations, and the beseeching him to hasten the consummation of his purpose, and to give to all his faithful ones the rewards of the resurrection. The Jews are specially mentioned, the sins of the Christian church and nations towards them confessed, and the fulfilment of all the promises made to their fathers earnestly and humbly besought.

A ritual is used, catholic in its character, being framed on the principle of combining in one harmonious system every true and holy rite of worship, and all the most pure and spiritual forms of prayer, which have been developed in the various divisions of the church, Greek, Roman, and Protestant, with the addition of whatever may be necessary to supply the deficiencies of the old liturgies, and to meet the exigencies of the present time. It is the duty of the apostles to gather up all the fragments of truth in worship, as in doctrine, and to put each into its right place, that

nothing be lost, but that the Lord, at his coming, may receive the full fruit of all that his Spirit has been enabled to bring forth in his church.

Besides these formal services, which are ordered with the exactness and dignity becoming the courts of the great King, there are also meetings for extemporaneous prayer, in which liberty is given to any whom the Holy Ghost may move to pray, in order that there may be the fullest opportunity for expressing unto God all the desires and aspirations which his Spirit may awaken in the members of Christ. The stately and majestic forms which are suitable to the public worship of the church must not be allowed to quench or restrain the Spirit, who does not limit his gifts to the clergy, but often manifests himself in the most precious and edifying ways even in women and children. And that there may be the freest room for his manifestations, meetings are appointed expressly for the exercise of spiritual gifts, in which all are encouraged to yield themselves to any movement of the Holy Ghost.

There are services for private confession and absolution, and for the anointing of the sick; in the former case to give an opportunity to sore-burdened hearts, to whom the public services of the church bring no deliverance, to find relief in the disclosing of their sins and burdens to one who will show to them the sympathies of Christ, and has authority to pronounce forgiveness to the penitent; in the latter case to bring, by the blessing of God on his appointed ordinance (James v. 14), healing to the body, and the renewing of strength and joy to the spirit. Christ is the fountain of blessing, for in him humanity has been redeemed; but he conveys it to men by the instrumentality of his servants, and in the ways of his appointment. God alone can forgive sin; he alone can heal disease; but he does both in accordance with the mystery of godliness, God manifest in flesh. By the man Christ Jesus, and by the men who receive authority and grace from Christ, it is his good pleasure to unloose the bonds and to remove the burdens of sin and the curse.

Both these services have been much abused and perverted, and, as the inevitable reaction, rejected by many, in the Christian church; and the apostles have sought to recover for them their right meaning and use. Confession is not, as among the Roman Catholics, compulsory and inquisitorial; but it is a means of grace which those who feel the need of are at liberty to ask for, and in the use of which they are brought under no obligation to disclose anything, except so far as their heart and conscience prompt them to do it for spiritual relief. The rite of anointing the sick differs from the sacrament of extreme unction in having for its chief end the healing of the body, and not the preparing of the soul for death. This change of its true character has come from losing sight of the Lord's victory over the grave, and thinking of him rather as "crucified through weakness" than as "living by the power of God" (2 Cor. xiii. 4), and able to convey life and health through the ordinances of his church.

The principle of symbols, which lies at the foundation of sacraments, is applied to the whole range of divine services. The outward and visible thing is regarded as the expression of the inward and invisible; the material as the vehicle of the spiritual. As water is used in baptism, bread and wine in the Lord's supper, and oil in the anointing of the sick, so lights and incense find their place among the instruments of worship. They symbolize the twofold work of Christ in revealing truth and making intercession, and suggest to the heart and the imagination more than words can utter. As the material creation has been virtually redeemed by his resurrection, and is to be actually and completely freed from all curse in his kingdom, it is fitting that its choicest products be used to give him glory, and to testify, as it were, unto its coming deliverance. But they should be used in sobriety and holy moderation, for the church is still a widow; and, above all, they should not be employed for the honoring of man (as with incense in the church of Rome), but only to show forth the praises of him

who created and redeemed them. The consecrated elements of bread and wine are kept upon the altar from one Lord's day to another, as the loaves of the shewbread remained from Sabbath to Sabbath upon the table in the holy place, partly for the daily communion, partly that they may be in readiness to be administered to the sick, but chiefly as a symbol and shrine of the spiritual presence of him who has made them to be his body and blood. In token of his thus making his sanctuary his habitation, a lamp is kept always burning before the altar, light in a house being a sign of occupancy.

The officiating ministers wear those vestments which have been generally used in the Christian church for many ages, on the principle that the dress of men should be suited to their place and work, and that the servants of a king when fulfilling their high duties in his presence should be clothed as befits his dignity. The same principle is applied to church architecture, and especially to the internal arrangements of the building, which are determined by the various orders of ministry, and by the nature of the services to be transacted. There is a threefold division of place, as in the Tabernacle: the sanctuary (so called), in which the altar stands, and to which the angel has chief access; the upper choir, in which the priests minister; and the lower choir, where the deacons sit, as the heads and representatives of the people. In these repectively the different parts of divine worship are celebrated, according to their analogy to the typical services at the brazen altar, within the holy place, and in the holy of holies.

[Note. — A few more pages on the relations of the Catholic Apostolic Church to other churches will close the present Article. They would have been inserted in this Number had not the remaining pages been needed for Notices of Recent Publications, several of which are now excluded for want of space.]

ARTICLE V.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Voices of the Soul.[1]

This volume contains much sterling thought and will repay a careful perusal. It leaves a solemn impression on the reader, and is well fitted to interest him in the study of religious truth. A work so good as this ought to have been better. It might be improved by more definiteness of statement. What, for example, does the writer mean by saying: "The soul of Jesus was greatly agitated in view of his approaching passion; but yet I cannot think that corroding care disturbed his spirit, or blighting anxiety withered his heart" (p. 332). Does this mean that Jesus was not "exceeding sorrowful even unto death," or that he did not sin amid his baptism of grief? "Estrangement from God is from its nature eternal; that is, left to itself, it must continue forever." "As estrangement from God is eternal in its nature, so reconciliation to God must be eternal" (pp. 282, 295). Must reconciliation be eternal in its nature, so that "*left to itself it must continue forever?*" Does the writer mean that it *must*, or that it *will* and *should* continue forever? Again, he is attempting to prove the truth that sinful men will receive "a punishment different from that of conscience," and is justly condemning the error that sinful men will merely suffer those pains of conscience "which are the constitutional result of sin"; but he goes so far as to assert, that if sinful men are to suffer merely those pangs which it is the nature of conscience to inflict, then "there is no moral government" (p. 118); "there is no accountability to God," "a premium is offered for crime" (p. 119). But does not God rule in the conscience? Is not *its* reproof *God's* reproof? We find numerous expressions like the following, which need to be qualified and explained: "The creation of the first man is really a prophecy of the God-man" (p. 21). "I apprehend that the Supreme Majesty had to humble himself when he called into existence the first particle of matter that settled upon the bosom of space" (p. 32); "Guilt cries out for suffering; and the *more intense* the suffering the *more satisfaction* there is to the moral faculty" (p. 137). "It is strange that this *last and greatest of human atonements* (the suicide of Judas) should stand side by side with the *divine* atonement" (p. 138). "In a profound sense, the soul is *duothelitic* instead of *monothelitic;* and in a sense equally pregnant with meaning, sin is *involuntary* as well as *voluntary*. The aboriginal soul, which is crushed down by the superincumbent mass of the

[1] Voices of the Soul answered in God. By Rev. John Reid. 12mo. pp. 374. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1865.

developed one, will not acquiesce in sin, — here it is involuntary; while the developed soul does acquiesce, — here it is voluntary. There is a primitive spectral soul ever haunting the one that has wandered astray, and ever pronouncing a condemnation against its deeds of wickedness. No sin can reach this haunting spirit, neither can any misery frighten it away," etc. (p. 248).

The preceding citations suggest the remark that, although the style of this volume has many excellences, it has also a class of faults which the writer of the volume might easily, and should sedulously, avoid. These faults of rhetoric are closely combined with a fault of logic. The words affect, as they are affected by, the thought. The following extracts will indicate the class of foibles to which we allude: a disregard of English idioms, a confusion of prosaic with poetical forms of speech, an apparent striving after words which have a deep sound, etc. "Man is *demeritorious* for not keeping the law" (p. 100). "It seems obvious that there is a *punishment of God* as well as a punishment *of the soul*" (p. 122). "If there be no *divine punishment*," etc. (p. 119). In the future state, "there will be the conscious *disapprobation of self*"; "there will also be the conscious *disapprobation of God* and the good" (p. 123). "There are mental wants that seem *to be stretching out their arms* for help, *away down at the very bottom of being*" (p. 304). "That there is a *dark zone* in the mind of man must be admitted by all"; "a *nebulous belt* surrounds the soul"; "an *extended kingdom* exists in the mind shrouded in darkness, greater even than the *kingdom of light*"; "there are germs of truth in the mind which we can *only half see by scraping away the soil that* is about them, and which will not appear above ground till the spring-time of eternity draws near" (pp. 300–306). "A visitor from some distant world would never know that the mighty array of glorified men were *once with sin defiled*" (p. 373). "In men of genius with their intellectual strides there is found a *typology of the future* (p. 311).

It would be unfair to pronounce a judgment against this entire volume on account of such faults as are here indicated. The volume has great and positive merits, and accordingly we are not surprised that it has positive faults.

Wayland's Moral Science.[1]

There is a sense in which some books are greater than the author of them. They contain signal excellences, with small faults to mar the effects of these excellences. We read them with almost unmingled respect for their greatness. But the author of these books has not only uncommon

[1] The Elements of Moral Science. By Francis Wayland, D.D., LL.D., late President of Brown University and Professor of Moral Philosophy. Revised and improved edition. 12mo. pp. 396. Boston: Gould and Lincoln; New York: Sheldon and Company; Cincinnati: G. S. Blanchard and Co. 1865.

powers, but has also still more uncommon weaknesses, and when his defects are set off against his merits he is found to be on the whole a weak man. We admire his superiority of genius, but are disgusted with his littlenesses, which being concealed in his writings stand out so much the more unpleasantly in his person.

There is also a sense in which a man may be greater than his books. He may have admirable gifts which he does not manfest fully in his writings. He may have inaccurate methods of thought and expression, and these are obvious in the very pages which conceal his rich endowments. Hence when we peruse the volume we feel not so high an admiration for it, as we feel for the man when we converse with him and examine his daily life.

We regard the late President Wayland as one whose rare character is not perfectly exhibited in his published writings. He was greater than they. We peruse them with respect; we learn wisdom from them, but we do not discover in them all his breadth of thought nor all his largeness of heart. They are good, but he was better.

We have been long familiar with his Treatise on Moral Science. When it supplanted Paley's Treatise as the Text-book in our colleges it produced an epoch in our system of ethical instruction. It evinces sound sense, careful investigation, wide-reaching thought. It is eminently wise, instructive, safe. It is more solid than precise, more sensible than accute, practical more than philosophical, a pattern of genuine philanthropy more than of keen dialectics. We first glanced at the work, thirty years ago while waiting in the bar-room of a city hotel for the departure of the stage-coach. Some of the sentences which we perused in that unpropitious hour and place have ever since lingered in our memory; there was so much of quiet dignity and reserved power in them. One of them was: "It is also to be remembered, that, in morals as well as in physics, the harvest is always more abundant than the seed from which it springs" (1st ed. p. 5). We were impressed then, as we have been ever since, with that first sentence in the final note which is so redolent of habitual kindness and good-nature: "I should be guilty of injustice to one class of my fellow-creatures if I should close this treatise upon human duty without a single remark upon our obligation to brutes" (1st ed. p. 446).

No treatise on Moral Philosophy has had so extensive a circulation in our land as this. Its great popularity has resulted, not from its scientific excellence, but from the honest good sense which pervades it, the general correctness of its statements, the philanthropic and Christian spirit that animates it, the transparency and unostentatious simplicity of its style, the spirit of independence which characterizes its teachings. On the subject of slavery, for example, Dr. Wayland was far in advance of his times.

We rejoice to learn, that a Memoir of this eminent man is in process of preparation, and that some of his hitherto unpublished writings will ere long be given to the world.

The Life of John Brainerd.[1]

Dr. Brainerd has done an excellent service to the community in publishing this Memoir. He has made an important contribution to the history of the American churches. He has communicated many interesting facts, and some of them have a theological, as well as practical, significance. We cannot exhibit the worth of the Memoir in any better way than that of making a few excerpts from it.

1. The following extract from John Brainerd's Journal illustrates *his* manner of viewing the Moravians; and also the general type of practical religion as described by President Edwards, Dr. Bellamy, and other New England divines:

"Thursday, Oct. 12, Attended family and secret devotions. Took leave of the honest man and his wife, and proceeded on my way towards the Indians, and, when I came to them, found they lived in the same town with the Moravians, and were entirely brought into their scheme of religion, which inwardly grieved me and greatly sunk my spirits, especially when, in conversation with some of them, I saw how erroneous and enthusiastic they were in some of their tenets. However, I spent the day in this place, which the Moravians call *Canatanheat*, partly in conversation with them and partly with the Indians. Visited all that were at home, going from house to house, but had very little satisfaction, — fearing that they were, many of them, poor deceived creatures. Discoursed with some of the white people as well as the Indians, and observed their manners and behavior, and found they set very lightly by verbal prayer, either private or public, saying that they always prayed in heart, that they very little saw the necessity of informing the understanding in the doctrines of religion, dehorting from sin, or exhorting to the observation of the divine commands and the practice of godliness, saying that persons must be told to believe in and love [our Saviour], as their expression always is, 'to look to and keep close to him, and then there would be no danger, but they would certainly be directed and inclined to do everything right;' and I observed further, as far as I could learn, that the spring and foundation of their love to the *Saviour* was because he suffered and died for sinners, and them in particular, which I endeavored to detect and show that that was not the only foundation, or the prime cause, of a true believer's love to God and Jesus Christ, etc. I also, in my discourse with one who bears the character of a minister, endeavored to convince and impress upon him the danger of deceiving the poor Indians and making them believe that they had an in-

[1] The Life of John Brainerd, the Brother of David Brainerd, and his Successor as Missionary to the Indians of New Jersey. By Rev. Thomas Brainerd, D.D., Pastor of the Old Pine Street Church, Philadelphia. 12mo. pp. 492. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Publication Committee; New York: A. D. F. Randolph. 1865.

terest in Christ's merits when they have never experienced a change of heart, for I observed that they made no account of a previous work of the law, and some of the Indians told me they had not been under any special concern, but, after they were baptized, their hearts began to love *our Saviour*, and one of them told me his heart was *quite good, quite good enough*. And this I found to be the case, that the Moravians would tell the Indians how Christ died and suffered, and ask them whether they loved him and were willing to be baptized, and if they assented would proceed to administer the ordinance to them, and admit them, if adults, to the Lord's supper. When the evening was come, the bell was rung, and the whole society called together to attend divine worship, upon which I also attended. They first sung one or two short hymns in the German language, then one of them took a text of scripture and spoke upon it perhaps near a quarter of an hour; after this they sung a hymn, and concluded with a very short prayer; and this I found was all they pretended to do, either public or private. I could not but be affected at the slight these people put upon prayer to God, and felt an inward desire to retire alone and pour out my soul to him, which I did; and it pleased the gracious Lord to give me considerable freedom and enlargement. Blessed be his holy name! After this, had some further conversation, and concluded the day." — pp. 196–198. See also pp. 202–208.

2. Compensation of the clergy. It appears that during the years 1760–1770, inclusive, Brainerd received for his services "fifty-nine pounds, nineteen shillings, though he had preached upwards of five hundred times." Dr. Brainerd remarks:

"He had been engaged for years; he had travelled in all weathers, and on all roads but smooth and well-beaten ones; he had erected some half-dozen churches; and all this outside of his main work; and, as a return for this labor, he had received for five hundred sermons less than sixty pounds, or about two shillings a sermon. This is the grasping avarice of the Presbyterian clergy! This man was doubtless called by some, in contempt, a *hireling preacher!* If men must live by the gospel, it is little wonder that when Mr. Brainerd died, so far as Presbyterian ministers are concerned, his field lay desolate for near a hundred years." — pp. 388, 389.

3. The influence of David and John Brainerd upon the Indians is still discernible. Rev. Cutting Marsh, well known as a missionary among the Indians of the West, writes to Dr. Brainerd, July 1, 1864, concerning Bartholomew S. Calvin, an Indian convert:

"I lent him the Memoirs of David Brainerd to read; and one morning early he called upon me in much distress of mind. 'Yesterday,' said he, 'I was reading of his frames of mind before his conversion, and I thought it possible that I might be in the same condition; and, as his preaching was the means of converting my mother, I thought now he was preaching to me.'" — p. 460.

This Mr. Calvin was the grandson of an Indian chief in New Jersey, and his mother was "the *first convert to Christianity*, under David Brainerd's preaching after he went among the Indians; and her husband was his teacher or interpreter. She said that he was the first white man she could ever love, having suffered so much from them, for she had always been afraid of them; but now God had sent this man to pay her for all the wrongs which she had suffered, and now she could pray for everybody.

"She loved David Brainerd very much, because he loved his heavenly Father so much that he was willing to endure hardships, travelling over mountains, suffering hunger, and lying on the ground, that he might do her people good; and she did everything she could for his comfort.

"After his death, his brother John succeeded him, and died much lamented by the Indians. Her father said, when David Brainerd first explained to the Indians what sin was, and how Jesus Christ came into the world and died to save them from everlasting punishment, it affected them so much to hear that Christ suffered to save such wicked Indians as they were, that they threw themselves upon the ground and sobbed aloud. Several hundreds were hopefully converted under his preaching, and he had two or three large churches in different parts of the country, as the Delawares were quite numerous at that time. Before David came among them, his people commenced going West in small bands; but, after the Brainerds closed their labors among them, they followed on after their brethren in small bands, and many of them carried the good seed which had been sown in their hearts to the far West. But the last company which was left in New Jersey her father brought to New Stockbridge, in the state of New York. Some of these went to Kansas; but they are dead, and nearly all which he brought with him." — pp. 461, 462. See also pp. 464–466.

Such incidents are interesting as intimations. "Everything visible is an intimation" of still more that is invisible. The smallest waif upon the shore is a sign of some argosy that has been on the sea.

We bespeak for the present volume of Dr. Brainerd a wide circulation among the friends of missions and of a Puritan literature.

Dexter on Congregationalism.[1]

The first two pages before the preface of this volume contain fifteen mottoes, and these give an intimation of one marked excellence of the

[1] Congregationalism: What is it? Whence is it? How it works; Why it is better than any other Form of Church Government; and its consequent Demands. By Henry M. Dexter, Pastor of Berkeley Street Congregational Church, Boston, Editor of the "Congregationalist," and Associate Editor of the "Congregational Quarterly." 8vo. pp. 306. Boston: Nichols and Noyes. 1865.

volume itself: it contains a large number of instructive and valuable excerpts from standard writers. Thus, Increase Mather is quoted as saying: "For the Congregational church discipline is not suited for a worldly interest, or for a formal generation of professors. It will stand or fall as godliness in the power of it does prevail, or otherwise" (p. v). This quotation illustrates the fact, that, from the first, it was the aim of the Congregational fathers to promote inward godliness and to eschew empty forms; and they regarded the *strength* of their system as lying, not in its conformity with the fashions of the world, but in its conduciveness to personal religious culture. Another quotation, from Hugh Peters, illustrates the fact that the fathers of Congregationalism regarded the strength of their church polity as also lying in its adaptedness to strengthen the individual judgment and the good sense of the people: "Independency, when as we know not any churches reformed, more looking at sister churches for helpe than ours doe, *onely we cannot have rule* yet discovered from any *friend* or *enemy*, that we should be *under canon* or *power* of any other church; under their *councell* we are" (p. v). Again, President Oakes is quoted as saying that Congregationalism, "*for the substance of it*, is the very way that was established and practised in the primitive times, according to the institution of Jesus Christ" (p. vi). This quotation illustrates the meaning of the phrase "for substance of doctrine." President Oakes did not distinctively intend to say, that Congregationalism is *really* and *truly* the scriptural system; that the *principles* of Congregationalism, as distinguished from the *language* in which they are expressed, are biblical; but his precise meaning was, that Congregationalism may not in its *minor* details be an exact copy of the apostolical usages; but in its *essential* parts; in its *more important* characteristics; in its *great* and *main* principles; in its *primary*, as distinct from its *secondary* qualities; in its substance, as distinct from its accessories, — it is the primitive system of the church. Another quotation illustrates the phrase yet more clearly: the Cambridge Platform says that "if the *people may elect* officers, *which is the greater*, and *wherein the substance* of the office [i.e. of an elder] consists, they may much more (occasion and need so requiring) impose hands in ordination, *which is the less*, and but the accomplishment of the other" (p. 142). Here *the substance* is synonymous with *the greater*, and contra-distinguished from *the less*. In like manner we read (p. 151): "This [Cambridge] Platform was agreed upon in 1648. In 1679 a Synod held in Boston 'considered it, and voted that they do unanimously approve of the said Platform *for the substance of it*.' Cotton Mather explains what they meant by the use of this language," and specifies some particulars in the Platform which were not, although the essential principles of the Platform were, "unanimously approved."

In these, and in numerous other instances, the extracts which Dr. Dexter has accumulated from the old writers are rich in suggestions. He deserves the gratitude of his denomination for the wealth of these citations.

It is ungracious to criticize a man for not doing more than he has done, when he has already accomplished more than any one else; yet we think that Dr. Dexter would have augmented the value of his work if, on some questions, he had cited a larger number of authorities. Thus, on the question whether the result of a council be mere advice, or advice backed up by power or dominion, he might have multiplied citations sustaining his theory. He has proved what he has asserted, but he has developed a power to prove it more abundantly. There are three possible theories in regard to this question. The first is, that the result of a council is mere advice, in the sense of an expression of opinion which is entitled to no special deference, like the hap-hazard or hasty judgment of a stranger or thoughtless passer-by. The second theory is that the result of a council, acting according to the rules and in the spirit of Congregationalism, is not a mere expression of a careless judgment, but is grave and solemn advice, given by judicious and impartial men after deliberate and patient investigation; therefore such advice has great "moral and spiritual weight"; "there is great inherent probability that it will be right"; "a strong presumption that it ought to be followed"; it has moral and spiritual authority, but no power to bind the conscience or force the action of those to whom it is given; fellowship is not necessarily broken if the advice be not followed. The third theory is, that the result of a council is not mere advice in the sense of an inconsiderate expression of opinion; nor mere advice in the sense of a thoughtful expression having moral authority and spiritual weight, but is determinative, decisive, final; and fellowship is broken if the result be not followed or obeyed. The first and third of these theories are ultraisms; the second and intermediate is the true congregational theory. Dr. Dexter says: "Councils have no authority whatever — properly so called" (p. 64.) By "*authority properly so called*," he means "legal or rightful *power*," "a right to *command*," "*dominion*." Councils are not "authoritative" in the primary sense of being "dictatorial," "magisterial," "peremptory," "*commanding*," having power to enforce compliance on all who would retain their fellowship. But Dr. Dexter does not mean to deny that the advice of councils is authoritative in a secondary sense; that is, the sense of its being entitled to great deference, so great "that nothing but the clearest evidence of its being in error can justify the honest followers of Christ in failing to comply with it" (p. 65). He does not mean to deny, that councils have authority, in the third sense which Webster attaches to that word: "The power derived from *opinion, respect*, or *esteem; influence of character*," — "or *mental* or *moral superiority*, and the like." John Milton illustrates the *authority* of a congregational council when he speaks of

> "Truth, wisdom, sanctitude, severe and pure;
> Severe, but *in true filial freedom* placed,
> Whence *true authority* in men."

Dr. Dexter does not intend to deny that the "results of councils conduct-

ing themselves according to congregational rules, are *authorities* in the fifth sense specified by Webster: "a precedent," — "an *opinion*, *saying*, or *statement worthy* to be taken as a precedent." It is a principle of Congationalism to respect usage, precedents; to revere the solemn declarations of men who have deliberated with painstaking and prayer on the subject of their advice. "Since this way of councils is Christ's appointed way out of difficulty for the local church, it is reasonable to hope and expect that his special guidance — as its Great Head — will make itself appear in their decisions, when reached as carefully, humbly, thoughtfully, patiently, and prayerfully as they always ought to be" (p. 65). But to be *influenced* by councils as *authorities* in this sense of precedents entitled to great deference, is very different from being *governed* by councils as *powers*, whose mandates we must obey, or else break the fellowship of the churches. Dr. Dexter says correctly, that "councils have not unfrequently assumed, or or seemed to assume, in their 'results' the language of power, rather than that of persuasion; decreeing, rather than dissuading from the wrong; enacting, rather than exhorting toward the right" (p. 65). But he does not deny that the persuasive and dissuasive words, the pious exhortations of one council may be appealed to as *precedents*, and, so far forth, *authorities*, by another council. In the primary sense they are no authorities; we have only one Master, that is Christ; but in an inferior sense, a man *authorizes* a report or an opinion, when "he gives authority, credit, reputation, or support" to the same (Webster).

This work of Dr. Dexter derives an especial value, not only from its wealth of citations and references, but also from its clear delineations of congregational principles; its fulness in stating congregational usages, its numerous historical illustrations, its complete indexes, etc. Every Congregational and Baptist clergyman will find the work a thesaurus of information, valuable in the practical details of his office.

Froude's History of England.[1]

"The immediate present," says Mr. Froude, near the end of the first volume of his history, "however awful its import, will ever seem common and familiar to those who live and breathe in the midst of it. In the days of the September Massacre at Paris, the theatres were open as usual; men ate, and drank, and laughed, and cried, and went about their common work, unconscious that those days which were passing by them, so much like other days, would remain the *dies nefasti*, accursed in the memory of mankind forever. Nothing is terrible, nothing is sublime in human things, so long as they are before our eyes. The great man has so much in com-

[1] History of England from the Fall of Wolsey to the Death of Elisabeth. By James Anthony Froude, M.A., late Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford. Vols. I., II., III., and IV. New York: Charles Scribner and Co.

mon with men in general, the routine of daily life, in periods the most remarkable in history, contains so much that is unvarying, that it is only when time has done its work, and all which was unimportant has ceased to be remembered, that such men and such times stand out in their true significance."

These words might seem almost to be written of our own time and country, rather than of England, and Henry VIII., and Queen Catherine, and Archbishop Cranmer. They, however, indicate the spirit and purpose of this history. Mr. Froude, by a careful, honest, and independent examination of original sources, seeks to arrive at a more sound and trustworthy conclusion respecting the men and events of one of the most important epochs of English history than has hitherto been reached. He not only states his own judgment, but gives the grounds of it, so that if not convinced, we may have the means of forming an independent opinion. He appears in these volumes as the defender of Henry VIII., who is not only the "bluff King Hal," of English popular judgment, but a powerful, wise, and mainly just and upright monarch. As against the Pope, as against Queens Catherine and Ann Boleyn — though compassionating the sad fate of these women — he is on the side of the king. His picture of Anne, though her early and melancholy end has ever excited so strong a sympathy, is not one to elevate her in popular regard, but essentially to debase her. We cannot say that the arguments for this conclusion seem entirely sufficient to destroy a compassionate doubt.

Mr. Froude's graphic account of the early character of Henry is very flattering, and has doubtless surprised many who have formed their opinions from former historians. "If Henry VIII." he says, "had died previous to the first agitation of the divorce, his loss would have been deplored as one of the heaviest misfortunes which had ever befallen the country; and he would have left a name which would have taken its place in history by the side of that of the Black Prince, or of the conqueror of Agincourt. Left at the most trying age, with his character unformed, with the means at his disposal of gratifying every inclination, and married by his ministers, when a boy, to an unattractive woman far his senior, he had lived for thirty-six years almost without blame, and bore through England the reputation of an upright and virtuous king. Nature had been prodigal to him of her rarest gifts. In person he is said to have resembled his grandfather, Edward IV., who was the handsomest man in Europe. His form and bearing were princely; and amidst the easy freedom of his address, his manner remained majestic. No knight in England could match him in the tournament, except the duke of Suffolk; he drew with ease as strong a bow as was borne by any yeoman of the guard;[1] and these powers were sustained

[1] The English bow was then three fingers thick and seven feet long, and the distance of an effective shot was about two hundred and twenty yards.

in unfailing vigor by a temperate habit and by constant exercise. Of his intellectual ability we are not left to judge from the suspicious panegyrics of his contemporaries. His state papers and letters may be placed by the side of those of Wolsey or of Cromwell, and they lose nothing in the comparison. Though they are broadly different, the perception is equally clear, the expression equally powerful, and they breathe throughout an irresistible vigor of purpose. In addition to this, he had a fine musical taste, carefully cultivated; he spoke and wrote in four languages; and his knowledge of a multitude of other subjects with which his versatile ability made him conversant, would have formed the reputation of any ordinary man. He was among the best physicians of his age; he was his own engineer, inventing improvements in artillery and new constructions in shipbuilding; and this not with the condescending incapacity of a royal amateur, but with thorough workmanlike understanding."

The third and fourth volumes carry down the history, with no abatement of interest, to the death of Henry VIII., in 1547. The final judgment of the author respecting Henry is given in the closing sentence of the volume. "His personal faults were great, and he shared, besides them, in the errors of his age; but far deeper blemishes would be but as scars upon the features of a sovereign who in trying times sutained nobly the honor of the English name, and carried the commonwealth securely through the hardest crisis in its history." It would be singular if the almost unanimous judgment of the ages with reference to a monarch whose life was so marked, should be reversed through the impartial investigation of a writer in the middle of the nineteenth century. This would be both to the honor and the shame of history.

The succeeding volumes will bring us to still more interesting scenes; the yet doubtful struggle between Romanism and Protestantism during the reigns of Edward, Mary, and Elisabeth. These volumes are promised early in the spring.

A Dictionary of the Bible; comprising its Antiquities, Biography, Geography, and Natural History. Edited by William Smith, LL.D. In three volumes. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. Also an Abridgment of the same, in one octavo volume, pp. 1039.

Messrs. Little and Brown are public benefactors in giving to us the three superb volumes of Dr. Smith's Dictionary of the Bible. Some articles in this dictionary are written in a style of surpassing elegance. Some of them exhibit varied and profound learning. But this great work we mention now, not with the purpose of commending it, for it is so well known by our readers already that it needs no lengthened commendation. It is not faultless, as no work of the kind can be; but it is a very important part of the apparatus which every clergyman needs. We regret that the price of the volumes renders it difficult for some students to purchase

them; and we now allude to the larger work for the purpose of saying that it has been abridged into one finely-printed and well-illustrated volume, which is sold at a moderate price. The title of the abridgment is: "A Concise Dictionary of the Bible; comprising its Antiquities, Biography, Geography, and Natural History; being a Condensation of the larger Dictionary. Edited by William Smith, LL.D., Classical Examiner in the University of London. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company." Of course if a scholar is able to procure the larger work, he should not hesitate to do so; but if he must deny himself that privilege, let him by all means obtain the abridgment. This, too, is not without its faults. Nothing is easier than to criticize any Dictionary or Cyclopaedia; but it is a valuable book of reference, and abounds with articles neatly and succintly written. Teachers of Sabbath-schools will find this abridgment a very important aid in their labors.

The question is often asked: Shall I purchase Smith's Dictionary of the Bible, or the third edition of Kitto's Cyclopaedia of Biblical Literature? It is very difficult to compare such works. Both are needed. Dr. Alexander has improved the Cyclopaedia very essentially: in the departments of "the Religious and Literary Archaeology of the Hebrews," of "Biblical Geography" and "Topography," the "Literary History of the different Books" of scripture, he has introduced a large amount of new material. In all such works composed by so large a number of scholars, the articles must be of various degrees of merit. That library is the most perfect which has the most copious assortment of these works of reference. One work supplies what the other lacks; and that one which in most respects is inferior to the other surpasses it in other respects. The library of Daniel Webster was distinguished by its multitude of Gazeteers, Encyclopaedias, Dictionaries, etc. They directed him to the sources of information on the various topics which he was called to discuss. The library of every clergyman should be rich in such helps as those furnished by Drs. W. L. Alexander and Wm. Smith.

Reason in Religion. By Frederic Henry Hedge. 12mo. pp. 458. Boston: Walker, Fuller, and Co. 1865.

Dr. Hedge is a suggestive writer. In the present volume he has uttered many profound truths. Some of them he has expressed in a style which is very beautiful; others in a style which is really eloquent. We are surprised to perceive how near he comes at times to a high orthodoxy, and how far he departs from it at other times. He often admits principles which, in our view, make it necessary to adopt the general system of Calvinism; and again he sanctions principles which, if established, would make it necessary to give up all confidence in an authoritative revelation. The volume gives evidence of a meditative habit, of learning, of rich imag-

ination, of ripe independent thought. We do not regard it as self-consistent, nor, in some of its statements, as exact or logical. His *style* is sometimes Pantheistic, although we do not suppose that a Pantheistic *idea* underlies it. Many passages of the Bible he interprets as allegorical which we interpret as literal, and he often finds a beautiful metaphor where we find a solid proof-text.

My Ministerial Experiences. By the Rev. Dr. Büchsel, Berlin. 16mo. pp. 290. London: Alexander Strahan and Co.

Dr. Büchsel may be considered as a representative of the pastors belonging to the high church evangelical party in Germany. He is a very decided foe to American Republicanism, and to all democracy in the church. He is a graceful, but not very animated preacher, and attracts a highly intelligent congregation to his church in Berlin. Prof. Hengstenberg and other Professors, many of the Prussian nobility, some members of the royal family, are regular attendants upon Dr. Büchsel's ministrations. He is more fascinating as a writer than as a preacher. The present volume has had an extensive circulation in Germany. It is gracefully translated into English. Another volume has been added to it in the German, which has not yet been clothed in an English dress. The Reminiscences of Dr. Büchsel are of interest, as affording a fair view of ministerial life in Germany, and illustrating the progress of evangelical religion, as also of the high church party, in the German States.

Life of Horace Mann: By his Wife. Boston: Walker, Fuller, and Company. 1865.

A new edition of this Memoir has recently appeared, which, among other improvements, contains a copious index. The want of such an index is a grave deficiency in the first edition. Mr. Mann was endued with great energy of character. One of his pupils says of him: "Labor was to him a sacrament. As Cecil said of Sir. Walter Raleigh: 'We know that he could and did *toil terribly*.' I find no other character which so illustrates to me that saying of Novalis as Mr. Mann: 'By enlargement and cultivation of our activity we change ourselves into fate'" (p. 456, 1st ed). Mr. Mann consecrated his industry and enterprise to various philanthropic schemes, but especially to the work of educating the young. He accomplished much in elevating the standard of our common schools, improving the structure of school-houses, enlarging the qualifications of school-teachers, etc. We think that his friends have claimed for him some honors which do not belong to him, or at least not to him exclusively. We know that the friends of other men ascribe to them the credit of originating certain schemes which are often ascribed to Mr. Mann. He was a vigilant opposer of orthodoxy, and often misrepresented it. He says of his early pastor, Dr. Emmons, that "he rarely if ever descanted upon the joys of heaven,

and never, to my recollection, upon the essential and necessary happiness of a virtuous life" (p. 13, 1st. ed). Now it was a peculiarity of Dr. Emmons that he believed in the *essential* and *immutable* difference between right and wrong, and in the *necessary* happiness of a moral agent who does right. Throughout this volume are scattered many criticisms on the evangelical scheme, and as often as the scheme is criticised it is caricatured.

Life and Letters of Frederick W. Robertson, M.A., Incumbent of Trinity Chapel, Brighton, 1847–53. Edited by Stopford A. Brooke, M.A., late Chaplain to the Embassy at Berlin. 12mo. pp. 359. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1865.

Mr. Robertson was born in London, Feb. 3, 1816. He died August 15, 1853. He was eminent for his intellectual independence, his sensitiveness of heart, his love of nature, his mental and moral activity, his fearlessness and manliness of bearing. He began his ministry as an evangelical divine; but he became at length decidedly hostile to the evangelical school, and stood by himself, representing and represented by no party. He was an admirer of the writings of Dante, Tennyson, Keble, Carlyle, Channing, and others of the more "Liberal School." He writes with great freshness and force of style; and the six volumes of his works which have been republished in this country have been received with great favor. He was too sensitive to public opinion; and he expressed his own convictions with more confidence than the amount of his learning would justify.

Essays on some of the Difficulties in the Writings of the Apostle Paul, and in other parts of the New Testament. By Richard Whately, D.D., Archbishop of Dublin. From the Eighth London Edition. 12mo. pp. 376. Andover: Warren F. Draper; Boston: Gould and Lincoln; New York: Hurd and Houghton; Philadelphia: Smith, English, and Company; Cincinnati: G. S. Blanchard. 1865.

"These Essays are published with the sanction of the late Archbishop Whately. They are reprinted from copies furnished to the American publisher by the author, and contain his latest revisions. The Essays on 'Some of the Peculiarities of the Christian Religion' will follow in the same style." Dr. Whately's writings are characterized by sterling thought and sound judgment. Clear and solid sense is his peculiar characteristic. He is often ingenious, generally candid, almost always plain and transparent. He sometimes fails in acuteness, as is seen in the third Essay of the present volume, where, as we think, he fails to apprehend the exact idea of "Election"; still, he is more sharp-sighted than the majority of writers on theological topics. We regard the present volume as, on the whole, the ablest of his theological works. It deserves the faithful study of every clergyman. Dr. Whately is one of those authors who can be as profitably

read by those who do not agree with him as by those who do. The religious opinions of a writer who earned so eminent a name in the department of logic and rhetoric, and who had so great skill in the practical affairs relating to the state as well as the church, cannot be without peculiar interest to the theologian.

THE PARABLES, read in the Light of the Present Day. By Thomas Guthrie D.D., Author of "The Gospel in Ezekiel," "The Saints Inheritance," "Way to Life," "Speaking to the heart." 16mo. pp. 278. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1866.

Dr. Guthrie discourses in this volume on twelve of the parables. He treats them with his usual freshness of illustration, depth of religious feeling, and rare earnestness of style. He agrees mainly with Trench in the exposition of the parables, and has adapted his exposition to immediate, practical effect. These, as well as his other discourses, are well fitted to influence the popular mind. Excellent, however, as this volume is, we have not been so much gratified with its general execution, as with that of some other volumes written by Dr. Guthrie and reprinted by the Messieurs Carter. We have recently reperused with much interest his "Way to Life," reprinted in 1862, which contains many eloquent passages, but which is inferior to his "Gospel in Ezekiel" and his "Inheritance of the Saints."

THE INTUITIONS OF THE MIND INDUCTIVELY INVESTIGATED. By the Rev. James M'Cosh, LL.D., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Queen's College, Belfast, Author of the Method of the Divine Government, Physical and Moral." New and revised edition. 8vo. pp. 448. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1866.

We regard this second as far superior to the first edition of Dr. M'Cosh's excellent work. It seems destined to introduce into the Scottish churches an improved method of reasoning on the doctrines of theology. We do not agree with all the opinions of Dr. M'Cosh, but we hold him, and especially his present work, in very high esteem. We trust that he will continue to write on those branches of philosophy which are intimately connected with the truths of revealed religion.

PHILOSOPHY OF RHETORIC. By John Bascom, Professor of Rhetoric in Williams College, Author of "Aesthetics, or Science of Beauty," etc. 16mo. pp. 251. Boston: Crosby and Ainsworth. 1866.

There is a marked condensation of thought in this volume. The style of it is distinguished for conciseness. We are happy to see (pp. 14–32) that Prof. Bascom gives a more extended meaning to the term *Rhetoric* than is given by some writers in this department; and that he defends the

study of Rhetoric as a means of *acquiring* and *retaining* those habits of expression which are called *natural*. Rhetoric, being derived from nature, favors nature and opposes artifice. We are also glad to perceive that he gives the right idea of *consciousness*, as in the sentence (p. 65): "Thought, that it may be thought, must be known to itself; feeling, that it may be feeling, must be aware of itself; mind, that it may be mind, must be conscious of its own phenomena." Throughout the volume are found many just and appropriate definitions. It may be studied with great advantage, not only by the scholar in the university, but also by the orator in professional life. More illustrative sentences from standard authors would, we think, augment the usefulness of the work.

Reminiscences, Historical and Biographical, of Sixty-four Years in the Ministry. By Rev. Henry Boehm, Bishop Ashbury's travelling companion, and executor of his last will and testament. Edited by Rev. Joseph B. Wakeley. 12mo. pp. 493. New York: Carlton and Porter. 1865.

"My forefathers were from Switzerland. There is a romance in their history." So begins this entertaining and instructive volume. Jacob Boehm, one of these forefathers, was converted among the Pietists, and afterwards joined the Mennonites. His son emigrated to this country in 1715, and settled in Pennsylvania. He became a lay elder among the Mennonites. He had a son Martin, who was a Mennonite preacher, and was the father of Henry Boehm, the subject of this memoir. Henry was born in June 1775. He learned the German language before he learned the English, and was one of the first among the American Methodists who preached in the German language. When he joined the Methodist church, in 1798, it had 266 travelling preachers and 65,980 church members. "Now," he writes, "we have nearly 7000 travelling preachers, and more than 900,000 church members, besides those in the South." Such incidents, with which this volume is replete, invest it with a singular charm.

History of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. By E. H. Gillett, Author of the Life and Times of John Huss. 12mo. pp. 576 and 605.

To write the history of the Presbyterian church, at the present day, is a work of great difficulty. It is too much to expect that any one narrative will satisfy all the parties which feel an interest in that church. Every narrative, however, is important, as it contributes the materials for a future more extended history. Mr. Gillett has undertaken a great work, and has performed it well. Some will differ from him here; others there; but all will, or ought to, admit that his spirit is candid and truth-loving. A full index is at the close of the second volume, and adds much to the value of the work.

History of the Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States of America. By Abel Stevens LL.D. 8vo. pp. 423 and 511. New York: Published by Carlton and Porter.

Dr. Stevens is well known as the author of the "History of the Religious Movement of the Eighteenth Century called Methodism," — a work of singular interest and power. The present history sustains his high reputation as a dramatic yet truthful writer. He states the facts of history with scrupulous care, while he groups them with a poetic taste.

Zulu-Land; or, Life among the Zulu-Kafirs of Natal and Zulu-Land, South Africa, with Map and Illustrations, largely from original photographs. By Rev. Lewis Grout, for fifteen years Missionary of the American Board in South Africa, Author of the "Grammar of the Zulu Language," and corresponding member of the American Oriental Society. 12mo. pp. 351. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Publication Committee; New York: A. D. F. Randolph.

We have long known Mr. Grout as a man of indefatigable industry, and of good scholarship. He was laborious as a missionary, and has become known in this country and in England by his controversy with Bishop Colenso, and by his other writings. The present volume is an interesting one, and we hope that it may be an earnest of other works from the same pen.

The Bible Hand-Book: An Introduction to the Study of Sacred Scripture. By Joseph Angus, D.D. Revised edition, with illustrations. 12mo. pp. 727. Philadelphia: James S. Claxton. 1865.

This Hand-book was designed for popular use, and is well fitted to awaken an interest in the sacred volume. It is judicious and instructive, and will, as it should, secure a wide circulation. It is not always entirely accurate, as is indicated on page 681, Vol. XXII. of this Review.

A Treatise on Astronomy, By Elias Loomis, LL.D., Professor of Natural Philosophy and Astronomy in Yale College; author of an "Introduction to Practical Astronomy," and of a Series of Mathematics for Schools and Colleges. 8vo. pp. 338. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1865. — This work is characterized by exactness and precision of statement.

The Martyrs of Spain and the Liberators of Holland. By the Author of of the "Schönberg-Cotta Family." 12mo. pp. 400. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1865.

Hours among the Gospels; or Wayside Truths from the Life of our Lord. By N. C. Burt, D.D. 12mo. pp. 215. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co. — A highly agreeable and instructive book.

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

HISTORY AND THEOLOGY OF THE REFORMED PROTESTANT DUTCH CHURCH.

BY ELBERT S. PORTER, D.D., EDITOR OF CHRISTIAN INTELLIGENCER, NEW YORK.

[NOTE. — This is the Fifteenth of the Series of Articles representing the peculiar views of different theological sects or schools.]

THE Puritans of England and the Calvinists of Holland were friends. In the evil days when both civil and religious liberty were contending for existence against the rage of kings and priests, they stood up together, counting not their lives dear unto themselves. They were heroes and martyrs. While the Puritans protested against the combined insolence and bigotry of a narrow-minded despot, Charles I., the Dutch Calvinists defied the cruel craftiness and vindictive power of the Spaniard. Those giants in the Christian church became its benefactors for all subsequent times. Their faith, their principles, and their aims live to-day in the hearts of their descendants, and compose a sacred pledge that the heritage bequeathed them by illustrious ancestors will never be squandered through selfish indolence, nor basely betrayed through lack of constancy.

With the progress of liberty in the world, England and Holland were once closely identified. The marriage of William Henry of Nassau, Stadtholder of Holland, with

Mary, elder daughter of James the Duke of York, in October, 1677, was an event which deserves to be regarded as of an unspeakable historical importance. It united the interests, the sympathies, and the strength of the two then most powerful of all the nations wherein the Protestant faith had taken root. When the Prince of Orange left Holland to become William III. of England, "his flag," says Macauley, "was immediately hoisted. It displayed the arms of Nassau quartered with those of England. The motto, embroidered in letters three feet long, was happily chosen. The House of Orange had long used the elliptical device, 'I will maintain.' The ellipse was now filled up with words of high import: 'The liberties of England and the Protestant religion.'"

At that time the Batavian Republic had attained its highest pitch of glory. It had humbled Spain, resisted France, expelled from its borders the janizaries of the Inquisition, founded its immense universities, achieved victories by sea and land, and was acknowledged as the chief patron of literature, art, commerce, and religious liberty. Its conjunction of political interest, through its great Stadtholder, with England was advantageous to both countries, and in the very highest degree beneficial to the interests of Protestantism. "For the authority of law," says the historian already quoted, "for the security of property, for the peace of our streets, for the happiness of our homes, our gratitude is due, under Him who raises and pulls down nations at his pleasure, to the Long Parliament, to the Convention, and to William of Orange."

The Calvinistic Christians who were thus associated in the Old World in illustrious labors for the Word of God and the rights of men were not divided in the New. Boston and New York, as they were nearly coëval in their foundation, have been distinguished from their infancy for their unfaltering devotion to the great principles which are essential to the right ordering and wholesome growth of the state and of the church. That heroic faith which led to the settlement of Massachusetts and of New York by men educated in the school of freedom, has never since been wanting in the hour

of peril. In seasons of public danger it has flamed out with all its ancient brightness, and lighted the path on which the American Union has marched forward towards the goal of its destiny.

Puritanism, both in Old and in New England, has vindicated its title to the gratitude of mankind by its intelligent and conscientious opposition to Popery, Prelacy, and Prescription. Hardly less can be said of the Calvinists of Holland and of New Amsterdam. The Reformed of the island and of the Continent differed, indeed, in many things; but together they gave proof that they were one in the faith delivered of old time to the saints. Why should not their children be also one in the same bond? Here, in the New World, circumstances quite well known for a long time fostered local jealousies; and perhaps badly-conducted controversies, political and ecclesiastical, have excited mutual distrust among those who have common memories to preserve and common interests to defend. If, however, at any time New England has been too self-assertive, on the other hand the Dutch pride of New York has never been deficient in susceptibility. But while the criminations of criticism are seldom controlled by the moderation of the few, it is a solace to know that Christian love can embrace opposites, and so make one of many. The heart of Christ is the centre of an august unity, and the fellowship of the people of God is cemented by a "blood thicker than water." The more, therefore, the churches of Jesus Christ come to recognize, study, and understand one another, will they be likely to strive together for the furtherance of the gospel.

In this faith the following account of the Protestant Reformed Dutch church has been prepared.

Its title is derived from the facts connected with its origin. In 1529 several princes, together with the representatives of fourteen Imperial cities present at the Diet of Spires, entered a solemn protest against enactments "contrary to God and his word, to their soul's salvation, and their good conscience." This was done April 19th, and a little less than twelve years

after Luther had opened the great religious revolution of the sixteenth century. By this act the Western church was divided into Romish and Protestant. From the date of its occurrence the nations felt within them the breath of a new life, which has ever since strengthened them in zeal and work for the emancipation of all men from the chains of superstition and the yoke of political servitude. The great mass of the people of Holland, together with the inferior and some of the higher clergy, declared in favor of the Protestants, and received for themselves that appellation.

About the middle of the century the Protestants were divided into Lutheran and Reformed; the first following Luther, the latter Farel, Calvin, and others. For awhile Lutheranism made comparatively little progress; but the Reformed faith extended itself rapidly over Switzerland, France, the Palatinate, Bohemia, Holland, Scotland, and more slowly into England. "The Protestant Reformed church" is therefore a purely historical title. As against the Papal hierarchy and all its corruptions the church is Protestant, and as against High or Low Lutheranism it holds the old Pauline, Augustinian, and Calvinistic faith in the sovereignty of grace and the natural helplessness of man as a sinner. The Calvinists universally rejected the doctrine of the sacraments and of free-will as set forth in the original Augsburgh Confession of 1530. Holland received the polity and the theology of Calvin, in distinction from the teachings of Luther, Bucer, and Zwingli, on points which separated them from the great Genevan reformers. But while the church of the Netherlands in the main approved the methods and conclusions of Calvin's interpretation of the scriptures, nevertheless for itself it adopted a confession of faith which was drawn up in the hope of reconciling differences and of harmonizing partially discordant elements of a party character. Of this more will be stated hereafter in its proper place.

The Reformed Dutch church is the oldest of the Presbyterian order in this country. It dates from the settlement

of Manhattan Island. So early as 1613 small trading posts had been set up at Manhattan and Fort Orange (Albany). The agricultural occupation of what was called New Netherland commenced in 1623. The pioneers were not men of mere adventure. While they were intent first upon commercial and next upon agricultural advantages, still they brought with them their religious convictions and habits. The West India Company, formed in 1621, agreed, under its charter, to send with the emigrants under its care pious schoolmasters, and comforters of the sick, who were often assistants of pastors.

The first minister of the gospel who arrived in New Amsterdam was Everardus Bogardus. With him was Adam Roelandsen, a school teacher. They organized immediately after their arrival a school, which has been maintained until this day. It is sustained by the collegiate church. The children of persons in connection with the Reformed church are there educated without charge for tuition. It is ably conducted, and in educational capacity ranks with the best schools in the city. The pupils, besides being trained in the ordinary curriculum, are carefully instructed in the Christian faith. Many of its graduates have become preachers of the word, and others have filled eminent positions in civil and social relations.

Religious services in the infancy of the colony were at first held in buildings temporarily appropriated for the purpose. On the arrival of Bogardus a plain church edifice was put up on the East River, at what is now very properly called Old Slip. In that edifice the Dutch emigrants worshipped until 1642, when, at the instance of DeVries, the great navigator, a substantial building was provided within the fort in the battery. In his journal DeVries says that, dining one day with Govenor Kieft, he observed to him "that it was a shame that the English when they visited Manhattan saw only a mean barn in which we worshipped. The first thing they built in New England after their houses was a fine church. We should do the same." This becoming

church was dedicated in 1642. It was superseded by the Garden-street (now Exchange-place) church in 1690.

These few dates are enough to define the points of its beginning. The church thus planted on Manhattan Island had contemporaries of its order and faith on Long Island, in New Jersey, along the Hudson river, and at Albany.

The numerical growth of the Reformed Dutch church was until lately slower than that of others. The causes which retarded its growth will appear from an enumeration of a few historical particulars.

Forty years after its settlement in 1664 New Netherland was ceded to the British government. Just prior to this date immigration from Holland had largely increased; immediately afterwards it almost ceased, while many families returned to the fatherland. The Rev. Thomas DeWitt, D.D., who is accounted to be a most trustworthy authority, says: "The population of New Amsterdam at the time of the cession was about fifteen or sixteen hundred, and that of the colony in its whole extent, ten thousand. The natural increase in the families of the Dutch inhabitants, joined to some occasional accessions from Holland and the parts of Germany bordering on it, as well as of Hugenots, led to the spreading of Dutch settlements and the increase of churches during the latter part of the seventeenth and the early part of the eighteenth century."[1]

For the space of nearly one hundred years after the Dutch colony had become subject to the government of great Britain, preaching in the Dutch language was maintained in all the pulpits of the Reformed church. Next to its attachment to country, there is perhaps hardly another affection of the mind more enduring than the love of one's mother tongue. Everything sanctifies and helps to perpetuate that love. Everything of country, — its laws, customs, and religion; its blood, sufferings, and achievements, all flow into its language. The songs of the nursery, the epics of bards, and the eloquence of orators, render sweet to the thought and dear to

[1] Historical Dis.

the heart the words of one's native tongue. The forefathers of the Dutch Church in this land have been blamed for their obstinate adherence to a language which was strange and uncouth in the ears of the community, and which their children even understood but imperfectly. But nature is slow to abdicate her throne.

Naturam expellas furcâ tamen usque recurret. — *Hor.*

If, soon after New York had become an English colony, the English language had been even partially introduced into its pulpits, the position of the Dutch church in this country would have been much better than it was down to the close of the last century. As the Dutch and English intermarried, and the young from necessity learned to speak English, the drift of social affairs gradually carried large numbers of Presbyterian Calvinists into the Episcopal church. At that day the good feelings which were cultivated between the Dutch and Episcopal churches rendered the transition from the one to the other by no means difficult. And so it came to pass that in fact the Hollanders, while they maintained their own church as a kind of national monument, nevertheless aided liberally and effectively in establishing Episcopacy. The wealth of old Trinity came from a Dutch lady, and St. Marks, which has long felt that it possessed "all the blood of all the Howards," was founded by the Stuyvesants and other Dutch families of social eminence.

Like causes produced like effects elsewhere. Consequently the early planting and training of the Dutch and Episcopal churches in the province of New York furnish a double and connected history. It does not transcend the limits of prudence to affirm that for a century, at least, the Episcopal church in and around New York received as much succor and sympathy from the Dutch Presbyterians as it did from the English population.

During all this period the Episcopal was popularly styled the *English*, and the Reformed the *Dutch* church, because of the respective languages used therein. Hence, too, the sub-

sequent interpolation of the word "Dutch" into the present style and title of the Protestant Reformed church. Strictly speaking, it is there now by no proper historical nor psycological authority, and is believed by many to be a drag upon the progress of the church almost as heavy as was the retention of a foreign language by it during the century succeeding the cession of the colony.

Another reason for the slow advancement of this church is found in the fact, that the denomination here was so long subject to a foreign ecclesiastical jurisdiction. It could not ordain ministers of the word. Consequently all applications for needed pastors were made to the classis or presbytery of Amsterdam. Interminable delays often occurred, to the great detriment of individual congregations. The evils of dependence were severely felt, and some curious attempts were made to avoid them. Thus, one candidate for the ministry was sent to New Haven, and received ordination there from a Congregational council. Another was regularly ordained by three clergymen of the Dutch church, under cover of authority from Governor Andros, who, though an Episcopalian, was a generous friend and patron of the Dutch Calvinists.

The question of ordination raised up two parties, the *Coetus* and the *Conferentie*, who became fearfully embittered against each other. The providence of God, however, cannot be diverted from its course by the wrath of men. In the end, what is right, good, and expedient overmasters honest and dishonest error alike.

The two parties above-named are thus described by Prof. Demarest, of the Theological Seminary at New Brunswick, New Jersey. "The *Coetus* was a body formed in 1747, which possessed no ecclesiastical, but only advisory, powers. From this sprang the party who proposed that this assembly should be changed into a regular classis; that an educational institution (for the ministry), should be established, and that the church boldly undertake to supply herself with a ministry. This was opposed by the Conferentie, who zealously advocated a continuation of the state of dependence on Holland."

The objection to the use of the English language in the pulpits of the Reformed church was overcome in 1764, when the Rev. Archibald Laidlie, who had been the pastor of the Scotch church in Flushing, Holland, arrived in New York, and was installed as one of the ministers of the collegiate church in that city. And in 1771, through the agency of the Rev. John H. Livingston, a native of Poughkeepsie, New York, who had been educated at Utrecht, the dissensions of the two parties above named were healed. These two events occurring so nearly together, prepared this church to edify itself and take part in the great work of evangelization.

But its plans, expectations, and purposes were then all arrested by the outbreak of the war for Independence. When peace at length had been declared, it found some of its houses of worship partly demolished, and its principal congregations impoverished by the drain made upon them during the struggle. For then, as in our late civil conflict, the Dutch church, its ministry and people, were ready to sacrifice all for liberty.

Not until the year 1784 were effective measures adopted to combine the energies and unify the purpose of this church. In the convention of ministers and elders held during that year steps were taken to aid Queen's College (which had been chartered in 1770 by George III., and named in honor of his queen); and also to establish a theological professorship in connection therewith.

As we have now reached a point in the history of the Reformed church, from which its future progress was steady and solid, it may be well to place in connection here some statistics which will show at a glance its successive stages of advancement.

Statistics.

In 1664, when the Dutch was superseded by English authority, there were in all the province of New Netherland but five organized churches and six regular preachers. One hundred and twenty years afterwards, that is, in 1784, a com-

mittee of the convention then in session, used the following language: "It appears that there are under the jurisdiction of this reverend body almost a hundred regularly constituted congregations, of which fifty-three are provided with the ministration of the holy gospel; that many of the vacant congregations are large and able, and that in them all there is an ardent desire for the word of God; that several of the ministers still occupied will, through old age and other causes, apparently not long be able to engage in the work of the Lord; that the number of additions, by reason of the recent lamentable war, are very small; and that, consequently, the lack of ministers is rather increasing than otherwise, there being not more than two licentiates to supply the existing deficiencies; that for the following two years there are no candidates to be expected, while at the same time the suffering congregations daily find their danger and affliction increased, partly by the lack of licentiates, and partly by the floods of error, infidelity, and all kinds of irreligion which are everywhere bursting upon our land."

Such were the condition and needs of the church at that period. Faith, courage, and constancy, however, were not wanting to those who were charged with its care. Obstacles had been overcome, difficulties removed, and a good heart for work remained. What has since been accomplished in extending its bounds, strengthening its institutions, and enlarging its influence can be briefly told. The census of the denomination, as reported in June 1865, is as follows: churches, 427; ministers, 436; candidates, 6; about 60 young men in preparation for the ministry; number of communicants, 54,286; catechumens, 19,864; number in Bible-classes, 15,700; in Sabbath-schools, 40,256; amount raised for benevolent purposes, chiefly for the several boards of the church, $225,410.44; amount raised for congregational uses, $545,540.99; infants baptized during the year, 3,064; adults, 540. These churches are associated in thirty-two classes or presbyteries, composing three particular and one General Synod.

The chief growth of the church has been mainly in the states of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Latterly it has extended itself into Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Iowa. In the West it has received special and valuable reinforcements of pious Hollanders who, oppressed by the dominancy of error in the state church of their native land, came hither at the bidding of conscience to find a home where they might maintain inviolate the faith they cherish. The leader of this pilgrim band was the Rev. Albertus C. Van Raalte, D.D., a man of apostolic zeal and of the ripest scholastic and theological attainments. He and his associates planted a colony at Holland, Ottaway county, Michigan, where they have prospered greatly in their secular and religious undertakings. Minor colonies have been also established in Wisconsin and Illinois. All of them are constantly receiving accessions from the Netherlands.

Government.

If there is any tangible middle ground between high-church Presbyterianism and old-fashioned Congregationalism, the government of the Reformed Dutch church is perhaps in possession of it. We make this affirmation with a desire that it shall be carefully scrutinized. First of all, it is to be remarked that its government in every part is fixed by a constitution to which every member, minister, church, and ecclesiastical body is subject. It defines ecclesiastical rights, modes of procedure, articles of faith, and an order of worship. All communicants are required to pledge their fealty, and all pastors are obliged to subscribe to this constitution. Cases of discipline, from whatever cause they may spring, must be investigated according to its provisions. In this way the constitution guards the rights and protects the consciences of all its subjects. No judicatory, not even the highest, is at liberty to disregard it. None of its features can be changed, except by a vote of two-thirds of all the classes. Hence arbitrary and capricious legislation is impossible, and all judicial matters are controlled by the rigid authority of

law, rather than by the extemporaneous rules suggested by circumstance.

The constitution of this church rests upon the principle that all authority in matters ecclesiastical, is committed by the great Head of the Church Catholic, first to the people, or to that body of believers comprising a single church. It postulates the right divine and indefeasible of any given number of communicants to organize a church, choose their officers, and elect their pastor. The democratic element of power is thus not only recognized, but full scope is given for its normal development. There are three ways permissible for the choice of officers. First, a free ballot; second, a choice between two sets of candidates; and third, an open nomination made by existing officers, to be ratified by the church after three publications. Any one of these three modes may be adopted. Once adopted it can be changed for another by consent of classis. The officers thus chosen are elders and deacons, who together compose the consistory. They serve for a period of two years only; after which they must be re-elected, or can be superseded by others. The elders are spiritual officers and are ordained to be assistants to the pastor in the spiritual care and government of the church. They are bound to see that the pastor preaches no strange doctrine, and that he deports himself becomingly. In case of his transgression they are required to report him to the classis. For a minister cannot be arraigned or tried save only by his peers. The deacons are officers, having charge of the poor. They are also particularly entrusted with the domestic finances of the church. Together the elders and deacons form with their constituents a body corporate, in whom are vested all the legal rights conferred by the state. Consequently our churches have no boards of trustees. Through their designated officers they control their secularities, as well as their spiritualities. Respecting their secular matters they are independent, not being required to give any account of them to any ecclesiastical body whatever.

A classis or presbytery consists of at least three churches,

commonly from twelve to twenty, and is partly a conventional and partly a delegated body. Each church sends its pastor and one elder, chosen by its consistory to the classical meeting, which is held twice every year. The classis has power to license, ordain, settle, and, if necessary, remove pastors. But no single classis can license or ordain to the ministry, unless there be present a deputy of the General Synod, who will report any irregularity, whether of doctrine or of procedure, to that body. Thus a fraternal concert of action is secured, and a classis has never yet been known from mere will-worship to disregard the authority of the constitution and of the General Synod. Hence, perhaps, proceeds that general harmony of faith and practice which has characterized the history of this denomination. Its checks and safeguards are nicely applied at the very points where divergences of doctrine or usage are likely to start. Trials for heresy have been so rare as scarcely to be worthy of mention, and consequently the peace of the church has not been disturbed thereby.

The classes are arranged under three particular synods, those of New York, Albany, and Chicago. They are delegated bodies, and are intended to transact certain kinds of business, judicial and legislative. Experience has not found these bodies to possess much practical utility as they are now constituted. They have not enough responsibility to make them important. Many would be pleased to have them made conventional, so that all the pastors in their bounds, with the delegated eldership, might come together annually for fraternal conference and edification. The drift of opinion is in favor of this change.

The General Synod meets annually, and is composed of three ministers and three elders from each classis, and when full should have one hundred and ninety-two members. The actual attendance rarely exceeds one hundred and thirty. To this body all the churches, boards, and institutions under its care report. It has supreme legislative and judicial authority, exercised, however, within the meets and bounds of

its constitution. The meetings of this body of late years have been exceedingly harmonious. The policy of the church being fixed, at least for the present, the general synod is intently studious to execute it. The Synod has correspondence with the Old School, New School, United Presbyterian, and German Reformed churches, and exchanges delegates with them. It has manifested a disposition to extend these fraternal and healing courtesies still further, because it believes in the "communion of saints."

Educational Institutions.

Rutgers (originally Queen's) College, was chartered in 1770. After passing through trials and adversities, it was at length, in 1825, placed upon a good substantial basis. From that date until the present it has gradually increased its resources and extended its usefulness. In 1863 one hundred and forty thousand dollars were added, through the liberality of the church, to its endowment foundation. The president is Rev. William H. Campbell, D.D. The faculty has eight professors. Last year the General Synod sold the property of the college for a nominal sum to its trustees. Connected with it is a grammar-school of about eighty pupils; a scientific school, which confers diplomas, and an agricultural college, endowed by the United States. The prospects of the college are encouraging. Its standard of instruction is very high.

Hope College, in Michigan, has been incorporated by the legislature of that State. It has ample grounds, and a substantial but not capacious edifice. Its endowment is now in progress, and the sum of about seventy thousand dollars is secured. Its president is the Rev. Philip Phelps, Jr., D.D. It is in contemplation to connect at an early day a theological department with this institution.

The Theological Seminary at New Brunswick may be regarded as coëval in its beginning with the college, that is, in 1770; for the college was intended to be a training school for those having in view the sacred ministry, and was

chartered expressly to that end. In 1784 the Rev. Dr. John H. Livingston was appointed Professor in Theology. The Rev. Theodorick Romeyn, of Schenectady, and Rev. Dr. Solomon Froeligh were also authorized to prepare students in divinity, with the understanding that such students should complete their course under Dr. Livingston. In 1810 the seminary was put in operation at New Brunswick, in connection with the college. In 1855 Mrs. Anna Hertzog, of Philadelphia, gave to the Synod thirty thousand dollars, for the erection of a theological hall. It is a large, stately building, on spacious grounds, and affords ample accommodations. There are now four professors in this seminary: Rev. Joseph F. Berg, D.D., Professor of Dogmatics and Polemics; Rev. Samuel M. Woodbridge, D.D., Professor of Church History; Rev. John De Witt, D.D., Professor of Oriental Languages and Literature, and Rev. David D. Demarest, D.D., Professor of Sacred Rhetoric and Pastoral Theology.

During the past year the Rev. N. E. Smith, D.D., of Brooklyn, proposed to give forty thousand dollars for the endowment of one of the professoral chairs, provided the church would raise an additional sum of forty thousand for the endowment of another. These amounts were paid over, in June of 1865, to the treasurer of the General Synod in accepted securities; so that now the four chairs in the seminary are duly supported. Other sums are being raised for the erection of four houses for the professors on the seminary grounds, two of which are now in progress of construction.

Among those who do not know it, the Reformed Dutch church has the reputation of being slow, inert, and even immobile. The facts above stated may mollify this unworthy judgment, and perhaps induce even admiration of the indomitable zeal and perseverance of a comparatively little band, which, during the past forty years, has rebuilt its old churches, erected new ones by hundreds, and endowed its institutions with an almost princely munificence.

Benevolent Institutions.

From its infancy in this country this church evinced a missionary zeal. It aimed to Christianize the Indians, and its people, in the main, treated the sons of the forest with frank and considerate care. Toward the close of the last and with the beginning of the present century, under the auspices of the New York Missionary Society, — the pioneer, we believe, in the great missionary movement in this country, — several missionaries were sent from this denomination into the wilds of Canada, and some into the forests of Kentucky, to preach the gospel, and collect the scattered people into houses of worship. Nor were these hard, primeval labors without enduring results. Churches were founded, some of which stand until this day, sources of good to the regions in which they were so long ago planted.

Soon after the formation of the American Board of Missions, this church, in its then comparative weakness, made a satisfactory arrangement to co-operate with that great and blessed institution, — the glory of New England; the surpassing proof of her abiding fidelity to the cross and the command of her Lord. At length, however, the feeling grew into a conviction that duty required the Dutch church to control her own church work. It had no fault to find with the American Board; but it was satisfied of the high moral expediency of bringing responsibility closely home, that so all the church might arouse itself to do more than it was then doing for the cause of foreign evangelization.

Accordingly, in the year 1857, by a vote almost unanimous, the General Synod resolved to conduct its foreign missions up to its own measure of ability. The result of this action has proved more beneficial than its friends dared to anticipate, as will presently appear.

The General Synod has five separate boards, through which it transacts its current business and carries forward its labors. The members of these boards hold their offices from, and give an annual account of their stewardship to, the Synod.

First is the Board of Corporation. It holds all the trust funds of the church, for education, church building, and for purposes of relief. In June 1865, it had educational funds amounting to $85,000,[1] the interest of which only is used; Widows' fund, $25,000; Permanent fund, $98,000;[2] Building fund, $12,000 (for professoral houses); Church building fund, $9,000. It has also a fund for disabled ministers, just begun, amounting to $438.92.

Second, Board of Foreign Missions. There are three missions under the care of this board, viz. one in India, one at Amoy, China, and one mission with two stations in Japan, employing twenty-eight missionaries, male and female, with many native helpers. The receipts of this board last year were $82,038.22.

Third, the Board of Domestic Missions received within the same period $24,315.83, which were expended in aiding seventy-five churches and sixty-four missionaries. The income of this board rises with each successive year.

Fourth, the Board of Education had under its care in 1865 fifty-six young men in preparation for the ministry, and fourteen parochial schools. One hundred and fifty dollars are allowed per year to each beneficiary.

Fifth, the Board of Publication, on Fulton Street, New York, has a lease of a building in which are located all the secretaries of the several boards, the office of the "Christian Intelligencer," and, on the first floor, a book depository and salesroom. It publishes a denominational and Sabbath-school literature, and is in a prosperous condition. It began with no endowment, but has made a capital that has been strengthened by donations amounting to about $10,000. It publishes a monthly quarto sheet, entitled "The Sower," which is the organ of the several boards.

Genius, Culture, and Worship.

If it be possible to characterize the genius of the Dutch

[1] These amounts are given in round numbers.

[2] To which must be added $80,000 since paid.

church it can be done in two words — *tenacity* and *liberality*. There is probably no other communion in this country more tenacious than it of its historical traditions, faith, customs, and usages. The Netherlanders on the North Sea are not more resolute in propping up their dykes than are the people of the Dutch church in preserving what is Dutch by providential favor and appointment. Assail their ancestral memories, their cherished faith, or their time-long usages of worship, and they instantly take the alarm. If you propose to innovate upon what time has sanctified, you encounter resistance, and each stalwart defender is ready to quote Roderick Dhu in face of the rash adventurer:

> "Come one, come all — this rock shall fly
> From its firm base as soon as I."

Sometimes this tenacity is very amusing. The writer knows a gentleman who had been brought up in a church whose pulpit was at the entrance, between the doors. He became an elder, and in process of time a new house of worship was erected. The congregation wanted the pulpit at the end of the church opposite the doors. The elder remonstrated: he was shocked at the thought of such an innovation upon the woodwork of the sanctuary. He offered a hundred dollars additional to his previous subscription; but the congregation had been so long annoyed by a pulpit between the doors, that they could not consent to please the worthy elder; and so the good man for conscience sake withdrew, and rode seven miles every Sabbath, to another church where the pulpit was *not* between the doors! The

> "Justum ac tenacem propositi virum"

of Horace sometimes defies the roaring floods and angry lightnings to very little purpose. Constancy is a great virtue when it is not stupid obstinacy.

Sometimes this tenacity is hurtful. It proved so when the Dutch language was retained in the pulpit at a time when a generation was clamoring for the gospel in English. That tenacity then almost destroyed the church. It drove the

flower of the most useful and influential of a rising community and of a growing city into an alien denomination, against whose prelatical assumptions all their national glories called upon them to utter a protest. By very many it is believed now that the word "Dutch" in the style and title of the church is a sad misnomer and a pernicious anomaly. As a name, it misleads and confuses. It needs explanation to be comprehended. It is no part of the historic title of the church. It repels not only strangers, but some of its own children. It is a bitter coating to a pill of sugar. For there is no church containing more popular and attractive elements in its spirit and forms; none more thoroughly American and national in all its principles and sympathies. Yet, by reason of this misleading title, not a few believe it foreign in nationality and speech. Nevertheless, the day is not yet dawning wherein there shall come relief from this hard and heavy burden. It will, however, come, for events, feelings, and convictions all proclaim its approaching advent.

The tenacity thus spoken of has, however, its great and sacred merits. In an age which delights to meddle with change; which worships novelties; which has no gratitude for the past and no confidence in the present; which puts increasing premiums upon credulity, and throws away pearls with a reckless hand to grasp after the "Dead Sea's withered fruit,"—it is pleasing alike to the pious and to the philosophic mind to find a church which, while it is ready to prove all things, is not ready to give up that which is good. The stern and tenacious conservatism of the Dutch church, like the Eddystone lighthouse, shines with benignant beams over the troubled waters that rave around its base.

With its tenacity is associated the utmost Christian liberality of spirit. Not only does it recognize all who hold the doctrines of life, but it refuses to allow non-essentials to hinder practical and genuine fellowship. All its history proves the truth of this affirmation, and its present condition illustrates it.

In its membership and ministry it is composite. Dutch,

Scotch, Hugenot, New Englander, German, and Italian are numbered among its communicants, its officers, and pastors. Only one condition is imposed; and that is, "receive the faith, and you are welcome." This hospitality is sincere as it is frank. Accordingly neither the pulpit nor the pews of the Protestant Reformed church have been shut against any seeking admission with the image and superscription of the Master upon them. Many of our congregations are comprised in the main of New England people; and among those whom the church delights to honor are pastors educated at Andover or Union or Auburn or Princeton.

Possessing this liberality, this church has never hesitated to unite with co-operative societies in works of benevolence. It has furnished presidents for all the chief national societies, and willingly contributed to their treasuries. If this liberality can be accounted a merit, it is also a duty which the Dutch Presbyterians and the New England Congregationalists may yet preach and practise in the future, as they have in the past.

Of the culture of the church this much may be said, without any appearance of boasting: that it is now and ever has been of a grade requiring high scholarship, classical and theological, in its ministry. Had there been a willingness to lower the standard of preparation recruits might have been rapidly obtained to fill up the ranks of its pastors and teachers, and so congregations, too, might have been gathered at an accelerated rate. But the church wants no novices in its pulpits. It requires long and thorough training on the part of its rising ministry, and is now thinking of prolonging the prescribed course of study for theological students. It prefers to build slowly, if so it can build what will stand.

So great and multiform have been the practical daily labors imposed upon them, that the ministry of this church, as a rule, have not found time to become writers of works of extensive erudition. A standard treatise on pastoral theology has been produced by the late James Spencer Cannon. In

the department of ecclesiastical history Rev. Dr. Thomas DeWitt, Dr. Demarest, Dr. Taylor, and Dr. Messler have written much worthy of attention. Concerning points in dogmatic and polemical theology Dr. Berg, Dr. Gordon, Dr. John T. Demarest, Dr. John DeWitt, Rev. H. E. Ganse, Dr. E. P. Rogers, Rev. J. DeBaun, Rev. Joseph Collier, Rev. John A. Todd, Rev. Mr. Quau, and some others, together with the late Professors Van Vrauken and McClellan, may be here referred to. Some excellent biographies have been produced by Drs. Gunn, Chambers, Williamson, and others. In general literature we would name Bethune, Matthews, Wortman, Van Santvoord, and Phelps, without undertaking to make the list complete.

Dr. Bethune's Lectures on the Heidelberg Catechism approach the only *system* of divinity which the church has received in form from any of her pastors or professors. In ecclesiastical archaeology the Rev. A. P. Van Giesen, a young but rising man, has written some articles of merit, indicating what he may do should he lay out his strength upon this interesting department of study.

Among her laymen who have rendered service to the state and church the names of Frelinghuysen, Tayler Lewis, J. Romeyn Brodhead, Ex-Governor Vroom, Scuyler Colfax, William B. Crosby, Jonathan Sturges, Robert H. Pruyn, and many others are held in high esteem. Every year brings into prominence in her various councils men of great natural and cultivated force. We cannot speak of them here.

The order of worship in the courts of the Lord is prescribed. It requires the reading of the law, the recitation of the Lord's Prayer and the singing of such psalms or hymns as have been approved and allowed by the Synod, *and no others.* Considering that the songs of Zion are in the highest degree formative of principles, as well as expressive of emotion, this church does not regard with favor nor with toleration the use of any compilations made on private account. She prefers the psalms and hymns which have been tested in the heroic ages of the church to any of softer sentimentality or of more sensational pungency.

Extemporaneous prayer is universally used. But there is an order of prayer in the Liturgy of the church which may be followed if choice or circumstance so determine. The forms for the administration of the sacraments are obligatory, and are read so often as the ordinances are administered. At the Lord's table the communicants recite the so-called Apostles' Creed aloud, with the officiating clergyman, though this is not universal.

Customs.

There are a few customs which are peculiar to this church. The elders and deacons are seated on the right and left hand of the pulpit. One pew for each class of officers is reserved for them. Thus they are near the pastor if needed for advice; can overlook the whole congregation, and observe what is noteworthy; and at the close of the service the consistory usually pauses to speak a kind or hopeful word to the preacher, whether he be the pastor or a stranger. Thus the affectionate relations which bind the Dutch clergy and their people to one another are fostered, and the right hand of fellowship is offered and received so often as they meet in the sanctuary. It is not a custom without meaning or value.

Every pastor is bound by the stipulations of his call and the terms of his personal subscription to preach once a month on the Heidelberg Catechism, that so the full order of scriptural doctrine may be gone over once in four years. This wholesome rule a few years since was in danger of being ignored, but it is now coming again to be very generally observed. Each pastor, with his elder, is required to answer his classis whether he has or has not complied with this rule, and his answer is sent up to the General Synod.

Members are admitted on confession of faith only when they have given proof of an experimental change of heart. Confirmation is not practised, neither are youth admitted to free communion on being able to recite the catechism. Candidates for admission are examined by the pastor and elders, and care is taken to receive none hastily to the fellowship of

the Lord's table. The Lord's supper is administered in many churches every two, in more every three, months. A preparatory service is held, at which each member of the consistory is called to answer "whether he knows of any communicant who has walked disorderly?" In this way a constant episcopal care of all the membership of each church is enforced. It leaves no apology for neglect of the exercise of proper discipline.

The observance of fast or holi-days is not a custom of this church. Good Friday is sometimes used as a day of public religious service. Christmas is celebrated by Sabbath-school gatherings. Easter is occasionally noted, not as a time to be honored, but as associated with an event of the utmost significance. Ash Wednesday is wholly discarded. In 1814, the General Synod adopted a report, of which the following is an extract: "Your committee observe that those customs and usages which are deemed essential and constitutional are preserved pure and entire by the different classes; and we observe likewise that those which are considered non-essential are dispensed with, or retained and altered according to the taste or circumstances of different ministers or congregations." There has been no later nor more definite legislation on this subject.

Under the head of customs a few observations should be made respecting the Liturgy of the Protestant Reformed church. Respecting it, this denomination holds a middle ground. It is opposed equally to the rigid and inflexible formalism of a purely ritualistic service on one hand, and to the illimitable license of purely individual choice on the other. Hence it makes the use of a part of its Liturgy obligatory, and leaves other parts to the intelligent option of its ministry. What is obligatory preserves a faithful statement of the cardinal doctrines of salvation, to be recited so often as the sacraments are administered or public officers are installed. At the present time two opposite tendencies exist: some are disposed to disparage the liturgical element in worship, and others wish to give it more distinctness and

impression. The latter tendency is believed to be much the stronger.

This church holds views of the Sabbath which cannot be more briefly defined than by styling them *Puritanic*. The Lord's day is devoutly recognized, not as being time sacred in itself, but as being consecrated to holy uses. Accordingly all sports, festivities, social visitings, and profane recreations it regards as sinful *per se*, and a violation of the spirit of the fourth commandment. Therefore it enjoins upon all its members the solemn duty of honoring the Lord's day, by abstinence from all forms of secular labor or pleasure, and by a diligent use of all its hours for religious improvement. While it has become fashionable among some in New England to speak evil of the Puritanic Sabbath, it is held almost without question in the Dutch church that the strictest spiritual observance of the day is demanded alike by the Bible and the good of men. "Times change, and we change with them." The Puritans at Leyden complained that their Dutch friends polluted the Sabbath by their sports, and now the Dutch people in this country are fearing not a little that New England, in its revolt from Puritanism, will suffer the Sabbath of its early glory to fall under the shadow of a disastrous eclipse. There are some old paths, along which the once illustrious of the earth travelled to glory and to God, which need to be searched out and repossessed in this age of frantic unrest. They who know them will not distrust their safeness, albeit enemies oppose. If even a heathen man was wise enough to say,

"Non est ad astra mollis a terris via,"

surely they who have entered the strait gate have learned that the narrow way of life needs to be pursued with a rugged constancy of faith, like unto that which was exemplified in the all-victorious Author of our salvation.

Theology.

In undertaking to give some account of the distinctive points in the theology of the Reformed Dutch church, the

writer feels a little doubt of his ability to present any such statement as will command the universal assent of the church in which he is a minister. For while the church is unquestionably a unit in all the great central matters of faith, yet it is to be remembered that many of its pastors and members received their early or professional training in other communions, and of course there learned to emphasize words and definitions and phrases according to the particular spheres of thought, speculation, or controversy in which they moved. Hence it has come to pass that the pulpits of this denomination do not all alike give forth identical sounds. There is liberty within certain limits, and therefore diversity of utterance. This must not be understood as implying that there is any laxity of clerical conscience, or any approach to latitudinarianism. The reverse of each may be confidently affirmed of those who have been put in trust with the gospel among us. Diversities of view respecting certain forms of theological statement are quite as common also among those educated in the bosom of the church as they are among its adopted children. These admitted, and even cherished, diversities, confined as they are within the horizon of established formularies, are believed to be consistent with a rigid and almost boastful Calvinistic orthodoxy. They prove, too, that law and liberty, order and freedom, creed and conscience, may not only co-exist, but are indeed correlatives. Buoys and lighthouses do not convert the mariner into an unthinking machine, nor bind his limbs with fatalistic chains. So neither do creeds, confessions, nor formularies deprive their enlightened subjects of the free use of their faculties in pursuing the science of interpretation. The moment a church insists that a technical word means precisely so much, and no more, or that theology, as a human science, is as perfect as the supernatural life of Christianity, it becomes despotic, and aims at the exercise of an impossible authority. Religion rests upon and involves the infinite; and as all piety is a feeling after God, and is an intense aspiration toward the hidden sublimities of an invisible world, therefore faith must

ever transcend knowledge. Consequently the terms of theological science are susceptible of meanings proportioned to the measure of faith. So long as there are degrees of faith there will be, and of necessity must be, corresponding degrees of perception, apprehension, and love for the ultimate truths of revelation. It is absurd to require all minds to discover an identical quantity of signification in common words or events; how then can it be expected that in the sphere where, without divine illumination, we can see nothing, or where that illumination is of unequal amount, there shall be an absolute community of perception?

It is, we judge, to be taken for a fact that every evangelical denomination, while it insists upon terms of subscription, and imposes a creed which is to be received *ex animo*, without hesitation or mental reservation, recognizes nevertheless the existence of certain psychological and spiritual laws which it does not desire to invalidate. These laws give vitality to doctrines and impart sanctity to creeds. Any effort made to weaken their action is followed by formalism and spiritual decay. Romanism is the product of such efforts in the past, while Protestantism is the defender, as it is the child, of the law of life and of liberty.

These observations naturally precede the statements we have now to make, delineative of the theology of the Protestant Reformed church.

It springs from, and is logically shaped and controlled by, the Belgic Confession, the Heidelberg Catechism, and the Canons of the Synod of Dordrecht, ratified in 1618 and 1619. A brief synopsis of the doctrinal substance of these formularies will present a sufficiently succint description of the distinctive features of the theology which rules in the Reformed Dutch church.

The Confession and Catechism are both remarkable in this, that they are experimental, rather than scientific, in their form and spirit. Flowing, as they did, out of the very heart of piety, environed with persecution, they expressed convictions and principles attested by the Holy Ghost and

sanctioned by the plain letter of the divine word. This is accounted to be their excellence, and the reason why they have so long been endeared to the affections of all who receive them.

While the great conflict was raging in the Netherlands between the Protestants and their persecutors an active theological controversy was also going on there and elsewhere, which finally divided the Protestants into Lutheran and Reformed. The Calvinists rejected the doctrines of the sacraments and of free-will as set forth in the original Augsburgh Confession of 1530. The German princes and churches for the most part adhered to the Lutheran, while the churches of France, Switzerland, Holland, the Palatinate, Scotland, and England received the doctrines which carried the Reformation over to the original apostolic faith.

The split between the Protestants took definite form at the Diet of Augsburgh. The *Confessio Tetrapolitana*, drawn by Martin Bucer, differed from the Lutheran views chiefly respecting the sacraments; but the difference was irreconcilable. The *Ratio Fidei* of Zwingli, sent to the same diet, took ground in favor of that particular phase of belief still known as Zwinglian, and which harmonized neither with the Lutheran nor the Calvinistic views of sin and of the sacraments.

In 1559 Guido de Bres, of Antwerp, drew up, in the French tongue, what has ever since been styled, from the place of its composition, the Belgic Confession. It was the fullest and the most conciliatory of all the formularies of doctrine hitherto presented for the approval of the Reformed. Other symbols preceding it had a controversial cast, and were devoted to the exposition of much-disputed points in theology. The Belgic Confession avoided a controversial cast of expression, and set forth a harmonious, scriptural, positive, and complete system of faith, including all the essentials of Christian doctrine, and omitting from its scope what should be left for determination to the enlightened judgments of individual minds. Immediately after it had

been prepared, this Confession was sent for examination to very many divines of foreign countries, and received from them an almost spontaneous approval.

Up to this time the doctrines of the Reformed had already made much progress in the northern provinces of the Netherlands, and churches had been organized there after the Genevan model. A synod was first held at Emden, a seaport town in East Friesland, at which it is believed that the Belgic Confession was subscribed by the members present. It was formally adopted by the Synod of Antwerp in 1566, and afterwards by that of Wessel in 1568. We do not propose to follow here the fortunes of this confession in Europe. It appeared in an age prolific of symbols, and over all its coëvals it has maintained an acknowledged supremacy of merit. The Augsburgh Confession was made in 1530; the *Tetrapolitana* (of Strasburgh, Constance, Meninga, and Lindau), in the same year; that of Basil was published in 1532; the first Helvetic, in 1536; that of Saxony, by Melanchthon, in 1551; the Wirtemberg, in 1552; the French, 1559; the English Confession of the London divines, in 1562; the latter Helvetic, 1566; the Belgic, 1566; and the Bohemian or Waldensian, in 1573. These dates are significant of great earnestness and zeal, universally prevalent in behalf of the faith once delivered to the saints. As all these confessions acknowledged the Bible to be the supreme rule of faith and practice, so it is instructive to find, on comparing them, that they harmonize so well with each other respecting the cardinal facts of the Christian system.

The Belgic Confession, as well as the Heidelberg Catechism, was brought to this country in 1609. Since the organization of the Reformed Dutch church on these shores it has been preserved here with pious care, and by strict ecclesiastical authority. While other confessions, such as the Savoy and Westminster, are held in high honor, subscription is required only to the Belgic on the part of the ministers of the Reformed church. But both the Confession and the Catechism are received and interpreted in accordance with the

Canons of the Synod of Dort, which are held to possess a certain regulative authority over the other formularies with which they are associated. The reason of this will presently appear.

The Heidelberg Catechism was composed in 1562, by Zachary Ursinus, a professor in the University of Heidelberg, and Casparus Olevianus, the favorite preacher of Frederick III. the Elector. Each shared in the preparation of the work. It soon won its way to the confidence of all the Reformed churches. It was translated into well-nigh all civilized tongues. A Greek translation was made, published, and sent at the expense of the States General of the Netherlands to the Patriarch of Constantinople. The Belgian government had it translated into Spanish. "The Swiss churches reconstructed the catechism of Zurich, after its clearer definitions. The Reformed churches of Hungary ordered it to be taught and explained in their churches, schools, and universities. It received high commendation from the pious and learned of England; while almost universally on the Continent it was acknowledged as a symbolic book of the Reformed churches. It was rendered into Hebrew, Greek, Dutch, Spanish, French, English, Italian, Bohemian, Polish, Hungarian, Arabic, and Malay, as well as German and Latin. It has passed through not less than five hundred thousand editions in Germany alone."[1] The most exact and complete edition of this catechism which has appeared in this country is that brought out by the German Reformed church, in 1863, and which contains a full historical introduction of great value.

The Synod of Wessel (1568), which adopted the Belgic Confession, also adopted the Heidelberg Catechism; and thus these two famous symbolic compositions were received by the churches of the Netherlands together. They were both held as subordinate to the word of God. From the first, declaration was made that "orthodoxy" implied obedience of faith to the inspired writings, and that symbolic

[1] Dr. Bethune.

works were of value only so far as they conformed to the mind of the Spirit. "If," says Vander Kemp, "we believe the doctrines of the catechism, it is not on account of the catechism, but of God's own word, out of which and according to which the catechism was composed. If we prize this little book, we love the word of God more: we commend it because it recommends and explains clearly the word of God to us."

For many years these standards very well expressed the general *consensus* of faith prevalent in the schools, universities, and churches of Holland. Hardly a discordant note broke the spiritual harmony of the ministry and membership of the Reformed churches there.

At length, in 1602, Jacobus Arminius, a pastor in Amsterdam, was elected to a vacant chair in the University of Leyden. His orthodoxy had been more than suspected. The consistory had made complaint of his departure from the received faith, but he protested that he heartily accepted the confession and catechism. Still, he failed to satisfy the custodians of the church, and his appointment as professor was opposed on the grounds of his infidelity to the standards of doctrine to which he had made subscription.

In every age errorists have evinced a sad lack of candor. They have practised concealments and dissimulations altogether inconsistent with an honest devotion to real or supposed truth. Arminius exemplified in his methods all the sinuosities of a mind intent upon mischief. While professing to be a conformist, he was secretly engaged in trying to bring in strange and unscriptural doctrines.

Gomarus, another professor at Leyden, at length exposed the character of the errors which Arminius had been propagating. This was the origin of the famous controversy which finally divided the evangelical church into Calvinists and Arminians. It was bitter in its beginnings, and is rugged still to-day. Arminianism, bald and positive, is not the gospel Paul preached, for it exalts man, and induces him to boast of powers he does not possess, and of merits he can never acquire.

This controversy agitated the church and the republic of Holland for a period of sixteen years, and produced irregularities creditable to neither party. Finally, to quiet the public mind, and to restore peace in the church, the great Synod of Dordrecht was assembled in 1618. We call it great, because, in truth, it was ecumenical in composition, character, interest, and authority. Since the Nicene, there had never been a more important council called for the settlement of doctrines precious to the entire household of faith than was that of Dort. Besides the deputies — professoral, cleric, and laic — from the states of the Netherlands, there were also present representatives from the Episcopal and Presbyterian churches of England, from the Palatinate, Hessia, Switzerland, Wetteraw, the republics of Geneva, Bremen, and Emden, and from the French churches. It was a convocation of the Reformed of all Protestant lands. As such, it defined the five points of doctrine which mark the broad line of separation between Calvinism and Arminianism.

Two centuries after this synod had finished its labors, the Rev. Thomas Scott, author of the commentary which bears his name, in a preface to the history of the synod, which he translated for use in England, makes this very weighty and significant declaration:

"The author desired to make it manifest that the deviations from the creeds of the Reformed churches in those points which are more properly called Calvinistic, is seldom, for any length of time, kept separate from deviations in those doctrines which are more generally allowed to be essential to vital Christianity. It must indeed appear, from the history with which this work begins, that the progress is easy, and almost unavoidable, from the controversial opposition to personal election, to the explaining away of original sin, regeneration by the Holy Spirit, justification by faith alone, and even of the atonement and deity of Christ; and that the opponents of the Synod of Dort, and the Remonstrants in general, were far more favorable to Pelagians, nay, to Socinians, than Calvinists, and were almost univer-

sally unsound in what are commonly called orthodox doctrines, and many of them far from conscientious in their conduct."

Thus this learned and pious divine, once an opponent of Calvinism, came, through strict investigation of its spirit and fruits, to bear testimony that the rejection of the doctrine respecting the operation of the sovereign and electing grace of God in the salvation of sinners is the starting-point of nearly all the heresies which afflict the church.

The Canons of the Synod of Dort are included under five heads. The first treats of divine predestination; the second, of the death of Christ, and the redemption of men thereby; the third and fourth, of the corruption of man and his conversion to God; and the fifth, of the final perseverance of the saints. Under the head of predestination these canons advocate neither fatalism on the one hand, nor Antinomianism on the other. They represent the whole plan of redemption in all its parts, relations, and ends to be of God, and made operative in the creature by sovereign grace manifested through the inspired word, the incarnate Christ, and the power of the Holy Ghost.

Respecting the atonement, they teach that the death of the Son of God is the only and most perfect sacrifice and satisfaction for sin; is of infinite worth and value, abundantly sufficient to expiate the sins of the whole world. And whereas many who are called by the gospel do not repent nor believe in Christ, but perish in unbelief, this is not owing to any defect or insufficiency in the sacrifice offered by Christ upon the cross, but is wholly to be imputed to themselves.

Concerning sin they affirm that man is corrupt and depraved by nature, wholly incapable of holiness, and inclined to all evil; and that he can be regenerated and converted only by the operation of the Holy Ghost, in connection with the word of God.

And, finally, that they who have once been made alive, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, and elected through sanctification of the Spirit unto eternal glory, can never lose

the life which they have received from above (ἄνωθεν), but will be preserved in a persevering faith which shall overcome sin, death, and the grave.

The Reformed Dutch church in this country has held and taught these doctrines from its earliest beginnings until now, without any opposition from within its own borders, except in a small schism which is believed to have been produced by the morbid sorrow of disappointed ambition, rather than by any serious objection to the doctrines themselves. Certainly there has been a most signal unanimity of consent to the authority of these canons, and all the pulpits of the denomination inculcate the Calvinistic theology. There have been within the last century only two cases of discipline among its ministry arising from false or pernicious doctrines.

Of the manner in which these doctrines are presented, a few observations should here be made.

While predestination and personal election are held as the ground of all hope, still, because of the mystery which invests their infinite relations, they are rarely pushed forward as the sum and substance of the gospel. They are assigned their place, and used for the comfort and encouragement of the people of God; but the *duties* of repentance and faith in the Lord Jesus Christ have precedence of all other themes.

The pulpits of the Reformed church are remarkably free from metaphysical or scholastic speculations. Its ministry are not encouraged in any attempts to impose a philosophy upon the word of God. Their sermons are Christological and experimental, and therefore void of perilous theories. The people themselves are so well instructed from the scriptures, that as a rule they have no relish for theological novelties. Hence it is that we find no theories of the atonement in our churches which may be properly styled commercial, or governmental, or Chalmerian.

"Sufficienter pro omnibus, efficater pro electis,"

is the discriminating formula which forbids disputes concerning a general or limited atonement. All agree that its value

and nature are infinite, and all consent that the application of its merits is through the eternal and elective grace of God. On this old and hallowed platform of the Reformation period the Dutch church in this country erected its banner in the beginning, and there that banner still stands, its staff unbroken and its colors unsullied. It is not ashamed to preach what Paul, and after him Augustine and Anselm and Calvin and Beza, and all the great champions of the Christian faith, have taught, when speaking according to the oracles of God.

The church numerically is not large; but to assert that its position is therefore weak, and its influence inconsiderable, would require either great ignorance or hardihood. It is not petrified into a motionless orthodoxy, nor wrapped like a mummy in the folds of sterile traditions. Its zeal, its activity, its keen observation and keener appreciation of the drifts of opinion and of the tendency of events forbid any inference so unworthy.

Cherishing its denominational life, it is without sectarian bitterness; and while it labors to cultivate its own vineyard, it rejoices in the welfare, prosperity, and honor of all kindred churches who hold with it the precious truths of the everlasting gospel.

ARTICLE II.

OUR PLACE IN HISTORY.[1]

BY REV. JULIUS SEELYE, PROFESSOR IN AMHERST COLLEGE.

THE subject chosen for the present discussion is Our Place in History. In the great revelation which God is making of himself in human events, to what page and period have we come? In that wondrous drama which begins with Eden, and shall only end with the New Jerusalem, the tabernacle of God with men, what act and scene are now transpiring? A question like this has too much interest to be wisely neglected, but possesses too wide a scope to be adequately discussed in a single discourse. It is the aim of the present Article to direct attention only to some hints which history furnishes towards the true answer, and which, whether sufficient or not to reveal this with unmistakable clearness, may at least indicate the direction in which it shall subsequently be found.

In undertaking such a work, we are under somewhat the same necessity as the navigator, when obliged to determine his present position from the course and distance already sailed. In present times, no matter what they may be, yet, because they are present, everything seems shifting and changing, like the mists and clouds. We have no clear horizon. We lack the vision of the sun and stars — of those eternal truths and unchanging principles — by which our place might be determined. The past is clearer than the present. The clouds which now encompass us will be dispelled to the eye of coming time, and the sun, which now though not beheld doth yet enlighten us, will be then apparent, as the changing appearances to ages long gone by have disappeared to us, and the eternal realities which lay then concealed

[1] Delivered as an Address before the Society of Inquiry of Andover Theological Seminary, August 1, 1865.

beneath them are now made known. There is no better way, therefore, of discovering where we now are in the great journey, than by taking account of where mankind has thus far been. Let us, therefore, go back to a point sufficiently early to enable us to mark the distance hitherto passed, and which shall cover a time sufficiently extended to determine the course in which we are now moving. If our way shall seem at first dusty, and the progress wearisome, each step points us towards a termination in which we may confidently rest.

In seeking for this, we begin where history begins,—in the region washed by the eastern waters of the Mediterranean, and extending north and east and south to the shores of the ancient Euxine, and beyond the Euphrates and the Tigris to the great plain which stretches between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. It is a region with marked adaptations to the people destined to inhabit it, fitted both to awaken and to fortify the peculiar elements with which they were to be endowed. Its grand features are those of constancy and exclusiveness. Without many great rivers, it abounds in lofty mountains and vast plains, whose imposing grandeur invites to contemplation, and fills the mind with awe and the sense of majesty. With few facilities for internal commerce and improvements, there is little to change the features of the landscape, or the habits of mind which a constant mingling with such scenes is fitted to induce. The air is clear, the skies brilliant, and the heavenly bodies shine with the same serenity and constancy which there mark the face of the lower creation. The people who dwelt here, though not made by the skies or the landscape, were adapted to these. Though under different governments, and subjected to varying political revolutions, all the inhabitants of this region have from the first maintained the same intense individuality, the same constancy and exclusiveness, which belong in so great a degree to the natural world around them. Whether we look upon them as Babylonian or Assyrian, Persian, Hebrew, or Arab, no people have manifested such a depth of

passion nor such an inflexibility of purpose as these. Nowhere has the individual, personal will, excluding all else from itself, and expending itself, not so much in outward acts as in a self-consuming yet self-abiding energy, been so prominent as here. The languages of these men are as inflexible as the mind which produced them. With abundant material for expressing the deepest passion, they are quite wanting as vehicles for the more refined shades of thought, or the more delicate phases of emotion. The fine art which was here cultivated is not painting nor sculpture, in which comparatively little passion can be expressed, but music, in which could be found most forcible utterance for the deep, strong, and almost fierce spirit of the people. Literature, so far as it bloomed upon this soil, was chiefly poetic, and this neither epic nor dramatic, but wholly lyric, as most consonant to the internal feelings which sought expression in this way. The governments are never popular, but always stringently despotic. One will rules all; and in the single person of the monarch every interest in the realm must centre.

But whatever be the characteristics of any people, we always find their highest expression and deepest root in the prevailing religion, which, among the Orientals, as elsewhere, was both the product and the producer of all else in their experience: it gave its own intense stamp to all their life, and grew in energy by that life. Dwelling amid such aspects of the natural world, and possessing such characteristics as have been described, we might anticipate that the religion of the Orientals would be not only deep, strong, unyielding, but altogether internal; feeding itself not with outward images, but with its own inner emotions; expressing itself not so much in the forms of the intellect, as of the heart and will; and in these not so much in those which have an ulterior reference, as in those whose design is chiefly to come back and feed the fires in which they had expression; a religion not so much of dogmas, or systematic statements, but of emotions, of desire, awe, and rapture; — a religion

of passion, of strong individuality, which sways the soul because it penetrates to its very depths, and sways it powerfully because it is not so much the expression as it is the infusing energy of whatever is most mighty in the soul's life. As there is something not only grand and constant, but exclusive and simple, in the lofty mountains and vast plains of this region; as there is something fixed and strongly individual in the intense passions and burning deeds in the language and literature and art and government of the Orientals, so does their religion have its sharply defined and central principle which marks the whole and shapes the whole. Such a religion, among such a people, could not be polytheistic. So intense and internal, it must centre around one object alone. The symbol of this may be the light, or the expression of it, the great force and majesty of nature, but its essence can be in naught else than a personal will. Into their religion all the passion and the will of the Orientals was breathed; or rather it breathed itself into them — transfusing and transfiguring and transporting them. Sometimes mystical, and often fanatical, but always eager, restless, impassioned, in their religious exercises, they have ever been the people where some form of the religious susceptibility has shown itself most prominently and permanently. The inspired prediction declared to their great progenitor, "God shall dwell in the tents of Shem," has never lacked a fulfilment. It is not accidental that Mahometanism, with its doctrine of the one God and his single prophet, should arise among one Oriental family, nor that the true religion of the one Jehovah and his chosen people should be first communicated to another.

That we may see the scope of all this, we must now add some light from a different scene. Let us pass westward then, pausing only as we go, before we leave the eastern world, to note the quick, inquiring looks and busy hands and skilful products of a western race, whose colonies dot the shores of the Orient, from ancient Taurus to the Propontis, and whose rising arts and laws and culture betoken the glory of a coming civilization to the western world, as

the splendor of the morning in those Ionian skies betokens the splendor of the day. We pause a little, till we are thrilled with the beauty of this liquid air and ethereal sea and shining landscape, and are awakened to something of the sympathy which responds in every breast to the beauty and productiveness of the natural world which here surrounds us. We linger yet, until our souls are hushed and kindled too to some new sense of the mystery of life, as we catch the floating strains of those winged words which first woke to life beneath these skies, and amid the murmuring, laughing music of these "much-resounding" seas. But we pass still westward, as the wave of power and of civilization which had flowed hither from that direction ebbs backward to its source, and stirs and fills with high activity the fountain whence it sprang. As in the Orient, so in Greece, everything is fitted for the development of the peculiar traits of the people who were to possess it. A people at first migratory and eager for the new, find themselves located where it is impossible to be satisfied with either indolence or ignorance. All nature here seems to have the force of an inspiration. Instead of that unbroken vastness and majesty by which the oriental mind found itself surrounded and penetrated, the utmost diversity of features filled the prospect before the Grecian eye. Nowhere in the world is there such a variety of mountains and plains and springs and rivers, combined with such an extent of inland bays and seas, studded and specked in every direction by islands of every shape and size, lying beneath a sky and pervaded by an atmosphere whose serenity invites to contemplation, and whose invigorating breath kindles to the most active life. But with all this diversity everything seems in harmony. The mountains capped with snow and the plains clothed with verdure, the rugged headlands which jut so boldly into the sea and the waters which sleep so gently at their feet, do not seem dissonant with each other. Nature suggests no wild deviations in Greece. The dignified and grand are clothed befittingly with grace. The stern and awful, which

beneath the darker skies of a northern clime frown with an austere gloom, seem here to partake of the radiance of the air which encircles them, and to increase the entrancing beauty of the landscape of which they form a part. An aspect so diverse and yet so uniform, so various and yet so harmonious, could not fail to awaken an ideal of beauty and harmony, as scenes more simple never would have done, and would fill the souls who possessed the ideal with a rapture and love and devotion unto it which the same scenes could never have called forth beneath a harsher sky. The Greek was adapted to this; not made by the natural world, but fitted for it, with a soul as various as the landscape, and as harmonious too, filled with curiosity and inquiry for the beauty and the truth of everything, and confident of their attainment; not awed, like the Orientals, with the majesty of nature, but attracted by it, coming close to it, and seeking for its secrets, believing that they could be found; penetrated with the deep conviction, though at first unconscious of it, that he himself possessed the key which could unlock the mystery of things, that all the wonders around him were but counterparts of wonders within, brought into unison, clothed with order and beauty, and thus invested with true being, alone by the living thought of the living soul. And yet the Greek did not, like the Oriental, dwell with his own reflections, and feed himself with these. Every thought and feeling of the Greek must have an outward form, and in this alone he could rest. His passions did not feed and consume themselves, but needed some outward object alike to evoke and sustain them. His will, thus, was not self-centred and relentless; he could not pursue one purpose with tireless energy, but was as facile and changing as were the new objects which he was constantly proposing to himself. His life and joy were ever in that which, though it had its type within, might yet be contemplated as without himself. The Oriental mind made all the outward world tributary to its still thought and deep passion and fixed will, while the Greek, finding full scope for his activity in giving form to

his sentiments and an adequate statement to his thoughts, derived his chief interest in external nature only as he sought and found in this some fitting expression for his inner self. The Greek was thus born an artist and a philosopher, and everything around him facilitated his education in these respects. But his art and his philosophy were both penetrated by the principle which pervaded so largely the natural world where they flourished. In both it was a prominent aim to bring the diverse into harmony, and to unite the many into one. The artist was constantly seeking a law of proportions, and the search of the philosopher was ever after a principle of combination. This it was which made their art so simple and so unaffected, and rendered their philosophy so subtile and yet so all-embracing. This same principle enters into all the movements of the Greeks. It stamps their language. It shapes their laws. It directs their history. And yet, because it looked so wholly outward, because it sought continuously for expression, and never could rest, like the Oriental, in that fulness of thought which was unexpressed and inexpressible, it left the Grecian life to be sensuous and the Grecian religion to be polytheistic. Though fraught with inestimable advantages to the world, neither the Grecian art nor philosophy could save the Greeks themselves from decay of manners and corruption of life.

But in the plans of God all branches of the human family stand connected, and each has its work to do, not for itself alone, but for all the rest. When the Greek and Oriental mind had each come to maturity — when the peculiarity of each had gained its fulness — it was the plan of God that they should be married together, and he who was to pronounce the banns was raised up and commissioned for this special service. Himself a Greek, but of a northern, rugged stock, which had escaped the later Athenian degeneracy, he realized in his person the fable of his birth, that in his veins the blood of Hercules was mingled with the blood of Achilles. High-minded and chivalrous, curbing his pas-

sions and despising pleasure; generous, even to prodigality, in his gifts; enriching his friends at the risk of impoverishing himself; ambitious of fame, and yet spurning a victory which could only be stolen in the dark; the lover of letters and patron of art and student of philosophy, and at the same time the unrivalled general and the unsurpassed king, who was as lofty in his purposes as he was grand in his achievments; the worthy son of Philip and the fit pupil of Aristotle; who would have been Diogenes had he not been Alexander, — became the conqueror of the world. We need not pause upon his history. The central act, which makes it significant for all time, and in which his wisdom was as apparent as had been his bravery in the steps which led to it, was the founding of Alexandria, where the marriage of the two worlds was consummated, and the Greek and Oriental minds became joined in one. The founding of Alexandria took place in 333 B.C., just in time to allow its fully developed fruits to appear when Christianity should be introduced to the world. What were these fruits? Alexandria became the centre in which the chief culture of the age was gathered. It was alike the emporium of trade and the seat of philosophy. Its influence grew apace. Its thinking gave laws to the thinking of the world. But the direction of its thought was quite peculiar. The union of that deep religious spirit which belonged to the Orientals with that refined philosophic direction so peculiar to the Greeks bore its legitimate offspring. The disposition to inquiry still remained as keen and searching and resolute as when led by Aristotle; but instead of being expended, as with him, upon the facts of experience and the natural world, it was now directed wholly to the spiritual and the divine. The clear, true, satisfying thought of God became the ultimate object of every philosophical inquiry.

But why was all this? Why was the earth thus fitted up, and these nations placed in these locations on it, and such a course of history permitted? What was the battle for which these hosts were marshalled, and what the vic-

tory which the eye that watched and the will that guided all had in contemplation? We cannot find the explanation to these events in the events themselves. Viewed alone they are an enigma, for which no one has the key. But the riddle finds its answer, and order, light, and life spring up from chaos, when we notice how all preceding movements stand in preparation for the incarnation of the Son of God and for the preaching of his gospel to men. Here was a religion propounded by One for whom the claim was put forth that he was not simply wise, but wisdom; not merely a true teacher, but himself the truth, the desire of all nations, the hope of every people, the restorer of Paradise, who should roll away the stone from the door of the sepulchre, and bring forth the buried hopes and joys of the world to an immortal life. His religion claimed to be supreme. It demanded universal reception. It was thus obliged to challenge universal scrutiny; and it boldly made the challenge. There was no hesitation about propounding it, and no fear of its results, among the early preachers of the Christian scheme. "Try me," it said, through them, to all the philosophies of the world; "search me; know me! The highest flights of human thought, the profoundest research, and the widest range of inquiry shall find me higher, deeper, broader, than them all."

If the Christian religion was a system for all times, and not for any one period, — for every people, and not for a single nation, — we should expect that, while it would both challenge and, when dispassionately viewed, secure the assent of the human reason, the first inquiry of the thinking world respecting it would be: What does it teach concerning God? And if its history was designed by a superintending wisdom and will to be the central stream in the world's events, into whose current all other streams were to pour, until its great tide should cover the earth as the waters cover the sea, we should expect that preceding ages would have been shaped all for it, and that, when propounded to the thinking world, this would be ready furnished with the eye best fitted to look

into its deep significance. And the actual history verifies both these suppositions. What does Christianity teach us respecting God? was the first great inquiry actually made in reference to it by the human reason; and the Alexandrian school of philosophy, and the direction of the Greco-Oriental mind, wherein were united that deep and intense religious spirit so characteristic of the Orientals, and that refined philosophic impulse so peculiar to the Greeks, were fitted perfectly to make it. The doctrine concerning God was the central topic of discussion in the first four centuries of the Christian church. And it is worthy of note that just as soon as this discussion gained its height, and the catholic doctrine of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost reached its full and satisfying statement, the Alexandrian school of philosophy, like a flower that has blossomed, passed to decay.

Let us proceed now still westward, to the chief seat and power of the western Roman Empire. One thought, one resolute aim to bring all the nations into a single body, had ever been the controlling agency in Rome. But how could a structure so vast and so various be held together? Physical power cannot make so many and such heterogeneous elements coalesce. It is not external restraints, but vital principles, which must save the body from breaking asunder by its own weight; and unless the Roman statesman seek for these, all the success of the Roman soldiers would be in vain. The Romans are thus, from the necessities of their position, students of human nature. They are the lawgivers of the world. They neither philosophize, like the Greeks, nor busy themselves in internal contemplations, like the Orientals; but they seek for rules of life and duty; they enter the soul not to dwell there, but to bring forth from its depths those central truths which shape its structure and should direct the course of all men. It is not speculation, but the state, with which the Roman mind has to do. It is not the relations of man to God, but to his fellow-man, which supremely engross it.

All this has its special meaning, and moves in the same

grand direction with all that has gone before. If the Christian religion is a true revelation from God to man, it will have relations to each, and will unfold the character of both. Not only will the being of God, but the nature of man, be hid within it, and form the proper object for the second great inquiry which the human mind would make respecting it. And as the union of the Greeks and Orientals, through Alexandria, furnished a direction of thought and inquiry of which God could be the only legitimate object, so the Roman history educated the Roman mind as profoundly and thoroughly to discuss the problem respecting man. And as the history of the church passes over from the eastern to the western world, we find, as a matter of fact, that it is not God, but man, not the mystery of the Trinity, but the mystery of the human soul, which becomes the chief topic of speculative thought and doctrinal discussion. The Augustinian and Pelagian controversy takes the place of that of Athanasius and Arius; and the Council of Carthage affirms a doctrine quite undeveloped in the Council of Nice. And as the influence of which Alexandria was the centre and type seems to have expended itself, and passes away with the first period of doctrinal discussion in the church, so the great power of Rome becomes broken, more obviously than before, at the close of the second. Augustine died A.D. 430, even while his city was besieged by the Vandals, and Odoacer, the barbarian, became king of Italy while that same century lacked one fourth of its completion.

But the Christian doctrine had in it far more than the mystery of God and the mystery of man, and the purpose fully to unfold its hitherto unfathomed meaning needed other agencies than had yet appeared.

Let us, however, now move northward in search of these. The ghostly shadows of more than a thousand years flit past us as we go. We seem to grope in increasing darkness. The power of the Papacy grows, and settles down around us like night. The successors of Gregory have gained a hold more universal than had even been sought by the successors

of Augustus. Innocent III. has declared himself king of all the kings of the earth, and has so successfully maintained the assumption that he is recognized as the supreme arbiter of every dispute, and the sole conservator of peace throughout the states of Christendom. The rule is as rigid as it is extensive. It lays its hand on the interests of the state and the family and the individual life, and holds them all with relentless rigor. It aims at undivided supremacy. Not only institutions and laws and customs, but even the secret thoughts and intents of the heart must yield to its decisions in this life, and submit to its retributions in the life to come. We call these the "Dark Ages," but they do not really lack for light. This rigorous rule of the Papacy was not accidental. It was not unnecessary. The untamed neck of the northern barbarians needed such a yoke. Its very rigor held them in bondage till they were ready for freedom, and then proved the very means of their emancipation.

When, now, the time arrived that the yoke was to be broken, we find that all things had been made ready for the rupture. Silent forces had been working all along through the Dark and Middle ages, in a direction of which no one at the time was conscious, but which no one in the light of subsequent events can mistake. The rise of Mahometanism and the effect of its early history on the Christian world; the scholastic tendency; the expulsion of Greek scholars from Constantinople after its capture by the Turks, and the revival of letters which sprang up as these became scattered over Europe; the advancement of the natural sciences, and the new interest excited in study of every kind; the discovery of America, nine years after the birth of Luther, and the wonderful zeal and energy which it kindled in every European state; the introduction of printing, and the increased circulation thus attained by the sacred word, were all both indices and instruments, which not only announced the coming of, but prepared the way for, that higher development of Christian truth, whose rising in the sixteenth century illumines us, and gives promise of enlightenment to the world.

It was not accidental that the Reformation arose in Germany, rather than with a Romanic or Celtic race. The Germans were endowed for this as were no other people. The condition of the German empire, with its host of petty princes, occupying the same territory and claiming in many respects the same jurisdiction as the Romish bishops, brought in collisions of the civil with the ecclesiastical power, and awakened an opposition to the Papacy not elsewhere found. The Germans had always chafed against external authority. They had always a prevailing instinct for freedom. As early as the time of Tacitus we find them noted for their sturdy independence. The Papal encroachments to which Spain gave a bigoted defence, and France yielded a grudging and fickle acquiescence, found always in Germany a stern opposition. This spirit, which seemed to have been crushed when Henry IV., stripped of his imperial robes, and in the garb of a penitent, with bare feet and uncovered head, and a rope around his waist, sought for pardon and grace at the feet of Gregory VII., was yet only bowed, not broken, and far from being rooted out. It grew in strength and stubbornness during the Middle Ages, and was ready for open rebellion and triumph as soon as the fitting time should come.

But it is not simply the fact of a rupture with the Papacy which is so important, as the direction it should take, and which He had marked out before who causes the seed to begin its germination in darkness, but who prefigures in its first unfolding all the processes of its completed growth. There was something in the original bent of the German race which predisposed them for the great work which he who made them had given them to do. What this was we may learn from various particulars. Their language reveals it; which, though less copious than the Celtic and Romanic tongues in inflections and variations of words, and thus not so well fitted as these for refined and delicate shades of feeling, or sharp and clear varieties of thought, is far more abundant in individual words, and in the power of combining these one with another, and is far better adapted for comprehensive thought,

for abstract generalizations, and especially for that inner facility for expressing the harmonious relations of things which is as characteristic of the German language as is an insight into these relations characteristic of the German mind.

Other illustrations will reveal the same feature. If we interpret some expressions in Tacitus, otherwise uncertain, by the light of the old Saxon poem of Beowulf, or the perhaps still older German Eddas, in which the primeval traits of the nation are revealed, we find that the Germans are especially characterized by the purity and constancy of their family and social relations. They seem to have always attached a high religious significance to the family tie. To its demands all others were made to yield. An injury inflicted upon any member of the family roused every other member to vengeance, even in the face of death. In the old hero-life, as pictured in the most ancient German poems, though a life of rapine and marauding, filled up with rude and reckless strife, the family bond furnished the only sure and ever effective claim to protection. The son was not only known by denoting his father, but the father was designated by his marriage alliance, while every boasting, audacious, self-confident hero stalks before us in these old poems as vaunting and as talkative of his sire as of himself. If we compare the ideas of the marriage relation in these old poems with those sketched by Homer, we find them as much more strict in their purity as has been the practice in these particulars of the Germans above the Greeks. In the exploits of Beowulf, the free-born queen who takes her seat beside the monarch at the royal board, and greets with lofty dignity the fierce assembly of the heroes, is no Penelope, whom a hundred suitors might, without danger, seek to woo in the absence of her lord, or no fair Helen, whom Paris might snatch from Menelaus, and Menelaus welcome back to his embrace again. No divided allegiance is ever thought of being received or returned by the chaste Norsewoman in the oldest records which present her to us. When her husband

dies she seeks no other connection, but, like the Hindoo widow, though in a vastly different spirit, follows him to the funeral pyre. The statements of Tacitus accord with this. Divorces were prohibited. Adulteries were punished as rare and inexplicable crimes; and neither beauty could inspire compassion for the criminal, nor wealth procure any alleviation of the doom. The Germans, says Tacitus, ever treated their women with esteem and confidence, consulted them on every occasion of importance, and fondly believed that in their breasts resided a wisdom which raised them above men, and a sanctity which allied them to the gods. This esteem and respect, without which all abiding love of the sexes must be wanting, constantly gave to the marriage relation a sacredness with which it has been invested by no other people, savage or civilized, who have not been brought under the direct and shaping influence of Christian love.

Other illustrations to the same effect might be drawn from the political movements and the philosophical speculations of Germany; but we cannot dwell on these. In them all one trait is prominent. The controlling disposition of the Germans is to seek for and cling to the inner and true relation of things. And when we see this disposition revealing itself everywhere, but showing its greatest strength and prominence in the clearness with which it recognized the true marriage tie, and the sanctity with which it invested that relation which Christ has made typical of the true relation between himself and the believing soul, can we believe it accidental that when the bold and sturdy German love of freedom broke with the Papacy, and a new range of doctrinal discussion was laid open in the church, the centre and chief point of attraction in it all was that true relationship or union which might be constituted through the gospel between the sinning man and the holy God? The corruptions of the church were as numerous and as prominent in Italy and Spain and France as in Germany; the doctrine of indulgences was preached all over Christendom; the fellowship of the soul with God was everywhere prom-

ised and sought through external and formal rights; but no vigorous and triumphant protest against these arose elsewhere; no deep feeling, which could respond vitally and hold tenaciously to the deep mystery of man's individual and personal and spiritual relations to God, was elsewhere found. The whole endowment and education of the Germans, not only fitted them to be the reformers of the church, but determined also the central point around which the great Reformation in the sixteenth century revolved. That point was the doctrine of salvation, or the union of man with God. How shall man be just with God? How shall God be just and yet justify man? How shall the two become one in a reciprocal fellowship and communion? These were the great inquiries with which the Reformation began and was consummated. As in the first period of doctrinal discussion in the church, God, and in the second, man, so now in the third, the union of the two, is the one theme of interest, for which everything had been before prepared, and in which every other object was for the time absorbed. If this order of sequence was accidental, and the preceding steps which had prepared the way for each stage came by chance, we must at least acknowledge that such accidents as these are beautiful as reason, and that such a chance rises to the dignity of a providence. But if there be a law in all this — a divine order and truth clearly planned and calmly executed by him "who hath created all things by Jesus Christ, to the intent that now, unto principalities and powers in heavenly places, might be made known by the church the manifold wisdom of God," — then the consummation of the plan is not yet fully gained; the steps which have been taken indicate the direction, and lead us towards, but not yet unto, the goal, — the twilight brightens, but there is not yet the perfect day.

If, now, in order to see the true position of the present time, and to determine more accurately where we belong in this great historic movement, we take the indications which the past, as thus far contemplated, may be said to

furnish respecting the future, some things would seem too clear to be easily mistaken. If all past history has been subordinate to one great scheme,—empires and kingdoms rising and falling; nations and races mingling and separating and moving on in the way best adapted to secure the triumph of the Christian system,—why should not the future be controlled for the same end? The Christian system has no merely temporary application. They know but little of its far-reaching adaptations who think it better fitted for one period of history than for all. Why, therefore, should it not control the future just as truly as the past? Moreover, we have seen that each of the three great periods which have marked its progress hitherto has been characterized by a special range of doctrinal discussion, wherein one great beam of its eternal light has shone through the prejudices and passions with which human weakness and impurity have clouded it all. Why should not this process continue until the Sun, of which all this light is but the partial effulgence, shall, full-orbed and in meridian splendor, lighten every man that cometh into the world, without a cloud to intercept his beams? Is the day less important than the dawning? Is not the process just as worthy of a completion as it was of a beginning? Why then should it stop until its fulness?

But still further. The movement thus far has been one of order. The steps of progress have been regular and successive, as might have been anticipated. It is no haphazard sequence which brings out the doctrine of God, of man, and of salvation in the connection in which we find them. Their order marks a plan of which they are only parts in preparation for the whole. But if these steps have been so orderly, why not also the next? If, as is obvious, the true doctrine respecting man could only appear in its proper light under the shining of the true doctrine respecting God, which it therefore follows in the order of doctrinal development, and if, in like manner, the true doctrine of the union of God and the soul depends upon the doctrines relating to these two, and is not, therefore, evolved till after these, may

we not with equal confidence expect that these three doctrines are but stepping-stones unto a fourth, and that these three great periods of history are leading us to another, in whose direction they not only point, but for which they prepare and hasten the way?

What, then, might we anticipate this coming period to be? Let us not be too confident, and yet when we look closely at that doctrine of salvation which marks the third great stage in the discussions of the church, one most important question intimately connected with this seems to struggle for a solution not yet found. What this question is may perhaps be indicated if we closely scan the process by which the work of salvation is wrought in the individual soul. That work must begin with a revelation of God. All the thoughts and feelings and purposes of the soul in its experience of salvation can only be awakened primarily by some undoubting knowledge of divine things. But this knowledge of God does not rest alone. Every beam of it is a revelation of human nature itself. As Isaiah, when he gazed with the seraphim upon the glory of God in the temple, found the vision a revelation also of his own defilement, so is this beholding of God ever a power which reveals sin unto the sinner, and which ever calls forth from the corrupt heart the one cry: "Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips; for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of Hosts." It is only as the human soul knows God that it knows itself, and it is only with this knowledge that it abhors itself and repents. There is thus prepared the way for the third step, or that knowledge of God in Christ which is faith, and that new love which springs up coincident with this faith, and which becomes the new life of the soul. Thus far the Christian experience is but a type of Christian history. But the fourth step of the work of salvation brings the soul in which it is wrought into relations to other souls. The Christian experience at once demands Christian fellowship. It binds together those who possess it in an organic community, connected also by insep-

arable bonds with the world around them. These social relations, which are as obvious as the development of the Christian life in the individual heart, and which are as deep and broad as the faith in which that life centres and the love in which it is expressed, are radical and productive—grow immediately out of the new-found relations of the soul with Christ, and follow from these as directly as the rays of the morning from the rising of the sun. May we not, then, expect, as the history of the world finds its type in the Christian experience in its first three stages, so may it also in the fourth; and that as the individual heart, by its knowledge of God and its knowledge of self, and its consequent experience of a fellowship with God, passes at once, without any further step of transition, into the church, or Christ's kingdom on earth, so the doctrine of the church is to form the fourth great field of discussion in the history of the church, and the meaning of Christ's kingdom among men to be the great theme for whose elucidation preceding ages have prepared the way?

While in a greater or less degree the doctrine of the church has been a subject of thought and inquiry in every period, yet up to the point we have contemplated it has only been thought of as involved in other doctrines. It has never stood out alone, as the only prominent theme. It has never been, like the great doctrines of the Trinity, depravity, and salvation, the focus in which all the lines of thought and inquiry of any age might be gathered together. The church has never affirmed a doctrine respecting herself, the denial of which would be heresy; and yet when we think of the mission of the church in history,—its relations to all human opinions and customs and laws and institutions, the grand achievments which have marked its progress hitherto, and the glorious promises which gild its prospects in the ages yet to come,—we cannot but believe that its true meaning is to be unfolded with a clearness befitting its great importance, until its aspect shall look forth, to every eye, beautiful as the morning, "fair as the moon, clear as the sun, and terrible as an army with banners."

But in all this we are not dealing with a mere theory. The facts confirm it. The doctrine of the church was felt to be a vital one, even in the time of the Reformation, and most intimately connected with the questions then discussed. Next to the question of salvation, and growing out of this, was the question of the church. The Romanist maintained that the church was the means by which alone the soul could come to Christ, while the Reformers affirmed the counter proposition, that only by faith in Christ could the soul come to the church. The Romanist declares that the church is the body of Christ, without spot or blemish, while the Protestant admits a relative impurity belonging to it, like the remains of sin in the new-born soul, from which it is only by struggles and progress to become free. But, with these conflicting views, the Romanist finds it impossible to deny the corruptions of the church, while the Protestant finds it almost equally difficult to maintain its authority. Here is the point at which Protestantism and the Papacy have taken an issue which abides to the present day; and no one who has carefully watched the movements of events can doubt that this issue, in its broadest aspects, has since the Reformation been constantly growing in prominence, until the question of the church has become comprehensively the question of our time. This will perhaps be more clear if we notice that all the questions concerning the church — its relations to its Divine Head and Lord; its relations to the state; its relations to individual churches; its relations to the individual conscience and will — are all gathered up comprehensively in the one question relating to the true constitution of human society upon earth. What are those inner and vital relations which bind men together in a true and organic fellowship, and what is the true rule and sovereignty over men in these relations, are inquiries which only present in particular forms the one great question embracing them all: What is the idea of the church, or what is the meaning of Christ's kingdom among men?

And, when thus stated, is it not evidently the true question

of our time? All over the civilized world it is the social problem which is pressing most earnestly for solution. To-day if we cast the eye over Europe, from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, from the mouth of the Seine to the mouth of the Danube, we find that all the movements of courts and cabinets and fleets and armies, that the most prominent and numerous discussions in the senate and by the press, that the most intense and earnest thoughts and feelings and actions of common men — all move in obedience to one central inspiration, which is breathing into every heart some new conviction of its organic fellowship with other hearts, and which thus binds all the movements of the present time unto itself, as gravity binds the planets to the sun.

This is, if possible, even more manifest in our own land. Long before our recent civil strife, the question which divided parties, and laid its hand, as none other has ever done, upon the beating heart of American life, did not relate so much to political economy as to social morality, — was not a question of wealth or trade or industry, but of human rights and equality and brotherhood. Are all men born free and equal; is there something in a man's manhood which entitles him to respect quite above and independent of his color or caste or outward condition; is the true constitution of society based upon the doctrine of human brotherhood? This is the question which roused and divided the nation before the storm of war broke upon us, and which, before the tempest had spent its fury, was revealed to every eye as the mighty issue between contending armies. And yet did we fully fathom the depth which this question sounded? Did we know how wide it reached? We thought it was the question of slavery. We supposed that the chief issue of the war was to give us a nation not only united, but renovated and free, and our dream of its future glory was satisfied with the prospect of a land wherein the sun, which this morning gathered his pavilion from the mists which rose round Mount Katahdin, and which to-night shall draw the curtains of his setting from the clouds which veil the Golden Gate, should

look down upon no rod of the oppressor and no fetter of the slave. But though this was included, there were other issues, yet profounder, also involved in our struggle. The bondman is a freedman; is he also a citizen — shall he meet us on equal terms at the ballot-box? This question of suffrage and citizenship, which, until rightly settled, is evidently to prove as controlling an element in our politics as that of slavery has been, only presents us, in a more vital way, the old inquiry: Is it equality of rights or distinction in privilege which lays the groundwork and shapes the superstructure of the social fabric?

And this question confronts us everywhere. If we turn our backs upon it, it sets itself before us, and calmly looks us in the eye. It enters into every topic which engages our attention in public affairs, and other less obtrusive relations in society. All our views of government or of the family state, all notions respecting labor or trade, every thought, in fact, which reaches beyond the sphere of our individual life, and lays hold, in any respect, upon those relations which bring man into contact with his fellow man will be modified by the answer we shall give to the inquiry, whether we will grant to every human soul, without distinction of caste or condition, the same privilege which we naturally enjoy, — whether we will love that soul with the same love wherewith God the Lord hath loved us? This is the question most controlling among us, most controlling everywhere, at the present day; but it is a very narrow view of it which does not detect its intimate relations, we may say its perfect coincidence even, with the question of the church, or Christ's kingdom. For what is this kingdom but a kingdom of righteousness and truth and love among men? Where else are revealed those organic relations which constitute the state; and how else can these be maintained? Where does liberty have its defense and law its basis and government its authority, but in those principles of universal love and truth and justice which it is the glory of Christ's kingdom not simply to reveal, but to actualize, among men? Philoso-

phers have dreamed of an ideal republic, or of some Atlantis or Utopia, where the perfection of society should be realized in the prevalence of every virtue and the exclusion of every vice; but these schemes, which have had in their minds only an ideal creation and adornment, it needs but the undisputed sway of the church, or Christ's kingdom, to introduce in perfect triumph. All the glory which gilds the brightest human dream of human progress and social welfare pales before the clear sun of that day when the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ, and he shall reign for ever and ever.

While the problem of the church and the problem of human society are in their broadest aspects one and the same, and while this is the great question which has been growing in prominence ever since the Reformation, and which is in manifest ascendency in all the movements of the present time, and which fixes thus the present period in the fourth stage of that great historic movement which began with the preparation for the coming of Christ, and which shall only end in his perfect triumph, it may not be presumptuous to ask this question at least: Whether, as the ancient Greek and Oriental history was all shaped in preparation for the first period, and Roman history for the second, and modern European in the German Empire up to the Reformation for the third, so may not the American history all have its meaning in reference to the fourth, and our mission in history, our work for the ages yet to come, be the work of social regeneration — the solution of the great problem: How human society on earth shall be one body, of which every individual is a living and organic member, the end and means of all the rest, and which shall thus at length be presented with everlasting joy, a faultless body, without spot or blemish, of which Christian love is the indwelling soul, and Christ himself the ever-living Head? We simply suggest the inquiry, with no intention of discussing it now. But whether such a discussion be possible at this period, or can only be adequately furnished at some remote future point, when the

disturbing influences of the present time, which now blind and pervert the vision, shall have passed away, this much at least is taught us by all that has yet occurred, — that the history of the world is the revelation of God, the movement of his providence according to his eternal wisdom and power and holiness and goodness and truth. Says Niebuhr, that most sagacious of historians: "It is not true that the study of history weakens our belief in divine providence; history is of all studies the one which tends to strengthen that belief." The history of the world is a temple, of which the free acts of the human soul furnish the materials indeed, but which are fashioned and fitted to their places in the rising structure by no human architect. The Great Master Builder manifests the shekinah of his presence in the holy of holies of the great sanctuary, while from its choir of ages rises one majestic anthem, grand and solemn, but with whose every strain a harmony divine is interwoven: Great and marvellous are thy works, Lord God Almighty; all thy works praise thee. Thou, and thou alone, art great!

ARTICLE III.

THE STUDY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE.

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THERE is no nobler achievement of the human mind than the production of a national literature. Its materials are more diverse, its forms are more varied, its sources are more numerous, its life is more enduring, than those of any other product of the conscious or the unconscious art of man. It appeals, too, to a much larger number for reception and approval, and satisfies broader and larger wants than any other work of the busy brain or the skilful hand.

The literary art, dealing with the subtile forms of thought and of imagination, and wielding the flexible or the plastic substance of language, has to do with a finer and more delicate matter than clay or marble, plaster or canvas. Yet subtile as are those forms, evanescent as are their expressions, — only less so than those with which music is concerned, — they outlast the massive structure of the architect, and often have lost nothing of their freshness when the once bright fresco is stained and darkened with the touch of time, and the once symmetrical statue lies a torso in the dust. "By the simple agency of twenty-four little marks, stamped on the written or printed page," said Mr. Everett, in his inaugural address at Washington University, St. Louis, — holding in his hand a volume of Homer, — "the immortal legend has flashed down to us through the vicissitudes of empires and eras; across the vast expanse of enlightened and benighted periods of history; from region to region, from his own rocky islet in the Aegean to shores unknown, undreamed of by him, — beneath the overwhelming billows of three thousand years, where peoples whole have sunk; and it now binds together, by the golden wires of intellect and taste, the mind of Europe and America, at this meridian

of their refinement, with the mind of every intervening age of literary culture, back to the cradle of infant Greece."

The literary art is more catholic in its spirit and in its product than any of its sister arts. As its votaries are more numerous, so it puts among its store of treasures works whose parallel other arts would not think it worth while to preserve. A song, a ballad, an epigram, a proverb, though separated from its author by the waves of time, is rescued from oblivion, while a sketch, a model, a melody, of equal merit, is allowed to perish. The standard of excellence in the plastic or the graphic art may be higher than in the literary, and hence what fails to reach it is neglected, while every literary product of any worth is likely to survive, though not to be universally esteemed. There is but one Raphael and one Michael Angelo; so, too, there is but one Shakespeare and one Milton; but the inferiors of the latter in their department are more sure of preservation than those of the former in theirs. For, unlike a picture or a statue, a book has other ends than to please or to inspire. It may instruct, it may express the spirit of the age, and perpetuate the form and pressure of the time. It may give utterance to some general sentiment or purpose which, from its importance in the history of human progress, may confer on its representative an immortality. The one increasing purpose that runs through the ages may be recorded in the poem, the drama, the essay, the oration, and the widening thoughts of men may have their enlarging expression in the accumulating literature of the world. A nation's history may determine the channel and the course in which the stream of its thought and discourse shall run; but that stream will mirror on its placid or its broken surface those guiding and enclosing banks between which it flows.

A national literature may, then, exhibit the greatest variety of forms in the several periods of its growth and development, and may have as great a diversity in the sources from which it emanates. It may have its different schools and their corresponding manners; but it will also include much

that, in its unconventional freshness and irregular forms, will prove itself a genuine product of the popular mind, and be worth preserving as a record of its tendencies and attainments. The student of the progress of the race, whether as a whole or in some of its national divisions, cannot forego the study of the world's literature. He must know the language in which it has taken shape; he must trace the tendencies and the results, whether individual or general, which it exhibits; he must subject himself to those powerful, yet at the time insensible, influences by which the best thought, uttered by the best men in the best way, determines the judgment and moulds the tastes of men. All this may be accomplished by the faithful and wise study of literature; and such a result, so far as the Anglo-Saxon race is concerned, we English, or the descendants of the English, may aim at and attain, in the diligent and proper study of our English literature.

A language is best studied in its literature. Its racy idioms and vigorous dialects may perhaps be often best learned from its colloquial forms. It may retain most of the flavor of the soil whence it sprung among those who till the earth or deal immediately with its various products. But sooner or later, and to a greater or a less extent, these idioms and dialects give a character to the written and the carefully spoken tongue. From time to time they come forth to infuse new vigor and life into that which tends to decay and is ready to perish. The stagnant pool is disturbed and fed by some new springs that break forth beneath its depths. All this — the original tongue in its form and its matter, — the various changes for the better or the worse in its syntax and its vocabulary — has its permanent record and illustration in the literature of the language. Thus the changes which the classical Latin of the Augustan age underwent, when that finished tongue lost its numerous inflections and inversions, and changed its orthography and its pronunciation, in diverging into the several Romance tongues, may be traced in the homily of the early Christian preacher and in the rescript of

the imperial magistrate; in the chronicle of the monk and the lay of the troubadour. A philologist must, then, be a student of the literature of the languages which he investigates.

A faithful study of English literature offers the best, and certainly the most interesting, means of acquainting ourselves with the genius of the English tongue. Its grammatical forms and structure, which it has inherited, not without loss or diminution, amid invasion, conquest, and civil commotion, may be seen in their earliest purity in its ancestral Anglo-Saxon; for English is but the most modern form of Anglo-Saxon, or, in other words, Anglo-Saxon is English in its earliest shape. In the chivalric legend of Beowulf, of the sixth or the seventh century, in the Anglo-Saxon Gospels, in the translated Orosius and Boethius of King Alfred, he may see the originals of our possessive and our plural inflections, our irregular nouns and adjectives, our complicated pronominal system, and the conjugations of our verbs, used with all the skill and ease which belong to familiarity with a synthetic tongue in the period of its life and vigor. Then, in the successive, sadder and sadder pages of that contemporary record of the national reverses, which monastic chroniclers kept in their seclusion, or in that half translated and half original poem which the country priest, Layamon wrote, far away from the court, in his parish on the banks of the Severn, he may see those inflections and terminal syllables dropping off, pronouns and verbs taking on more modern shapes, and some old syntactical forms vanishing altogether. One declension swallows up the other two; the verb throws off the incumbrance of its terminal consonants, and retains no more letters than are needed to convey the radical idea associated with its root. These patriotic monks and this lonely parish priest offer in their history and their verse a proof of the difficulty which the people found in retaining and using the cumbrous forms of their synthetic tongue, and of the readiness with which they yielded to the necessities of their daily life, and simplified what they could not easily employ. Their

patriotism prompted them to use their native tongue; but, like that of the people at large, it was not equal to the needless task of perpetuating the inflections which that tongue originally possessed. So Anglo-Saxon grammar gradually became English; and since 1450 A.D. it has experienced no essential change.

It is in its vocabulary that the English language has received the largest accessions; and that vocabulary in its great capacity and still increasing resources, in its original materials and its development, and its present almost unequalled fulness and fitness, can be best learned only in the literature into which it is inwrought. The thoroughly educated geologist is not content to study only the classified and labelled specimens of a cabinet; he wants to see them "in situ." He would read from the very pages of the great stone book. He would see the succession of strata, their mutual relations and influences, their interruptions and their continuity, what gems lie hidden in their secret folds, what fossils have left their imprint on their texture, and in death have become immortal. So the student of language cannot content himself with the alphabetical lists of the dictionary, though he have obeyed the rival publishers' injunctions, and have "gotten the best." He may thus learn etymology, spelling, and pronunciation, but not meaning and usage. Lord Chatham, it is said, used to prepare himself for a speech by studying Bailey's Dictionary. But whatever inspiration those venerable folio pages may have given him, they could have taught him little about the real significance and force of the words which he wielded with such matchless power. Words, like men, are social; they were not made to be alone; and just as we cannot learn a man's character in his isolation, but must see how he acts and is acted upon by his neighbors, if we would know what there is in him; so must we study words in their combinations, that we may see how their meaning is determined and how their force is modified by their fellows. The student of any foreign language must often have been disappointed in the amount of help which

his dictionary has afforded him in learning the precise shade of meaning which a word bears in a certain context. He turns from his book to his lexicon. He finds the word there in its place, with perhaps half a score of definitions appended. Which shall he adopt? If he adopts one, the chances are that it does not so exactly suit the case before him as to give him entire satisfaction. Almost unconsciously to himself, and the more frequently as he gains experience, he learns to modify the lexical meaning of the word, and to give it a sense which he would find it difficult himself to express without a long circumlocution. If this be true of a foreign tongue, it is not less so with our own, which we learn in the main without the help of a dictionary. No thoughtful man can reflect on his own and on others' use of his native tongue, without perceiving that every man is thus a dictionary to himself, and that the best speakers and writers, whose perceptions are nice and whose judgments are accurate, are the best dictionaries. Familiarity with the English literature in its successive periods and its finest specimens is the surest guide to the meaning and use of the English language. The garden and the field, where the soil yields up its richest juices for nutriment, where the pure breath of heaven gives perfume, and the sun tints the green leaves and the many-colored petals, are a better school than the most accurately painted plate or the most carefully arranged herbarium.

In the Ninth Lecture of his Second Series, Mr. Marsh turns aside to "notice a widely diffused error, which it may be hoped the lexicographical criticism of the present day may dispel." "I refer," he says, "to the opinion that words, individually and irrespectively of syntactical relations and of phraseological combinations, have one or more inherent, fixed, and limited meanings, which are capable of logical definition, and of expression in other descriptive terms of the same language. This may be true of artificial words; that is, words invented for, or conventionally appropriated to, the expression of arbitrary distinctions and technical notions in science or its practical applications, and also of the names

of material objects and of the sensuous qualities of things; but of the vocabulary of the passions and the affections, which grows up and is impressed with living meaning by the natural, involuntary processes to which all language but that of art owes its being, it is wholly untrue. Such words live and breathe only in mutual combination and interdependence with other words. They change their force with every new relation into which they enter; and consequently their meanings are as various and as exhaustless as the permutations and combinations of the digits of the arithmetical notation. To teach, therefore, the meaning of a great proportion of the words which compose the vocabulary of every living speech by formal definition is as impossible as to convey by description a notion of the shifting hues of the pigeon's neck." [1]

As we thus learn the meaning and the use of words by studying them in their literary combinations, so, too, by the same method do we learn something of their history. The date of the first appearance of a new term or phrase may thus be readily determined, as, e. g. when Lord Bacon, in 1612, in his intended dedication of his inestimable treasury of "counsels, civil and moral," justifies its title of "Essays" — the first use of the word to designate that style of composition — by saying: "The word is late, but the thing is ancient;" or as when the Westminster assembly of divines, in the time of the English commonwealth, in their debates and acts, first use the word "congregational," to meet the necessities of discussions which were so largely concerned with the nature and the laws of ecclesiastical congregations. Thus new words arise to meet the new necessities of thought and purpose, and, like the deposits and geologic formations of the earth's crust which record the story of the pre-Adamite period, register the history of a people and of individual men.

Every genuine literary work is a contemporary document, revealing something of the dispositions, tastes, habits, purposes, — in brief, the spirit, — of the age to which it belongs;

[1] Marsh's Lectures, II., 383, 384.

and often something also of the character and history of its author. The real interest which attaches to any national literature lies in the men who have unconsciously revealed themselves in it. You pick up a fossil shell, hard, lifeless, perfect in its preservation; you prize it not for its antiquity, its rarity, its perfectness, but for the living being whose character it bears, and whose memory it perpetuates. Were it not for this association, it would not be worth more to you than a block of granite or a crystal of quartz. The proper study of our English literature, then, will compel it to yield up to us a true and lively picture of the men who read it and of the men who wrote it. It will tell us what it owes to the race that gave it birth; what to the country that determined its character; what to the author whose sensitive soul was swept, like the chords of a lyre, by the rude or the gentle hand of the time in which he lived. Archbishop Trench has taught us thus to study the separate words that are imbedded in our literature and that live in our daily speech, and happily the rising generation, under such instructive guidance, have come to attach a new value and meaning to language. They are no longer content merely to handle and interchange the current coin of our social converse; they pause to see "whose is the image and the superscription," and are the better pleased if they can decipher, and in a measure restore, that which has been effaced by frequent handling. Even these single words, interesting as they are made to appear in the Irish Primate's treatment of them, appear still more interesting in the light of the works in which they occur. There is a whole story of disappointed national anticipation, smothered hate, restless subjection, and undying patriotism in the Anglo-Saxon chronicler's use of the Roman word "peace," to denote that which in his independence he would have called "frith" from freó = free. "The peace that was the result of *freódom*, and suggestive of it, could, indeed, exist no longer for the disheartened and down-trodden nation. The death-like calm that succeeded the ruthless Norman devastations was suffi-

ciently well expressed, thought the simple Saxon chronicler, by one of their own weak, meaningless terms." [1]

But it is literary productions considered as a whole, or in larger portions than isolated words, that are most interesting and instructive as historical documents. The name of the gleeman who first sang the prowess of Beowulf, or the din of the battle of Finnsburg, and the flight of "the swart raven over the corpses of many good foes" has not been preserved. It is doubtful whether in the legend of Caedmon we have perpetuated the name or the character of the bold imaginative paraphrast of the Old Testament. But if these ancient singers found a fit and willing audience, we may confidently infer what manner of men they must have been to love such warlike verse. It glitters with "the bright shields borne over the bulwarks of the ships," and echoes with the clatter of "hard, hand-locked, bright-ringed, iron war-shirts, fierce helms, and overflowing mead-cups." Fierce sea-monsters and watchful dragons — the product of the imagination dwelling beneath the clouds and among the boisterous waves of the German ocean — lend mystery and excitement to the marvellous story. When the heroes are not fighting they are draining beer-goblets, giving and receiving bracelets and weapons, or listening to the terse, ejaculatory phrases in which, to the sound of the "musical wood," the scóp or gleeman celebrated his patron's prowess. Even when treating of sacred themes, the Christian poet warms in his description of angelic strife and suffering, and lingers over the bloody deed of Judith with a fervor and satisfaction not inferior to that with which his pagan predecessor "gazed on the hot heart's blood, while the horn sang a doleful death-note." We need no other document to tell us that the race who welcomed such songs were a hardy, fearless, earnest people, loving peril for its own sake, and equally at home in a fight or a carousal; and though civilization has softened and modified many of their features, we

[1] Keane's Handbook. p. 47.

may trace them still in the most belligerent and the most gluttonous nation of Europe.

We pass on six or seven hundred years, and we ask another writer skilled in song-craft the character of the age and of the men for whom he wrote. "The father of English poetry" gives answer in that immortal prologue which daguerreotypes for us English society in the reign of Edward III. The last crusade was a comparatively recent event to that generation. The men who read the Canterbury Tales had followed the banner of the Black Prince at Creçy and Poictiers; and many of them might have sat for the picture of Chaucer's "veray parfit gentil knight." We recognize the conventional John Bull, whose broad shoulders and rosy face Punch has made familiar to us, in the Frankelein who was "Epicures owen sone," in whose house "it snewed of mete and drinke, and whose table dormant in his halle alway stode redy covered alle the longe day." It seems probable that the Frere — "a wanton and a mery," "an esy man to give penance," who "knew wel the tavernes in every toun," and whose "eyen twinkeled in his hed aright, as don the sterres in a frosty night" — had his prototype in that very friar, for beating whom in Fleet Street it is on record that the young law student Geffrey Chaucer was fined two shillings! A heavier price for this youthful recreation would not have been exacted or tolerated by men who must have keenly relished the satirical humor that touched up the lineaments of the dainty and amorous Prioresse, the luxurious, sporting Monk, the drunken Sompnour the grasping Pardoner, and who must have felt with how just a discrimination, and with how loving a hand was drawn the pendant picture of the poor Parson who

> "Cristes lore, and his apostles twelve,
> He taught, but first he folwed it himselve," —

a picture, whose faithful modern copy by Goldsmith sheds a hallowed light about "the deserted village" of Lissoy.

The political and the social causes of the English reformation are already at work in a society which would endure

such keen satire of its religious teachers; and the readers who smiled at Chaucer's ridicule of the ecclesiastics of his time were the ancestors of those who roared over Skelton's ribald abuse of Wolsey, and rejoiced to see Henry VIII. write himself "protector and only supreme head of the church and clergy of England." And what has English literature to tell us of the English race in that fermenting sixteenth century, — including the reigns of Henry VIII. and his imperious daughters, — that period full of the rapidly expanding germs of so much of our modern literature and modern life? Six or seven different translations of the Bible measure the popular thirst for religious knowledge. Controversial treatises — the monuments of the zeal of More and of Tyndale, of Latimer and of Ridley — are as sure a token as the fires of Smithfield of the intensity of feeling with which the old faith and the new came into conflict. The drama, the field of the chief triumphs of the English mind, was just fixing its limits and offering its attractive stores. The innumerable plays which that century and the next produced; the freedom and imaginative power with which society, with its myriad passions, was dealt with; the inexhaustible wealth of character and of language which the English stage then displayed, reveal to us with wondrous fulness the temper of the age. "Acting," says Mr. Froude, "was the especial amusement of the English, from the palace to the village-green. It was the result and expression of their strong, tranquil possession of their lives, of their thorough power over themselves, and power over circumstances. They were troubled with no subjective speculations; no social problems vexed them with which they were unable to deal; and, in the exuberance of vigor and spirits, they were able, in the strict and literal sense of the word, to play with the materials of life."[1]

But still further, a genuine literary work may be made to testify to the history and the personal character of its author. Testimony of so specific and individual a nature is oftener

[1] Froude's England (Eng. ed.), I. 69.

more interesting than the broader and vaguer evidence borne in reference to the spirit of a nation or of an age. For *a man* is a more attractive object than *men* or *humanity*. Even a writer whose works are so impersonal as Shakespeare's, who so completely invests himself with the character and the garb of his personages, cannot help revealing himself at times. It is not microscopic criticism which detects in his strong dissuasives from unlawful passions in "The Tempest," or from marriage between persons of quite unequal age, as in "Twelfth Night," the bitter fruit of his own experience with the mature Anne Hathaway; while it is generally admitted that in his Sonnets the strong utterances of restless discontent with the player's life, and of the profound sense of degradation which it produced, are passages of real autobiography. But the majority of authors are more free in their revelations of self. We do not here refer to direct confessions, like those bitter misanthropic lines which commend Lord Byron's verse to many a morbid, disappointed youth, or those healthier and purer lines in which the "sage and serious" poet of chivalry laments the unprofitableness of his attendance on a court swayed by Lord Burleigh, or records the experiences of his love in the Shepherd's Calendar, or in those sonnets that were the glow-worm lamps that

> "Cheered mild Spenser, called from fairy-land,
> To struggle through dark ways."

The robust and lively verse of Chaucer is full of testimonies to his character and his culture. The amatory lore of Provence in "The Court of Love," and the scholastic physics of "The House of Fame" show what sort of studies had been pursued by "Philogenet of Cambridge, clerk." The rich flavor of monkish legend and minstrel's fabliaux, the sweetness and delicacy of Italian rhetoric, and the homeliness and coarseness of English story-telling had been distilled into the tales that enlivened the famous ride to Canterbury. These betray the culture of books; but there is far more than this to be found in Chaucer in his best moods and manner. That poet "small and faire of face," with "elvish countenance"

and eyes that "stared upon the ground," who joined himself to that mixed company, had had a long and varied experience among men, which made him as ready to be a companion with the miller, the cook, the shipman, as with the knight or his squire. His humor everywhere found fit materials. His tender love of nature, his respect for womanhood, his hearty sympathy with the people, had gathered strength amid the green hedgerows of England, in his own Woodstock, and among the bright cities of sunny Italy. And now, near the age of seventy, he offers the mature fruit of changeful years, to which the palace and the prison, the embassy and the battle-field, have alike yielded their ripening influence. Sir Philip Sidney tells us that his muse bade him look into his heart and write. What he saw there we can also see, as we read the transcript of it in the "high erected thoughts" and chivalrous deeds of Pyrochles and Musidorns. The knightly temper of the Plantagenets has its worthy representative in the more modern court of the Maiden Queen; and Spenser's Gloriana could not have found a truer vassal than the young hero of the field of Zutphen. The stately verse of Milton, in keeping with his sublime theme, unattempted yet in prose or rhyme, its texture stiff with the barbaric pearl and gold wrought into it, with its occasional references to his own bodily and domestic sorrows, gives us to see, in no vague outline or faint colors, the old blind bard, fallen on evil days, poor, proscribed, deserted, disappointed, out of sympathy with his nation and his time, turning from earth to find in the contemplation of the celestial and the paradisiacal world that satisfaction and peace which were denied him in this. Or once more, to come down for illustration to our own century, we have an entire and sincere revelation of self, both direct and indirect, in the meditative, didactic, descriptive verse that flowed with an unruffled stream from Rydal Mount. The quiet recluse whose sojourn there has made the spot hallowed ground, had no other employment than to observe and register the growth of a poet's mind, and to perpetuate in reflective narrative or thoughtful sonnet the

memories and associations which for him gathered around one and another secular or ecclesiastical shrine, — the vales of Switzerland, the banks of Yarrow, the lakes and glens of Cumberland. If, therefore, one would thoroughly know what manner of man William Wordsworth was, let him read and ponder his varied and numerous poems, and he may leave, in the main, unread his nephew's heavy and tedious biography.

Thus should our literature be studied as an exponent of the men who read and of the men who wrote it. The keen and inquisitive eye will detect much between the lines. Many a verse will be found to have been penned with the very heart's blood. The actor will often be caught without his mask. The throbbing of a nation's life will be felt often to time the pulses of a poet's melody. We shall either ascend to those masters who dwell upon the heights of story or of song, or we shall bring them down for a while to be companions with us on our lower level; and we shall recognize in them that touch of nature which makes the whole world kin.

Such instructive results as these from the study of English literature may be made the objects of direct and conscious pursuit. The theme of inquiry is specific, and the aim is well defined. But besides this method of investigation, which leisure and power will not allow all to prosecute, there is a more common and familiar, but less distinct and decided course, leading often insensibly to advantages which to the majority of readers are in the end perhaps even more valuable. This is the reading of the classic writings of English literature for purposes of intellectual pleasure and aesthetic culture. It is not easy, it may be that it is not possible, for the most careful reflection to determine the nature or the amount of one's indebtedness to the habitual reading of any writer or class of writers. The elements of our education are so numerous, and many of them so subtile, that, though we may admit the prominence of one or two, we cannot pretend to tell what helps or what hinderances these may have had from other associated forces. The

process of mental assimilation, like that of bodily, is so comprehensive that we cannot ascribe to any one variety of food the vigor and the health of the mind's growth. Thus much may, however, be confidently affirmed, that familiarity with the literature of a people of so grave, earnest, and manly a character as the English, who in their writings have shown themselves to be sensitive to all that is beautiful in nature, to all that is true and honest in man, who appear capable of appreciating the profounder and the lighter passions that sway the heart, — the deep under-current that flows beneath society, the humor and fancy that play upon its surface, — and who in their changeful history have developed for themselves a language, rich, precise, flexible, suited to all the requirements of human thought and expression, cannot but instruct, inspire, elevate, and purify the intellect of man.

It is rather remarkable that the best history of English literature that has appeared is the work of a Frenchman.[1] It is by Hippolyte Adolphe Taine, a young and rising man among the present school of essayists and littérateurs in Paris. He is, if we are not mistaken, a professor of Aesthetics in "l'Ecole des Beaux Arts," and has by some recent radical utterances in the lecture-room at once offended the authorities and commended himself to the students. His history has the merit of being an independent, original, and philosophical account of the influences under which English literature has developed itself, from the Anglo-Saxon period down to the present time. Chambers's Cyclopedia and Cleveland's Compendium of English Literature present well-written biographical sketches of English authors, and well-selected specimens of their styles. Craik's History traces in a more connected manner the rise of the English language and the successive periods of its literature. But even this is dry and uninteresting, and is rather consulted as a book of reference than read for the pleasure or the inspiration which

[1] Histoire de la Litterature Anglaise. 8vo. 4 tomes. Paris: Hachette et Cie. 1863–64.

it affords. Mr. Taine's work, however, clothes with that clearness, liveliness, and grace of style which have made the French the interpreters of the thought of Europe, an attractive and instructive theory of the development of the English mind, and a picture of the nation itself in each stage of that development. This critical theory he had illustrated in several volumes of essays which he published before giving to the world this larger and maturer fruit of its application. Some of its principles and aims have been adopted and enforced in our preceding remarks. A literary work, according to him, when "rightly interpreted reveals the psychology of a soul, often that of an age, sometimes that of a race." Three principal elements determine the character of authorship, — race, situation, and chronological position. These three "primordial forces," as he terms them, modify each other, and are themselves affected by other and subordinate influences, but they are the great conditions which determine the character of a nation's literature. Thus, for example, the Aryan race have certain marked characteristics, but the soil, the climate, the position of Great Britain give to these a different development from that which they had in Greece or in Italy, while in a writer who stands so far down in the chronological order of authors as Pope, or Byron, or Wordsworth, the result of the operation of these two influences will be different from that exhibited in an earlier author, who has had fewer predecessors to inspire and to guide him.

Our readers cannot fail to detect in this theory of criticism the influence of that positive philosophy of which Mr. Buckle is the prominent representative in the department of history. Though they will find it admitted by the author that these physical, social, and moral influences cannot be accurately measured, and that their effect cannot be estimated with any great degree of certainty, they will regret that the providential government of a personal God in determining these results is not more fully recognized, and that the religion of Christ has not a greater weight assigned to it in making the English race and the English literature what they are. The

moral earnestness of our race is indeed described with great force; but it is made too much a matter of climate and geographical position. This is the great defect in the book. A Frenchman, moreover, can hardly be expected to appreciate the gravity and sublimity of Milton. Mr. Taine's estimate of this great Christian poet is, perhaps, the least successful part of his work.

But with the exception of these faults, — and they are great faults, — this history of English literature is worthy of high praise. We know of no other history of our literature that presents so lively and so interesting, and withal so true, a picture of the literary activity of our ancestors in Great Britain, and of the influences under which it was exerted. The authors themselves are summoned before us, and from their own testimonies, most skilfully employed, we learn their personal character and the social and the political atmosphere they breathed. Our English cousins may not relish the picture of their life at some periods of their history as painted by this lively pencil; but they must confess that though the picture comes from the other side of the channel it may on that account be all the more truthful; they have themselves furnished the subject, and even the colors. The book is at once a history of the nation and of its literature. To trace the progress of the British mind is to trace the history of British civilization. We are much mistaken if this record of that progress will not, from its point of view, be found to possess profound interest and permanent value. It certainly goes far towards supplying a want that has long been felt in this field of historical writing. We do not look for a translation of this work from Great Britain, but we wish that some enterprising American publisher would put it within the reach of many who cannot afford to purchase it, or who are unable to read it, in its original form.

ARTICLE IV.

THE CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC CHURCH.

BY REV. W. W. ANDREWS, WETHERSFIELD, CONN.

(*Continued from page* 159.)

Its Relations to the Existing Churches.

After what has been already said, a few words will suffice to show the relations of this movement to the whole Christian church. It is not for the adding of another sect to the multitude which now rend the body of Christ, for apostles cannot be the founders of a sect, nor the originators of a schism. Their spiritual jurisdiction embraces all the baptized; and if they are restored, it is with authority to bring back all the churches into the true order of God's house. A sectarian movement is one set forward and directed by self-chosen leaders, or one proceeding on principles subversive of catholic unity. If any part of the church claims to be the whole, by denying to the rest all sacraments and ministry; or if it sets itself in antagonism to all others, seeking to build itself up by their overthrow; or if it separates itself, and withholds the offices of Christian love from the brethren; or if it circumscribes its organization by political or local boundaries, so as to be ecclesiastically independent of the rest, it thereby makes itself a *sect*, which is a portion of the body set in wrong relations to the other portions. The law of every healthful organism is the intercommunion and mutual helpfulness of all the parts; but this requires central organs, which shall sustain and control all the rest. If these are destroyed, or hindered in their workings, the harmony of the organism is impaired; and their restoration is indispensable if the ends for which it was created are to be answered. The church, which from its relations to Christ, the one head, is one body, and can be but one (although it may exist in a disorganized condition), had

in apostles a central ordinance, which embraced all the members, held them in their places, and ministered grace and strength to them from their Head in the heavens. The restoration of this office by the Lord would be no act of schism, nor would those whom he set in it, nor those who followed them, and received his commandments and ordinances from them, be schismatics. Apostles would be restored for the deliverance of the church from schism; not to increase and exaggerate its evils. The congregations gathered under them would not stand in hostility to the existing churches, but would, as it were, form the very heart and centre of the body, from which blessings should flow forth by every unobstructed channel to all the living parts.

This is the relation in which the restored apostles, and the churches that have been organized by them, believe themselves to stand to all other Christian communities. They do not disown and cast off any portion of the visible church which has not cut itself off by making utter shipwreck of the faith; but they recognize all the baptized as their brethren, and honor and seek to uphold the existing ministries and sacraments, however defective, and in whatever weakness they may be found. In the service of the holy eucharist, after having prayed for apostles and for all ministers serving under them, they say: "And unto all in any holy office in thy church give thy heavenly grace; and enable them to fulfil their several duties in thy fear, and in purity of heart. And cause all Christian people to grow in grace, in the knowledge of thy will, in sound religion, and unto all perfection." They believe that God has restored the highest forms of ministry ever known to the church for the common blessing of all, in order that the whole flock of Christ may, if it be possible, be recovered out of its divided, impoverished, and enfeebled condition; and they therefore regard themselves not as a sect adding to the confusion of Christendom, but as the first battalions of a disorganized army to wheel into line, and take their right places under the right leaders. God begins with a part as an example of what he would

have all to become, and as his instrument for the help of their brethren. They are not a sect, for they are gathered under a catholic (universal) ministry, and hold, without addition or rejection, the catholic faith and catholic ordinances of worship, and recognize as one with themselves in the body of Christ, all who believe his gospel and have been baptized into his name.

The special object of this divine movement in the church at this time they believe to be to prepare the way of the Lord, that he may return to the earth and establish his kingdom. It is for the making ready of the wife of the Lamb for her approaching marriage (Rev. xix. 7, 8), by clothing her with the fine linen which is the righteousness (*δικαιώματα*, all forms of righteousness, internal and external) of saints. This is the end for which the ancient gifts and ministries have reappeared, and the storehouses of Christian antiquity have been made to yield up their treasures, that the Lord at his coming may find his church lacking no spiritual grace or ornament that befits his bride. They believe that the restoration of apostles is the fulfilment of the promise to send Elijah the prophet before the coming of the great and dreadful day of the Lord, to turn the heart of the fathers to the children, and the heart of the children to their fathers, lest he come and smite the earth with a curse[1] (Mal. iv. 5, 6); a promise which was fulfilled to the Jews in raising up extraordinarily the highest ministry known to the Jewish dispensation — the prophetic, and which must be fulfilled to the Christian church by the raising up again of the highest ministry known to the Christian dispensation — the apostolic;

[1] It is a striking fact that from a little time after the death of the first apostles, there has been an expectation that Elijah would come in person, and probably Enoch with him, to stem the ungodliness of the last days, and to bring succor to the struggling, sinking church. This interpretation of the promise is too literal, because it is against the fundamental law of the Christian dispensation, viz. that Christ's own ordinances and gifts are sufficient for the perfecting of his body; but the fact of such an almost universal tradition shows the widespread conviction that the existing ministries, after the removal of apostles, would be insufficient to prepare the church for her Lord's coming.

for this alone can do the work of reuniting men in all those divine and human relationships of which fatherhood and sonship are the type.

Nor are they disappointed, however much they may sorrow, that few, comparatively, receive their witness, for so it has been at the close of each preceding dispensation. But they are far from limiting the salvation of God to themselves, for they look upon the present work as the first of a series of his merciful actings in the bringing of the present order of things to a close. It is for that gathering of the first-fruits which precedes and sanctifies the harvest (Lev. xxiii. 10, 11; Rev. xiv. 4, 15, 16). The first-fruits are that company who are sealed with the seal of the living God while the angels are holding back the four winds. During the time of troubled calm which precedes the tempest, God seals his servants again, as in the beginning, by endowing them with the gift of the Holy Ghost, through the laying on of the hands of apostles (Rev. vii. 1–4; Eph. i. 13, 14; Acts xix. 1–6). They are the first stalks in the harvest field to be ripened, and the first to be gathered into the garner of the husbandman, before the judgments of God are poured out upon the earth. There is another company who *come out of* the great tribulation (Rev. vii. 9, 14), from which the sealed ones are exempted, purified by the fiery trial which they might have escaped. There is a day of wrath for apostate Christendom swiftly approaching, which will involve in sore calamities, but not in irremediable ruin, a great multitude who were slow to discern the peril and to receive the warning. God will save every one that loves him, but to Laodicea it will be by rebuke and chastisement (Rev. iii. 19). The harvest shall be reaped, and all the good grain shall be gathered in, but not till the storm has beaten upon it.

There are to be two stages in God's work of vengeance, answering to the two great forms of wickedness set forth under the symbols of Babylon and the beast; the former representing the church become corrupt and idolatrous; the latter symbolizing the lawless and infidel spirit which would sweep away Christianity altogether. The revelation of the

man of sin, the Antichrist, is yet future, and will immediately precede the revelation of the Lord in the glory of his kingdom.[1] It will be the consummation of the movement now swiftly going forward in all Christian countries, known under the names of Liberalism, Rationalism, and Pantheism, which are manifestations of one and the same spirit of rebellion against God and his Christ in the different regions of politics, theology, and philosophy, and are destroying the very foundations of authority and faith. Babylon will be first judged, as the adulterous wife whose doom is to be burned with fire (Rev. xviii. 8); and the instruments of her destruction will be the beast, to whom she has given the husband's place and rights, and the kings that fight under his banner (Rev. xvii. 26, 27); against whom, in their turn, the wrath of the Lord will burn, and they shall be cast living into the lake of fire (Rev. xix. 20). From all these fearful woes God would save his faithful people, and he will take away at the earliest dawn of the day those who have received his seal and have kept it from pollution, to meet the coming King, and to be hidden with him "until the indignation be overpast," and then to be manifested with him in glory. To resist to the uttermost the revelation of Antichrist by recovering the church from the errors and sins which have been the apology for the infidel, and by bearing a full witness to Christ in all his offices and works against the enemy now struggling to defile his cross and to rob him of his throne, is the burden which we believe God to have laid in this time of the end upon apostles, and the churches which receive them; and the reward which we hope for is to be the helpers of our brethren, and to "escape the things which are coming upon the earth, and to stand before the Son of Man" (Luke xxi. 36).

[1] The coming of the Lord *to* his saints, and his coming *with* his saints, are distinct events, and must not be confounded. Before he sets his feet upon the earth, and while he is yet hidden in the clouds of heaven, he will gather his saints to himself, and this will be done at different times, answering to the distinct seasons of first-fruits and harvest. All this may be invisible to the world, as his own resurrection was, but he will afterwards reveal himself and his church, so that every eye shall see him.

ARTICLE V.

BRÜCKE'S PHYSIOLOGY OF SPEECH.

BY LEWIS R. PACKARD, PROFESSOR IN YALE COLLEGE.

During the last half-century the science of language has made most rapid and unexpected progress. It has, one may say, come into being within that time, and attained sufficient development to be marked off into departments, each of which covers more ground, and demands more labor for its mastery, than would before have been thought necessary for the whole field. One of these subdivisions is that which treats of the theory of the formation of the spoken sounds of language. To this but little attention has been given, until recently, in this country; and it is with a view to indicate the starting-point for it and make known more widely the method pursued by others in working out a theory, that we propose to give in the following pages some account of an excellent German work on the subject. The book, published in Vienna in 1856, is by Dr. Ernst Brücke, Professor of Physiology in the Hochschule of that city, and has the title, "Elements of the Physiology and Classification of the Sounds of Language."[1]

It was written, as the title page sets forth, for the use of students of language and teachers of the deaf and dumb; and one of its chief merits is, that it combines in such a high degree the theoretical and the practical; that, while it keeps in view the needs of a teacher of deaf mutes in describing by what position of the organs sounds are produced, it also pursues so exhaustive and scientific a method that its principles may be applied to the explanation of all possible sounds of known languages, with the single avowed exception of the so-called *clicks* of the languages of Southern Africa. To prove

[1] Grundzüge der Physiologie und Systematik der Sprachlaute für Linguisten und Taubstummenlehrer bearbeitet von Dr. Ernst Brücke, Professor, etc. Wien: 1856.

the presence of the practical element, I may quote one or two examples. Speaking of the difference between toneless and toned consonants (p. 8), he says, "Even the deaf mute understands it without difficulty, if he puts his finger on the larynx (the Adam's apple) of his teacher, and feels how it quivers, from the vibration within, when *v* is pronounced, but is not moved by uttering *f*." So again (p. 65): "The English *th* would serve as a Shibboleth for most Germans who have learned that language, but only because they have had unskilful teachers; not because they are naturally unable to utter the sound, for any one who has not lost his front teeth can with proper instruction learn to give it in a few minutes." No single quotation could serve as evidence that the author pursues a thoroughly scientific method throughout the book; it is only by studying the system that we can satisfy ourselves whether he has realized his own conception of the work before him, as expressed in the following words (p. 30): "In arranging the consonants, we must clearly understand that, as when treating of the vowels, our business is not to distribute into certain classes a heap of letters that we have learned from others, but to classify, on an exhaustive plan, all the possible methods of uttering a consonant. If to-morrow a new language should be discovered, whose sounds, like those of the Indo-European and Semitic languages, were produced only by the *expulsion* of breath, our system must have places ready for them all, so that we should not be obliged to form any new classes, or to give up our old ones."

The book consists, as its title indicates, of two parts; one treating of the physiology, the other of the classification of sounds. The second part is altogether historical and critical; for of course the author's own classification, with the reasons for it, has been already given in the first part. And it is of this first part, treating of the sounds of language from a physical point of view, that we propose to give an account. After a brief historical sketch of previous works on the subject, it proceeds to discuss in order the larynx and its sounds, the vowel sounds, including diphthongs, the simple conso-

nants, the compounded consonants, and the softened (*mouillé*) consonants. We shall follow the same order.

The author's description of the chief organ of the human voice is admirably simple and clear, as we see especially by comparing it with one made so unintelligible by technical terms as that prefixed to Soule and Wheeler's "Manual of English Pronunciation and Spelling" (Boston, 1861), or with one so confused and ill-proportioned in its parts as that in Max Müller's third lecture (Lectures on the Science of Language, Second Series: New York, 1865). It consists, says he, of two highly elastic bands, which stretch across the larynx from front to back, and project like ledges from the sides towards the centre, being protected a little way above by the heart-shaped [1] cartilage called the epiglottis. They are made to vibrate by the air driven out of the lungs, and by this vibration produce the tone or sound heard in the vowels and toned consonants. In other words, they restrict periodically the passage of the air, being pressed up and asunder by it, and then coming together again, and thus produce the rhythmic pulsations of air which cause to our ears the sensation of sound. This vibration and consequent sound occurs, however, only when the edges of the vocal chords are, by the action of the muscles of the larynx, so brought together that the space between them is quite narrow. They can also, by the action of the same muscles, have their free edges so separated that the space between them is comparatively broad, and then the air comes noiselessly through the larynx, and becomes audible only by rustling against the sides of the cavity of the jaws. This rustling the Greeks indicate by the rough breathing, we by the consonant *h*. As, however, this so-called consonant is not produced under any of the conditions which attend the production of the consonants as a class, it is to be excluded from their number in systematic discussion and classification. In this

[1] Max Müller (p. 123 f.) calls it, less precisely, "leaf-shaped," and writing for an English audience, says it "falls over the larynx, like a saddle on the back of a horse."

place, therefore, the author discusses briefly the difference between the *spiritus asper* and *spiritus lenis* of the Greeks, the *Ha* or *Hha* and the *Ain* of the Arabic, and treats also, in passing, the guttural *R* of the dialect of Lower Saxony. The first two seem to differ, as the sonant *h* and silent *h* of the English, in the greater or less degree of power with which the breath is forced out of the lungs. It is not worth while in this sketch to linger upon these subordinate and somewhat obscure points.

There is yet another phenomenon of speaking to be mentioned by itself before we take up the main subject, and that is whispering. It is described (p. 8) as produced when the vocal chords are brought so near together as to check somewhat the passage of the air between them, yet not so near and in such tension as to vibrate enough to cause sound. What is then produced is not actual sound, but mere rustle of the air; yet the rustling is not now, as it is in the case of the *h*, against the inner sides of the mouth, but also against the sides of the larynx and the vocal chords. The degree of tension, however, of the chords is variable; for in whispering, as well as in speaking, there is a perceptible difference between *b* and *p*, *d* and *t*, etc.; that is, between the toned and toneless consonants. A little further on (p. 16), Brücke says that the difference between speaking aloud and whispering is, that in the first the vocal chords vibrate regularly in equal times, in the other, irregularly; and the same statement is made by Max Müller (p. 129). By bringing these two statements together, it would appear that regularity of vibration varies as the tension of the chords, — the more tense the chords, or the nearer together, the more regular the vibration, — and that at a certain point in their relaxation or separation the vibration becomes so irregular that voice passes into whisper.

We come now to the proper *sounds* of language, and first, the simple vowel sounds.

There are in every simple vowel sound or musical note three distinct parts, as Max Müller (p. 113) puts it, to be noticed and explained:

1. Strength or loudness.
2. Height or pitch.
3. Quality (in French, *timbre;* in German, *tonfarbe*), which, in vowels, means the perceptible difference by which we know *a* or *o* from *i*, *e*, or *u*.

The first of these, it is agreed, "depends upon the amplitude of the excursions of the vibrating particles of air" (Max Müller); that is, if a cord vibrates, upon the space it passes over (with a given length of the cord).

Brücke gives an interesting account of the various experiments by which the different causes of the other two qualities of sound have been ascertained. The experiment most worthy of mention here is that of an Englishman, Robert Willis, in 1828, who was the first to come near to the solution since established. He placed a piece of watch-spring in contact with a toothed wheel, so that it was made to vibrate by the teeth of the wheel as it revolved, and then found that the pitch varied with the rapidity of revolution, while the quality of the sound was changed by lengthening or shortening the vibrating part of the spring. This led him to distinguish between the primary and secondary vibrations of the spring, or impulses given by it to the air. Each time the spring left one of the teeth it gave the air an impulse, which was transmitted to the ear. These he called the *primary* impulses, and he noticed that the pitch of the sound produced depended on the rapidity with which they succeeded one another; that is, on the rapidity of the revolution of the wheel. But in trying to come to rest between two successive teeth, the spring would vibrate about its centre of equilibrium, and in so doing give rise to a new series of impulses of the air, which Willis called *secondary*. These followed each other more or less quickly, and so varied the quality of the sound, according as the free part of the spring was shorter or longer. It would be natural to infer that the primary impulses might follow one another so rapidly that there would not be time enough between any two for the secondary impulses of slower rates; in other words, that

certain *qualities* of sound would become impossible as the *pitch* was raised above a certain height, and this is known to be the fact with the human voice. It is possible to sing *e* and *i*[1] on notes that are too high for *o* and *u*.

But how does this experiment apply to the human voice? We have in our throats, it is true, no toothed wheel or watch-spring; but we produce in a different way the same vibrations of air, and it seemed worth while to give this experiment in such detail because it is so simple and intelligible in itself, and because its results apply to what takes place in the production of vocal sound. We produce in our throats the primary and secondary pulsations of air; but here the primary are dependent directly on the vibrations of the vocal chords, and the secondary on the length of the column of air between them and the lips. This seemed to be proved by the fact that the same vowel sounds could be produced in an artificial tube with a metallic tongue[2] freely playing in it, and by observation of the effect of varying the length of the tube and the shape of its mouth. It is seen with such an instrument that the pitch of the tone depends on the vibrations of the metallic tongue, which give rise to the primary pulsations of air; while the quality of the tone is altered by lengthening or shortening the tube, or by varying the size of its mouth; that is, by varying the rapidity of the secondary pulsations. Thus Willis found that such a tube, with a wooden funnel for a mouth, could be made to produce in succession the vowels *i*, *e*, *a*, *o*, *u*, by gradually narrowing the opening by a board laid across it. The vowels of the human voice are more perfect than any thus artificially produced, partly because the single parts of the organ are better adapted to their work and the bones in proximity to them aid in the vibration (as may be easily seen in pronouncing *i* distinctly and loudly), and partly because both the ways of varying the quality of tone, — change in the

[1] The vowels are to be pronounced throughout as in Italian.

[2] It should be observed that this metallic tongue corresponds, not to the human tongue, but to the vocal chords, whose vibration it is intended to imitate.

length of the tube and in the size of its opening, — are employed in the human voice, as Brücke proceeds, after this prefatory account of experiments, to show. He takes up the vowels one by one, and analyzes the position of the organs in producing them.

U. In uttering this vowel the tube is lengthened as much as possible, by depressing the larynx and pushing forward the lips, so that the one is at its greatest distance from the other. At the same time the opening at the end is narrowed by bringing the lips together.

If the lips are not thus projected and brought together, it is indeed possible to utter an *u*, but then it will be noticed (by placing the finger on the Adam's apple) that the larynx is lowered more than in the other case, in the effort to supply the needed length to the tube; and besides, the *u* thus produced is by no means so full and perfect as the other. If the lips are opened wide, it is impossible to utter this vowel; for it is impossible to sink the larynx so low that the length of the tube shall compensate for the want of a narrow opening.

I. In producing *i* the tube is at its shortest, for the larynx is raised as high as possible, and at the same time the wide opening of the lips draws them back so that their distance from it is diminished. It is noticed, also, that the tongue rises close against the roof of the mouth, and leaves only a narrow channel in the middle for the air; but what effect this narrowing of the tube has upon the waves of air in it, Brücke confesses himself unable to say. He points out, however, that it may be the cause of that vibration of the bones of the skull mentioned above, which is noticed as occurring more strongly when *i* is fully uttered than with any other vowel.

When the lips are projected or the larynx depressed, as in pronouncing *u*, it is impossible to utter a clear, perfect *i*. If it is attempted, in the former case the German *ü* is produced, in the latter, an imperfect *i*.

A. This vowel stands between the two which have been

described. In uttering it the vocal tube is, we might say, in its most natural position, and so shorter than for *u*, and longer than for *i*; since the lips are not projected, nor is the larynx depressed, while yet on the other hand, the lips are not retracted by wide opening of the mouth, nor is the larynx raised as in uttering *i*. It may be remarked, also, that the vocal tube is for this vowel open in its whole extent, and not closed in the middle as it is for *i*, nor at the end as for *u*.

These three are the cardinal vowels of the whole system. To this view of them we are thus led not less by the indications of physiology than by the historical development of the Indo-European and Semitic languages. The remaining vowels are but intermediate sounds, produced on the way from one to another of these; and hence we find, in treating them, that we have left the firm ground we have thus far trodden, and are stepping where the dividing lines are less distinct. Here is more room for variety of names and sounds. The two extremes and the one mean of the series have been discussed. The other vowels are the intermediate terms whose number, as well as the position and description of each, will vary as the powers and practice of different observers differ.

In passing from the position for *a* to that for *i* the intermediate sounds are produced by a gradual shortening of the vocal tube and narrowing of it in the middle. In going in the opposite direction, from *a* to *u*, they are produced by a gradual lengthening of it and narrowing of the mouth-opening. Now, to the question how many vowels are to be located between these extremes, the answer is given, so many as an ordinary ear, without special training, will notice as distinct sounds. A language is established by the speaking and hearing of the multitude, and has its sounds determined by the average ear and tongue, not by the trained organs of a critical student. On this principle Brücke marks off only three vowels between *i* and *a*, and three between *a* and *u*. The vowels are in their order from *i* at one extreme through

a to *u* at the other, *i*, *e*, e^a, a^e, *a*, a^o, o^a, *o*, *u*.[1] We give the list and descriptions *verbatim*.

1. "The *i* of German and Italian, the *ee* of English, e.g. Germ. *wider*, Ital. *giro*, Eng. *wheel;* I denote it by *i*.

2. "The French *é*. It is the high *é* in the Hungarian word *szép* (pulcher), and in the New Slavonic *bél* (albus). In German we have it long in *ewig*, *selig*, short in *werden*.

3. "The French *è*, or the German *e* in *Hehl*, *ehrlich*, *echt*, etc., which I denote by e^a.[2]

4. "The French *ê* or the German *ä*; in my notation a^e. English, *man*, *fat*,[3] Hungarian, *fekete* (niger).

5. "The pure or Italian *a* in *ballare*, *cantare*, etc.

6. "The deep *a* of German in *Wahl*, *Arm*, etc., which is also often heard in Hungarian, e.g. *bal* (miser), and which I will denote by a^o.

7. "The sound intermediate between *a* and *o*, which is heard in the English words *lord*, *scorn*, and in the French *encore*; in my notation o^a.

8. "The pure *o* as we utter it in *Oper*, *Woge*, etc., and in the Latin words *bonus*, *nomen*, etc. Its short sound is heard in the German *Ordnung*, and the Latin *orbis*, as at present pronounced. I denote it by *o*.

9. "The German *u* in *Muth*, *Duldung*, the French *ou;* in my notation *u*."

Besides this list, there is a number of other vowel sounds in frequent use, which Brücke describes as formed in the positions which the mouth assumes in passing from one

[1] Brücke's system of signs for vowel sounds is in form borrowed from algebraic notation, but in principle an imitation of the terms, such as north by west and west by north, of the mariner's compass.

[2] It will be difficult, we think, for an American tongue to make, or ear to detect, the difference between the *e* of *ewig* and that of *Hehl*. The sounds between *i* and *a* seem to be less sharply defined, and hence admit more variety of opinion, than those from *a* to *u;* perhaps the distance is less, while the number of stages is made the same.

[3] This seems a surprizing mistake. The peculiar short *a* in *man* or the different one in *fat*, is very unlike the French *ê*, or the German *ä*. The English *main*, *fate*, would have been more correct.

of these extremes to the other without going through the mean, *a*. His diagram makes it plain; *i* and *u* being the extremes, the list just given goes up one side of the triangle, through *a*, and down the other side to *u*. But we may go right across from *i* to *u*, or from *e* to *o*, or from e^a to o^a, and produce a new set of vowels. "The i^u is the *y* (Ypsilon) of the North German pronunciation, e.g. in *Myrte, Physik;* the u^i is the *ü* of the literary German in *Würde, über*, etc., the French *u*." "The o^e is the German *ö* in *Oel* and *hölzern*, while e^o is a sound somewhat rare in German, but perceptible generally in those words whose orthography wavers between *e* and *ö*, e.g. *zwölf* (low German *twelw*)." The a^{oe} he describes as the vowel sound heard in the French words *veuve* and *soeur*.

$$\begin{array}{ccccccc} & & & a & & & \\ & & a^e & & a^o & & \\ & e^a & & a^{oe} & & o^a & \\ e & & e^o & & o^e & & o \\ i & & i^u & & u^i & & u \end{array}$$

Thus far we have spoken only of perfectly formed vowels, in which, the various parts of the organs of speech were in full and perfect action to make the sound distinct and full-toned. But very often, perhaps in the majority of cases, this does not take place, and then we have imperfectly formed vowels. This fact has been noticed before in speaking of *u* and *i*. One may go through all the vowels in this way, giving them an indistinct utterance and varying the shape of the mouth and the length of the vocal tube but little, if at all, in changing from one to another. The vowels thus produced are hard to distinguish apart, and are often confused.[1]

There is one simple vowel sound still remaining to be mentioned here. It is that which Lepsius (quoted by Brücke,

[1] Brücke gives several examples of these indistinct vowels from the English language, where he says they abound, which seem to contain some errors. For the indistinct *o* he gives *not, hot, cough*, for the indistinct *i, pin*. Of these, *cough* has evidently not the same *o* sound with that of *not* and *hot*, but rather what he denotes by o^a, as in *scorn*. Then too, *not, hot,* and *pin* do not seem to belong here at all. They have not indistinct vowels, but the regular short sounds of their respective vowels. We have in English a series of short vowels quite distinct from one another, and distinct, in quality and quantity, both from the long vowels, as in *hat, bet, pin, not, but*. Both these and the corresponding long vowels may be, and often are, incompletely and indistinctly uttered; tending in that direction whenever unemphasized.

p. 24) calls the undefined vowel, Max Müller (p. 134) the neutral vowel. These names seem to be used to denote a short vowel sound which cannot well be assigned, by reason of its indistinctness, to any of the principal vowels, yet is itself one of the commonest sounds, at least in English. Max Müller gives as examples of it, *but*, *dust*, *spurt*, *assert*, *bird*, *ăgainst*, *finăl*, *principăl*, *ideă*, *captaĭn*, *villăge;* and says that all unaccented syllables in English have a tendency towards it. Brücke is more cautious, saying that in most of the examples of it commonly given, the vowel is really a short e^e, or an imperfectly formed o^e, o^a, or a^{oe}. Another remark of his applies to such cases as *finăl*, *principăl*, *captaĭn*, given above, and to *mutton*, *wooden*, etc., that often in pronouncing them there is in fact no vowel sounded between the two consonants of the final syllable. Where *d* or *t* precedes the vowel, the tongue often does not leave its position against the roof of the mouth before the *n* is heard, and no vowel can be uttered while the tongue is in that position; and there is a similar reason for not sounding *a* in the quick utterance of *principal* and *final*. Brücke agrees with Max Müller in saying that the occasions of indistinctness in a vowel sound are shortness and want of accent.

This leads him to a consideration of the question whether long and short vowels differ in quantity (or length) only, or in quality also. He starts with a quotation from Rudolph Von Raumer, who proves by German examples that there is a perceptible difference in quality between, for instance, long *i* as in *Bienen*, and short *i* as in *binden*. Brücke's discussion is too incomplete to be worth giving in full. His conclusions are:

1. That a vowel commonly long may be indefinitely shortened, or one commonly short lengthened, without letting either pass into the other; and that, therefore, it is wrong to regard the two classes, the long and the short vowels, as always differing each from each in *quantity*.

2. That of the German vowels, *o*, *u*, *ö*, and *i* are often in common conversation imperfectly enunciated when short;

but this sound of them is never prolonged; when lengthened they are the same in quality with the usual long *o*, *u*, *ö*, and *i*. On the other hand, *e*, *ä*, and *a* are always sounded alike, whether long or short.

3. That it is not worth while to try to distinguish by special letters the long from the short vowels. The letter should denote as exactly as may be the *quality* of the vowel, and the incidental matter of *quantity* be indicated by some added sign.

On the whole, then, his answer to the question would be, that there exists a difference in quality between the long and short vowels, but it is confined in German to the vowels *o*, *u*, *ö*, and *i*. We have expressed (in note on p. 266) the opinion that in English this difference extends to all the five common vowels.

Brücke's treatment of the diphthongs, which follows next, is to us one of the most unsatisfactory parts of the work. It consists entirely of a description of the way of producing a diphthong, and a criticism of the German characters for two of them. Max Müller is hardly more full, but then his plan allows little space for details, and he has used that little on less important topics. There are several points about the diphthongs which we should be glad to have treated more fully by the careful observations of Brücke and with the abundant illustrations of Max Müller. They deserve to be classified and arranged, if possible, in one scheme with the simple vowels. The preferences of different languages and the historical development of new combinations would be worth studying. The written signs, especially in German, demand explanation, as some of them represent sounds very different from those produced in passing from one to the other of their elements.

It remains only to speak of the nasal tone, which may be given to all vowels and diphthongs by opening the passage between the throat and the nose, and so letting the air vibrate through the hollow of the nose as well as that of the mouth. It is proved by a simple experiment that in pronouncing a

vowel without this nasal tone, the air issues from the mouth only. If a flame is held so as to be reached by any air coming from the nose, but by none from the mouth, it does not flicker so long as the simple vowel is uttered, but does as soon as the nasal tone is given to the vowel. It is proved also, by holding the nose tightly and still uttering vowels with the nasal tone, that the tone is not produced only by the passage of air through the nose, but also by its vibration within the nasal cavity. Nasal vowels abound in French, but do not occur at all in German, and scarcely at all in English. It is noticed that in all known languages only four vowels *a*, *ä*, *ö*, and *o*, with perhaps *i* in Portuguese, ever have this nasal sound.

We have thus gone through Brücke's discussion of the vowel sounds; designing neither to adopt with implicit faith, nor to criticize, all he says, but simply to reproduce the main points of his system, with here and there a remark. We shall find the description of the consonants somewhat more systematic and interesting.

We come first upon a subject of various opinion, — the nature of the difference and the reasonableness of the distinction between vowels and consonants. The difference implied in the name *consonant*, that the vowels only are capable of being sounded alone, has been long since, Brücke says, proved not to exist, though it is still often enough taught as the real one. The use of it for the practical purpose of teaching may still be plausibly defended, even by those who would acknowledge that it was quite unscientific, because untrue. What then is the real difference between the two classes of sounds? A vowel is a sound in the production of which the channel from the vocal chords to the lips is open through its whole length; but in the production of a consonant "there is in the mouth-channel either a closing at some point, or at least a narrowing, which causes a perceptible noise, independent of any vocal tone." The locality of this closing is an essential element in the classification

of consonants which Brücke proceeds to make. But it may be asked, is there any reason for this old-time distinction of sounds into these two classes — vowels and consonants? This question is answered in the negative by Professor W. D. Whitney,[1] who urges that all the sounds of language should constitute but one class, being arranged in it according to the degree of closure of the mouth-channel, beginning with the most open vowel and ending with the closest consonants. We can only say here that Brücke's view is an approximation to this, in so far as he makes the openness or closeness of the mouth-channel the only point of difference between the two classes.

There are now four different ways in which the passage of air through the channel of the mouth may be checked, more or less completely; and this causes a division of the sounds produced into four classes.

1. The passage of air through the nose is shut off, and also through the mouth, so that it is entirely checked. Thus the breath is dammed up, as it were, and when the check is removed, issues with a sudden explosion, whence the sounds thus produced are sometimes called explosives. By Brücke and others they are called check sounds (Verschlusslaute). These are the mutes.

2. The passage of air through the nose is shut off, and the channel of the mouth is so narrowed in one part or another as to allow the air to pass only with a sort of rustling or rubbing noise. Sounds thus produced are called by Brücke rubbing or friction sounds (Reibungsgeräusche), and are such as *f*, *s*, *z*, the German *ch*, and *j*. They are sometimes divided up under the names aspirates, sibilants, and semi-vowels.

With these he classes the *l* sounds, because they are produced similarly by a rustling or rubbing of the air against inner parts of the mouth, though in them it passes along the sides of the tongue instead of along the middle.

[1] In a paper "On the Definition and Relations of Vowels and Consonants," read before the American Oriental Society in May, 1865, and to be published in the Society's Journal.

3. The passage of air through the nose is shut off, while in the mouth some part is so placed as to be set in vibration by the issuing stream of air. Thus are produced the vibration sounds (Zitterlaute), of which *r* is the principal one.

4. The passage of air through the mouth is shut off, while that through the nose is open. Thus are produced what are called by Brücke resonants (Resonanten), and by others either nasals or semivowels. They have this in common with vowels, that they are produced by the sound of the voice proper, and not, as other consonants, by some noise independent of the vocal chords; but they differ from vowels in that the mouth-channel is closed in producing them, so that they cannot be used in connection with consonants as vowels are.

In one of these four ways every simple consonant (except of course the larynx sounds, *h* and the similar ones of other languages, which were spoken of at the outset) is produced; either by a check, a friction, a vibration, or a nasal resonance. But there is another principle of classification to be combined with this; viz. according to the part of the mouth in which the narrowing or entire closing takes place. It may be at the lips, the under lip meeting the teeth or upper lip; or at the front part of the tongue; or at the middle or back part of the tongue, when it rises to meet the upper parts of the mouth. Thus we have three places, in any one of which sounds may be produced in any one of the four ways above mentioned. These three classes, with four subdivisions in each, give twelve theoretical forms of consonant sound. But this must be multiplied by two, for in each form there may be a sonant or a surd letter produced; each form may be uttered with or without the accompaniment of sound from the vocal chords: except that the resonants, as their name implies, can be only resoundings of vocalized or sonant breath in the channel of the nose. This distinction into sonant and surd, which is more familiar under the names soft and hard, middle and smooth, must play a prominent part in any scientific analysis of consonant

sound. Brücke discusses it at some length a little further on (pp. 55ff), and proves conclusively that the only difference between *b* and *p*, *d* and *t*, *z* and *s*, *v* and *f*, etc., is, that during the closing of the organs to produce the former letter of each couplet, the vocal chords are brought together so as to produce sound by their vibration as soon as the check is removed, or sometimes while it lasts; whereas in producing the second letter of each couplet they are not so brought together. The statement receives a curious confirmation from the fact that in modern Greek, since β and δ have the sounds of *v* and *th sonant*, the sounds of *b* and *d* are represented by $\mu\pi$ and $\nu\tau$. Here μ and ν are added to give sound to π and τ; in other words, to represent the sonants corresponding to *p* and *t*.[1] It is, then, neither the greater force with which the air is expelled that distinguishes *p* from *b*, etc., as some have said, nor, as others, the tighter closing of the mouth-channel. The first is refuted by the example of the two English words *midshipman* and *clubman*, where the following *m* prevents any explosion of air at all in uttering *p* and *b*, yet without the explosion there is no difficulty in distinguishing one letter from the other. The second explanation is refuted by the showing of experiment, that, however tightly any part of the mouth-channel be closed, if the vocal chords are in motion only a sonant letter can be produced; and, however slightly it be narrowed, only a surd issues if the vocal chords are apart and motionless. These two alleged differences do indeed generally occur in pronouncing sonant and surd letters, but they are only incidental, naturally resulting from that which is the essential difference, viz. whether the stream of air in the throat is or is not obstructed by the vocal chords. If it is obstructed (that is, if the letter is a sonant), it is natural that the hinderance in the mouth-channel need not be so firm and tight, and that the explosion, when it comes, will be less violent than if the air rushes unchecked from the compressed lungs.

We proceed now to the description of the method of utter-

[1] For a somewhat parallel case, see note on p. 283 below.

ing the consonants, taking them up in three classes according to the place of articulation, that is, the place in the channel of the mouth where the obstruction or narrowing occurs; finding also in each class four subdivisions, according to the precise form of obstruction employed, and in each form, except the fourth, a surd and a sonant letter.

I. The first class includes those consonants whose place of articulation is at the extreme front of the mouth. The obstruction to the free passage of air is caused by bringing together the lips, or touching the upper teeth with the lower lip. Under this class we have as the first subdivision:

1. The check sounds. In producing *p*, the lips are closed and the passage of air through the nose also is cut off; then the breath, being pressed from the lungs into the mouth, issues by a sudden opening of the lips with explosive force. But the explosion does not occur when an *m* follows, as in *midshipman*, and in that case the *p* is produced by suddenly checking with the lips the stream of breath which pours forth in uttering *i*. Thus the letter *p* strictly denotes only the state of rest of the organs, when lips and nose-channel are both closed against the issuing air.

If now this air is vocalized by contracting the vocal chords so that they vibrate, and continue so through a part of the time of holding the lips shut, a *b* instead of a *p* is produced. It can be but for a moment that the breath is vocalized when the lips are shut thus, since it is done by forcing it over the vocal chords into the *cul-de-sac* of the mouth, which is soon full.

2. The friction sounds. It is clear that in pronouncing *f* the upper teeth are lightly pressed upon the lower lip, and the air rushes out between them. A sort of *f* can be produced without the teeth, by bringing the lips together so that the air in passing out between them makes a rustling noise, like that in the other case. This letter is the pronunciation given by some to the German *v*, though commonly no difference is made between it and *f*. This second *f* differs from *p* only in the less completeness of the closing of the lips. So also,

Brücke says, it is possible to produce with the under lip and upper teeth a sort of p sound,[1] from which the former or common f shall differ in the same way and degree. If now the common p is denoted in a systematic notation by p^1, and this second kind of p by p^2, then the f sounds would be correspondingly denoted by f^1 and f^2, the latter being the common f.

When the mouth is in the position for uttering f, it is only necessary to vocalize the breath in order to change the f into v, the German w, so that v is the sonant corresponding to the surd f, just as b corresponds to p. As there are two f sounds, f^1 and f^2, so are there also two v sounds, though in English we have only v^2, our common v. In German we find both v^2 (w^2 in a German system), as at the beginning of words, *wo*, *wann*, and v^1 (w^1) in the combination *qu*, as in *Quelle*, *quälen*.[2] Brücke makes the suggestion in passing, that in German *kw* should be written instead of *qu*, and that the letter w should be confined to the sound v^1, and v used for v^2. In fact, as he remarks, the German language has now two signs for the f^1 sound, f and v, and only one (besides u in *qu*), w, for v^1 and v^2.

3. The vibration sound produced by the lips in the position for p^1 does not occur in any language (unless in one obscure exception, p. 35) as an element of words, but only as an interjection of loathing; hence we pass it over. Brücke brings it into his system of notation, using the Greek ϕ for the toneless, and κ for the toned utterance.

4. When we put the lips in position for p^1, and let the breath vibrate the vocal chords and then pass out through the nose, we produce m, the resonant of this first class. There

[1] To utter an initial p in this way (the final p is easier) it seems necessary to place the upper teeth far down over the under lip, in order to make the check complete. Perhaps a very close and even set of upper teeth would make this unnecessary.

[2] We presume that Brücke here means, though his language seems to imply the opposite, to include in v^1 the sound of the German w after a consonant, as in *schwimmen*, *zwei*.

is, of course, no *surd* corresponding to this resonant letter, nor is there any m^2 in use.

II. In coming to the second class of sounds we leave the lips, and have to do with the tip or front part of the tongue when pressed against some inner part of the mouth.

1. The check sounds. There are four different ways of producing a *t* sound, which Brücke describes in the following order:

t^1 is produced by laying the sides of the tongue against the upper teeth, so that its tip touches the inner gum just above the upper front teeth. This closes the mouth-channel, and the passage through the nose being also closed, the air is checked as completely as in the case of *p*. This is the common, or, as Brücke calls it, the alveolar *t*.

t^2 is the cerebral or cacuminal *t* of Sanskrit. The tip of the tongue is turned up and back, so as to touch the roof of the mouth, and to give the under side of the tongue a convex curve towards the front.

t^3 is called by Brücke the dorsal *t*. In it the upper surface of the tongue has the convex curve towards the front, touching the forward part of the palate, while the tip is bent down and touches the lower front teeth. This kind of *t*, he says, is formed by many Germans in uttering *st* and *ts*.

t^4 is called the dental *t*, because in it the check of the breath is effected by the tongue with the teeth alone, without the help of the palate. It is produced by holding the teeth a little apart and stopping up the opening with the tongue. Our author remarks that it need hardly be distinguished from t^1, except for the peculiarity of the friction sound that corresponds to it.

To these four kinds of *t* sound correspond four sonants, d^1, d^2, d^3, d^4, the only difference being that in the latter the breath produces sound as it passes over the contracted vocal chords.

2. There are also four friction sounds corresponding to these four check sounds, and developed from them just as *f* and *v* were from *p* and *b*, by letting the check to the passage

of air be incomplete, leaving a small space through which it may rustle out.

From t^1 we have in this way s^1, which may be called the common *s*, though not so in German; from t^2 an s^2, which would correspond in use to the other cerebral letters, though, as Brücke states, the Sanskrit cerebral letter *s* represents the sound *sh*, German *sch;* from t^3 an s^3, which Brücke says appears in the German words *heisz*, *liesz*, *dasz*, *das*, etc., and in the sharp, hissing *s* of the English.

From t^4 we have s^4, which is the ϑ of modern Greek, the Spanish *c* before *e* and *i*, and the surd *th* of English. The peculiarity of this s^4 was the reason for distinguishing t^4 above from the other forms of *t*. The position of the tongue may vary within certain limits; it is essential only that it should come close to the upper teeth so as to leave a narrow space behind them, through which the air passes to the teeth, producing the characteristic sound of the s^4 by striking upon them. It is easy to see from this position of the tongue how natural it is that the Greek ϑ appears as *f* in Russian.[1] The edge of the upper teeth lies midway between the lower lip and the tip of the tongue, and if the former instead of the latter is pressed upon it, *f* is produced.

The sonant series corresponding to these four surds Brücke denotes by z^1, z^2, z^3, z^4, and they are produced just as the surds are, with the addition of sound from the vibration of the vocal chords. Of these, z^3 is the common *z* of the English, and appears in German as initial *s* before a vowel, e.g. in *Sohn*, *singen*, while z^4 is the English sonant *th*, as in *other*, *with*, the δ of modern Greek, a sound which does not appear in German.

L sounds. Another series of friction sounds can be developed from the four forms of *t*, when, having the check for *t* perfectly formed in the front part of the mouth, one opens a passage for the air on each side of the tongue, between it

[1] So too in Latin *f* is sometimes the etymological representative of the Greek ϑ, as in ϑήρ, *fera*; ϑύρα, *foris*. Do not these facts support the view that the ancient sound of the ϑ was that of s^4?

and the upper back teeth. In this way an l is produced. The surds Brücke denotes by $\lambda^1, \lambda^2, \lambda^3, \lambda^4$, and the sonants by l^1, l^2, l^3, l^4, the figures having the same meaning as before. He remarks that the existence of these surds in German was pointed out by Joh. Müller, and that Purkinje asserts that they occur in Polish. Of the sonants, l^1 is the common l of German, and apparently also of English; l^2 is thought to be the peculiar l sound of the Vedic Sanskrit; and l^4 is produced by one who lisps (l^3 occurring in a combination to be described hereafter). Into his discussion of the different sounds of l in Polish we cannot follow our author.

3. Vibration sound. This is the common r sound, which Brücke denotes by r for the sonant and ψ for the surd. The tongue lies as it were in equilibrium, with its tip just behind the upper front teeth, neither touching them as in t^1, nor forming a narrow channel behind them as in s^1, but lying free, so that it is easily pressed down by the breath issuing from the lungs, and recovers itself only to be again depressed, and thus vibrates up and down.[1]

4. Resonants. If we place the organs of speech for d^1, d^2, d^3, d^4, successively, and then open a passage through the nose for the intoned breath, we produce n^1, n^2, n^3, n^4, which are thus related to d in its various forms as m is to b. The n^1 is the common n of the languages of Western Europe.

III. Sounds of this class have their place of articulation, that is, the place where the stream of air is stopped or narrowed to produce them, at the middle or back part of the tongue.

1. In order to teach deaf mutes to utter a k sound, Brücke says the method is to make them utter a t, which is apparently an easy letter to learn by imitation, and then to press the front part of the tongue down with the finger or a spatula. In this way they are compelled to check the stream of air with the *back* part of the tongue against the palate, and in this position only a k can be uttered. If one pro-

[1] This vibration cannot be detected in the ordinary English r. As we commonly utter it, it seems to be not a vibrating, but a friction sound.

duces a dorsal t, t^3, and then moves the point of contact of tongue and palate backwards, he will find that, after passing a certain line, he cannot help uttering k. In general, the place of articulation of k begins where that of t ends. The essential difference between the two letters seems to consist in the size of the space in the throat behind the point of contact, it being larger for t than for k. There seems to be also an effort in the contraction of the soft palate, of which one is conscious just before the explosion of a k, to diminish that space still more than is done by drawing back the tongue.

There are two kinds of k, one uttered by contact of the tongue with the hard palate, the other with the soft palate. The line of division between these two palates is easily felt by running the forefinger back along the roof of the mouth. The tip will reach the soft palate just about as the third joint is entering the mouth. These two kinds of k are denoted by k^1, that on the hard, and k^2, that on the soft palate. There may be, of each of these, several subdivisions, according as the point of contact is farther forward or back in the peculiar region of each, but they are not thought to deserve special notation. Such a k sound as the Italian *ch* in *chiesa* is the farthest forward of all; back of it stands the German *ck* in *wickeln*, and at the inner limit of the region of k^1 the Caf of Arabic. At the front limit of k^2, and so at the line of division between the hard and soft palates, as may be proved by inserting the finger at the moment of uttering it, lies the k of the German words *Stock*, *Ruck*, etc.; and at the back limit of k^2, that is, at the inmost point of all the check sounds, lies the Kaf of Arabic.[1] In uttering this sound the passage of air through the nose is cut off by the meeting of the soft palate with the posterior half-arches of the palate, while the back part of the tongue rises to touch the soft palate, and so checks the air passing out through the mouth. It is impossible to utter any check sound, with a smaller space behind the place of the check than in this, because it is impossible

[1] We may illustrate these several kinds of k by the English words *speak, quick, back, dock, duck*: the last (Kaf) not occurring in English.

to close perfectly the channels of both nose and mouth at once if the check in the mouth is any further back, between the base of the tongue, for instance, and the uvula. But there is a friction sound, and perhaps a resonant, which closes the mouth-channel in its utterance at a point behind that of Kaf.

G corresponds to *k*, just as *b* to *p* and *d* to *t*, and has the same range and variety of articulation. It is not necessary to employ special notation for the different varieties of k^1 and k^2, g^1 and g^2, or even different signs in common language for these main divisions. For their use depends on a principle easily understood and remembered. Putting the vowels in the following order, *i*, *e*, *a*, *o*, *u*,[1] the kinds of *y* or *g* to be used with them would form a similar series from the one farthest forward to the one farthest back in the mouth. When one utters, or prepares to utter, *i* or *e*, the middle part of the tongue need move but a short distance to reach the hard palate and produce k^1 or g^1; in *a*, *o*, and *u*, it is the back part of the tongue and the soft palate, the parts whose contact produces k^2 or g^2, that are nearest together.

Brücke treats in this connection of a matter interesting to the student of German, the sound in that language of final sonants, namely *b*, *d*, and *g*, after resonants. The usage is quite variable, but the tendency appears to be to make all final sonants surd. This is the established rule for *d* after *n*, and for final *b*. The general reason seems to be the difficulty of uttering the final sonant. It is easy to see that after a resonant it requires a marked effort to force the breath over the vocal chords with motion enough to produce sound into the mouth, closed and already partly filled with air.[2] In English *b* and *d* are fully preserved after a resonant,[3]

[1] The order inversely as the length of the mouth-channel in pronouncing them.

[2] After a vowel there is no such effort needed: in that case is the difficulty that of timing the relaxing of the vocal chords exactly with the explosion of the consonant? For if they are relaxed too soon, we have a double letter, *dt* or *bp* or *gk*; if too late, it makes the word end in a vowel.

[3] This seems to be an error in fact in regard to *b*. It too, like *g*, is merged

but *g* disappears, the word ending with the sound of the resonant.

2. Friction sounds. As from *p* we formed *f*, and from *t* *s*, so in a similar way, by making the check imperfect and leaving a little channel for the air between the tongue and the palate, instead of *k* we utter a sound denoted in German by *ch*. Brücke denotes it in his system by χ, giving as examples of χ^1, *Licht*, *Recht*, of χ^2, *Wache*, *Woche*, *Wucht*, receding in position as in the case of *k*.

It was said above, in treating of *k*, that there was a friction sound farther back in the mouth than the farthest *k*. Brücke denotes it by χ^3, and says it is found only in certain compound consonants, used chiefly in Arabic. He describes it as produced by stretching the soft palate strongly back and upwards, and raising the back part of the tongue against the uvula and adjoining parts, so as to leave a slight space on each side and permit some air to pass. The sound thus produced is like *ch* (in German), but rougher and deeper.

The sonants corresponding to these surds are the different forms of the *Jot* or consonant *J* of German. Brücke denotes them by y^1, y^2, and y^3, corresponding respectively to χ^1, χ^2, and χ^3. In uttering y^2 there is often something of a harsh vibration of the tightly-stretched soft palate, which makes it, especially at the beginning of a word before a vowel, seem to be quite an *r* sound. "It is true," says our author, "that there may perhaps be some vibration even of the uvula or epiglottis in uttering this sound"; but he adds that he finds it possible to utter it in full perfection without any vibration at all.

3. Vibration sounds. When one puts the organs into position for χ^3, but then hollows the middle of the tongue, along which the uvula lies, into a channel, so that the uvula may vibrate freely in it, the stream of air in passing out will produce the toneless *r gutturale* or *uvulare*, in Brücke's sys-

entirely in the sound of the resonant, as in *bomb, climb, comb, crumb, dumb, jamb, lamb, limb, numb, thumb, womb.* After surds we write *d*, but pronounce *t*, in the preterite forms of verbs, e.g. *dropped, scoffed*, etc.

tem, ξ; and when vocal tone is added the sonant, *r uvulare* or *provençal r* of the French, which is ρ in Brücke's notation.

4. Resonants. By letting the air pass through the nose when the mouth-channel is closed, as for g^1 and g^2, we produce the two resonants of this class, which Brücke denotes by π^1 and π^2, and illustrates by the sound of *n* in *Klingel*, *Bengel*, for the first, and in *Wange*, *Schwung*, for the second.

Having thus gone through all the simple sounds, Brücke pauses before going on to the compounded sounds, and discusses in a general way certain points of the system thus developed. He discusses the connection between a check sound and its sign, — in other words, what part of the process of uttering a check sound does the letter represent, — and shows that it stands for the closed state of the organs, and not for the act of causing or ending that state. He discusses the difference between surds and sonants, of which the main points have been already given above. He discusses the meaning of the term *aspirate*, whether a sonant can ever be aspirated, and the relation of the friction sounds to their corresponding check sounds. He discusses briefly the proper classification of *l*, — whether it should go in with the friction sounds, or form with *r* and the resonants a group called *liquids*, — and refutes the theory that the resonants should be joined with the check sounds in a class called *explosives*. Finally he offers a brief general defence of his system, from which (p. 61) we translate the following:

"It will be perceived in my system that the several members have in their symmetrical arrangement a mutual dependence, which remains invariable throughout; that there are toned consonants corresponding to all the toneless ones, and differing from these only by the state of the vocal chords; that the check sound can always be formed from the appropriate friction sound simply by closing completely the mouth-channel at the point where it is only narrowed; that the resonant in no case differs from the sonant in any other respect than in the opened nose-channel; and that the *l* sound is formed from the corresponding *d* sound never

otherwise than by opening side passages for the breath between the tongue and the upper teeth. There is not the least irregularity. From this fact and the fact that I have gone step by step over all the places of articulation which the tongue can reach, — from these two things, I say, it has been possible for me to give an exhaustive list of simple consonants. Had I not taken this course, but satisfied myself with arranging in their proper order the sounds I had myself heard, I should have found no place in my system for the cerebral sounds of the Sanskrit; for in 1848 when I worked out the system I had not the least knowledge of the sounds of that language."

Upon this we would remark only, that perhaps the system is a little too perfect, — not quite enough conformed to the facts of language. At least it seems as if p^2 and b^2, as well as ϕ and κ, were inserted only for symmetry or for the theory's sake, since it does not appear that they occur in use in any language; and it is hardly necessary to give four distinct forms of the surd l sound, λ^1, λ^2, λ^3, λ^4, when the very existence of such a surd in any form has to be proved.

It remains to give Brücke's account of the compounded consonants (*zusammengesetzte consonanten*) and of the softened (*mouillé*) sounds. By compounded consonants he does not mean x and z, each of which is really a group of two consonants, denoted by one sign for mere convenience; but such as the German *sch*, the French *j*, the English *sh*, in which, to give his definition, "the organs of speech take at the same time the positions for two different consonants." For example, if the tongue is in position for χ^2, and then the tip is turned up into the position for s^1, a sound combined of these two will be produced. And that it is not a mere succession of sounds appears from the fact that it can be prolonged indefinitely without either part's giving way to the other. Thus is produced the German *sch* $[s^1 \chi^2]$, and if it is made sonant, we have the French *j*, as in *jamais*, which would be denoted by $[z^1 y^2]$, the brackets in each case showing that it is a compounded sound, and not a succession of

two simple sounds. In the English *ch* and *j* we have a simple sound followed by a compound sound denoted thus, $t^1\,[s^1\,\chi^2]$ and $d^1\,[z^1\,y^2]$.[1] It sometimes happens that a simple *k* in one language passes in another into one of the compound sounds. Thus the Latin *carmen* is in French *charme*, in English *charm*. This can be no argument for holding that *ch* is in either language a simple sound, unless it be a rule of comparative phonology that simple sounds must always appear as simple sounds only. But for such a rule there is no proof. It may be added that apparently only these two friction sounds, *s* and χ, are in fact thus combined into one. In the case of the resonants and check sounds it is possible to combine the positions for two of either class, but not to utter the combined sound. It is possible to place the organs rightly for *m* and *n*, or for *b* and *d*, at the same time; but no sound can be uttered without making one give place entirely to the other. In Arabic there are two consonants, Kha (surd) and Ghain (sonant), which consist of a friction sound and a vibration sound combined $[\chi^3\,\xi]$ and $[y^3\,\rho]$.

To these are to be added two exceptional combinations of a vowel and a consonant; exceptional, because in most cases the conditions of consonant utterance preclude the possibility of simultaneous vowel utterance. They are $[uv^1]$ and $[iy^1]$. When one fixes the mouth for *u* or *i*, and then narrows the space between the lips, or between the tongue and the palate, so as to produce the friction sound v^1 or y^1, the compound sound results, which Brücke understands to be the *w* of *water*, or the *y* of *year*.

Finally we have sounds for which there is no precise name in German or English, but which are known by the French name *mouillé*, *moistened*, which may in this application be translated *made liquid* or *softened*. They consist of certain consonants with the sound y^1 following very closely, so as almost to form one sound, and indeed several writers have treated them as such. This modification is applied to *n* and *l* in the four Romanic languages, and to several other letters

[1] The English *j* is transcribed into German by *dsch*, as *Dschonke* for *junk*.

besides these in languages of the Slavic family. That the sound thus produced is not a simple nor a compounded sound is proved clearly in this way: If one utters *campan*, the n^1 at its end can be prolonged indefinitely without variation; but if one utters *campagne*, and endeavors to prolong this *n mouillé*, he finds himself to have passed from n^1 (or n^3) into y^1, and to be prolonging the latter. In the moment of passing from n to y^1, the part of the tongue which was nearest the palate is lowered just enough to allow a slight stream of air to pass through, and it is this stream of air rubbing along out, that produces the friction sound y. These two sounds, n and y, cannot be uttered simultaneously, for n requires the mouth-channel to be closed and the nose-channel open, while y must have these conditions reversed. The change is so quickly made, that some do not admit that it takes place. Others have thought that the second part of the sound was not the consonant y or *jot*, but an i, or something intermediate between i and y. Brücke disproves the former theory by showing that he can utter i after any form of l, l^1i, l^2i, l^3i, l^4i, without producing an *l mouillé*, but as soon as he utters l^3y^1i, l^1y^1i, or l^4y^1i, he has the right sound of the Italian *gli*. As to the other theory, he does not know what is meant by "something intermediate between i and y," unless it be the compound sound described above as $[iy^1]$, and for this he says the larynx must be raised higher than it ordinarily is for a letter *mouillé*. In general, it is the dorsal letters, l^3, n^3, t^3, d^3, s^3, z^3, that undergo this modification, because the tongue in uttering them is nearer to the position required for y^1 than in any other form of consonant sound.[1]

We have tabulated Brücke's signs for the simple consonants according to his classes and forms, in order to present the system at a single view after it has thus been explained at length. In only one place does the table vary from his

[1] Brücke seems to have had doubtful specimens of English imposed upon him as the best usage, for he describes the *t* of *tube* and the *s* of *suit* as letters *mouillé*, writing the words according to his notation $t^3y^1\,\bar{u}\,b$ and $s^3y^1\,\bar{u}\,t$.

use of signs. It has v^1, v^2, where he, writing in German, has w^1, w^2, because the English v corresponds to the German w in sound, and clearness seemed to require it rather than the German letter. The characters in italics and the Greek letters (except π^1, π^2, χ^2) denote sounds that do not occur, we believe, in English.

	Surds.	Sonants.
I. Lips:		
1. Check sounds,	p^1, p^2	b^1, b^2
2. Friction sounds,	f^1, f^2	v^1, v^2
3. Vibration sounds,	ϕ	κ
4. Resonants,		m
II. Front part of tongue:		
1. Check sounds,	t^1, t^2, t^3, t^4	d^1, d^2, d^3, d^4
2. Friction sounds,	s^1, s^2, s^3, s^4	z^1, z^2, z^3, z^4
L sounds,	λ^1, λ^2, λ^3, λ^4	l^1, l^2, l^3, l^4
3. Vibration sounds,	ψ	r
4. Resonants,		$\acute{n}^1$, n^2, $\bar{n}^3$, n^4
III. Back part of tongue:		
1. Check sounds,	k^1, k^2	g^1, g^2
2. Friction sounds,	χ^1, χ^2, χ^3	y^1, y^2, y^3
3. Vibration sounds,	ξ	ρ
4. Resonants,		π^1, π^2, (π^3?)

To complete the list of consonant sounds in English, we should add to these the following:

$[uv^1] = w$ $\quad$ $[s^1\chi^2] = sh$

$[iy^1] = y$ $\quad$ $t\,[s^1\chi^2] = ch$

$k\,[uv^1] = qu$ $\quad$ $d\,[z^1y^2] = j$

$h\,[uv^1] = wh$

ARTICLE VI.

REGENERATION — THE WORK OF GOD.[1]

BY REV. AUSTIN PHELPS, PROFESSOR AT ANDOVER.

An unperverted mind will approach reverently any revelation of God in the destiny of man. The conception of an invisible Power, has itself a fascination for a finite mind. It is not strange that the Wind should have been deified in pagan theology. Little as a human mind can know of a power which the eye has never seen, yet when dependence upon such a power reaches out to cover everything in the future which renders immortality attractive, a sense of mingled grandeur and suspense is awakened, which holds the mind fast, in the attitude of a subdued and anxious learner. Metaphysical relations of truth in such connections are often unwelcome. Sometimes, indeed, they seem unnatural. The instinct of a docile spirit is to approach such truths as objects of faith, rather than as subjects of analysis.

To no theme is such a spirit more becoming than to the doctrine of Regeneration. In inviting your attention with such a spirit, to a single branch of this doctrine, it is my wish to contemplate by itself, as far as possible aloof from metaphysical debate, the revealed fact that

The Change of a Human Heart is the Work of God.

I. We shall reach the most vital aspects of this subject most directly by first defining to ourselves, briefly, what we mean when we ascribe the change of a man's heart to Divine Power. This doctrine may be considered as affirming several truths.

In the first place, it affirms that a human soul never changes its own character from sin to holiness through the involuntary development of its own sensibilities. Holiness cannot so exist in emotive forms as to spring up impul-

[1] A discourse preached in the Chapel of the Theological Seminary, Andover.

sively in a heart which is unconscious of will to produce it. Holiness is not an instinct. It does not grow automatically out of the make of the soul, as with proper incitements, compassion, gratitude, reverence, may do. The heart of man, in relation to the causes of rectitude within it, is not like a harp, which to utter its voices needs only to be hung in the wind.

The doctrine we are to consider further affirms that man never turns from sin to holiness by an effort of his own will, independent of supernatural Power. This is something more than the assertion often made, "that man cannot change his own affections by direct volition." The inability involved in this latter assertion is not the fruit of depravity. The grace of God does not remove it. It lies in the constitution of mind, regenerate or unregenerate. A saint cannot, more than a sinner, love God by resolving "I will love God." Either might as reasonably resolve: "I will see this symphony of Beethoven; I will hear the beauty of Loch Lomond." The blind man had more of reason in his philosophy when he pronounced the color of scarlet to be *like* the sound of a trumpet.

The doctrine of man's dependence upon God for regeneration affirms nothing respecting such psychological possibilities of change. It affirms that man never turns from sin to holiness by any effort, direct or indirect, of his own will, uninfluenced by supernatural power. We do not affirm that he cannot do this, except in the figurative sense in which a mother cannot hate her infant; a compassionate man cannot bear the sight of a victim on the rack; a miser cannot part with his gold; Joseph's brethren could not speak peaceably unto him; God cannot lie. In the literal sense of both scientific and popular speech a sinner can, but will not, cease to be a sinner without the intervention of Divine Power.

Consistently with this view, the doctrine of Divine agency in regeneration also affirms that the unaided force of truth does not suffice to persuade the human soul from sin to holi-

ness. Here also we affirm only the fact of experience. The doctrine does not degrade the dignity of truth. It does not deny the intrinsic power of truth over mind as mind, regenerate or unregenerate. It does not refuse to discern in truth a tendency to convert a soul, and in the soul a tendency to yield to truth. It only affirms the fact of real life, that these tendencies are overborne. The suasive working of truth when not energized by the grace of God is a failure.

In this view is involved a subsidiary fact — that all human instrumentalities and expedients by which truth is intensified, and so made appreciable by human sensibilities, are powerless to change the heart. Authority, sympathy, reasoning, eloquence, the magnetism of person, and whatever else enters into the mystery of persuasion, in which mind impels mind by the enginery of speech, may change well nigh everything in man except his character. That, these auxiliaries to truth all fall short of, in their profoundest reach.

Let it be observed, then, once more, that when we ascribe to God the change which takes place in regeneration, we mean that, over and above all natural tendencies and finite agencies, God performs an act of sovereign power in every change of character from sin to holiness. What that act is, what that power is, other than as characterized by their effects, the scriptures do not teach, and we need not affirm. The psychological process of which moral conversion is the consequence is at best a theme of philosophical conjecture. Belief respecting it is no necessary part of faith in the biblical doctrine of regeneration. Beyond a declaration of the *fact*, we are not called upon to affirm or deny.

Our conception of the fact of divine agency in regeneration may be sharpened, however, and we may be protected against some confusion of faith, if we observe that, so far as we know, the act of renewing the human heart is an entirely *unique* disclosure of God. We know of nothing else like it in the history of the universe. We call it "creation." We pray, with the Psalmist, "Create in me a clean heart!"

Yet it is not an act of physical omnipotence, like that which creates an oak. We denominate this mysterious transformation "a new birth." Yet we should deserve the rebuke which our Lord gave to Nicodemus, if we should discern in the act such an expression of omnipotence as that which creates a soul. We picture this divine renewal as a "change of heart." We pray that the stony heart may be taken and the heart of flesh given. But ours would be a childish dream of heaven, if we should look for such a miracle of power as God wrought in the creation of the first woman. God cannot create a human character *as* he creates the being who sustains that character. God could not have created Adam's character *as* he created Adam. We speak loosely when we say in our creeds "man was created holy." So, infinite sovereignty could not have originated the piety of the beloved disciple *as* it summoned into being the fisherman of Galilee. We portray this unspeakable change as a "resurrection." We cry out in our despair, "Who shall deliver us from the body of this death?" But our despair must be eternal, if we have no other hope than *such* an act of Deity as the raising of Lazarus. The dry bones which Ezekiel saw were in vision only. So far as we know the history of God's working, regeneration stands alone. Divine forces in nature — even divine forces above nature, yet acting upon things material — present no parallels to it.

Consequently the emblems which we derive from the material and the sentient world to express the phenomenon of regeneration are only emblems. They are not kindred facts. They do not belong to the same plane of divine efficiency. They are not *definitions*, they are pictorial *descriptions*, of the new birth. The new birth transcends them, as matter sentient transcends matter inert; as intelligence transcends both; and as *character* transcends all organism of matter or mind. We shall often conceive most truthfully of such a phenomenon by throwing our minds back of the symbols devised for its expression. As a disclosure of God, it is at once original, solitary, and ultimate. Nothing like it, so far

as our knowledge extends, has preceded, or will follow, the earthly history of man. Nothing like it in the universe, so far as revealed to us, lies outside of the moral experience of the human soul. Such a phenomenon, and the primal Cause of it, cannot be exhaustively expressed by any similitude. They must be described by results, rather than defined by analysis. To whom will ye liken God?

It may aid us further to conceive of the regenerating act as a unique disclosure of God's power, if we recall the fact that in like manner we conceive of the atonement as a solitary device of his moral government. Thus, also, we look upon the incarnation as an unparalleled expression of the personality of Godhead. It would be as truthful to confound these with the emblems by which we struggle with our poverty of speech to express them, as it is to confound the regenerating power, as is sometimes done, with creative power, or preserving power, or the power of miracle, or any other variety of executive energy emanating from the Will of God.

Yet if we observe faithfully the actual working of God in regeneration, and judge the cause by its effects, we are not left without some practical hints of its nature.

Thus we approximate a radical idea of it when we discover it to be a moral, as distinct from a physical power. We have a valuable notion of it, when we term it persuasive, as distinct from compulsory, in its operation. We derive fearful admonition from the fact that it is resistible, not invincible, by the subjects of it. Yet we rest in hope when we know that it is certain in its working, and sure of its end; not capricious, not chimerical. And do we not revere the supernatural majesty of it when we look up to the height of the solitude in which it works, without equal and without adequate symbol among all the revelations made to us of Infinite Mind?

II. The proof of the fact of Divine Agency in regeneration is derived chiefly from the Word of God. Yet it cannot be needful in this place to dwell with exegetical minuteness on an array of proof-texts of such a truth. An analysis of the

text[1] of this discourse may serve as a specimen of the declarative passages in which this doctrine is taught.

"To as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God; which were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." We cannot press to the quick the significance of the word "power" here. Yet we need not shrink from it through fear of its implication against human freedom. We must concede, however, to an objector against the whole conception of a new birth that there is here an infelicity, though not necessarily an inaccuracy, in our English version. "Prerogative" is the idea which the word in its connection requires, rather than "ability." "Privilege" it is rendered in the margin of our larger Bibles. "To them assigned he the privilege of being the sons of God." But this is not the vital part of the passage in respect to the truth before us. That appears in the sequel: "Which were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." That is, this new birth which entitles men the sons of God, is not the fruit of ancestral dignity. It is not consequent upon the laws of natural generation. It is not the product of human influence. It is a work of God. Language could not be more explicit.

A most interesting feature of the scriptural method of teaching this truth is seen in the fact that no timidity is exhibited by inspired minds in their guardianship of it. They do not seem to fear that a change of heart will not be ascribed to God by those who experience that change. The passages are not numerous in which the central point of significance is, like that of the text, a contrast of Divine with human power. Occasionally, indeed, we read such monitory words as these: "By grace ye are saved, through faith, and that not of yourselves — it is the gift of God"; and such as these: "I have planted and Apollos watered, but God gave the increase; so then neither is he that planteth anything, nor he that watereth, but God."

[1] John i. 12, 13.

Such, however, is not the general mood of inspiration on this subject. More frequently than otherwise, the fact of the divinity of regeneration is *inserted*, as if by the by; not as intrinsically inferior, yet as relatively subordinate, in the structure of the inspired thought. Thus, we are told that "God hath quickened us together with Christ"; the dignity of association with Christ being the gleaming point in the language. We are taught that "as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God"; with emphasis not chiefly on the guidance of the Holy Spirit, but upon the dignity of the adoption. We are admonished, "God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation, through the sanctification of the Holy Ghost," in which not so much the divinity of the power, as the eternity of the election, is the focal thought. We are reminded, "Ye are washed, ye are sanctified by the Spirit of our God"; and not so much the agency of the change, as the contrast it has created with "thieves and drunkards and extortioners," marks the climax of impression. We hear Paul exclaiming: "What is the exceeding greatness of the power of God to usward who believe"; not the bald fact that it *is* the power of God, but the unutterable magnitude of that power, is the point of concentration.

Thus the inspired mind speaks at its ease of the fact of Divine working in regeneration, as if it were a truth which an experience of the change, or even an admission of the necessity of the change, would draw after it as an inevitable corollary. Inspiration does not pet the doctrine, nor prop the doctrine, nor seem to tremble for the honor of the doctrine. It treats the doctrine more regally. By collateral mention of it, by calm assumption of it, by cool implications of it, by unpremeditated allusions to it, and by delicate hints of it, the inspired mind treats it as if it were a truth of which an intimation is equivalent to a demonstration,— a truth which, once insinuated into the mind through crevices of thought, will be like light to the universe. It will assert itself. It will prove itself. It will vindicate its own dignity, and flood

all things else with its superabounding radiance. Such is the temper of the faith in this doctrine which the inspired writers would create in a believing soul. Theirs is a placid faith, an intrepid faith, an unsuspicious faith; a faith never wavering in itself, never tremulous over the treasure it guards; a faith which sees God so intensely in the wonders of his grace, that to its clear, calm eye this world seems like a "drop of water resting in the hollow of Jehovah's hand."

III. It is not needful for the force of argument, but it will be impressive for the purpose of illustration, to advance in this train of thought a step further, and inquire if there be anything in the experience of a change of heart which is suggestive of a supernatural Cause?

We see in the material world much which is immediately suggestive to us of the presence of God. We obtain our first vivid conceptions of Divine power from the evidences of that power in natural phenomena, over which we do not consciously pause to elaborate the conviction of God's working. We do not educe it from a nice balancing of probabilities. We see it; it forces itself upon us. We know it; it overpowers our consciousness of all speculative processes. We can only look on in silent awe while the wonderful perfections of God unfold themselves. Do we not thus see God in a cataract, in a tempest, in the lightning, in the ocean? Do we not thus discern his hand in the heavens, which are the work of his fingers? Do we not thus behold the light of his countenance in the dawn of morning? Do we not thus hear the sound of his footfall when night settles on the world? To a believing spirit these phenomena are all immediately suggestive of God.

Our present inquiry, then, is: Do we discover in the developments of the human soul in that process of experience of which conversion is the exponent any similar tokens of God's agency? Do we perceive anything which impels us to feel, as by intuition, that we are witnessing an act of God?

That every instance of conversion is of this electric character we cannot affirm. Not every work of God in the nat-

ural world is such. God acts in the formation of a vein of anthracite as efficiently as in the creation of the Himalayas. Science teaches us that the forces antecedent in the one case were as elemental and convulsive as those in the other. So in the spiritual world, the change of a soul in regeneration may be wrought by processes which conceal themselves from all eyes but that of him who sees where is the vein for silver and the place for gold. Yet to the wisdom of a later world those processes shall be seen to have been as formative and as revolutionary as any that have racked other natures with tumultuous conversion.

But some phenomena are observable in the experience of some minds which, assuming the scriptural theory of regeneration as a *possible* fact, are *immediate* tokens of the presence and the power of God. To some of these let us direct our thoughts.

1. Such phenomena may be observed in the *manner* of the conversion of some persons. Of this, illustration will be more convincing than abstract proof. Take, for example, the conversion of the Apostle Paul. Look at it as a fact in the history of mind. Set aside as irrelevant to the object before us whatever was miraculous in the events of that journey to Damascus. Make no account of the supernatural light, the voice from heaven, the shock of blindness. Consider not the means, but the manner, of that change in the man. Mark its impetuosity. Note the instantaneousness of that arrest of passion. It is like a torrent frozen in mid-air. Observe the revulsion of feeling. Threatening and slaughter give place to convictions of sin. Malignity is supplanted by prayer. Perceive the revolution of character in that instant of trembling and astonishment. Call it regeneration, conversion, new birth, or by titles more comely to philosophic taste; call it what you will, it is a change of character. The Pharisee becomes a penitent. The persecutor becomes a Christian. The murderer becomes a saint. For aught that appears in the narrative, the change is almost like a flash of lightning. How brief the colloquy which proclaims the whole

of it! "Who art thou, Lord?" "I am Jesus." "Lord what wilt thou have me to do?" We do not know that mind can move more rapidly than this in such a juncture of its history, and yet move intelligently. Then put together the two lives of the man — his life before, and his life after, this convulsive crisis. Saul and Paul join hands over this invisible gulf, as over the river of death — the same being, yet two different men. His character has experienced a change like the transmutation of metals. Take these as facts of sober mental history, and do they not seem to speak the presence of a supernatural Power? If the world could come to that ninth chapter of the Acts as to a modern discovery in psychology, philosophic systems would grow out of it; all futile in explanation of the process, but all confessing the reality and the divinity of the thing.

Yet this passage in the life of one soul is a representative of a class of changes of religious character, in which it is unphilosophical not to see the working of Divine power within the enclosure of finite being. Such a passage in the life of a soul was the conversion of Luther. Such also was that of John Bunyan and of Gilbert Tennent. Such was that of the late Rev. Dr. Wilson of Philadelphia, who was suddenly prostrated under conviction of sin, through a sense of the Divine goodness in the failure of his pistol to fell his antagonist in an assault. The mental experiences of such men, considered merely as data of mental science, deserve a consideration which they do not often receive. The world, from the beginning until now, has inferred the presence of supernal agencies in the mental changes of men, from less conclusive evidences than those furnished by such conversions as these. Socrates believed — and philosophy has revered him for the faith — that an invisible Spirit swayed his thought, and he believed it on less evidence than this. Napoleon believed — and poetry has discovered piety in the faith — that supernatural power intervened in his destiny; and he believed it on less evidence than this. It has passed into the cant of literature to ascribe inspiration, even divinity, to great minds on infinitely less evidence than this.

So have we seen and heard in our own day, and among men and women whose names will never be heralded in biographies, evidences of a power working in their souls, which suggests to us irresistibly the presence of God. We have seen great suddenness of conviction, — a blasphemer has been struck down by a sense of guilt, as if by a bolt of fire, like that which fell at Luther's feet. We have known a velocity of movement from conviction to penitence which has seemed like the speed of light. We have learned that such processes of conviction and conversion have tallied with the pleadings of intercessory prayer. Prayer has seemed to be prescient of history. We must abandon the laws of natural association if, with the scriptural doctrine of regeneration in the background, we do not see in such changes a work of God. It is not seldom that unbelief is awed into silence by them, even when they are still distasteful to its culture. The belief is thrust upon the incredulous observer, — he cannot resist it: — "This is not the work of man; this is not hypocrisy; it is not enthusiasm; it is no fiction of a mind fuming with effervescent sympathy; it is no nightmare of one frantic through fear of death: this is a work of God, — I can no more question it than I can question the power of a Creator if I see the solid globe quivering and gaping in the throes of an earthquake."

2. The presence of Divine agency is often suggested, further, by the experience of men in conversion, not in the manner of the change, but in the *magnitude* of the change itself. John Foster has observed the evidence of Almighty Power in the awakening of intellect in those who are converted in gross ignorance. He says: "It is striking to observe how the rigid soul seems to soften and grow warm and expand and quiver with life. With the new energy infused, it struggles to work itself into freedom from the wretched contortion in which it has so long been fixed, as by the spell of some infernal magic. It is filled with a distressed and indignant emotion at its own ignorance; actuated with a restless earnestness to be informed; acquiring an unwonted

pliancy of its faculties to thought. We have known instances in which the intellectual change has been so conspicuous, that even an infidel observer must have forfeited all claim to be a man of sense if he would not acknowledge: 'This, which you call divine grace, whatever it really be, is the strangest awakener of faculties, after all.'"

But what is such intellectual awakening in comparison with the moral regeneration which underlies it! When a man who has spent half a lifetime in the dens of vice comes forth to sit as a meek disciple at the Lord's table; when it is said of a scoffer, "Behold he prayeth"; when we hear a thief crying "Lord remember me"; when a man whose name has been the synonym of vileness, and whose brutality cities have borne as a curse upon their youth, becomes a preacher of Christ; when one whom the moral sense of the world has doomed as an outcast, "lost" as no other sinner on earth can be, from whom the virtuous have turned aside in the street lest they should but touch the hem of her garment, — when such a one is seen coming to Jesus, and standing behind him at his feet, weeping, and bathing them with her tears, and wiping them with the hair of her head, till he who knew no sin turns and says: "Her sins, which are many, are forgiven, for she loved much," — how is it possible *not* to discern that God who doeth wonders?

Those early Christians of Rome and Corinth, had they no evidence of God's power in regeneration, when an apostle enumerated to them the loathsome catalogue of crimes by which Paganism had degraded humanity, and then added, "such also *were* some of you." Had such a man as Augustine no reason for the faith which was in him, that his "evil and abominable youth," as he affirms, was transformed by "thy grace only, O Lord, thy grace only"? Was this a visionary faith to such a man as Colonel James Gardiner? Who shall say that John Newton took the name of God in vain, in ascribing to Divine power that change in his heart which took him from the helm of a slave-ship, and taught him to compose, for all succeeding ages, such a hymn as that

commencing "One there is above all others"? Had a man with such a history no right to speak from his own experience of God's power in his soul, when he taught us to sing,

> "Sweet was the time when first *I felt*
> The Saviour's pardoning blood"?

Had *he* no right to sing as he did,

> "Amazing grace, — how sweet the sound! —
> That saved a wretch like me!"

3. Still another form of this illustrative evidence of Divine agency in regeneration appears in its *diffusiveness* to large numbers simultaneously. Scarcely can a more memorable exhibition of God be found than that presented by a revival of religion. Historians seldom take note of so obscure an event; yet if the secret connections of revivals with the destiny of nations could be disclosed, they would appear to be more critical evolutions of history than the Gothic invasions. A volume has been compiled, narrating the decisive battles of the world. But more significant that this, and probing deeper the Divine government of the world, would be the history of revivals.

Our sense of the reality of revivals as revelations of God is apt to be impaired by several causes. In certain periods their frequency so familiarizes our minds with them that they impress us as little as the tides. At other times the very vastness of their extent overpowers our ability to associate them with definite thoughts of God. It is our weakness, that in spiritual things our vision is often more intense in the specific and the minute, than in the multifarious and the immeasurable, disclosures of his working. Does not a single star in the sky sometimes move us more sensibly than the whole spangled heavens, roofing the world over? So, the conversion of one soul may seem to bring us nearer to the Infinite Mind than days of pentecost. Perhaps, more than all else, the pathological infirmities and the moral perversions, with which human nature defaces God's work in wide-spread revivals, fascinate our gaze as we look on.. Our vision grows distorted. We cease to discern between good and evil. We

become like men who are color-blind. We are unconscious that it is our own disease which dims our eye.

But to any sane mind whose vision faith has sharpened, so that it can see truth luminous through murky surroundings, a revival of religion will appear to be one of the most godlike events in history. Regarded as an achievement of power only, to be made the theme of philosophical inquiry, it can be traced to no human forces. Viewed as an index of prophecy, it is often one of the night-signals of this world's march heavenward.

That swaying of a nation to and fro by secret agency, — by a Power, which no man sees, and no man hears, and no man can explain; of which no man can tell whence it comes or whither it goes, yet a Power which every man feels; and which singles out from the innumerable throng this one and that one, by laws of selection which no man can define, till scores grow to hundreds, and hundreds to thousands, and an army of the elect gathers at the bidding of this voiceless One — what mystery of faith could invite such incredulity as that involved in denying to such a phenomenon the Will of God? If men would but apply to the history of revivals the same laws of cause and effect which they adopt in reasoning upon the origin of the Crusades, no man with the scriptural idea of regeneration as an hypothesis in his mind, could withstand the evidence of Almighty Power in any revival which has commanded the faith of the church as a work of the Holy Ghost. We may sum up the testimony of such revivals, taken in the mass with all their perversions, in the confession made by many irreligious men of the last century, who had lived through the "Great Awakening" of that period, and by many also who have recently watched the phenomena of the "Year of Grace" in Ireland, that the events of which they had been eye-witnesses were inexplicable by any psychological laws which should not recognize the presence and the direct working of God in the souls of men.

4. Still another variety of the illustrative evidence of Divine agency in regeneration is found in a class of facts

which indeed are exceptional in their character; yet they are among the signal exhibitions of God in Christian experience. I allude to certain *abnormal* growths of Christian life which are unproductive of Christian joy. To those who are familiar, to any large extent, with unwritten Christian biography, this will suggest a distinct and most instructive class of examples of regenerate experience. They utter unconscious testimony to the working of him whose glory it is to conceal a thing.

When certain varieties of temperament come under the sway of regenerating grace they shrink instinctively from faith, even from hope, that the life of God may have been imparted to such as they. The credibility of experience in these cases is marred by no overweening self-confidence. The most fastidious sceptic is not here repelled by the assumptions of haughty sanctity. No honest lip can curl in contempt of the inconsistency of character with profession. These Christians make no professions. They express no assurance. They enjoy little or no hope for themselves. The inner life of some of them is as the valley of the shadow of death. Yet who that knows anything of unrecorded Christian history does not recall some from this group of crushed spirits, who have exhibited to all spectators an overwhelming testimony to the working within them of infinite power? They have seemed to exhale the evidence of God's indwelling. They have commanded from others a confidence which they dared not whisper to themselves. They have been as unconscious as infancy of the beauty of the Divine life they expressed. They wist not that their faces shone. Men stand in awe of such characters, and gather around them to make obeisance to them. God hath indeed chosen these weak things to confound the wise. Sceptics are dumb in their presence; rude men are mellowed; and strong men bow themselves at the glance of their meek eye. They make us weep when they speak of God's dealings with them. Their silence is more eloquent than speech. "I saw under the altar the souls of them that were slain for the word of God,

and for the testimony which they held." In emergencies of our mental life do we not sometimes turn to these voiceless witnesses for refuge? Does not our coarser faith lean upon them with a firmer trust than upon strong men armed, and mighty men of valor? We are not careful at such times to inquire whether the emotions which overwhelm us can be justified by this world's wisdom. We do not care whether they can be accounted for by a syllogism. Something within us assures us that in communing with such beings we hold converse with him whose temple they are. We bid kings and counsellors of the earth to fall back to the right and the left, and let these few choice spirits go up before us. We follow those who have been chosen kings and priests unto God.

This unconscious testimony to the Divine indwelling occasionally exhibits itself in strange — yes, in fearful — forms; for it is contrasted with strange and fearful forms of suffering. I can never listen to the singing of some of the hymns of Cowper without a thrill of reverence for the grace of God which could work so mightily in a diseased soul. Some of Cowper's most affecting lyrics, to which millions of Christian hearts have turned lovingly, as to the most truthful expression of their own experience which they have ever found, except in the Psalms of David, were composed during those eleven years in which, as he tells us, not a solitary moment of hope of his own salvation ever cheered his soul. By those rivers of Babylon he sat down and wept; and his wailings have been heard in thousands of the sanctuaries of Zion to-day. Oh mystery of Grace, — that regenerating love should thus gleam out and make radiant the path of sympathizing beholders, when not a ray of it could find ingress to the bleared and swollen eye of the unconscious believer!

May we venture to probe the mystery? Can it be the object of such a phenomenon to give to the universe a monument of God's triumph over Satan, in a conflict the severity of which *submerges* weak human nature to depths which light cannot pierce? In the shock and struggle of that warfare, in which the supremacy over man's soul is contested by un-

seen belligerents, may it not be that God sometimes suspends the hiding of his power, and lays out the forces of his will in majesty which the human consciousness cannot bear to look upon? Shall man *see* God in such conflicts and live? But the reflex influence of such experience upon the usefulness of the believer is more intelligible. I have heard it said by one, the fragrance of whose memory yet fills this place, that "no man could be qualified to write a commentary on the Psalms of David, who had not known some great sorrow." So, when God regenerates a chosen one who is to become dear to the hearts of many generations, the secret method of grace sometimes is to work out the change by processes which shall disclose its reality to all minds but his. To him the volume is sealed until the time of the end. Yet his tremmulous fingers have written it that the scriptures might be fulfilled: "I will lead the blind by a way they knew not; I have surnamed thee, though thou hast not known me."

Even upon the insane experience of such a soul we may reasonably found our faith in the divinity of the Power which dwells in it. We turn from the testimony of such a one in his despair, to his testimony as we doubt not he rehearses it to awe-struck angels. "Poor Cowper," as thy friends used to call thee, —"Our guide, our teacher, our brother," rather would we name thee, — what thinkest thou now of God's dealings with thy soul? Dost thou not now understand those mysterious eleven years? Was it not worth eleven years of sorrow, to be thus enabled to express some of the experiences of God's people in all coming time? Was it not worth eleven years of conflict, to be thus disciplined as the witness of God to unborn millions among whom this shall be told as a memorial of thee? Was it not worth eleven years of bondage to the powers of darkness, to be thus led to the composition of one such song of Zion as that in which thou hast taught us that "God moves in a mysterious way"? Was it not worth eleven years of despair, to be thus moved by the throes of thine own anguish to assure all other believers, as thou hast done, that "There *is* a fountain filled with blood"?

Dost thou not now see that when thou didst say for our comfort,

> "Then, in a nobler, sweeter song,
> I'll sing thy power to save,"

thou didst speak words of unconscious prophecy?

IV. The doctrine of Divine agency in regeneration is fruitful of practical results.

1. Of these one of the most obvious is a disclosure of the profound nature of depravity. Evil is radically crafty. The serpent was more subtle than any beast of the field. We get even from an experience of sin no such profound notion of it as we derive from the means and powers necessary to eradicate it. So we approximate the radical idea of depravity most nearly through this revelation of God's work in the new birth.

To discern the vital truth here, unconfounded by fictitious alleviations, we need to guard our thoughts against the conception of a depravity which is not guilt. In the subject of a moral government, guilt and depravity are equivalents. Depravity, as has been shown in a previous discourse,[1] in any sense of it which makes it an object of moral displeasure, is character; nothing less, nothing more. And depraved character is guilt. The need of a work of God to change the heart suggests, therefore, the depth of this depravity of character which the common sense of men recognizes, and the common conscience condemns as *guilt*. The necessity in question is proof of the exceeding sinfulness of sin. It denounces no involuntary corruption; it permits no such burial of our sense of personality. It demands no conviction of sin for constitutional degeneracy; it inflicts no such suffocation upon conscience. The soul that sinneth, *it* shall die. The son shall *not* bear the iniquity of the father.

The necessity of creating extinguished faculties would be a light matter in comparison with that which actually presses upon an unregenerate soul. The real emergency of the case probes deeper. It reaches down, down, to the lowest depths

[1] Bib. Sac., January 1866.

of conscience, where such ideas as right, wrong, guilt, remorse, punishment, pardon, are the elements; down below theories of the make of the soul as a creature of power, below the *stock* it comes from as a prisoner of the body; down to what the soul is in its own *chosen* being. And there, in that underground of conscious character, regenerating love finds faculties not one of which is defunct, sensibilities which are all quivering with life, a will which baffles death in its tenacity; an unshattered soul, which in its wholeness can obey God, and will not. The sinner can give to God *all there is of him* — and will give nothing. The depravity therefore which his dependence proves, I repeat, is the depravity of guilt. Such depravity is an incomparably more fearful thing, for it is more profound and more hateful, than degeneracy of stock or taint in the blood. The difference is the measureless one between misfortune and crime. Morally estimated, the misfortune is nothing — the crime infinite. The degeneracy of blood is only a condition of probation — the depravity of guilt is a chosen doom.

What, then, must such depravity be, if it be so profound as to need the intervention of omnipotence to root it out? Divest the thought for a moment of technical dialect. Conceive what must be the character of that intelligent soul, that sane mind, that free being, that responsible man, whose sheer guilt constitutes his helplessness, and creates his need of the interposition of a power such as has no parallel that we know of in God's working elsewhere. Who shall guage that moral abyss in which a soul lies, when, with its godlike endowments of intelligence, conscience, and freedom intact, it is fallen because it would plunge down; prostrate, because it will not rise; guilty, because the unmitigated and unrelenting forces of its will are concentrated in the choice to be so; and *therefore* its salvation is thrown back — an anomaly in the history of the universe — upon the resources of Infinite Mind? By what similitude shall we paint such a being's unlikeness to God? What shall we call him? Yet such is man as the gospel finds him. Such is man lost, the

world over. Such is man unregenerate in schools of science and in homes of refinement, as well as in the abodes of poverty and the lairs of vice. To the dispassionate thoughts of God this ruin of soul is a reality, whatever we may think of it. His calm eye looks down on this assembly, and singles out this lost one, and that lost one — how many, who dares to conjecture? — "Lord, is it I?" To him this desolation of godlike being is a reality as vivid as the great white throne.

2. The moral uses of this doctrine of the new birth also disclose in it a singular harmony. No other theory of human nature prostrates man so low before God; yet no other uses so honestly for the purpose of that abasement man's own intelligence, the workings of his own reason, the longings of his own heart, the convictions of his own conscience. Confronted with the Word of God on this subject, a man is made to see with his own eyes, to hear with his own ears, to understand with his own intellect, to interpret his own nature, to feel in his own consciousness, and, if regenerated, to yield in his own personality. Thus the whole man is humbled. No one part of him gives the lie to another. God's work within him does not falsify his necessary beliefs. He is not made a maniac or a fanatic or a mystic. Nor is he left for one moment to the reasonable indulgence of a conception which jars the integrity of his conscience or taints with suspicion his thoughts of God. Truth here, as in all other revelations of itself, hints at a system of congruities.

3. Through this opening we have also an impressive outlook upon the work of man's renewal as a work worthy of God. One of the most suggestive thoughts in our modern literature is the title of a sermon by one of our own preachers: "The Dignity of Human Nature shown from its Ruins." So we might discourse of the "Majesty of God as shown in the Reconstruction of the Ruins of the Fall." In this work God does but reclaim his own. He rebuilds the fragments of his own image. His work is the more godlike, the more loftily we exalt the human constitution within which he

operates. In this we indulge no self-assertion: we only assert God. For the more godlike the man in his endowments as regenerating grace *finds* him, the more awful has been the shock of his fall, the more profound is the depth of his ruin, and the more superhuman, therefore, are the attributes exhibited in his recovery. We have no pinions with which to wing our flight to the altitude of such an achievement. We can only look on speechlessly at a work so much like God in its conception, and so honorable to him in its consummation.

4. Yet we change our position by a step only, and it is not so much the sovereignty of God that we see in the new birth as his condescension. It is characteristic of those aspects of truth which from one angle of vision display the Divine dignity most impressively, that from another they exhibit the Divine lowliness inexplicably. So it is with the work of God in man's renewal. Viewed from above as a work of dominion, nothing appears more like a Sovereign God; yet viewed from within, nothing seems its equal as a disclosure of a condescending and self-forgetful Friend.

Said Whitefield, on one occasion when overcome by a sense of his personal election by the divine mercy: "Why me, Lord; why me?" So might we inquire respecting every renewed child of Adam: Why has God chosen this one? Why that one? Why is a fallen one singled out from this boundless universe of souls? Why should God stoop and reach down so low? Why expend his wisdom, his power, his patience, his love, his complicated and costly beneficence on passions so odious and hearts so obdurate? We can have no adequate conception how odious they are to him. We, through mere refinement of taste, revolt from contact with guilt in its grosser forms. When a sensitive woman encounters savage vices to save the souls of men, we look on with awe. But few understand the sacrifice. We call it a heroism which is not of this world. Yet what, in the comparison, must every unrenewed heart be to the mind of God, — a Mind infinite in its sensibilities as well as in its

perceptions; a Mind, therefore, whose recoil from sin is an unrevealed experience, because no other mind is capable of conceiving such a revelation? It should not have surprised us if God had deemed it beneath his dignity to regenerate a depraved soul. So man would have reasoned. We should have said that Divine magnanimity ought not to be thus humiliated. Omniscient thought ought not to be abased, immaculate purity ought not to be contaminated, infinite love ought not to be shocked, the eternal choice ought not to be degraded by such inglorious association. Why did not God reason so? Why did he not simply doom the ruin to its desolation? Why did he not bury its ghastliness from the sight of the universe, and — leave it there?

5. This subject also individualizes the Holy Spirit as a personal Friend. That is not an unmeaning peculiarity of the plan of salvation which assigns to the distinctions in the Godhead diverse relations to this work. A mature Christian experience finds no unnaturalness in a concentration of itself at times upon one or another of these manifestations of God in redemption. That is an imperfect acquaintance with God which has not led the heart to embrace in its distinct consciousness of affection the Holy Ghost. A reality of Christian life is expressed in that language of affectionate praise in which psalmists have taught us to address the third person of the Trinity. Our Saviour knew the cravings of the regenerate heart when he gave to the Holy Spirit a sympathetic, rather than a reverend title: "The Comforter, he dwelleth with you."

6. We may learn, finally, from this theme one element of the spirit with which men should seek their own salvation. No sinner can seek eternal life aright, none will seek it in earnest, whose soul is not pervaded with the conviction of his need of a change which must be wrought by the power of the Holy Ghost. The soul must again stand face to face with God, as in the hour of its creation. This conviction cannot legitimately lead to helpless inactivity. It cannot tempt to impenitent delay of duty. The sense of moral

helplessness is never to be sought as an end: it is to be used as a means. Its proper drift is to deepen more profoundly the sense of guilt, until the sense of guilt shall impel the sinner to him who only can redeem. This, then, is the conviction which the pulpit should impress upon an unregenerate sinner. He should be taught to feel that he is so overloaded by his own sins, he is so obstinate in his own perverseness, he is so prostrate in the helplessness of his own guilt and in the guilt of his own helplessness, that nothing but almighty grace will save him. This is the measure of his guilt, — that he needs omnipotence to change his heart. No other view than this meets the facts of a sinner's condition. He is thus in the hands of God. He is thus dependent on God's will for his conversion. He is made thus dependent by his own wilfulness in sin; by nothing else. This is dependence in the supreme degree. It is ultimate, as no other dependence can be. The question of a sinner's salvation, therefore, must be suspended upon God's own good pleasure. It is no anomaly that the result is locked up in the recesses of an eternal purpose. It is no merciless decree that he hath mercy on whom he will have mercy. It is in love, my impenitent hearers, that you are permitted to stand in this emergency alone with God. It is the joy of Christian faith to leave you there. The solicitude of friends must leave you there. All human appliances and means of grace must leave you there — in the hands of God. We entertain no views of truth which would remove you from those everlasting arms. We teach no such theology as would relieve you from this dependence of guilt upon Almighty Grace. We preach no such theology. We hold no such. We can gather around you, with our solicitudes, instructions, persuasions, entreaties, warnings. We can go with you to the throne of mercy, and there plead for you. But there our work ceases. We must, and we rejoice that we may, leave you there, — each one, shut in to his own solitude with GOD.

ARTICLE VII.

MARTYRDOM, IN THE APOCALYPSE.

BY THE LATE REV. B. F. HOSFORD, HAVERHILL, MASS.

A GENUINE epistle should carry incidental evidence of the condition of the persons to whom it was addressed, as well as of the writer's condition. Assuming what is generally admitted, that the Christians to whom the Apocalypse was first sent were suffering persecution and in imminent peril of martyrdom, and assuming what the more recent critics admit, that it was written during the persecution under Domitian (A.D. 96?), we propose to consider some of its unstudied intimations of such experience on their part, together with some historical facts illustrating and confirming these intimations.

In the opening of the book (i. 5) the writer salutes the churches he is about to address, and pronounces upon them a benediction "from Jesus Christ the Faithful Witness" (ὁ μάρτυς ὁ πιστός). This may mean simply that Jesus Christ is faithful and trustworthy in the testimony he is about to give through his apostle John, although this does not exhaust the meaning of the word μάρτυς; indeed it hardly touches its most pathetic significance. Jesus, for whom John is now speaking, had suffered violent death rather than retract one iota of what he had said and taught. He not only bore witness to the truth, but he sealed his testimony with blood. John is now writing, at Christ's suggestion, to his followers, who are in bitter trial, and sorely tempted to renounce the profession of their faith. He therefore says to them, not merely that the Master is faithful and will fulfil all his promises unto them, but he says this in words which remind them of that Master's steadfastness in like trials. The language pictures to their faith their divine Redeemer enduring the cross for the truth's sake, and thus appeals to them to show the same steadfastness unto the bit-

ter end. The stimulating argument of the passage is in substance this: Jesus was the Faithful Martyr, a witness steadfast unto death. Be *thou* also faithful unto death, and I will give thee a crown of life.

This construction of the passage finds confirmation in ii. 13, where the same words (ὁ μάρτυς μου ὁ πιστός) are applied to Antipas, and there rendered "my faithful martyr who was slain," etc.; and this would seem a specially appropriate and beautiful allusion if, as some commentators suppose, this Antipas was the beloved Timothy, angel of the church at Ephesus before John assumed the oversight of it.

It is further illustrated and confirmed by a passage in a letter from the persecuted Christians in Gaul to their brethren in Asia Minor, giving an account of the sufferings of their fellow Christians there under the emperors Aurelius and Commodus: "Though they had neither once nor twice, but many times, endured martyrdom, ... they did not proclaim themselves martyrs, for it did not become us to apply this name to them; but if any one of us, either by letter or in conversation, called them martyrs, they seriously reproved us. *For they cheerfully yielded the title of martyr to Christ, the true and faithful martyr*" (witness). Alluding to those martyrs who had already departed they said: "They now are martyrs whom Christ has thought worthy to be received in their confession, setting the seal to their martyrdom (testimony) by the issue."[1]

Moreover, John, in verse 9, speaks of himself as he would not, were they whom he addressed enduring only the ordinary trials of life: "I, John, who also am your brother and companion in tribulation, and in the kingdom and patience of Jesus Christ, was in the isle that is called Patmos, for the word of God, and for the testimony of Jesus Christ." That is, I am not only your brother in Christ, — sharer with you in the hope of his kingdom — but your co-partner in the tribulation (θλίψει) and in the patience, or patient endurance (ὑπομονῇ), of this tribulation which comes upon us on account

[1] Eusebius, V. 2.

of Jesus Christ. For this cause am I a prisoner on this desolate rock, etc. The whole paragraph is exceedingly intense, but on that very account the more inappropriate, unless addressed to experiences of a like intensity.

Thus the book opens with a bold allusion to the fact that Christ died a martyr. Its first utterance from him is written in blood, as if prophetic of what his followers must endure, and of the heroism necessary to endure it.

The opening salutation of the Apocalypse is followed by its introduction proper, viz. seven brief epistles to as many prominent churches in Western Asia Minor. While admitting that these may have been representative churches of all then in existence, or, indeed, of all yet to be in the world, we regard these letters to them as none the less *bona fide* epistles, suited to the characters of those churches at that time, and therefore good incidental authority as to their condition at the time. As the circumstances of Daniel and of Amos tinged, if they did not suggest, the imagery of their respective prophecies, so did John's knowledge of Ephesus and of its sister churches, as well as of the temper and conduct of Nero and Domitian, enter unconsciously into the imagery of the Apocalypse. The Spirit did not rigidly control the style, but having suggested the truth, left John to dress it somewhat according to his personal knowledge and taste, incidentally weaving in allusions and illustrations furnished by passing events.

Now what intimations, if any, do these letters give that the Christians to whom they were addressed were then suffering persecution?

To the church in Ephesus the Great Head says (ii. 2, 3): "I know thy works — thy labor unto weariness (*κόπον*), thy patience under such labor, ... and thou hast patient endurance (*ὑπομονήν*), and hast borne burdens for my name's sake, and hast not fainted under them," etc. This does not necessarily indicate active persecution, but rather those intense experiences which spring up on the borders of persecution. The tenor of this epistle is at least very different from that

of Paul to the same church some thirty years before, and when as yet the Pagan emperors had not stretched forth the hand to vex the followers of Christ; and still more unlike the general tenor of his verbal address to the elders of that church who met him at Miletus while on his way to Jerusalem (Acts xx).

The message to the church in Smyrna opens thus: "These things saith he who was dead, but lives again" [the conqueror of death and therefore his followers need not fear it]: "I know thy tribulation" (θλίψιν). This word, the first specification as to their condition, bears us at once into the midst of fiery trials. There is nothing ordinary in *tribulation*. "Fear nothing of what thou shalt suffer [not even this which I now foretell]; behold the devil shall cast some of you into prison, that ye may be tried, and ye shall have tribulation ten days." Here it is no longer cruel and treacherous *men* that annoy; neither unfeeling Pagan nor apostate Jew now vexes them, nor any inferior demon, but the arch rebel himself — the malignant and unrelenting accuser of the brethren. The measures employed, then, will be worthy of the leader! The *prison* has already played a melancholy part in the tragedies of persecution, sometimes as a school preparatory to the stake and the block, more often as a means of wasting and worrying out the fortitude which fire and axe could not daunt. Bishop Pathinus, of Southern France, was cast into prison at the age of ninety, and survived its horrors only two days. Tertullian thus encourages his incarcerated brethren: "The prison is also the abode of the *evil* spirit, where he assembles those who belong to him; but you are come to the prison for the very purpose of treading him under foot in his own abode. . . . . The prison is darkness, but ye are light; it has fetters but ye are free, in God's sight. . . . . Discard the name of prison, and call it retirement. . . . . The limbs feel not the pressure of the stocks when the soul is in heaven." [1]

"Tried," cruelly and malignantly by him who imprisoned

[1] Neander's Memorials, 97, 98.

them. God tries his people lovingly, as a means of purifying and strengthening them; Satan tries them maliciously, in the sense of soliciting or tempting them to sin. He *tries* to break down the steadfastness of their faith and profession. "Ten days," meaning rather a short than a long or indefinite period. An intense fire the sooner burns out. "The war will be short; it may be desperate!" "Be thou faithful unto the death, and I will give thee a crown of life." Count not life dear as weighed against fidelity to the Master. Give it up, as he did, if the persecutor insists upon it; so shall you win and wear the crown of life eternal!

Neither gentleness nor violence of interpretation can make these word-clusters yield anything but scarlet. Accordingly, Dean Trench says this epistle "strikes the key-note of martyrdom." And it is all the more significant if, as this careful critic thinks it probable, the venerable, firm, and lovely Polycarp — already ripe for martyrdom and waiting for his crown — was the veritable person to whom this epistle was addressed; at that very moment less an angel figuratively of a bleeding church on earth, than one literally of the church triumphant in heaven.

The church in Pergamos is thus saluted: "I know thy works, and where thou dwellest, — where Satan's seat is; and thou holdest fast my name, and hast not denied my faith, even in those days wherein Antipas was my faithful martyr, who was slain among you, where Satan dwelleth."

The intensity of their trial is indicated, first, by the title twice given to the place, as Satan's seat — Satan's dwelling-place. It was therefore the capital of the confederacy, in which the prince of this world, whom Christ had once cast out, held his infernal court, plotting restoration; secondly, a distinguished Christian of their number, Antipas, had already there gained the martyr's crown; thirdly, the phrase "*even in those days* wherein Antipas," etc., implies a period of special tribulation, which only the specially steadfast could survive. It was a period when the enemy, in a fit of desperation, undertook to storm these Christians' stronghold. It

was to their honor that they had not faltered, even in these terrible days.

The epistle to the church in Thyatira, having noticed the fact that a pestilent heresy had corrupted a portion of that church, and that this must be purged out so as by fire, adds for the few who had remained faithful: "That which ye have already, hold fast till I come"; implying a coming trial in which they would be sorely tempted to recant. A similar direction is given to the church in Sardis: "Be watchful, and strengthen the things which remain that are ready to die; for I have not found thy works perfect [perfected, πεπληρωμένα] before God. Remember, ... and hold fast"; i.e. be steadfast unto the bitter end.

In the epistle to the church in Sardis there is nothing which bears directly on our subject, unless it be that the Saviour's promise to him who should overcome — "I will *confess* his name before my Father, and before his angels" — was designed especially for such as feared to confess Christ, or concealed a previous confession. We may at least use the occasion to make some quotations showing how the faithful among the primitive Christians regarded the duty of a prompt and open confession of their faith in Christ; and how this significant act stood in their minds for the whole Christian character, since the faithful were often called simply confessors. Thus Victorinus, a distinguished rhetorician of Rome in the fourth century, embraced Christianity. For a while he shrunk from a public profession, out of regard to his former friends. At last, fearing that Christ might, according to his own words, deny him, if he persisted in concealing his faith, he came forward to profess. It then being proposed to him to make a profession of his faith and receive baptism before a private assembly, he utterly refused, saying it were unreasonable for him to be ashamed to confess his hopes of salvation before the people, while he publicly professed before them daily his character as a rhetorician. Of this Augustine, who relates the fact (Conf. VIII.), says in flowers of sacred rhetoric: "He now blushed not to be the

child of thy Christ, and the new-born babe of thy fountain; submitting his neck to the yoke of humility, and subduing his forehead to the reproach of the cross. . . . . Rome wondering; the church rejoicing."

Justin Martyr thus repels one of the slanders of Trypho the Jew: "As for us who have received the religion of the holy Jesus, yourselves know very well that there is none throughout the world that is able to fright us from our profession. . . . . Of our great love of an eternal and pure life, we desire to converse with God the Father and Creator of all things, and *hasten to confess*. . . . . No one is ashamed, none is sorry, save that he had not long before become a Christian. If he is informed against, he glories in the charge; if accused, he makes no defence; if questioned, he confesses even of his own accord. . . . . We declare and openly profess in the midst of all your tortures; even while bleeding and torn we proclaim aloud that we worship God through Christ."

Certain confessors at Rome who had already been confined in prison for a year, wrote thus to Cyprian of Carthage, who at this time, was more influential in the church than the bishop of Rome: "What more glorious and blessed lot can, by God's grace, fall to man, than amid tortures and the fear of death itself to confess God the Lord; than with lacerated bodies and a spirit departing, but yet free, to confess Christ the Son of God; than to become fellow-sufferers with Christ, in the name of Christ? If we have not yet shed our blood, we are ready to shed it. Pray then, beloved Cyprian, that the Lord would daily confirm and strengthen each one of us more and more with the power of his might; and that he, the best of leaders, would finally conduct his soldiers, whom he has disciplined and proved in the dangerous camp, to the field of battle which is before us, armed with those divine weapons which can never be conquered."[1]

The charge to the church in Philadelphia is quite as pungent, and still more to this point: "Thou hast a little strength,

[1] Neander, I. 133.

and hast not denied my name. . . . . Because thou hast kept the word of my patience [my word requiring patient endurance], I also will keep thee [preserve thee in, and deliver thee] from the hour of temptation. . . . . Hold that fast which thou hast, that no man take thy crown."

These hearty commendations for not having denied Christ's name amid sore temptations, together with these urgent and oft-repeated exhortations to hold on and hold out, naturally suggest, by way of contrast, the case of the fallen, or *lapsi*, as the early Christian writers called them; those whose faith wavered in times of severe trial, and who, perhaps, publicly recanted in order to save their life; but many of whom, as soon as the indignation was overpast, repented, and hasted to seek restoration to the name and honor which they had forfeited.

Thus, in the epistle of the Christians in Lyons and Vienna to their brethren in Asia, from which we have already quoted, we read this mournfully tender passage, interjected amid the inspiring records of Christian heroism: "Others, indeed, appeared unprepared and inexperienced, and yet so weak as to be incapable of bearing the intensity of the mighty contest. Of these, indeed, *about ten also fell away*, causing great sorrow and excessive grief to our brethren, and damping the ardor of those who had not yet been taken. These, however, although they endured all manner of affliction, nevertheless were always present with the martyrs, and never left them. Then indeed we were all struck with great fear on account of the uncertainty of their holding out in the profession, not indeed dreading the tortures inflicted, but looking at the end, and trembling lest they should apostatize."[1]

A confessor at Rome during the Decian persecution, writing to a confessor at Carthage in order to engage the intercessory prayer of the African martyrs for a fallen sister, says: "I pray you to mourn with me for the death of my sister, who in this desolation has fallen away from Christ; for she has sacrificed [unto the heathen gods], and offended the

[1] Eusebius, V. 1.

Lord, as appears evidently unto us. On account of her transgression I spend this joyful time of Easter in tears, both day and night." [1]

While halting between two opinions and taking counsel of their timidity, how timely and stirring these exhortations. "Be watchful, and strengthen the things which remain that are ready to die." "Hold that fast which thou hast, that no man take thy crown." Parallels in spirit to these, and not unworthy to come in here as illustrations, may be found far and wide in the messages which Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, a century and a half later than this, sent from his place of concealment as opportunity offered, for the strengthening and comforting of his church during the terrible persecution under Decius.

Speaking to his clergy of the confessors, he says: "There remains something more than they have yet fulfilled; for it is written: "Praise no man before his decease"; and our Lord says: "He that endureth *unto the end* shall be saved." To the confessors themselves he thus writes: "Still we are in the world; still we are on the battle-field; we fight for our daily life. Hence you must strive that, after such a beginning, you may make progress; that what you have so happily begun may be brought to perfection. It is but little, if a man has been able only to *obtain;* it is something more to be able to *keep* what he has obtained, even as faith and regeneration cannot bring unto eternal life merely by being once received; they must be kept. ..... Not in *that* sense have we joined the soldiers of the Lord, that we think of nothing but peace, and flee from conflict; since in the conflict the Lord has gone before us as the teacher of humility, patience, and suffering; since what he has taught us to accomplish he has himself accomplished, and what he exhorts us to suffer he has first suffered for us." And then he adds these comforting and strengthening words for those who were scattered abroad, and thus deprived of social Christian fellowship: "*He* is not alone who has Christ for a companion

[1] Eusebius, XIII.

of his flight. He is not alone, who, preserving the temple of God, is not without God wherever he may be. ..... And it is no small honor of martyrdom when a man dies not publicly and among many, since he dies for Christ's sake. It is enough that *he* is a witness of his martyrdom who tries and crowns the martyrs." [1]

The epistle to the Laodiceans suggests the near neighborhood of persecution, from which it was their misfortune and shame to be left free. They are fearfully rebuked for their lukewarmness in the divine life, and impaled on high for the warning of the indolent and apathetic in all times. It emphasizes this rebuke and illustrates their guilt to consider their surroundings at the time. Everything in their neighborhood was throbbing with feeling and energy. The sacred body of Christ was sweating blood at every pore. The agonizing shriek of brethren and sisters floated by on every breeze. That whole household of churches was in dire affliction. Every fibre of principle and of sensibility in every soul was on the stretch, and sung out a shrill agony when it was snapped. The burning zeal of the faithful was fast eating them up. Even the cold-iron Roman persecutor was red-hot *in his way*. But the Laodiceans were neither cold nor hot. They had neither the poor merit of zeal in a bad cause, nor sympathy for those who were suffering in a good cause; and the bold figure of speech in which the Redeemer intimates that to be cold, as the heathen persecutor, without any of the forms or professions of love, were better than to remain thus, sets forth his holy disgust with such an apathy amid such circumstances. Thrice dead does this church seem, that it is begirt about with the experiences and exhibitions of such intense living, — "a mountain of ice in a sea of fire!"

We should observe one marked feature common to all these seven epistles, viz. that the promised reward, whatever it be, is conditional upon their *overcoming* in this conflict; and to this point, as by a *nota bene*, their attention is challenged in each epistle by these same words: "He that hath

[1] Eusebius, XIII.

ears to hear, let him hear what the Spirit saith unto the churches." Moreover, the varied and expressive imagery which sets forth the promised rewards implies the severity of the conflict. Every conceivable form of reward is offered, because they were to pass through every possible form of suffering.

We are aware that nothing is more common in the New Testament than the representation of Christian life under the figures of warfare and conflict; but this emphatic repetition of the word *overcome*, with the energetic words attending it, requires for it an extraordinary meaning, — the very highest significance which the words will bear.

When the New Testament elsewhere speaks of the Christian conflict, it is as an officer by his camp-fire rehearses at length the story of a past battle or the probabilities of a future one, and how he would have his faithful soldiers acquit themselves in it. But the allusions to conflict in these epistles are like the brief, sharp, spirited words of that officer when leading his men into the thickest fight. There is an itensity in them which were unnatural, not to say impossible, except in the face of tragic realities. Such burning words are born only of fiery occasions.

Thus far the testimony of the introduction of the Apocalypse as to the status of the Christians to whom it was first addressed. Does the book proper correspond to the introduction in this particular?

In chapter vi. 9–11 we read: "And when he had opened the fifth seal, I saw under the altar the souls of them that were slain for the word of God, and for the testimony which they held: and they cried with a loud voice, saying, How long, O Lord, holy and true, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth? And white robes were given unto every one of them; and it was said unto them, that they should rest yet for a little season, until their fellow-servants also and their brethren, that should be killed as they were, should be fulfilled." Here are two points of interest in relation to our subject: First, these

were martyrs for Christ, clothed in white, in token of steadfastness to their profession, even unto the death; peculiarly honored in heaven because faithful amid peculiar trials on earth.

Further light is thrown upon this point by comparison with a similar passage in vii. 13–15: "And one of the elders answered, saying unto me, What are these which are arrayed in white robes; and whence came they? And I said unto him, Sir, thou knowest. And he said to me, These are they which came out of great tribulation, and have washed their robes, and made them white in the blood of the Lamb; therefore are they before the throne of God." Here John's attention is directed to a celestial group whose robes are unusually resplendent; and wishing to know the the reason of this honorable distinction, he is told that these came out of "great tribulation, ... therefore are they before the throne of God," or in his immediate presence. "Great tribulation" would naturally suggest to the reader of that day the tribulation of persecution. He would therefore understand, unless otherwise instructed, that these glorious ones were martyrs and confessors, and, like those alluded to in chapter vi., were clothed with unusual honors because they had passed unscathed through unusual trials.

A second point of interest in this passage (vi. 11) is, that others still of their brethren were yet to be slain for Christ's sake. The appointed number of blood-witnesses (*μάρτυρες*) was not yet full. Hence those already slain, and who were impatient that God the holy and true should complete the appointed number, so that their death might be avenged, were bidden to wait for a little season, when, it was implied, their prayer would be answered. Their agonizing appeal to the holiness and truth of God to avenge their wrongs — as if he could not be God and not avenge them — are impressive proofs of the greatness of those wrongs. As that fearful sonnet-prayer of the great Christian poet of England in behalf of the persecuted Piedmontese, commencing "Avenge, O Lord, thy slaughtered saints," could not have been ex-

torted from his soul but by the most wanton cruelties on the part of their tormentors. What experiences of the primitive Christians answer to these strong representations except the cruel outrages they suffered at the hands of heathen persecutors? Nothing could be better suited to stir up the minds of the persecuted believers to the highest point of heroic endurance than this, which we will venture to call pictorial representation.

The leaders of our Revolution prepared the people to stand fast to the bold and hazardous Declaration of Independence by a graphic recital of the wrongs they had submitted to from the parent country, notwithstanding their earnest but respectful remonstrances. The great English dramatist represents the wily Anthony as filling the Roman populace with a perfect frenzy to avenge Caesar's death by holding up before them dead Caesar's mantle, and showing the gashes which the knives of the conspirators had made in it — bidding them look at "Sweet Caesar's wounds — poor, poor dumb mouths." In the Parisian Revolution of 1848 it was a man deeply read in human nature who, in order to fire the passions of the populace to avenge their fellow-citizens who had been shot down by the soldiers of the king, piled their dead bodies into a cart together, and then drew it by hand, and with torch-lights, through the streets of Paris at midnight; while they who dragged it along sang, marking the time with their melancholy tread, "Sweet is it to die for one's country," interspersing this dirge with stirring strains from the Marsellaise. Is it any wonder that the morrow opened upon the streets of that city swarming with blouses eager for martyrdom on the barricades? It is something as if the loyal people of this nation should behold in visions of the night their patriotic brethren who have already fallen at the head of their brave ranks in battle; and the noble captives who for weary months were pining away in Southern prisons; and the many loyal spirits in the revolted states, overpowered, but patiently waiting the time of their deliverance; and from all these should hear the mournfully

harmonious cry, pleading with that Sovereign Justice that is never appealed to in vain: "How long, O Lord, how long!" Could human nature behold this unmoved? Would not the avenues to every recruiting office be soon choked with volunteers? Thus, but without the tragical grossness of these scenes, does this apocalyptic picture appeal to the Christian heroism of the reader, making his blood leap and boil along his veins. To followers of Christ who were constantly exposed to violent death for their Master's sake, no appeal could have been more effectual.

Let us, for a moment, turn aside from our main point to say, as something suited to our day, that this revelation in the fifth seal would seem to show: first, that the persecuted saints remember in heaven the wounds which the body of their Redeemer *in them* suffered on earth. Those wrongs were too deeply scored into their souls to be erased by the processes of death and coronation. Secondly, these saints, though trophies of a mercy which will always be uppermost in their minds, retain also a strong sense of justice. For God's sake and the sake of the universe their prayer will still be: "How long, O Lord, holy and true, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth?" Thirdly, these saints in heaven cannot rest till retributive justice overtakes the wilful and incorrigible enemies of their Redeemer; as the best communities on earth cannot be made quiet while known felons and murderers are at large. Fourthly, saints in heaven will therefore rejoice, and sing Alleluia, — their joy will be completed when God shall have vindicated his justice in full upon the blood-seeking enemies of his Son. Fifthly, until such retribution is made, these saints will find a comparative satisfaction in praying for it and expecting it. Though under the altar and pleading, they are still in heaven, and full of a substantial though not completed peace and rest.

In chapter xiii. 1–10, we have the picture of a beast, with seven heads and ten horns, rising out of the sea and making war upon the saints. It is not possible that the Christians

of that time should have applied this picture to any other than pagan persecuting Rome. After giving a vivid picture of his desperate rage against the church, the writer abruptly bids the reader take notice: "He that leadeth into captivity shall go into captivity; he that killeth with the sword must be killed with the sword. Here is the patience and the faith of the saints." That is, the arm of the persecutor shall ere long break by its own force; violence shall overthrow violence. Here, then, is a call upon the saints for patience and faith — patience while they suffer these terrors; faith that their sufferings will soon end.

The remembrance of the fiery trials of Christians during Nero's reign, some thirty years before, would furnish them explanation and commentary for this remarkable passage. They would read this bold prediction by the lurid light of the fires which that amateur murderer of the innocent had kindled: "He that leadeth into captivity shall go into captivity." This would recall to mind the fact that Nero himself, soon after his persecution, was a lonely, shivering, midnight fugitive from the face of his own indignant subjects; secreting himself in the narrowest apartment of an obscure country cottage — a fugitive emperor, begging protection from the meanest of his subjects!

"He that killeth with the sword must be killed with the sword"; this, too, would remind them that even before his hiding-place was suspected, his heart failed him, and he called aloud for some friendly hand to release him from the burden of life; and when no one answered, "What," said he; "have I neither friend nor foe to rid me of this load?" And when at last discovered, he half butchered himself by a faltering thrust at his throat, and left the good work to be completed by his blood-thirsty pursuers, whom he had trained to relish such pastime. Thus did he who first raised the sword of state against the church of Christ fulfil this prophecy in a double death by violence, as an assassinated suicide.

When they read still further (xiv. 10), "the same shall be

tormented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy angels and in the presence of the Lamb," they must have recalled, as a fearful commentary upon it, the time when, at the instigation of this demoniac monster and trifler, followers of the Lamb were clothed in robes saturated with pitch, and then set on fire by night to illuminate his pleasure gardens on the Vatican hill, — "martyrs in their shirts of fire," as modern poetry has christened them, — a royal entertainment indeed!

It was but a little season after this was first read, before Domitian, Nero's successor in persecution, who added to his cruelty the blasphemy of calling himself "Lord and God," also perished by the hand of assassins. It is said that, becoming suspicious even of his domestics, he lined the walls of his favorite walks with stones whose polished surfaces would reflect the approach of any stealthy foot from behind; but all this precaution could not screen or shield him from the ministers of vengeance whom the Head of the church sent to fulfil his promise for those who lift up the sword against his beloved. It is remarkable how literally this prediction was fulfilled upon the whole line of persecuting emperors. Of sixteen who, as primaries or subordinates, were more or less active in this bloody work, there is probable evidence that ten were assassinated, two were suicides to avoid a more violent death, one died in battle, one was flayed alive and salted, and two died in peace, one of whom owed his natural death to the fact that he had laid down the sword and retired to private life.

On a few of the still extant tombstones of the early Christians at Rome, some of whom may have died under Nero, are engraved small cups with inscriptions thereon, which indicate that the persons buried there were forced to drink poison as a means of death. Thus we read: "The cup could not give to Constans the crown which the steel was permitted to offer"; i.e. the poison failing to do its work (as Christ had promised, Mark xvi. 18) the steel was called in. Now as the older Christians to whom the Apocalypse was first sent

might recollect having seen in their childhood followers of Christ removed in this manner, by cup or steel, or both, what a vividness would that recollection give to the new promise just arrived from Patmos: "The same [who have administered this bitter portion to others] shall drink of the wine of the wrath of God which is poured out without mixture into the cup of his indignation" (xiv. 10).

In chapter xvi. seven angels are sent to pour out the vials of God's wrath upon the earth, in retribution for its bloody treatment of the church: "And the second angel poured out his vial upon the sea, and it became as the blood of a dead man; and every living soul died in the sea. And the third angel poured out his vial upon the rivers and fountains of waters, and they became blood. And I heard the angel of the waters say [the guardian angel whose special charge it was to preserve these waters pure, but who was still more interested to have God's holy character vindicated], Thou art righteous, O Lord, ... because thou hast judged thus; *for* they have shed the blood of saints and prophets, and thou [in turn] hast given them blood to drink; for they are worthy." "Even so," responds an angel from the altar, speaking for another court of heaven, "even so, Lord God Almighty, true and righteous are thy judgments." The retribution was in keeping with the sin; there was propriety and beauty in it; it was in good taste, — a literal retribution, — a giving back of the same element which had been paid out. Whether or not the divine nemesis has a special pleasure in retributions of the same kind and quality with the sins, it is certain that the human mind takes a special satisfaction in them. Its instinctive response to such judgments always is — "Even so, Amen!"

We introduce here, as throwing a side-light upon our subject, a clause from xiv. 4: "*These are they which follow the Lamb whithersoever he goeth.*"

The attention of John was arrested by a company of the heavenly host standing near the Lamb on Mount Zion, bearing the Father's name upon their foreheads as if they were

his peculiar possession, and singing that new song in which none but the redeemed could bear a part. Anticipating the reader's interest to learn who these are and wherefore thus distinguished, John says, "these are they which follow the Lamb *whithersoever* he goeth." The phrase intimates that whereas some had followed him only while it was agreeable or respectable, but had fallen back in the day of sore tribulation, these had followed him regardless of circumstances; and thus is their unfaltering fidelity on earth rewarded in heaven. So the disciples in Gaul to their brethren in Asia, speak of the martyr Vettius Epagathus thus: "For he was, and is still, a genuine disciple of Christ, *following the Lamb whithersoever he goeth.*" So also Ignatius, about a quarter of a century after John wrote, when in the amphitheatre, and just before the wild beasts were let into the arena, looking up to the immense conclave of faces that encircled him around, calmly said: "Romans, spectators of this present scene, I am here, not because of any crime, nor to absolve myself from any charge of wickedness, *but to follow Christ*, by the love of whom I am impelled, and whom I long for irrepressibly."

This apocalyptic picture, designed to implant and encourage the martyr spirit, had its effect upon the infant and persecuted church; for from this time forward to the end of persecutions, the Lamb was never without steadfast followers, even in those places where Satan's seat was. Did the first emperor-persecutor originate the inhuman device of lighting up his gardens at night by clothing a number of the doomed sect with robes of fire? Here were more than his depraved ingenuity knew how to dispose of, ready thus to let their light shine to honor their Redeemer amid that pagan midnight. Were followers of the Lamb called for by other emperors, to be torn limb from limb by hungry beasts, for the amusement of the hundred thousand heathen spectators assembled in the new Coliseum? Rome had already within her precincts enough who counted not their lives dear unto them to supply the daily demands of that arena for months

in succession. Though to declare one's self a Christian was to hear on the morrow the summary verdict: "away with him to the lions"; and though sometimes, in scarcity of other food, the ravenous beasts of the amphitheatre were fed on Christian flesh as an economical measure, yet voluntary confessors were so numerous and willing that the greedy populace never came short of their daily recreation, nor did the young lions lack or suffer hunger.

Did a Roman governor at Ephesus once issue his bold edict of extermination against all the followers of Christ in his province, thinking thus to uproot the growing evil utterly, or frighten it back beneath the soil? So also did so many Christians in that province come forward, voluntarily professing themselves the followers of Christ, and claiming the fulfilment of his threat, which would win them all a crown in a better kingdom, that the astonished pagan shrunk from the bloody intent, which promised to leave him a mournful ruler over a depopulated district. "What," said he, with a wit tempered with chagrin, "are there no precipices and halters" by which to help yourselves out of your wretched life?

Did successive emperors thus by turns, for nearly two hundred years, try to crush the young life out of Christianitity? They sadly mistook its etherial quality; for as Tertullian had said to them: "Semen est sanguis Christianorum" — The blood of Christians is seed. Every precious drop sowed, sprang up multifold. The common sentiment, amounting to a universal ambition, among the followers of the Lamb during all that period, was to gain a martyr's name and crown. When summoned to die, they answered, singing: "We ascend to the place of punishment as if we were ascending to heaven"; and when gone, their surviving brethren could write of them in no less glowing terms than these: "The faithful proceeded with cheerful steps; their countenances shone with much grace and glory; their bonds were as the most beautiful ornaments; and they themselves looked as brides adorned with their richest array, breathing the fragrance of Christ so much that some thought they had been

literally perfumed."[1] From the east to the west of the broad empire, wherever the central heart could throb out its hostility to the Lamb, there were found, without searching, his faithful disciples as ready to follow him to the arena or the prison or the stake as to Jerusalem or to Caesar's palace — an "ingens multitudo," as Tacitus said of them in a particular province, ready, like Paul, not only to be bound, but to die for Christ.

After singing of both judgment and mercy, the writer again suddenly pauses to repeat (xiv. 12): "Here is [another occasion for] the patience of the saints. Here are they that keep the commandments of God and the faith of Jesus Christ" [amid severe trials]. And then is added in close connection, and as if referring expressly to such faithful martyrs: "And I heard a voice from heaven saying unto me, Write, blessed are the dead which die in the Lord; yea, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their labors, and their works do follow them!"

"They rest from their labors." There it was — underneath the palaces and gardens of their persecutors, and within a fifteen minutes' walk of the place where they first read these comforting words from John — that a multitude which no man can number of Christian martyrs were, from that day forward, laid down to rest from their sufferings, and their place of repose received, from the faith in which they died, that sweet name, *cemetery* — a place for sleep and rest, while they waited a glorious resurrection to the life to come.

The most frequent epitaphs upon the tombstones of these early sufferers for Christ, buried and preserved in the Catacombs, are: In peace; In Christ; He sleeps in peace; In the peace of Christ. The following are literal copies from these sacred records: Gemella sleeps in peace; Victorina, in peace and in Christ; Vidalio, in the peace of Christ; The sleeping-place of Elpis; Aselus sleeps in Christ. And around these records are engraved the sweet symbols of the lamb, the olive leaf, and the dove, breathing peace and love.

[1] Milner, I. 177.

But lest we should infer that their life and death were as peaceful as their sleep, we read: Primitius in peace, after many torments, a most valiant martyr; Paulus was put to death in tortures in order that he might live in eternal bliss; Clementia, tortured, dead, sleeps, will rise; Lannus, Christ's martyr, rests here — under Diocletian he suffered — in Christ. In all these sacred records of the dead in Christ, engraved on rocky tablets — and hundreds of them have been carefully arranged, so that they may be easily read, along the left of a gallery in the Vatican — there is never a word of murmur or despair; never one that breathes revenge upon their persecutors, and rarely one that indicates the manner of their unjust and cruel death; but all whispers of peace and rest in Christ, together with significant emblems of the resurrection and the life to come. Whatever Rome above ground may be, or may have been during these past eighteen centuries, *subterranean* Rome has remained steadfast in its primitive faith; it has suffered no division or heresy; it has put on no earthly pomp to smother its spirit; it has craved no earthly power; it has never worried Christ's poor, or tampered with his words. It is therefore the best interpreter the world has of the character and faith of those who lived and died under the influence of the immediate successors of the apostles. The soil all around the eternal city was not only enriched at first by the precious blood of Christ's faithful witnesses, but it is still full of the seeds of resurrection life, waiting to be quickened by the first shining of the Sun of Righteousness at his second coming, to judge the world. Those primitive saints were "great in deeds, greater in sufferings, greatest in death, for the honor of Christ." They fulfilled to the letter what Cyprian in his apology claimed for them: "We do not speak great things, but we *live* them." Persecution could lop off members, but its thrusts could not reach the Heart of the church. It could silence human tongues, but the great Truth only pleaded and cried the more earnestly; and for every faithful one stricken down from among the followers of the Lamb, two sprang forward into

his place. The blood of Christians *was* seed, and therefore the Christian church has been immortal. Its Head still lives, and therefore the gates of hell shall never prevail against it.

Paul, speaking for the religion which he preached and by which he lived, said: "When I am weak then am I strong"; for "God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the mighty, and things that are not to bring to naught the things that are." And Julian — speaking for himself, and for the pagan religion which had been trying for nearly three centuries, first to destroy and then to withstand Christianity, but had seen it steadily rising in authority, until at last it sat down on the right hand of the majesty of the empire, without thinking it any robbery so to do — testified to the same truth, but in a different form and spirit, when he cried out in despair, as he was giving up the ghost: "O Galilean, thou hast conquered!"

These stirring truths appear once more, and in still another dress, in xx. 4, 5, 6: "And I saw thrones, and they sat upon them, and judgment was given unto them; and I saw the souls of them that were beheaded for the witness of Jesus, and for the word of God, and which had not worshipped the beast, neither his image, neither had received his mark upon their foreheads or in their hands; and they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years. But the rest of the dead lived not again until the thousand years were finished. This is the first resurrection. Blessed and holy is he that hath part in the first resurrection: on such the second death hath no power; but they shall be priests of God and of Christ, and shall reign with him a thousand years." The principal subjects of these verses were martyrs on account of their faithfulness to Christ. This faithfulness is indicated by the fact that they had not the mark of the beast on their foreheads, i.e. they did not publicly recant and compromise with the persecutor who represented the pagan religion; nor had they his mark on their hands, i.e. they did not, even in secret, lift up the hand to this abomination, to worship it, or swear by it, or touch any of its profane symbols. And

now these faithful blood-witnesses, who were without spot and above suspicion, enjoy a peculiar blessedness as the reward of their unfaltering fidelity. They sit on thrones, participating in judgment, as a victor king calls a council of his generals to advise as to the disposition to be made of the captives. "They are priests of God and of Christ, and shall reign with him a thousand years," being as it were the cabinet of the Great King, and uniting in themselves both the regal and sacerdotal dignity. They have even some advantage over the pious dead who had fallen asleep in times of peace (although the precise nature of this advantage is not defined), for we read, "and the rest of the dead lived not again until the thousand years were finished." "On such the second death hath no power," i.e. their first dying, in so marked a way, utterly vanquished the mighty enemy. And as a premature death was what they suffered for Christ, so an early restoration from its dominion would be their appropriate reward: "Holy and blessed is he that hath part in the first resurrection!"

Thus does this passage resound once more, and for the last time, the key-note of the Apocalypse, viz. the martyr's spirit and the martyr's reward, kindling a like spirit in those who should read and understand. Then follows the brief account of the general resurrection, the judgment, the eternal retributions, and especially the superlative blessedness of the righteous redeemed in the new Jerusalem, with which fitting scene the glowing representations of the Apocalypse close.

The foregoing resumè of the bearings of the Apocalypse on this one point indicates what fearful and desperate forces "the gates of hell" are, and yet that even they shall not prevail against the church of Christ; it indicates the intense and persistent hatred of the depraved heart against Christian godliness, but also the more powerful Christian love which can overcome that hatred. It shows also what a love Christ's followers have for his church, and how much they are willing to do and to suffer in its behalf; say rather, how much he

enables them to suffer and do; for they love him only as he first loves them. It also shows the power of the passive Christian graces. The followers of Christ can break down certain obstacles by energetic *doing*; other and more stubborn difficulties can be melted down best by submissive and meek suffering, provided always it comes by reason of well-doing and for Christ's sake. Again, it shows that not only endurance and suffering, but even the sufferer's death may promote the cause for which he dies. Certain great works are completed only by the death of him who laid their foundations. From the day of Christ's crucifixion to the day of his second coming, martyrdom for the truth in his cause is a surprising power. We but imperfectly comprehend as yet, and perhaps on earth we never shall comprehend, the full significance of suffering in the redeemed as well as in their Redeemer. As remission, at first, was made possible only by the shedding of blood, so has the knowledge of this expiation been set home to the heart and conscience of the lost only by the spirit of martyrdom. The weakness of the church of this day is its lack of the martyr spirit. Its veins are full, but of a colorless fluid. The vital scarlet has been bleached out by critical analysis and overculture. There is no lack of those who are willing to *live* for Christ; but where are the primitive "multitudes" equally ready to *die* for him? Where are the followers of Christ to-day who count death in the way of duty as the climax of their life, without which life were an incompleted work? Finally, it shows that the sufferings of the followers of a suffering Saviour may become the occasion of a closer resemblance to, and familiarity with him, and on this account may be welcomed by them, even as Paul has said (Col. i. 24): "Who now rejoice in my sufferings for you, and fill up that which is behind of the afflictions of Christ in my flesh, for his body's sake, which is the church."

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTICES OF RECENT GERMAN PUBLICATIONS.

FROM OUR GERMAN CORRESPONDENT.

Christian Ethics.

Handbuch der christlichen Sittenlehre. Von Dr. A. Wuttke, Professor of Theology at the University of Halle, Prussia. 2d edition. 2 Vols. Berlin: Wiegandt and Grieben; London: Asher and Co. 1865. — The above handbook of Christian ethics appeared for the first time in 1860; the present is an enlarged and revised edition. Few books on such a subject have been so very differently received by the various theological and literary organs of Germany; and yet it has been able to compete with the older standard work of Harless and the excellent posthumous book of Schmid. These circumstances of themselves would lead us to expect that it must have a peculiar character. On this ground, and because the German treatment of ethics or moral philosophy is so different from that current in America and England, we shall devote more space to the present notice than is ordinarily our custom.

We shall first give a view of the skeleton of the work, and then refer to one or two individual features. We must say, however, beforehand that it is impossible, within the limited space alloted to us, to convey anything more than a very vague idea of the subtilty and fulness of thought by which the handbook as a whole is characterized. It is divided into four parts: I. Introduction: 1. The idea of a system of ethics and its place in the cycle of sciences. 2. The scientific treatment of ethics. 3. The history of ethics and of the moral consciousness in general (pp. 1–297). The history of ethics falls into the following sections: 1. Heathen nations, as the Chinese, Hindoos, Egyptians, Persians, Greeks, Romans; 2. The Old Testament and the Jews; 3. Christian ethics: *a.* The early church, *b.* The Middle Ages, *c.* Modern times. For this part of his task Dr. Wuttke had prepared himself by a previous interesting work on the History of Heathendom. For the student this is a most interesting and profitable part of the treatise, though unquestionably open here and there to considerable criticism. Sometimes his attempts to draw a distinction between the ethics of this and that people are marked by over subtilty. English and American works on ethics are imperfectly presented. We do not think he has been quite just to Locke, among others; and such treatises as Wayland's, Wardlaw's, Mackintosh's, Tappan's, and others, both American and English, are entirely unnoticed; even Edwards is passed over in silence. Our views of morals are represented or *mis*represented almost exclusively by the Deists.

After this somewhat lengthened historical introduction (280 pages), he advances to his proper task; and here the author displays his greatest peculiarity, though he is not quite without forerunners in the method he pursues. We cannot do better than describe the following three parts in the author's own words: "Christian ethics, as distinguished from philosophical ethics, are based on historical facts, to wit, on the redemption wrought out in Christ. Redemption, however, presupposes sin; and sin presupposes the moral idea. Consequently a knowledge of Christian morals, as based on redemption, presupposes a knowledge of the moral state of unredeemed man; and this, again, a knowledge of the ideal state of being on which man turned his back in sinning. A treatise on Christian ethics, accordingly, must consist of three parts: I. The moral considered *in itself*, without reference to sin — ideal morality; morality as willed by the holy God. II. The *fall* from the truly moral; *sin*, or the guilty perversion of the moral idea in acts — that which man, as unholy, wills. III. The moral in its *renewal* by redemption; the new birth of moral truth out of sinful corruption — that which God wills as graciously forgiving, and man, as penitent."

"He alone is moral in the Christian sense who is conscious of having been redeemed by Christ. Those alone can be conscious of redemption who feel themselves to have been sinners apart from redemption; and no one can be conscious of sin who has not a consciousness of the moral ideal." "The first section sets forth ideal morality, morality which has known no sin; morality in the state of *innocence*. The second sets forth the actual morality of the natural man — morality in the state of *sin*. The third, the morality of man reconciled and united with God by regeneration; or morality in the state of grace." A student acquainted with English works will at once see from these few words, how great is the difference between German methods and ours. Most German works, however, confine their attention to the last of these three sections; for example Harless, whose work falls into the three divisions, *Heilsgut*, *Heilsbesitz*, *Heilsbewahrung*. For including the other two sections in his treatise Dr. Wuttke has been much criticised. The first is described as useless; for it is asked: What do we know of the moral in itself, apart from, prior to sin? We are of a different opinion; and Dr. Wuttke has confirmed our belief both in the possibility and usefulness of such an undertaking. Indeed, unless *Christian* ethics and *ideal* ethics can be shown to be essentially identical, the former can never stand their ground; in other words, Christian ethics, with the exception of such duties (repentance, etc.) as have been created by sin, must be demonstrated to be the revelation of ideal ethics. The second section, with a considerable part of the historical review, some may think out of place in a handbook of *Christian* ethics.

The second, or ideal, part falls into six sections: I. The moral subject, r *man* as an individual and as a social being. II. God as the ground

and archetype of moral life and the source of law. III. The objects of moral action; viz. God and the creature. IV. Moral motives. V. Moral action (1) considered in itself, as *preservative*, *appropriative*, and *formative*; and (2) the relation of these forms to its objects. VI. The fruit of moral life considered as the moral end.

The third part is divided into seven chapters: I. Nature and origin of sin. II. God in his relation to sinful man, as punishing, loving, chastising. III. The moral consciousness in the state of sin. IV. The objects of the moral relationship. V. Sinful motives. VI. Sinful action considered in itself and in relation to its objects, as opposed to moral preservation, appropriation, and formation. VII. The fruit of sin, in the individual, in society, in nature, in the future. The fourth and most important part comprises six sections: I. God as the Redeemer, and his holy will concerning the redeemed. II. Man redeemed, in his individual and social capacity. III. The objects of the moral activity of the redeemed; to wit, God and the creature. IV. The moral motives of the regenerate. V. The moral action of the redeemed, as distinguished *in itself* into endurance, warfare, preservation, appropriation, formation; and the bearing of these distinctions on its various objects — God, ourselves, other men, nature. VI. The goal and fruit of moral life, and the Christian's relation thereto. This goal as the good of the individual, the family, of society, of the state and of the church.

The sections in the three parts just sketched will be seen to bear a considerable similarity to each other; there is, consequently, a certain amount of repetition. The repeated thoughts, however, are presented in each case from a new point of view.

Let us now direct attention to one or two individual points. It is unnecessary to say that it is out of the question that we should here examine and pronounce on the system as a whole.

Dr. Wuttke answers the question "What is the moral?" as follows: "*The moral* is the good, so far as it is realized by the free-will of a rational creature." But what then is *the good*? His answer runs: "The moral idea is based on the idea of an *end* or *aim*. An aim or end is an idea which is to be realized by a vital movement. Whatever corresponds to an idea is relatively thereto *good*. Truly good, good in the fullest sense, is that which corresponds to a rational, that is, to a divine idea — which perfectly expresses a divine idea in actuality." "For me everything is truly good that aids me in attaining the true perfection willed for me by God; or, in the last instance, this perfection itself." The difference between man and other creatures is, that the latter have the good in them as a necessary law; man as a free law, or *command*. In nature the end realizes itself; in man the free-will gives it reality.

His definition of *conscience* is not so precise as we should have wished. On the one hand, he says: "Conscience *is* the *revelation* of the divine will

to the moral subject, given in the rational self-consciousness; conscience is the certitude of the moral"; "the consciousness of the moral law, which must go before every moral judgment, is the inmost essence of conscience itself." On the other hand, he represents it as a faculty, without which we could no more have moral ideas than we could see light or colors without the eye. We think Dr. Wuttke is chargeable here with a use of figurative language, which is out of place in a work claiming scientific exactness. *God's revelation is the light in which conscience sees and judges;* not the conscience itself. Perhaps, too, this is what our author means.

What constitutes the moral quality of an action? Dr. Wuttke answers: "The moral quality appertains neither to the motive alone, nor to the act alone: neither to the end or intent alone, nor to the means alone; but to both in their oneness. A good end does not sanctify the means; nor a good means the end; but a good end can be reached alone by good means. An end which *could* be reached by immoral means must itself be immoral." We are rather disposed to think that there is a little unnecessary hair-splitting here, arising from forgetfulness of the circumstance that the motive covers and determines not merely the end, but also the means; so that we may, after all, say the moral quality of an action is constituted by the motive or aim.

Dr. Wuttke's view of the relation between religion and morality is sound. "Neither religion nor morality is possible, the one without the other. Both religion and morality bring man into relationship to God. In religion, however, man's relation is more receptive; in morality, more active; in the former, he rises to fellowship with God; in the latter, he manifests this fellowship by bringing out the divine image in himself and the outer world." It is obvious that if we see light alone in God's light, true morality without true godliness is impossible, whatever modern atheists may say to the contrary.

One of the most peculiar features of the system is its classification of all human activity under the three rubrics — preservation (*schonen*), appropriation (*aneignen*), and formation (mould, *bilden*). These are the modes of the activity itself, considered in itself; each, of course, expresses itself differently, according to the difference of its objects. Dr. Wuttke expounds the matter as follows: "As the aim of all truly moral activity is to produce an agreement between the acting person and the moral object, it stands related on the one hand to the former as its starting-point, on the other hand to the latter as its goal. This agreement therefore may be brought to pass in two ways; either by *appropriation* or *formation;* that is, either by the object being subordinated to the subject, or the subject to the object. But as every form of being, so far as it is good, has essential rights of its own, it has rights relatively to the activity of a moral person; in other words, the right of appropriation or formation is not unconditioned, but limited by the inherent rights of the object. Both

modes of moral activity are limited, accordingly, by a third — by the recognition of the rights of the object of activity, in other words, by *preservation*. Preservation would seem indeed to be a merely passive relation, but Dr. Wuttke shows that it implies action. It is action in the form of self-restraint. On the part of governments, it is the recognition of the principle of self-government. Such a division has obviously many advantages; though we may doubt its naturalness or sufficiency.

Among the necessary conditions of morality, our author adduces *faith in immortality*, and we think justly. His remarks on the subject are marked by great warmth and point. Referring to the recognized duty of man to sacrifice his life for the attainment of a great moral end, he says: "A world in which the good could only be accomplished at the cost of the annihilation of the being whose duty it is to accomplish it, would be a totally perverse world, and would have no right to impose moral duties at all."

The parts of the work which have pleased us least are those which treat of governments and subjects; for there the author's Prussian, or rather Middle Age, absolutistic ideas come into play.

We had marked many other chapters, passages, and points for notice; but must draw to a close. We have been specially interested in the paragraphs on the *revelation of the divine will to man*, and on *things allowed* as distinguished from things *enjoined*.

Dr. Wuttke's work is enriched with constant references to the scripture; and has besides an excellent table of contents and index. With all its faults it is adapted to do good service, and is deserving the attentive study of every theologian and pastor. It is a good sign for Germany that a second edition of such a book has been called for in so short a time.

Christliche Sittenlehre (Christian Ethics). *Von Dr. C. F. Schmid, late Professor of Theology at the University of Tübingen.* Stuttgart: G. G. Liesching; London: Asher and Co. 1861. — The posthumous work of one of the soundest theologians of Germany: a man to whom such living coryphaei as Dorner have looked up with profound respect. What we have remarked above, and in a previous number in connection with Harless's Christian Ethics, concerning the difference between Anglo-American and German methods, applies in the fullest sense to Dr. Schmid's work. It is a thoroughly and profoundly *Christian* book. Here there is no shilly-shallying between the natural reason and the mind of the spirit; the decision of the latter alone is *duty*, unconditioned duty. "The subject of Christian ethics is Christian truths, so far as they, on the one hand, teach us what is morally good, and, on the other hand, move the will to realize the good, determining the mode and motives of the realization." A number of points which never occur in our ordinary works on moral philosophy, such as faith, regeneration, repentance, the bondage of sin, sanctification,

Christian conflict, and so forth, find here a profound and sober treatment. Dr. Schmid's mind seems to have been of the heavy artillery kind. His book is not light reading; its outward crust is hard, and sometimes unpromising; but we can promise earnest readers sound and strong nutriment below. Like Wuttke, he gives at the beginning a brief history of Christian ethics. His method is very different from that of the last-mentioned writer; considerably more complicated, as it strikes us; but the substance is essentially the same. We have now introduced to our readers three excellent works on this important subject; but scarcely know which to commend most, for each has its own special excellences and defects.

The Book of Ruth, in Hebrew and Chaldee. Edited by the Rev. C. H. H. Wright, M.A. Dresden, London, and Leipsic. 1864. — The able and industrious author of this work has had two objects in view; first to exhibit a specimen of a minute collation of Hebrew MSS., embracing not merely varieties in the consonants, but also in the Masoretic vowels and accents; and secondly to supply junior students with such assistance as may be needful in their early attempts to read Hebrew. Scholars like Rödiger, Thenius, Riehm, Flügel, have borne such testimony to the thoroughness with which Mr. Wright has executed the first part of his task that it is unnecessary for us to add anything. We will only give our testimony regarding the second part; and we must say that it seems admirably adapted to the object in view. There is enough help to encourage an industrious student, and not enough to spare him independent labor. The help, too, is just of the kind that one most needs in commencing Hebrew; i.e. he supplements his own explanations by exact references to grammars (Conant's Gesenius and Kalisch). A short specimen will best illustrate our meaning. "Chap. i. vs. 1. וירחי. The usual phrase used in the commencement of a work, serving to connect it with preceding times. On form, vid. Ges. § 74; rem. 3 *e* Kal. § LXVII. 15 *c*. On the impersonal use of the 3d pers., Ges. § 134. 2; Kal. § 101. 1. On the ו, vid. Ges. § 126, *b*. 2.; Kal. § 95. 1. בימי. On the dagh., vid. Ges. § 21. 1; Kal. § 5. 7. *c*. On the noun, vid. Ges. § 94 2; Kal. § XXXII." This is precisely the help we should have welcomed when a student. The selection of Ruth is also thoroughly wise. The mechanical execution is what one would expect from a first-class Leipsic printing firm.

Philosophy of Religion.

Die philosophisch-kritischen Grundsätze der Selbstvoraussetzung oder Religionsphilosophie. Von G. Mehring. (The philosophico-critical principles of the Presupposition of the self, or the Philosophy of Religion.) Stuttgart: Chr. Belser; London: Asher and Co. 1864. — We do not remember ever to have opened a book with so *uncanny* a title as this of the highly respected Prelate Mehring; but our readers may be assured that its great

substance is both very interesting and very intelligible. The strange expression "*presupposition of the self*" is chosen purposely in order to indicate the goal aimed at as *barely* as possible, that is, as far as possible without positively affirming anything as to its nature. It is obviously out of the question to give an account here of Prelate Mehring's entire system; we shall therefore limit ourselves to a summary of the table of contents, a description of his point of view, and reference to the interesting chapter on miracles. The work is divided into three parts, of which the first is devoted to the *Presupposition of the self;* the second, to *Revelation;* the third, to the *History of Revelation.* In the second part such questions are discussed as natural and revealed religion; inspiration; prophecy; the God-man; miracles; faith and knowledge; the scriptures. In the third, creation; the original state of man; providence; the primal revelation, etc; the fall and its consequences; the method, work, and goal of redemption.

The point of view is the following: Our *human self* is not an absolute, self-existent being, but finite; it has become what it is. This circumstance alone warns a thoughtful mind to ask: *How* has it become what it is? *What* is presupposed by its being, constitution and activities? We find that this self, this self-conscious unity, develops three different modes of activity — knowledge, feeling, and volition. Each of these activities must be examined to ascertain, whether it does not point to something necessarily going before itself, and what that something is. Now each of them actually does point to a background; but none of the three tells us what the background is. We may, indeed, hastily say, the background is God; but our premises do not warrant the conclusion. With equal justice another might say, what you call God is, for knowledge, the category of substance or the eternal movement of thought; for feeling, a personification of our longing; for volition, the sublimated idea of our causative energy. This is the course taken by Teugbach.

Looking further, however, we find these activities concentrated in a centre, which we designate our *personality.* The only satisfactory presupposition of the human personality is the personal God. Here is the bridge, or the premise, we lacked before. We should have been glad to give a view of the course taken by the argument at this point, for it is marked by much subtilty and suggestiveness; but we have not space. To our mind, it is clear that the point of departure selected by Prelate Mehring is substantially right; though an Anglo-Saxon mind would treat the subject less abstractly than our author has done.

A few words now on the chapter on *Miracles:* a crucible in which a Christian thinker may, nay *must*, at once test every system of religious philosophy. The term "miracle" marks the relation in which a particular fact stands to an already settled system of knowledge, usually empirical. If the fact harmonize with the system, it is called natural; if no place can be assigned it, we give it an exceptional position outside the system, — we

call it either marvellous or miraculous. This exceptional position, however, may in time be exchanged for a position in an enlarged system. Rationalists assert that all so-called miracles are destined to be thus removed from the one sphere to the other. With regard to marvels this is true; but the question is: Whether a something absolutely new, something in no sense derivable from existing causes extraneous to God, is not possible. Dr. Mehring affirms this possibility, and establishes it very correctly by a reference to the nature of personality in general, and of the primal person, God, in particular. One of the essential features of personality is the power of beginning something; in other words, to be a *cause;* whereas in nature there are no causes proper. The primal personality has of course the power of making an absolute beginning; and such a beginning is a miracle relatively to the existing order of things. In short, the question of miracles depends on the question of a living God.

With this very scanty, but already too extended, notice, we commend Dr. Mehring's book to the discriminating study of all theologians.

The Mosaic Account of Creation and Natural Science.

Die Schöpfungsgeschichte nach Naturwissenschaft und Bibel (Creation according to Natural Science and the Bible). *Von Prof. F. W. Schultz, Breslau.* Gotha: F. A. Perthes; London: Asher and Co. 1865. 2 Thaler. — Prof. Schultz, of the University of Breslau, the author of a Commentary on Deuteronomy, written in the spirit of his master, Hengstenberg, has here attempted a new reconciliation of the claims of science and of faith. The work is divided into the following main sections: Natural Science: I. The Bible in Relation to Natural Science: 1. The Primal Creation (Gen. i. 1); 2. The Primal condition of the Earth; 3. The Formative Creation (Gen. i. 3 – ii. 3). II. The Differences between Natural Science and the Bible, and their Reconciliation: 1. The Principal Attempts at Reconciliation; 2. Solution of the Difficulties; 3. Scriptural Evidence in favor of the Position taken. III. The Bible and Natural Science in relation specially to the Creation of Man and to the Close of Creation. Under each of these heads a large amount of valuable information, clearly and interestingly put, and much suggestive thought and argument are collected, for the sake of which alone the work deserves attention. We must confine our notice, however, to one or two points of central import.

The general spirit of the work is expressed in the following words: "Neither by rejecting nor limiting the results arrived at by natural science, nor by any mere mode of explaining the Mosaic narrative, shall we be able to get over the differences to which we have called attention; but solely by gaining truer insight into the entire nature of revelation." With regard to the spiritual significance of the Mosaic narrative, Prof. Schultz

says: "The great truths meant to be inculcated by this account, to wit: that the world has not existed from eternity; that it is not self-developed, but a divine creation; that God created it gradually; that he brought the single creatures into existence out of general sub-strata, in natural order and succession; that he consequently produced each new creature on the basis, and by the help of what went before; and that he brought everything to the perfection necessary for the existence and development of man — remain untouched by natural science. If they are assailed at all, it is by *irreligion*, not by *science*." But even the order in which Genesis represents creation to have taken place, Prof. Schultz shows, in substantial agreement with Hugh Miller, to agree in the main with that which natural science recognizes. The most important difficulties then remaining, are that creation is described as the work of a *few days*, and as divided into *stadia*, distinct from, and successive to, each other. These two difficulties Prof. Schultz meets by the following suggestion — not to be identified with the *long-day* theory advocated by Hugh Miller, M'Means, Delitzsch, and others — "We have to do here, not with an historical narrative, whose facts and circumstances impose precise conditions of time and circumstance on the narrator, but with a *revealed picture* of that which could not be viewed in itself, or by a physical eye, but solely in its idea, that is, in God's thought, by the spiritual eye. Now if we can only establish this one point, that a narrative of such a character *must* represent things as a single fact and as comprised within one day, because of their inner unity in the divine mind, which in reality required for their realization many facts and long spaces of time, these difficulties will surely be set aside without sacrificing anything of the Bible." That this may be the case he tries to show from the analogy of prophecy, and by applying the principle to the narrative itself. But we must now close. Prof. Schultz's idea is worthy of a careful examination, especially as he is himself a man who thoroughly values his Bible; but whether it offers a complete solution is another question.

Manetho: The Beginnings of our History and Chronology. By Dr. Auton Heine. Gotha: F. A. Perthes; London: Asher and Co. 1865. — Dr. Heine believes that he has discovered the chronological statements of Manetho's third book, which were believed by Bunsen and Lepsius to have been lost; and claims therefore to have found the key to the chronology of the Pharaohs. The results of his deciphering of Manetho's work are laid down in this publication. Among other important features, it professes to establish the chronology of the Jewish patriarchs, judges, and kings, and to set the truth of the Biblical record in the strongest light. As the work is dedicated to the celebrated Orientalist, Fallmerager, and Dr. Heine's labors have been favorably noticed by him, we presume it must be accepted as able.

Christliche Klänge aus den griechischen und römischen Klassikern (Christian Accords from the Greek and Roman Classics). *Von Prof. R. Schneider.* Gotha: F. A. Perthes; London: Asher and Co. 1865. — A delightful collection of illustrations and proofs of the truth of such passages as, "He left not himself without witness, in that he did good, etc"; "That they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him and find him, though he be not far from every one of us; for in him we live and move and have our being"; "Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons; but in every nation he that feareth him and worketh righteousness is accepted with him." The passages selected are arranged according to the Lutheran Catechism; those from the Greek classics are translated into German; the comparison is of course made with Luther's translation. All we need do by way of further recommendation of a book, for which we are sure hundreds of theologians have longed, is to say that it ends with a detailed index, and is in excellent taste. The following will give our readers a glimpse of the character of the work. Demosthenes says: πᾶς ἐστι νόμος εὕρημα μὲν καὶ δῶρον θεῶν, Every law is a discovery and gift of the gods. Aristotle says, with Paul: πάσῃ θνητῇ φύσει γενόμενος ἀθεώρητος, ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων θεωρεῖται ὁ θεός, God who is invisible to mortal natures is known by his works. Ideo difficulter ad sanitatem pervenimus, quia nos aegrotare nescimus. — Seneca. Ut ipsa mens se agnoscat conjunctamque cum divina mente se sentiat, *en quo insatiabili gaudio completur.* — Cicero.

Christian Evidences.

Apologetische Beiträge (Apologetic Contributions). *Von. Dr. Friedrich Düsterdieck.* Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht; London: Asher and Co. 1865. Price 16 sgr. — Dr. Düsterdieck's book contains some admirable arguments in defense of the resurrection of Christ; but is mainly devoted to the subject of inspiration, in its relation to the individuality of the sacred writers and their real or supposed mistakes. He himself believes that they did make mistakes; for example, the mistake of expecting that Christ's second coming would take place immediately. But in allowing this, he deems himself not to be in any measure detracting from their authority. He says, on the one hand: "I hold to a view of inspiration which admits of the possibility of error on the part of the inspired writers — error not merely in historical and similar external matters, but even in matters affecting doctrine" (such as the second coming); but, on the other hand: "*I reject every theory* of the nature of the scriptures and of the inspiration of its writers as *false and destructive*, which is incompatible with the words of Paul in 1 Thess. ii. 13: "When ye received the word of God which ye heard of us, ye received it not as the word of men, but *as it is in truth, the word of God.*" Our readers will

feel, we think, that we have given them here a hard problem to solve; we can only say, without at all intending to endorse Dr. Düsterdieck's views, that the problem is worth solving; for he is, what few have been who could go so far, evidently animated by a profound conviction of the unspeakable worth and absolute authority of the scriptures. One other brief extract to illustrate the spirit of the book. In answer to an opponent who may be supposed to say, "Prove to us that such an inspiration as you refer to actually exists," he says: "There is only one source from which we can draw convincing evidence of the reality, and a clear notion of the nature of inspiration; to wit, the divinely inspired writings themselves. But this is surely reasoning in a circle! Certainly it is; and we always must reason in a circle, when our reasoning relates, not to mere *intellectual entities*, but to *actual living phenomena*." To use a homely illustration, we can never prove that sugar is sweet to a man who will not taste it. We can most conscientiously and earnestly recommend the perusal of the book, even to those who know that they will be unable to accept the author's view of inspiration; for it contains very much with which even the strictest may agree, both on this and other questions of Christianity.

The Immaculate Conception.

Die römische Lehre von der unbefleckten Empfängniss aus den Quellen dargestellt und aus Gottes Wort widerlegt (The Romish doctrine of the Immaculate Conception exhibited from the original sources, and refuted from God's word). *Von Lic. Dr. Ed. Preuss.* Berlin: Schlawitz; London: Asher and Co. 1865.—We know of few arguments for the necessity of a mediator like the God-man, Christ, so forcible as the remarkable, historical phenomenon of Mariolatry. Dr. Preuss traces out the history of the gradual rise of the doctrine of the immaculate conception, which forms the necessary basis and justification of the practice of Mariolatry. His work, though based on many years' careful study of the original documents, is remarkably well-written—so written that an intelligent reader will scarcely lay it down if he once properly begins. This is praise that one can, unfortunately, seldom bestow on German scientific publications. Our space will prevent us from doing more than refer to one very interesting fact which he brings to light; that, though the *festival of the conception* of the Virgin was first celebrated in Lyons, the justification and firm establishment of the festival by the affirmation of her *immaculate* conception proceeded from Oxford! John Duns Scotus, Doctor subtilis, was the first formally to announce this most anti-Christian doctrine. It is pleasing to find that St. Bernard was one of its most earnest opponents. Dr. Preuss's book deserves to have a very wide circulation.

Commentar über das neue Testament (Commentary on the New Testament). *Von Dr. H. A. W. Meyer.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ru-

precht; London: Asher and Co. 1865.—This is a new edition of Meyer's Commentary, which is publishing in parts at a considerable reduction from the ordinary price. It is to be completed in fifty-six parts at 10 sgr. per part, being thus cheaper than usual by one sixth. A subscriber is at liberty to leave off at any point, but must begin with Matthew unless he should already be in possession of one or more portions. It would be needless for us to say anything in recommendation of a commentary now appearing in its *fifth* edition, and which is universally allowed to be one of the most thorough, candid, learned, and clear commentaries on the entire New Testament that Germany has produced. It is decidedly preferable to de Wette. The publishers deserve the thanks of all theologians and clergymen for so materially facilitating the acquisition of this important work.

Praktische Auslegung des Briefes an die Colosser (Practical Exposition of the Epistle to the Colossians). *Von Theophil Passavant.* Basel: Bahnmaier's Verlag; London: Asher and Co. 1865.—Passavant, a highly esteemed, thoughtful Swiss clergyman, who died a short time ago, was the author also of practical expositions on the epistles to the Ephesians and Philippians. So far as the term "practical" means shallow, or diffuse, or sermon-crutchy, it does not apply to this book; it is rich in thought, in the wisdom that comes of experience, in biblical reference, and in appropriate extracts. Though not directly apologetical, it by no means lacks hints of that character. As in the best sense a practical unfolding of the glorious substance of Paul's epistle we commend the book to such as may be able to read German.

Das Apostolische Glaubensbekenntniss für die Gemeinde erklärt (Lectures or Sermons on the Apostolic Creed). *Von Dekan Hirzel, Canton Zürich.* Zürich: Carl Meyer; London: Asher and Co. 1865. 12 sgr. —Six solid apologetic sermon-lectures on fundamental points of the Christian faith. The following remark on the subject of the union of God and man in Christ will illustrate the spirit of the author: "Human nature is in itself susceptible of the divine; nay more, man is constituted truly man by his capability of a fellowship with God, such that God himself can dwell and live in him. The very men who deny the Divinity of Christ most stoutly, speak oftenest of the God in their own breast, in their own spirit, as though he dwelt and lived in *them alone.* Now whereas we are mere individuals, possessing human nature in a limited and sin-defaced form, Christ is *the man* who represents human nature in its entirety and unmutilated perfection. How much more then must God be able to dwell in and be united with Him."

ARTICLE IX.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THE VICARIOUS SACRIFICE, GROUNDED IN PRINCIPLES OF UNIVERSAL OBLIGATION. By Horace Bushnell. 8vo. pp. 522. New York: Charles Scribner and Co. 1866.

This volume will probably be less acceptable to the public than some other of Dr. Bushnell's volumes have been. It will not, like some of them, enlist in its favor any particular school or party of theologians. It does not, so much as some of them, electrify the reader with the touches of a rich and fervid piety. It will not, so much as some of them, charm the popular mind with brilliant imagery and wealth of rhetorical diction. We detect in the volume its author's gorgeousness of imagination, but not his most captivating appeals to the fancy of the people. We discover here, as in his other works, a genius which will command admiration; but this genius is not combined with that accuracy of thought and statement which is more essential on the subject of the vicarious sacrifice than on any other.

One fault of the volume is, that it does not conform to the common law of language. It so often gives a new meaning to old words, that we are in constant fear of misunderstanding it. The very title of the book suggests an illustration of what we mean. The term "vicarious sacrifice" was never used before as it is used here. Dr. Bushnell appears to acknowledge that such is the fact, and in this instance prevents our misapprehending him; but in other instances he leaves us in doubt.

Another fault of the volume is, that it does not give a full and accurate statement of the doctrines which it opposes. It animadverts, for example, with some severity on the theory of atonement as held by Drs. Edwards, Smalley, Griffin, and others. "Christ, they conceived, has simply shown by his death the same abhorrence to sin that would have been shown by the punishment of the guilty" (pp. 365, 366). But Dr. Bushnell replies: "Abhorrence to sin expresses almost nothing that would be expressed by punishment. Abhorrence is a word of recoil simply, and not a word of majesty. There is no enforcement, no judicial vigor in it. I may abhor what I am only too weak, or too much in the way of false pity, to handle with due severity. It does not even require a perfect being to abhor sin, especially in the wicked forms of it, [what are, and what are not the wicked forms of sin?] that is, to draw back from it, as being disgusted and shocked by it" (p. 367). We object to these and similar remarks of Dr. Bushnell, because they fail to exhibit, justly and completely, the theory which he here impugns, and which we believe to be the substantial truth. The theory is, that God expresses in the atonement as fully as in the infliction

of eternal punishment, not only his abhorrence of sin, but also his determination to punish the incorrigible sinner, his regard for his law, for the honor of his retributive justice, for holiness in all its forms.

Dr. Bushnell adds, that the sufferings of Christ do not express God's abhorrence of sin; and also that the Edwardean theory tacitly admits the very dogma which it was intended to deny, i.e. the strictly penal nature of Christ's sufferings (pp. 369–371). On the same principle he ought to have added, that the curse upon the ground, Gen. iii. 17, 18, does not express God's abhorrence of sin; and that if we believe that it does, we must believe that the ground is literally punished. But may not a man consistently believe that the present state of the earth itself exhibits the divine hatred of sin, and still deny that the earth is actually suffering the penalty which the divine law threatens against sin? On a similar principle, may not a man consistently believe that the sufferings of Christ are a manifestation of God's abhorrence of moral wrong, and yet are not the threatened penalty of the law?

Another fault of this volume is, that it insists on statements which it does not attempt to prove, and which ought not to be insisted on without proof. When he affirms that the New England theory of the atonement contains a latent admission that Christ was literally punished, he ought to have defined the word "punishment," and then adduced some reasons for asserting that on this theory Christ suffered the legal penalty which had been threatened against sinners. So, when he opposes the older theory of expiation, he describes it as involving the idea "that the sacrifice offered softens God, or assuages the anger of God;" "it throws in before God, or the gods, some deprecatory evil, in the expectation that the wrath may be softened or averted by it" (p. 486). Dr. Bushnell admits, that "the advocates of Christian expiation do not define it in the terms which he has given" (p. 488). He ought also to admit that they expressly deny the propriety of these terms. They often disclaim the idea as fully as Dr. Bushnell disclaims it. "And yet," he says, "they do mean, if we take their whole mental content, something more [than a bloody sacrifice], viz. just what I have described" (p. 488). But is this their uniform meaning? We think that Dr. Bushnell should have stated, what the New England divines have so often affirmed, that the old theory of expiation contradicts itself; professedly it disclaims the notion that God is mutable, is softened, is "turned from wrath to grace," but it conducts some of its processes on the supposition that he is literally pacified, and transformed from a state of anger without mercy to a state of mercy without anger. In which of its processes does it tacitly ascribe this change to the divine mind? It seems to us, that Dr. Bushnell should have specified what these processes are, and should have adduced proofs that the old theory is inconsistent with itself. It is not exactly fair to charge the older divines with believing that God was made gracious by the atonement, for they affirm that they

do not believe it. On the other hand, it is not exactly fair to affirm, that they never conduct their reasonings on the basis of the theory that God is made gracious by the atonement, for they do sometimes proceed on this basis. Still it is of no avail for an author to insist that this is their latent assumption, unless he *prove* that it is so; and Dr. Bushnell does not give us this proof. The New England divines do not reject the old Calvinism, but they adopt its main principles, and discard such of its processes as contravene these principles, and thus they frame a "consistent Calvinism."

One of the most serious faults of the volume is, that it "confounds things which are different." An instance of this is the manner in which the different kinds of obligation are confused one with another. We do not suppose that Dr. Bushnell really believes, yet he uses such language as makes the impression, that to provide an atonement was the duty of Jehovah, in the same sense in which it is the duty of a man to avoid injustice; that to open a way of salvation for sinners was obligatory upon God, in the same sense in which it is obligatory upon man to avoid malevolence. If such ideas were correct, they ought to be expressed with more care, in order to avoid the aspect of irreverence. But we think that they are incorrect. There is a wide difference between a duty to avoid malice and a duty to exercise grace, as also between the obligation of a creature and the obligation of a sovereign Creator. We presume that Dr. Bushnell never intends, yet he seldom avoids the appearance of intending, to reject the distinction between positive and negative virtues, perfect and imperfect obligation. The neglect of this distinction will confuse our ideas of the atonement and of the entire kingdom of God.

Some of the gravest mistakes of the volume are found in its representations of law, of retributive justice, and of punishment. But within the limits of a book-notice we cannot fairly describe Dr. Bushnell's views of these topics. It is too easy, as it is too common, to misrepresent them. An Article upon them, which was intended for the present number of the Bibliotheca Sacra, we hope to insert at a future time. Meanwhile we must add, that although the author does not manifest in some parts of the volume his usual originality of mind, yet he has developed an uncommon degree of independence on the topics last named. We wish that he had devoted as much freshness of thought to the defence as he has devoted to the subversion of the doctrine, that the sufferings of Christ were substituted for the punishment of sinners.

Essays on the Supernatural Origin of Christianity, with special Reference to the Theories of Renan, Strauss, and the Tübingen School. By Rev. George P. Fisher, M.A., Professor of Church History in Yale College. 8vo. pp. 586. New York: Charles Scribner and Co. 1866.

These essays are written in an easy and pleasant style. They are understood at once, and are precise as well as perspicuous. They embody the

results of careful reading, as well as of discriminating thought. They are suggestive and timely. So much has been said of German scepticism, that we have long needed an intelligible exhibition of its processes. Professor Fisher has described them candidly. He has thus illustrated the massiveness of the argument for historical Christianity. We have been particularly pleased with his second Essay, on the Genuineness of the Fourth Gospel, with his third, on the Recent Discussions upon the Origin of the First Three Gospels, with his fourth, fifth, and tenth, on various theories of Baur, and with his sixth and seventh, on the Mythical Theory of Strauss, and the Re-statement of this Theory. We have been less satisfied with his eleventh and thirteenth Essays. Still, we regard the whole work as a highly important contribution to our theological literature, and an honor to the American press.

Personal Reminiscences of the Life and Times of Gardiner Spring, Pastor of the Brick Presbyterian Church, in the City of New York. Vol. I. pp. 348. Vol. II. pp. 293. New York: Charles Scribner and Co. 1866.

We do not object to this work as egotistical; a volume of *personal* reminiscences must introduce the personal history of the author, and if he attempts to avoid an appearance of egotism he falls into the worse fault of affectation. We do not coincide with Dr. Spring in some of his statements; we think that he has misjudged some movements and some men; still, even these errors illustrate the spirit of the times in which he has lived, and are thus of some historical importance. We think that he has established several facts which have been doubted heretofore, and has answered some questions which need not be asked hereafter. The passages relating to his early life, his parents, his early theological friends, the Andover Seminary, the American Bible Society, are of permanent value.

The Works of Philip Lindsley, D.D., formerly Vice-President and President elect of the College of New Jersey; and late President of the University of Nashville, Tennessee. Edited by Le Roy J. Halsey, D.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary of the Northwest. With Introductory Notices of his Life and Labors, by the Editor. In three vols., 8vo. pp. 648, 720, 731. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co. 1866.

These volumes are beautifully printed. They embody the results of long-continued thought and of multifarious reading. They are monuments of the industry of their author. They will be of permanent historical value, as illustrating the progress of education in our country.

Lectures on Pastoral Theology. By Enoch Pond, D.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Bangor. 12mo. pp. 395. Andover:

Warren F. Draper; Boston: Gould and Lincoln; New York: Hurd and Houghton; Philadelphia: Smith, English, and Co.; Cincinnati. Geo. S. Blanchard and Co. 1866.

"The first edition of these lectures was published twenty years ago." "They have been entirely re-written, and several of them have received important modifications." They are composed in a perspicuous style, and abound with wise and pertinent counsels. Dr. Pond has many rare qualifications for an adviser in the department of Pastoral Theology, and has embodied in the present volume the results of a large experience in the practical duties of the ministry. All, especially youthful pastors, can derive much profit from these carefully elaborated lectures.

A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Genesis; with a new Translation. By J. G. Murphy, D.D., T.C.D., Professor of Hebrew, Belfast. With a Preface by J. P. Thompson, D.D., New York City. 8vo. pp. 535. Andover: Warren F. Draper; Boston: Gould and Lincoln; New York: Hurd and Houghton; Philadelphia: Smith, English, and Co; Cincinnati: Geo. S. Blanchard and Co. 1866.

"Dr. Murphy was born in 1808, in the village of Comber, County Down, about seven miles from Belfast, Ireland." "In 1836 he was ordained to the ministry in the Presbyterian Church," and after a pastorate of five years was appointed Head-Master of the Royal Academical Institution at Belfast. In 1847 he entered on his present Professorship of Hebrew in the Assembly's College at Belfast. He has published a Hebrew Grammar, has translated Keil's Commentary on Kings, and has nearly completed a Commentary on Exodus (Dr. Thompson's preface, pp. xi, xii). Dr. Murphy has prefixed a valuable preface and introduction to his Commentary, has given a new translation of Genesis, and "the Commentary is the complement of the translation. It is critical and exegetical; but, so far as these qualities are distinct, much more attention has been paid to the latter" (Author's Preface, p. xv). Dr. Murphy's style is perspicuous; his arrangement orderly; his treatment of his theme judicious. While we do not find in his work that mass of learning which distinguishes the German commentaries, we are not, on the other hand, embarrassed by that excess of quotation which sometimes disfigures these commentaries. Although we are not satisfied with all of Dr. Murphy's conclusions, yet we think that he gives to an English reader a clearer view of the book of Genesis than has been given by any other commentator who has written in the English language. The work may be advantageously studied by intelligent laymen, as well as clergymen. A good illustration of the intelligence and caution with which Dr. Murphy pursues his inquiries is given in § XI. pp. 85–94.

Commentary on the Gospel of St. John. By E. W. Hengstenberg, Professor of Theology, Berlin. Translated from the German.

Vol. II. 8vo. pp. 541. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co.; Dublin: John Robertson and Co. 1865.

In this volume the characteristics of Prof. Hengstenberg are conspicuous; his ingenuity and acuteness, his immense learning, his resolute and persistent spirit. We are often surprised at the power with which he seizes upon the minutest incidents, and groups them so as to sustain his own theories. Many of these theories will stand of themselves, but some of them need his skill in marshalling the slightest intimations which may help to bear them up. His opinions are defended with so much vigor, that they must command attention when they do not enforce assent.

The Centenary of American Methodism: A Sketch of its History, Theology, Practical System, and Success. Prepared by order of the Centenary Committee of the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church. By Abel Stevens, LL.D. With a Statement of the Plan of the Centenary Celebration of 1866, by John M'Clintock, D.D. 16mo. pp. 287. New York: Carlton and Porter. 1866.

The efforts which have been and will be made, during the present year, for the enlargement of the Methodist church are truly sublime. The present volume is intended and well adapted to aid these efforts. It fascinates the reader. It quickens his *personal* interest in the great and good men who have been conspicuous in the history of Methodism. Dr. Stevens aptly remarks: "There is much that is heroic and even romantic" in this history. The progress of the Methodist church has been so astonishing as to become, of itself, a strong argument for the church. Here, as elsewhere, the French proverb is verified: "There is nothing which succeeds with the world like a success."

The Women of Methodism: Its three Foundresses, Susanna Wesley, the Countess of Huntington, and Barbara Heck; with Sketches of their Female Associates and Successors in the early History of the Denomination. By Abel Stevens, LL.D. A Centenary Offering to the Women of American Methodism, from the American Methodist Ladies' Centenary Association. 16mo. pp. 304. New York: Carlton and Porter. 1866.

In its sketches of the "elect ladies" of Methodism, in its portraitures of earnest and ardent piety, this volume is fitted to engage the interest of every devout reader. Dr. Stevens, as in his other historical works, so in this, has rendered a service, not only to the great denomination with which he is connected, but also to all other denominations "that have obtained like precious faith with us."

An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, and of the principal Philosophical Questions discussed in his Writings. By John Stuart Mill. 2 vols. Boston: William V. Spencer.

Mr. Spencer has done the American literary world a service by repub-

lishing, in very convenient and attractive form, this latest considerable work of Mr. Mill, and following it with the miscellaneous writings of the same author, in which various questions of social and political philosophy are ably discussed. John Stuart Mill is the son of the distinguished philosopher and writer, James Mill. He was born in 1806, and was educated mainly by his father. He early gave promise of ability, and in 1827 edited Jeremy Bentham's "Rationale of Judicial Evidence," which he supplied with notes and supplementary chapters. Writing freely for the reviews, he first became widely known as an independent thinker by his System of Logic, published in 1843. In 1848 he published his Principles of Political Economy. He has since published a work on Liberty, and another on Parliamentary Reform. In Philosophy he belongs to the school of sensationalists, denying the existence of *a priori* truths, affirming that knowledge is limited to phenomena, and is derived solely from experience. He maintains that we have no knowledge of things, but only of "impressions produced in our consciousness." Matter is reduced to a mere possibility of sensation: "Matter may be defined a permanent possibility of sensation" (I. 243). Mind is only a permanent possibility of feeling: "If I am asked whether I believe in matter, I ask whether the questioner accepts this definition of it. If he does, I believe in matter, and so do all Berkeleians." Truths which most philosophers consider as necessary and absolute are in his view contingent, the result of experience and association. The axioms of mathematics and morals are mere generalizations, and may be hereafter reversed. There is in them no element of necessity.

The position of Mr. Mill with respect to Sir William Hamilton is that of intense and almost universal antagonism. He sees in him little that is philosophically good or praiseworthy. On almost every point he disagrees with the Scottish philosopher; and where he accepts his conclusions it is only to show that though true they are inconsequent, or half truths, or sustained on no good foundation, or better harmonize with other theories. The points which he examines are: The relativity of human knowledge, the doctrine of the absolute, the philosophy of the conditioned, consciousness, the belief in an external world, the law of inseparable association, the doctrine of unconscious mental modifications, and the theory of causation. Thence he proceeds to the topics included under the head of Logic, and then considers Hamilton's theory of pleasure and pain, the freedom of the will, and the study of the mathematics.

In this investigation Mr. Mill is clear, vigorous, earnest, and goes directly to the point. He avoids no difficulties, but marches squarely up to the apparently impregnable and unassailable points of his antagonist. But then he is sometimes unfair, superficial, and inconclusive. We are especially glad of this book, because it says all that can be said in favor of the "experiential" philosophy. There is no living writer on that side of the

question equal in acumen, in vigor, and manliness to Mr. Mill; and what he cannot prove will not, to this generation at least, be likely to be proved.

Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic have this disadvantage, that they are posthumous publications, edited, indeed, by friends deeply sympathizing with his philosophical opinions, but still without his final revision. Many things, doubtless, would have been modified, some errors corrected, and some inconsistencies harmonized, had he lived to complete his grand scheme and himself present it to the world. They have the advantage of a method both honest and severe, of a vigorous treatment which awakens the interest and stimulates the mind to the utmost, of a spirit humble and religious, and a generally healthful and sound direction.

"My efforts to enter into possession of the vast world of moral and metaphysical truth," says John Foster, "are like those of a mouse attempting to gnaw through the door of a granary." So have many thought besides him, and after all our nibbling we still remain on the outside. Still we may be approaching the interior, and every fair and manly and honest controversy may bring to us at least a modicum of truth as its result. As we have suggested before, while there seems to be in these volumes some personal animosity which may prevent a fair judgment, yet it is not Hamilton alone who is assailed in them, but the great structure of intuitional knowledge. This gives the work its true philosophical significance. It is full of seeds which may germinate and spring up in essential moral and practical results. Hamilton may be wrong, is undoubtedly so, in many important conclusions; but the sensational philosophy must go out into utilitarian ethics, and can hardly escape the doubt or denial of the fundamental doctrines of theology.

Massachusetts Ecclesiastical Law. By Edward Buck, of the Suffolk Bar. 12mo. pp. 310. Boston: Gould and Lincoln; New York: Sheldon and Co.; Cincinnati: Geo. S. Blanchard and Co. 1866.

Seldom is so much labor expended on a book as has been devoted to this. The author has been signally industrious in searching out the ecclesiastical cases which have been tried in our courts of law; and the numerous, almost inaccessible, results of councils, discussions in pamphlets and periodicals, relating to church discipline and government. The references to the larger and smaller publications on ecclesiastical affairs would alone be worth the price of the volume. The statements of ecclesiastical law are enlivened by allusions to various incidental topics, and by a subtile humor that underlies the technical phraseology. This technical phraseology is made as sparing as possible, and the volume, with its copious indexes, is readily understood by laymen as well as professional men. Baptists, Congregationalists, and Presbyterians will be especially interested in this work, although many of the principles of it are applicable to all other sects. Mr. Buck deserves the hearty thanks of the churches, not only in Massachusetts, but throughout the land, for his persevering toil.

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE ORIGIN OF THE GOSPELS.

BY REV. J. ISIDOR MOMBERT, D.D., LANCASTER, PA.

THE recent appearance of two notorious works, of unequal merit, directed against the authenticity of the evangelical record, induces us to subject the evidence for the genuineness of that record to a critical examination. We enter upon this task with no arbitrary prejudices or axioms, but look for the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. We do not begin our investigations with any *petitio principii* analogous to that of the romancing Rénan,[1] "that the Gospels are in part legendary is evident, since they abound with miracles and the supernatural," or to that of the finessing Strauss,[2] who postulates criteria to determine the genuineness of a writing, which, applied to other writings than the Gospels, would sweep out of existence well nigh every monument of antiquity. Our object is simply to examine the evidence in our possession, to test it fairly, without any *suppressio veri* or *suggestio falsi*, and to see if it is sufficient to justify our reception of the evangelical record. In doing so we shall adhere to the order pursued by Strauss, whose work, in point of learning and scholarship, is incomparably superior to the superficial, fantastic, and flippant production of the author

[1] Rénan, Vie de Jésus (9th ed.), Introd. p. xvi.

[2] Strauss, Leben Jesu (Berlin, 1864), pp. 40–47.

of the "Vie de Jésus." We adopt the order of Strauss, not because it is the best, but because we are prepared to dispute with him every inch of ground, and because we write against him. His book is brimful of mischief; and, although as yet not before the public in English, it will doubtless be so before very long, "for Satan finds some mischief still for idle hands to do." A brief analysis of that work will not be deemed out of place here. It professes to be a life of *Jesus*, not a life of Christ. It eliminates the divine, the supernatural, and the miraculous from the life of Christ, and takes up the biography of Jesus. It proposes to deal with the Jesus of history, not with the Christ of faith. It affirms that "the conception of a life of Jesus is the snare in which the theology of our time had to be caught and to be ruined." In a chapter entitled "The Different Works on the Life of Jesus" the author takes occasion to give pretty rough handling to all who differ from him, and to castigate particularly those who since the appearance of his first work have been his most successful opponents. As a specimen, we give his caustic treatment of Neander. "Neander's Life of Jesus Christ has three mottoes, from Athanasius, Pascal, and Plato: all the good spirits of theology and philosophy were invoked in this last stress, but the only motto setting forth the spirit of the book, and a biblical one to boot, is wanting; to wit, the passage Mark ix. 24: 'Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief.'" [2] Ebrard, in particular, is denounced as "the representative of restored orthodoxy on the standpoint of impudence," while Rénan and Keim are hailed as welcome colleagues. Chapter II. takes up, *a*, the external evidence of the origin and date of the Gospels, and reaches the conclusion that it is wanting; *b*, the internal character of the Gospels, with the same result. Then follows, in two books, the life of Jesus. The first containing what pretends to be a historical sketch of the life of Jesus; the second, "the mythical history of Jesus, as to its origin and development," with the general result, which we put in the author's own words: "I

[1] Strauss, p. 5. [2] Strauss, p. 31.

do not believe that matters are so bad, as has been maintained, that we cannot know for certain of any one saying which the Gospels make Jesus utter, whether he really did utter it. I believe that there are some which, with all that probability beyond which it is impossible to go in matters of history, we may ascribe to Jesus, and I have endeavored to indicate above the marks by which they may be recognized. But this probability approaching certainty does not extend very far, and it is even worse about the acts and events of the life of Jesus, excepting his journey to Jerusalem and his death. Little is established, and just concerning that to which ecclesiastical belief is peculiarly linked — the miraculous and superhuman in the acts and experience of Jesus — it is rather an established fact that it did not take place. But that the salvation of man should depend upon the belief of things of which in part it is certain that they did not take place, in part uncertain whether they did take place, and only in the least part beyond doubt that they did take place; that the salvation of man should depend upon the belief of such things, I say, is so absurd as to render a refutation unnecessary now-a-days."[1] After this brief account of the whole work, we proceed to the consideration of the *external* evidence for the authenticity of the evangelical record; reserving the examination of the internal evidence for some future day.

Strauss (p. 47) admits that our four Gospels were extant towards the end of the second century, received in the church, and constantly quoted by Irenaeus in Gaul, Clement at Alexandria, and Tertullian at Carthage as the works of the apostles and apostle-disciples whose names they bear; but he calls attention to the circumstance that other Gospels were still in circulation, that the Gospel of the Hebrews and that of the Egyptians, the Gospels of Peter, Bartholomew, Thomas, Matthias, and the twelve apostles were not only in use among heretical sects, but also frequently cited by orthodox teachers of the church, although at that time, and ever

[1] Strauss, pp. 623, 624.

afterwards, the four Gospels of our canon were considered as the truly reliable foundations of the Christian faith. The question why just these four, neither more nor less, were regarded in that light he answers in the language of Irenaeus[1]: "The gospel is the pillar of the church, the church is diffused over the whole world, the world has four regions; it is therefore proper that there should be four Gospels. Again, the gospel is the divine breath or wind of life for mankind; now as there are four principal winds on earth, so there are four Gospels. Or as the world-creating Word is enthroned above the cherubim, the cherubim have four forms, so the Word has given us a four-formed gospel;" adding: "This singular argumentation must not be understood to intimate that said circumstances were the reason why Irenaeus received only four Gospels, neither more nor less; rather these four had at that time risen to pre-eminent esteem in the catholic church, which was earnestly striving for the unity of the faith, and Irenaeus sought to arrange this relation after the spirit of his age; but this arrangement shows that spirit to have been absolutely foreign to the spirit of our age — the spirit of intelligent criticism."[2]

We are surprised at this introductory paragraph, for it certainly tells decidedly against Strauss, notwithstanding the artistic skill with which he has *arranged* it. The fact that the four canonical Gospels were as early as towards the close of the second century regarded as embodying the only reliable groundwork of the Christian faith, and that in every section of the church, is surely highly creditable to the spirit of that age, a spirit which, so far from being credulous, was sufficiently critical to discard every spurious or apocryphal Gospel, and to fix upon the four canonical Gospels as alone entitled to confidence. Does the argus-eyed vigilance which presided over the canonical Gospels, the Briaerius-armed fortitude which flung every heretical, apocryphal, and uncanonical composition to the winds, not speak well for the critical acumen and integrity of the early custodians of the faith once

[1] Adv. Haeres., III. 11. 8. [2] Strauss, p. 48.

delivered to the saints? The argumentation of Irenaeus, according to Strauss himself, was not the reason why that eminent Father received the four Gospels only, but shows that the four Gospels, so far from *beginning* to be recognized as authoritative, had long since been received, and were universally acknowledged to be authentic, and so thoroughly established as to induce Irenaeus to illustrate their four-visaged aspect by cosmical and heavenly relations. "Irenaeus died in the second year after the close of the second century; but he had sat at the feet of the venerable, and by him much venerated, Polycarp, who himself had been the disciple of John, and had intercourse with other eye-witnesses of the evangelical history. Irenaeus, narrating this himself,[1] expressly and affectionately refers to the memorable information which Polycarp had received from the lips of John and other disciples of Jesus, adding that all was in perfect agreement with the scripture.[2] Are we nevertheless to suppose that Irenaeus did not hear Polycarp in any way refer to the Gospel of John, and yet did repose absolute faith in that Gospel, — he who used the pure word of the scriptures as a sacred weapon against heretics, the men of scripture interpolation, and of the apocrypha? To be sure this, as is obvious, brings us to John himself; but this support of the testimony of Irenaeus for our Gospels, and particularly for that of John, on Polycarp, and through him on John himself, has truly more authority than the supposition that the Gospel of John may have ap-

[1] Iren. adv. Haer. III. 3. 4; and especially his Epistle to Florinus in Euseb. Hist. Eccl. V. 20 (Iren. Opp., ed. Stieren, I. 822).

[2] Epist. ad Florinus: "Vidi enim te, quum adhuc puer essem, in inferiore Asia apud Polycarpum, quum in imperatoria aula splendide ageres et illi te probare conareris. Nam ea quae tunc gesta sunt melius memoria teneo, quam quae nuper acciderunt (quippe quae pueri discimus, simul cum animo ipso coalescunt eique penitus inhaerent), adeo ut et locum dicere possim in quo sedens beatus Polycarpus disserebat, processus quoque ejus et ingressus vitaeque modum et corporis speciem, sermones denique quos ad multitudinem habebat; et familiarem consuetudinem quae illi cum Johanne ac reliquis qui Dominum viderant intercessit, ut narrabat, et qualiter dicta eorum commemorabat; quaeque de Domino ex ipsis audiverat, de miraculis illius etiam ac de doctrina, quae ab iis qui verbum vitae ipsi conspexerant acceperat Polycarpus, qualiter referebat, cuncta scripturis consona."

peared suddenly in the earlier years of Irenaeus, say about 150, and that in the simplicity of his nature he reposed implicit faith in the same." [1]

The testimony of Papias, Bishop of Hierapolis in Phrygia, during the first half of the second century, found in a fragment of his work, λογίων κυριακῶν ἐξήγησις, given by Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. III. 39, has been used by Strauss, Rénan, and the whole infidel school for the purpose of invalidating all respect for the genuineness of the first two Gospels. Let us see what it is. That ancient writer says concerning Matthew: *Ματθαῖος μὲν οὖν ἑβραΐδι διαλέκτῳ τὰ λόγια συνετάξατο, ἡρμήνευσε δ' αὐτὰ ὡς ἦν δυνατὸς ἕκαστος*—"Matthew composed the sayings (of the Lord) in the Hebrew language, but every one interpreted them as he was able." That these λόγια denote the Gospel according to Matthew is admitted on most hands, even by Strauss. The term was so understood by all the patristic writers, and cannot well mean anything else, if we connect it, as we ought to do, with the notice of Papias concerning Mark, which immediately precedes the foregoing passage, and where the words, τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ χριστοῦ ἢ λεχθέντα ἢ πραχθέντα, are used as synonymous with κυριακῶν λογίων, for the sayings of Christ cannot well be separated from the works of Christ and still less can they be understood without the latter. In the same sense Ignatius (ad Smyrna, c. 3) calls the Acts of the Apostles λόγια ἀποστολικά. That Matthew composed his Gospel in Hebrew, that is in Aramaic, is not only asserted by Papias, but also by Irenaeus, Origen, Eusebius, Jerome, Epiphanius, and others.[2] The testimony

[1] Tischendorf, Wann wurden unsere Evangelien verfasst? Leipzig, 1865. A brief but most valuable contribution to the literature on the evangelical canon.

[2] Irenaeus, adv. Haer., III. 1, in Euseb. Hist. Eccl. V. 8: ὁ μὲν δὴ Ματθαῖος ἐν τοῖς ἑβραίοις τῇ ἰδίᾳ αὐτῶν διαλέκτῳ καὶ γραφὴν ἐξήνεγκεν εὐαγγελίον.

Origen, in Euseb. Hist. Eccl. VI. 25: πρῶτον μὲν γέγραπται τό κατὰ τὸν ..... Ματθαῖον, ἐκδεδωκότα αὐτὸ τοῖς ἀπὸ ἰουδαϊσμοῦ πιστεύσασι, γράμμασιν ἑβραϊκοῖς συντεταγμένον.

Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. III. 24, describes Matthew as πατρίῳ γλώττῃ παραδοὺς τὸ κατ' αὐτὸν εὐαγγέλιον. The same author relates, in Hist. Eccl. V. 10, that Pantaenus, after the middle of the second century, on a missionary journey to

of Papias is certainly not entitled to great respect, for the extracts from his work preserved by Eusebius abundantly justify the latter's estimate of his capacity, that he was a man of very limited intelligence (*σφόδρα σμικρὸν τὸν νοῦν*). But whatever may be said of him, the testimony of men like Irenaeus, Origen, and Eusebius deserves the very highest consideration. They do not enjoy the reputation of thoughtlessly repeating floating and unauthentic rumors, and they had, doubtless, good reasons, independent of the notice of Papias, for their assertion that Matthew's Gospel was originally composed in Hebrew. But where is that original Hebrew Gospel according to Matthew; and what authority have we to believe that Matthew's Gospel in Greek is identical with the Hebrew original? These are the real questions at issue, and we confess, they are almost impossible to solve. As to the first question, we have unfortunately no answer to make beyond the fact that it is no longer extant, and therefore have no means to determine, by a comparison of the Aramaic Gospel of Matthew with the canonical Greek Gospel of Matthew, whether the two are identical; but the universal reception of the Greek Gospel as that of Matthew by the very witnesses for the existence of an Aramaic original is certainly a strong argument for its genuineness; for if they had entertained any doubt of the genuineness of the Greek translation or version of Matthew they would have intimated as much. Moreover, there is no trace whatsoever of the existence of any other Greek version of Matthew's Gospel, and universal reception must here be deemed the strongest evi-

the Indies, found there persons acquainted with the Gospel of Matthew, to whom Bartholomew the apostle had preached, and left among them the Gospel of Matthew in Hebrew, which was preserved until that time.

The Synopsis s. s., appended to the works of Athanasius, says: *τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ Ματθ. εὐαγγέλιον ἐγράφη ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ματθ. τῇ ἑβραΐδι διαλέκτῳ.*

Epiphanius testifies the same, Haeres. XXIX. 9; XXX. 3; LI. 5.

Jerome, Catal. c. 4: "Matthaeus primus in Judaea propter eos, qui excircumcisione crediderant, evangelium Christi hebraicis literis verbisque composuit; quod quis postea in graecum transtulerit, non satis certum est." So in many other places.

dence of the authenticity, on the celebrated canon of criticism laid down by Tertullian (adv. Marcion, IV. 5): "In summa si constat id verius quod prius, id prius quod et ab initio, ab initio quod ab apostolis, pariter utique constabit id esse ab apostolis traditum quod apud ecclesias apostolorum fuerit sacrosanctum."

The assertion that the so-called Gospel according to the Hebrews is identical with the Hebrew original of Matthew's Gospel is simply gratuitous, but a comparison of all the notices concerning it which have come down to us renders it in the highest degree probable that it was a corrupted recension of Matthew, a spurious production, exhibiting some features of resemblance to our Matthew, but omitting much and adding more. It was held in very doubtful reputation, and, so far from being older than our Matthew, seems to be of later origin.[1] The hypotheses concerning the relation of the Gospel according to the Hebrews to our Gospel according to Matthew are endless, but the few fragments of the former in our possession are insufficient to establish more than has here been stated. Certainly to place the apocryphal Gospel according to the Hebrews on a level with our Matthew, as Strauss does, is purely arbitrary, and critically unfair; for while the latter is before us in its entireness, well authenticated by the universal consent of the most ancient and reliable witnesses, the former exists only in insulated passages,[2] accompanied by conflicting notices, the most trustworthy of which brand it as a spurious production; its universal rejection, as opposed to the universal reception of our Matthew, is

[1] Epiphanius, Haer. XXX. 13: ἐν τῷ γοῦν παρ' αὐτοῖς εὐαγγελίῳ, κατὰ Ματθ. ὀνομαζομένῳ, οὐχ ὅλῳ δὲ πληρεστάτῳ, ἀλλὰ νενοθευμένῳ, κ. τ. λ. The same author, l. c., gives us the following beginning of that Gospel: ὅτι ἐγένετό τις ἀνὴρ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦς, καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς ἐτῶν τριάκοντα, ὃς ἐξελέξατο ἡμᾶς καὶ ..... εἶπε· παρερχόμενος παρὰ τὴν λίμνην Τιβεριάδος ἐξελεξάμην Ἰωάννην καὶ Ἰάκωβον, υἱοὺς Ζεβεδαίου, καὶ Σίμωνα καὶ Ἀνδρεὰν καὶ Θαδδαῖον καὶ Σίμωνα τὸν ζηλωτὴν, καὶ Ἰούδαν τὸν Ἰσκαριώτην, καὶ σὲ τὸν Ματθαῖον καθεζόμενον ἐπὶ τοῦ τελωνίου ἐκάλεσα, καὶ ἠκολούθησάς μοι.

[2] The fragments may be seen in Fabricius, Cod. Apocryph. Nov. Test., I. 355 seq.; Grabe, Spicileg. patr., I. 25 seq.; De Wette, Einleit. (2d ed.), 82 seq., et al.

certainly a strong negative argument in favor of the ground we have taken.

But we have still to account for the existence of our Greek Matthew. Its internal structure, as we shall have occasion to show hereafter, bears the impress of originality, especially in its citations from the Old Testament, which neither agree uniformly with the Hebrew text nor with the LXX, and, although for the most part taken from the latter, evinces a freedom of treatment more suited to the plastic moulding of an author than to the constrained action of a mere translator. If our Greek Matthew is an original production, it may be either the work of Matthew himself, or that of some apostolical man, who made it under the personal direction of the apostle. Either hypothesis may be substantiated. Matthew wrote for the Jews, to show them that Jesus of Nazareth was the expected Messiah. Jews were scattered over the whole world.[1] A double version of his Gospel, emanating from himself, the one in Hebrew or Aramaic, for the Jews of Palestine, the other in Greek, for the Jews of the dispersion, comports well with the evident design of the Gospel, and does not conflict with the above-mentioned notices of Papias and Jerome.

Enough has been said to show that the data at our disposal do not warrant a positive conclusion, and still less a satisfactory solution of the whole subject; at the same time, it is abundantly manifest that the absolute rejection of Matthew's Gospel as an authentic document by Strauss and his sympathizers is an illustration of the unfairness and arbitrary procedure which characterize that school. We shall hereafter sum up the whole evidence for the canonical Gospels and have occasion to state the argument drawn from the existence of the Peschito and Itala versions, from the recently discovered most ancient Syriac text, and the Codex Sinaiticus, which clearly establishes the fact that about, or soon after, the middle of the second century the four Gospels

[1] Irenaeus, Origen, and Jerome say that it was written "for the Hebrews"; not for the Hebrews of Palestine only.

existed substantially in the same form in which we now have them; that the versions were made from the Greek text, and that the beginning of the evangelical canon must be placed at the end of the first century. Meanwhile we fully endorse Olshausen's remark concerning Matthew: "While all the Fathers of the church relate that Matthew has written in Hebrew, yet they universally make use of the Greek text as a genuine apostolic composition, without remarking what relation the Hebrew Matthew bears to our Greek Gospel; for that the earlier ecclesiastical teachers did not possess the Gospel of St. Matthew in any other form than we now have it, is established" (Echtheit, etc., p. 35).

The concurrent testimony of the ancient church makes the second canonical Gospel, that according to Mark, dependent on oral communications from Peter. The tradition, to be noticed presently, is more or less confirmed by the following data, drawn from the New Testament. Mark the Evangelist is identified with the "Mark whose surname was John," mentioned Acts xii. 12, 25, John being his Jewish name, and Mark his Latin surname. He was the son of a certain Mary, who lived at Jerusalem (Acts xii. 12), and to whose house Peter came after his deliverance from prison, and there found "many gathered together, praying"; he was probably a convert of Peter, who calls him "Marcus, my son" (1 Pet. v. 13), an expression which seems to imply that Mark was indebted to Peter for his new-birth, and certainly denotes a very intimate relationship. Mark was also a cousin (*ἀνεψιός*) of Barnabas (Col. iv. 10), and it was probably through the influence of the latter that he became early associated with Paul. The tradition that he was one of the seventy disciples cannot be substantiated, nor have we certain data that he was the young man, having a linen cloth cast about his naked body, who followed Christ on the night of his betrayal, and who, when seized by the young men, left the linen cloth, and fled from them naked (Mark. xiv. 51, 52), although this delicate mode of referring to himself is parallel to that of John (i. 40, xix. 26), and perhaps to that of Luke

(xxiv. 18). He accompanied Paul and Barnabas as their minister (ὑπηρέτης) on their first missionary journey, but, from some cause not known to us, he left them at Perga (Acts xiii. 13), and when Paul afterwards refused to take him as a companion on his second journey, he went with Barnabas to Cyprus (Acts xv. 36–40). At a later period we find him with Paul at Rome (Col. iv. 10; Philem. 24). Still later he had joined Peter at Babylon (1 Pet. v. 13), and was with Timothy at Ephesus when Paul wrote to him during his second imprisonment at Rome, and expressed the desire that Mark should return to him to Rome (2 Tim. iv. 11). He is said to have been the founder and first bishop of the church at Alexandria (Euseb. Hist. Eccl. II. 16; Hipp. Opp. p. 41). The testimony of the so-called Presbyter John, furnished by Papias (in Euseb. Hist. Eccl. III. 39), in the beginning of the second century, of Irenaeus (adv. Haer. III. 1. 1; 10, 6), of Tertullian (c. Marc. IV. 5), of Clement of Alexandria (in Euseb. Hist. Eccl. II. 15; VI. 14, and Adumbrat. in 1 Petri), of Origen (in Euseb. Hist. Eccl. VI. 25), of Jerome (Catal. c. 8, and Ep. ad Hedib. c. 11), of Epiphanius (Haer. LI. 6) and others, describes Mark as the companion and interpreter (ἑρμηνευτής) of the Apostle Peter. Although the testimony of these ancient writers is not identical in other particulars, they all agree in this, that Mark was the companion and interpreter of Peter. This well authenticated notice by no means contradicts the unquestionable fact that Mark aided Paul in the dissemination of the gospel; he felt attached to both, but more to Peter, his spiritual father, and there is nothing to preclude the possibility of his having been much with the latter.

The testimony of the Presbyter John, given by Papias (in Euseb. Hist. Eccl. III. 39) we give for convenience sake in English: "And John the presbyter also said this: Mark, being *the interpreter of Peter*, whatsoever he remembered he wrote with great accuracy, not however in the order in which it was spoken or done by Christ, for he neither heard nor followed the Lord, but he was, as I said, afterwards a fol-

lower of Peter, who gave him the necessary instruction, yet not as a history of the Lord's discourses. So that Mark has not erred in anything by writing some things as he remembered them. For of one thing he was carefully attentive, not to omit anything of what he had heard or to falsify anything in said accounts." *The main point of this testimony is that Mark wrote his gospel from his recollection of the oral discourses of Peter.* This is substantially the testimony of Irenaeus (adv. Haer. III. 1, 1): *Μετὰ τὴν τούτων* (Petri et Pauli) *ἔξοδον Μάρκος ὁ μαθητὴς καὶ ἑρμηνευτὴς Πέτρου, καὶ αὐτὸς τὰ ὑπὸ Πέτρου κηρυσσόμενα ἐγγράφως ἡμῖν παραδέδωκε.* Tertullian (c. Marc. IV. 5) says that the Gospel of Mark was called by some the Gospel of Peter ("Marcus quod edidit evangelium Petri affirmatur, cujus interpres Marcus), and probably with reference to this relation calls Mark the author an *apostolicus* (c. Marc. IV. 2). The most explicit account, however, is that of Clement of Alexandria (in Euseb. Hist. Eccl. VI. 14): "When Peter had publicly preached the word at Rome, and declared the gospel under the influence of the Spirit, many present requested Mark, who had followed him from afar and well remembered his sayings, to reduce his discourses to writing, and that he after composing the Gospel, gave it to those who had requested it, which when Peter understood, he directly neither hindered nor encouraged it. And again, Eusebius (Hist. Eccl. II. 15) quotes from Clement's Hypotop. lib. VI. the following: "So freely, however, did the splendor of piety enlighten the minds of Peter's hearers, that it was not sufficient to hear only once, nor to recite the unwritten instruction of the divine preaching; but they persevered in all sorts of entreaties to solicit Mark, the follower of Peter, and whose Gospel we have, that he should leave them a written monument of the instructions thus orally conveyed. Nor did they cease their solicitations until they had prevailed with the man, and thus became the means of that writing which is called the Gospel according to Mark. They say also that the apostle, ascertaining what was done by revela-

tion of the Spirit, was delighted with their ardent zeal, and authorized the writing to be read in the churches. This account is given by Clement, in the sixth book of his Institutions, and confirmed by the testimony of Papias, bishop of Hierapolis." Clement says, moreover (Adumbratio in 1 Petri, Oxon. p. 100): "Marcus, Petri sectator, palam praedicante Petro evangelium Romae, coram quibusdam Caesareanis equitibus, et multa Christi testimonia proferente, penitus ab eis ut possent, quae dicebantur, memoriae commendari, scripsit ex his, quae a Petro dicta sunt, evangelium quod secundum Marcum vocitatur." Origen (in Euseb. Hist. Eccl. VI. 25) also traces the Gospel of Mark to the oral discourses of Peter. Jerome (Ep. ad Hedib. c. 11) accounts for the origin of Mark's Gospel thus: "Marcum, cujus evangelium Petro narrante, et illo scribente compositum est"; and (Catal. c. 8) more explicitly: "Marcus, discipulus et interpres Petri, juxta quod Petrum referentem audierat, rogatus Romae a fratribus, breve scripsit evangelium, quod quum Petrus audiisset, probavit et ecclesiae legendum sua auctoritate edidit, sicut Clemens in sexto hypotyposeon libro scribit." And Epiphanius (Haeres. LI. 6) reports: *εὐθὺς δὲ μετὰ τὸν Ματθαῖον ἀκόλουθος γενόμενος ὁ Μάρκος τῷ ἁγίῳ Πέτρῳ ἐν Ρώμῃ ἐπιτρέπεται τὸ εὐαγγ. ἐκθέσθαι· καὶ γράψας ἀποστέλλεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἁγίου Πέτρου εἰς τὴν τῶν Αἰγυπτ. χώραν, κ. τ. λ.*

The main difference in these accounts is, that between Irenaeus, who says that Mark wrote his Gospel after Peter's death, and Clement, and those who wrote after him, according to whom the Gospel of Mark obtained the sanction and approbation of Peter himself. Midway between them is the testimony of Papias, who says that Mark kept a faithful record of the discourses of Peter at the time they were delivered. On the simple hypothesis that Mark began his work during the life of Peter and completed it after his death, this apparent divergency disappears, for we cannot suppose Mark to have begun his work without the apostle's sanction; he may even have had it completed, and secured for it Peter's authority, and still not have delivered it for

circulation until after his decease. The apparent contradiction in Clement's own statements, that Peter neither hindered nor encouraged the undertaking (Euseb. VI. 14), and that he publicly sanctioned it with his authority and recommended its circulation (Euseb. II. 15), has been conciliated by the supposition that Peter neither encouraged nor hindered the work at first, but afterwards approved of it ("licet fieri ipsum non jusserit, tamen factum non prohibuit"—Ruffinus).

Whatever may be said of these minor differences, the main point of all this testimony, that Peter directly or indirectly influenced the composition of Mark's Gospel, that it is founded on the oral delivery of that apostle, derives the strongest possible corroboration from its *universal reception* as a canonical Gospel in the early part of the second century, and from internal characteristics, which strongly point to a Petrine origin. The manner in which certain matters affecting Peter personally are treated, deserve particular notice and one or two illustrations may not be out of place here. In Matthew xvi. 13–19, Peter's reply to our Lord's question is followed by Christ's declaration: "Blessed art thou Simon Barjona," etc.; it is wanting in the parallel passage, Mark viii. 29, although we find there an account of Peter's want of faith, which is not mentioned in Luke. It is Mark who records the history of Peter's denial more minutely, and under more aggravating circumstances (xiv. 66), than the other evangelists, brings out the direct bearing of Christ's reproof to Peter (xiv. 37), and records the special message to Peter (xvi. 7), which is not found in the other Gospels.

Strauss and Rénan reject this Gospel with as little ceremony as possible. There is nothing new in what they say; it is simply the old rationalistic, destructionist argument. It is first argued that the evidence of Irenaeus, Clement, and Eusebius being contradictory, the only remaining evidence of Papias is cut up, torn to pieces, and misconstrued with the general result that it must relate to another, more fragmentary, and less logical work than our Gospel according to Mark. Of course the whole of this illogical procedure de-

pends upon the interpretation of the first sentence of the testimony of Papias: ὅσα ἐμνημόνευσεν ἀκριβῶς ἔγραψεν, οὐ μέν τοι τάξει τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ χριστοῦ ἢ λεχθέντα ἢ πραχθέντα, "whatsoever he remembered he wrote with great accuracy, not however in the order in which it was spoken or done by Christ." Strauss argues "that everything depends on the meaning of οὐ τάξει; for if Papias thought Mark wrote not in the *right order*, we have to determine what the *right order* was; that the reference could not be to the order of John's Gospel, which Papias did not know; that he knew a Hebrew Gospel according to Matthew, and Greek *digests* of the same, but that the order of Mark's Gospel does not so materially differ from the arrangement of our Greek Matthew as to warrant the assertion of Papias; that Papias in accounting for the want of order in Mark's Gospel by its dependence on the discourses of Peter, who is said to have only occasionally discoursed of Jesus, *denies not only the right order, but all historical order*, in the narrative of Mark; that such order is not more wanting in our Gospel of Mark than in any of the other Gospels, and that Papias, if we thus construe his assertion, could not refer to our present Gospel according to Mark, but *must* have had before him an altogether different writing; that the condition of our present Gospel according to Mark, so far from showing a greater dependence on Peter, exhibits such dependence in a less degree than the Gospel according to Matthew, and shows a dependence on Matthew incompatible with the statement that its author drew his information from the discourses of Peter; that since the description which Papias furnishes of the Gospel of Mark does not fit our Gospel according to Mark, and since he accounts for its origin by the existence of a relation which does not account for the existence of our Gospel according to Mark, the testimony of Papias does not relate to the latter, and is consequently worthless." But it is patent that, while we have no coercive interpretation of the language of Papias, it contains nothing to justify the extraordinary construction which men of the school of Strauss give it. Whatever be

the meaning of οὐ τάξει, it is clear that it does not mean disorder, imperfection, and incorrectness; for Papias distinctly affirms that Mark "wrote with great accuracy," and was guided by the principle "not to omit or falsify anything that he had heard." The words taken as they stand in the context, without any violent disruption from the connection in which they occur, mean nothing less or more than that Mark did not record the works and words of Christ in the exact order in which they took place, but in the order in which Peter was wont orally to describe them. The language of Papias passes no censure on Mark, but intimates that that evangelist records the sayings and doings of Christ with the utmost fidelity in the order pursued by Peter. The whole theory of an epitomized compilation or digest is purely arbitrary, which sound criticism must and does unequivocally condemn and reject. The obvious design of Papias was to bear testimony to the scrupulous fidelity of Mark as an evangelist, and it was doubtless this fidelity which caused his Gospel to be received from the beginning, and by the consentient voice of the church, as a canonical Gospel. Moreover, the scriptural notices concerning the evangelist make it abundantly clear that his early adoption of the Christian faith, his intimate relations to Peter, Paul, and the other founders of the church, gave him the opportunity of the utmost and most authentic familiarity with every particular of the evangelical history, and placed him beyond the necessity of extracting from or compiling the writings of other men. His Gospel, as a whole, is a unit in style, language, and manner, and the freshness and vivacity of those portions of it in particular which are not found in the other Gospels evince an originality that ill comports with the constrained action of a mere copyist, compiler, or epitomizer. We cannot, therefore, see in the testimony of Papias anything that conflicts with the contents and condition of our Gospel according to Mark, and adding his testimony to that of Irenaeus, Clement, Jerome, and others, consider the genuineness and canonicity of that Gospel well established.

The questions relating to its internal condition will come up hereafter.

The third canonical Gospel is ascribed by the general consent of ancient Christian writers to Luke, the beloved physician, the friend and companion of Paul, and author of the Acts of the Apostles. Luke is mentioned by name only three times in the New Testament, Philem. 24, Col. iv. 14, 2 Tim. iv. 11; these epistles are generally believed to have been written by Paul during his imprisonment at Rome; in the first passage he is designated as Paul's fellow-laborer, in the second, as the beloved physician, in the third, simply as Luke. That the Luke of Philem. 24 is identical with the Luke of Col. iv. 14 is evident, from the fact that in both places his name occurs in connection with the same men (cf. Col. iv. 9, 10, 12, 14, with Philem. 10, 23, 24). From the statement Col. iv. 11 (cf. vs. 14) it cannot be inferred that he was not of the circumcision. We are absolutely without any certain historical data as to his origin and conversion, but we have an unlimited supply of conjectures, which the curious may find in the dictionaries and introductions. Some have endeavored to identify Luke the Evangelist with Lucius of Cyrene (Acts xiii. 1), a Christian teacher at Antioch, who, again, has been supposed to be identical with the Lucius mentioned Rom. xvi. 21. This hypothesis is based on the form of the name Lucas, which is evidently a contraction, but of Lucanus, and not of Lucius. The contraction of Lucanus into Lucas has an analogy in Silas from Silvanus, and some support from the title of the Gospel in Codd. Vercell. and Corb. in Mabillon's Museum Ital. I. 111, which reads, *Evangelium secundum Lucanum*.[1] The tradition that Luke was not only a physician, but also a painter, is of mediaeval origin, and a pure fable. Nothing positive is known of the events belonging to the close of his life. The first Christian author who notices

[1] Lange's conjecture that Luke was one of the Greeks who came to Jesus shortly before his death (John xii. 20), and identical with the Aristion of Papias (ἀριστεύειν = *lucere*), is founded on a very doubtful and bold etymology, which few are prepared to recognize. Cf. Lange, Leben Jesu, I. 252.

the personal relations of Luke confines himself to the data of the New Testament, but afterwards, and especially in the Middle Ages, many particulars concerning him were set in circulation, which need not be repeated here.

The testimony in favor of the authenticity of this Gospel is by no means so meagre as Strauss would make us believe. The oldest testimony for its genuineness as the production of a disciple of the apostles, is the existence of the Acts of the Apostles, which on internal grounds must be ascribed to an apostolical man, and which on external and internal grounds is uniformly ascribed to Luke. The concurrent testimony of Irenaeus, Tertullian, Clement, the Peschito, the Muratorian fragment, Origen, Eusebius, and Jerome, declares Luke the author of the third canonical Gospel, an apostolical disciple, and an author who wrote on the most authentic information. Let us glance at these notices. Irenaeus (adv. Haer. III. 1, in Euseb. Hist. Eccl. V. 8) says: "And Luke, the companion of Paul, set down in a book the Gospel preached by him" (i.e. Paul). The manner in which Strauss disposes of this statement exhibits a degree of assurance which would hardly be credible, if we had his opinion only on oral report. He thinks "that the reference to a book necessitates the supposition that Irenaeus speaks of a different work from the Gospel of Luke, because the Gospel which Paul preached was different from that which we have now in the third or any other Gospel, inasmuch as the burden of the apostolical and the most ancient preaching did not consist of a detailed biography of Jesus, but gave only a short proof of his Messiahship from the prophecies of the Old Testament, of his resurrection from the dead, with an occasional account of the atoning virtue of his death, the institution of the holy supper, or the quotation of some of his memorable sayings; that Paul was the last man to couch his discourses in such historical forms, for owing to the lateness of his admission to the apostolate he could hardly know all the details of the life of Jesus, nor did he seem to attach importance to them" (l. c. p. 53).

What authority has Strauss for these statements? If he can only produce his own opinion and critical acumen, we beg leave to decline that kind of testimony, and give decided preference to that of Irenaeus, who must have known at least as much of the matter as the oracular Strauss, especially as the account he gives (l. c. III. 14) of the contents of the Gospel proves that in the book preserved to us we possess the same which he knew. It does not suit his purpose to discuss the other testimony; but we shall presently find him making the most of an opinion of Eusebius and Jerome, and trying hard to pull to pieces the prologue of our Gospel. A man who sets up as such a prodigy for learning, candor, and honesty ought to have a less convenient memory, which generally enables him to forget facts that make against his theory. He has not a word to say about Tertullian, who actually says that the Gospel of Luke was sometimes ascribed to Paul ("Lucae digestum Paulo adscribere solent"), or of Origen's statement, that the Gospel of Luke was recommended by Paul (*τὸ κατὰ Λουκᾶν, τὸ ὑπὸ Παύλου ἐπαινούμενον εὐαγγέλιον* in Euseb. Hist. Eccl. VI. 25), or of the valuable notice in the famous Muratorian fragment, to wit: "Tertio evangelii librum secundum Lucam. Lucas iste medicus post ascensum Christi cum eum Paulus, quasi ut juris studiosum secundum adsumsisset, nomine suo ex opinione conscripsit. Dominum tamen nec ipse vidit in carne. Et idem prout, assequi potuit. Ita et ab nativitate Johannis incipit dicere." As to the opinion of Eusebius (l. c. III. IV.) and Jerome (Catal. Script. Eccl. p. 7), that when Paul uses the words "according to my gospel" in Rom. ii. 16 and 2 Tim. ii. 8, he refers to Luke's Gospel, it is admitted on all hands that it is erroneous; but it proves how strongly and universally the participation of Paul in the production of the third Gospel was acknowledged in the early church.

In the prologue of our Gospel, Luke accounts for its origin thus:

"Forasmuch as many have taken in hand to set forth in order a declaration of those things which are most surely

believed among us, even as they delivered them unto us, which from the beginning were eye-witnesses, and ministers of the word; it seemed good to me also, having had perfect understanding of all things from the very first, to write unto thee in order, most excellent Theophilus, that thou mightest know the certainty of those things wherein thou hast been instructed."

From the language of the prologue Strauss draws the following inferences:

1. "That at the time when the author of the third Gospel wrote there was already a considerable Gospel literature extant, which he reviewed critically."

2. "That since he distinguishes the many compilers of the Gospel history from the original eye-witnesses and ministers of the word, whose traditions were worked out by the former, he does not seem to know any Gospel of exclusively apostolical authorship."

3. "That since, in order to excel his predecessors, he does not specify some peculiar source of information, e.g. the instruction of an apostle, but simply that he had diligently inquired into all things from the beginning, it does not seem as if he were the companion of an apostle, in which light the author of the third Gospel has been regarded from ancient times."

These inferences, excepting the first, are far from just; they are neither logical nor honest.

1. It is evident from the language of the prologue that the author of the third Gospel was acquainted with many Gospel histories, which he critically reviewed. But the result of that review could hardly have been satisfactory to him, for otherwise he would not have resolved to compose his Gospel. Who the πολλοί were, the author does not state. He must refer to more than *two* authors and his reference cannot therefore be limited to Matthew and Mark; moreover, he does not speak of Gospels, but only of certain statements or memoirs (διήγησις), fragmentary accounts, and, as he describes them, as mere attempts or undertakings (ἐπεχεί-

ρησαν) he cannot well mean the apocryphal Gospels, which did not exist at that early period, nor hardly the Gospels according to Matthew and Mark, which were of apostolic origin. Hence the conclusion of Origen (in Hieronymus, Homilia I. in Lucam) seems to be just: "Hoc quod ait, 'conati sunt,' latentem habet accusationem eorum, qui absque gratia Spiritus Sancti ad scribenda Evangelia prosilierunt. Matthaeus quippe et Marcus et Johannes et Lucas non sunt conati scribere sed scripserunt."

2. It cannot be inferred with certainty from the language of the prologue either that the author of the third Gospel knew not the Gospels according to Matthew and Mark, or that he knew them. He does not refer to Gospels at all, but to certain *diegeses*, and as he expressly distinguishes the authors of said *diegeses* from the original eye-witnesses and ministers of the word, he cannot mean the authors of the first two synoptical Gospels, who belonged to the latter category; and it is altogether immaterial whether he knew them or not, because the account he gives of the sources whence he drew his information connects him immediately and directly with the original eye-witnesses and ministers of the word. This will appear from what we have to say.

3. The author of the third canonical Gospel does specify peculiar sources of information:

a. Direct *oral* communication from the apostles, who were the original eye-witnesses and ministers of the word. He says explicitly: *καθὼς παρέδοσαν ἡμῖν οἱ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτόπται καὶ ὑπηρέται γενόμενοι τοῦ λόγου* (cf. Acts i. 21, and John xv. 27). No language could be plainer than that here used by our Evangelist; he includes himself explicitly among the number of those to whom the original eye-witnesses and ministers orally communicated the things most surely believed among them; and how in the face of this express declaration Strauss can venture upon his inference that the author of the third canonical Gospel was not the companion of an apostle, we can only explain on the well-known principle, "none so blind as those who *will not* see"; but this is almost

too charitable a construction, for Strauss designedly substitutes his own *oratio obliqua* for the language of the prologue in the Gospel, and omits all reference to the important ἡμῖν, which we have italicized above.

b. Many written documents, attempts, or essays, more or less fragmentary, but confessedly emanating from apostolical tradition, of which he felt fully competent to make a critical use, "having had perfect understanding of all things from the very first." Adding these results of a candid examination of the prologue to the above-mentioned testimony of the most trustworthy early writers, we reach the opposite conclusion of the leader of the destructionist school, viz. that while he labors hard to make it appear that the author of the third canonical Gospel is not Luke, the companion of Paul, we hold that he is the author; that while he seeks to invalidate the testimony by unfair twistings and misstatements, we consider it entitled to respect, and sure to survive his assaults and aspersions.

Before passing on to the fourth canonical Gospel, the section of Strauss's book entitled "Further Evidences for the first three Gospels" requires to be noticed. Turning to certain passages in the canonical Epistles, which are generally believed to furnish testimony for the early existence of the Gospels, Strauss dispatches them without much ceremony in the most arbitrary manner. The striking coincidence of 1 Cor. xi. 23–25 with Luke xxii. 19, etc., relating to the institution of the holy supper, he explains by the arbitrary dictum, that the author of the third Gospel took his account from the Epistle, without condescending to notice the circumstance that the date of the Gospel most probably coincides with that of the Epistle, and that, while the former was probably written at Caesarea, the latter is known to have been indited at Ephesus; nor does he seem to perceive that that remarkable coincidence, on any hypothesis as to date and place of composition, is a strong point in favor of a Pauline participation in the origin of the Gospel. On a matter so important and difficult we have a right to insist

upon something more than oracular utterances. He admits that Heb. v. 7 contains an undoubted reference to the agony in Gethsemane, recorded in all the synoptical Gospels, but thinks it too general to determine whether the author of that Epistle was indebted for his account to any canonical Gospel or to the current evangelical tradition. This is a strong concession on the part of Strauss, and the simple circumstance that, with all his ingenuity, he could not well say less, is a clear proof of the weakness of his position, for although he seeks to fortify it by the parenthetical remark that the date of that epistle is not fixed, it is acknowledged on all hands that all the synoptical Gospels were probably extant at the time of its composition, which seems to coincide with the siege of Jerusalem by the armies of Titus. He also admits the reference of 2 Pet. i. 17 to the transfiguration of Christ, and the identical words in which Matthew records the voice from heaven to have spoken (cf. Matt. xvii. 5, who has, however, the term ἐν ᾧ for Peter's εἰς ὅν; and Mark ix. 7; Luke ix. 35, where the words εἰς ὅν, κ. τ. λ., are wanting), but rejects that passage as an evidence for the early existence of the synoptical Gospels, to wit, that of Matthew, because the second Epistle of Peter is one of the latest writings of the canon, and its testimony, consequently, does not take us back further than the end of the second century after Christ. Here again we have a bold dictum, contradicted by the most competent critics, who are agreed that the language, range of thought, and scope of that Epistle, point to an origin which coincides with the closing years of the Apostle Peter, say A.D. 66–68, and argue strongly for the existence of one or all the synoptical Gospels some thirty years after the death of Christ.

Equally unfair and sweeping are Strauss's assertions concerning the testimony of the apostolical Fathers. He begins, as usual, with doubts cast on the genuineness of their writings, and on the early origin claimed for them, seeking thus to prepare the way for his work of destruction. Here, again, we have no reason to substantiate his doubts and insinuations,

but fresh oracular utterances, although he reluctantly concedes that the pretended Epistles of Barnabas, Clement of Rome, Ignatius, and Polycarp, as well as the so-called Shepherd of Hermas, contain in part allusions and in part references to passages and incidents recorded in the three synoptical Gospels. But the manner in which he attenuates that concession and attempts to account for every allusion and reference to the contents of the canonical Gospels, by his unique assertions and innuendoes, shows the true animus of the man. He says, e.g. "If the pretended Ignatius writes to the Romans (cap. vi.), 'It is better for me to die in Christ than to rule over the ends of the earth, for what is a man profited, if he gain the whole world, but suffer loss in his own soul,' or if Barnabas includes among other exhortations which allude in part to the Epistle of Paul, and in part have no parallel in the New Testament, the following: 'Give to every one that asketh thee' (cap. x. 2), it is clear that the one thought of the saying of Christ which we read in Matt. xvi. 26, and the other of the saying found in Luke vi. 30 and Matt. v. 42; but such allusions render it difficult to determine whether they drew their information from our Gospels, and indeed from any written source, or from oral tradition. But even their express references to sayings of Christ do not lead us any further. If Polycarp in his Epistle to the Philippians (cap. vii.) says: 'Pray the all-seeing God that he lead you not into temptation, as the Lord said, "The Spirit indeed is willing but the flesh is weak,"' we cannot mistake the reference to Christ's exhortation in Gethsemane (Matt. xxvi. 41) and to the petition of the Lord's prayer (Matt. vi. 13), but it is doubtful whether the author had these sayings from the same source from which we have them. The existence of scriptural sources must be assumed, if Barnabas (cap. iv). introduces the saying, 'many are called, but few chosen,' with the words 'as it is written,' or if the author of the second Epistle of Clement (cap. ii.), after quoting a passage of Isaiah used in the Epistle to the Galatians, continues: 'and another scripture says: "I came not to call the

righteous, but sinners"'; but in the former instance the scripture denotes, doubtless, the apocryphal book of Ezra, while in the latter the citation of an evangelical notice as holy scripture in connection with a book of the Old Testament indicates a very late origin of the Epistle; while even here we cannot know whether the scriptural source employed was just one of our Gospels (Matt. xx. 16, xxii. 14, ix. 13)."

It is hardly neccessary to expose the fallacies, quibblings, and distortions of this extract. They are self-evident to any candid reader, who will take the trouble of perusing the context in the apostolical Fathers; we will only say that the application of such a criticism to any writing extant, the work of Strauss not excepted, must destroy all belief in any and every thing that cannot be reduced to the test of the senses. The value of the testimony of the apostolical Fathers we intend to state after we have done with Strauss's strictures, for the above extract is only the forerunner of his artillery.

The circumstance that the sayings of Christ as quoted by the apostolical Fathers sometimes differ from those which we have in the canonical Gospels, and sometimes are not found at all in them, is to Strauss further proof of the worthlessness of their testimony. To take but one illustration. In the first Epistle of Clement (cap. xiii). we have, in an exhortation to humility, the following words of the Lord Jesus, "which he spoke, teaching equity and long-suffering, for he said: Be merciful, that ye may obtain mercy; forgive, that ye may be forgiven; as ye do, so it shall be done unto you; as ye give, so it shall be given you; as ye judge, so ye shall be judged; as ye are kind, so shall ye find kindness; with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again." Strauss thinks the allusion to Matt. vii. 1 unmistakable, but the enlargement so deviating, that it can neither have been taken from Matthew nor from Luke, who, in the parallel passage (vi. 37, etc.), enlarges upon the text of Matthew, but in a different manner, but that the author of the first Epistle of Clement seems to have drawn it from some other Gospel. There

would be force in the stricture of Strauss if we had only such involved and complicated citations and allusions as those to which he refers; but considering that the writings of the apostolical Fathers have many distinct and unmistakable quotations from the canonical Gospels, the inference lies near that they were familiar with those Gospels, and in the habit of quoting them as we quote them; and if here and there we encounter verbal differences, or expansions and enlargements, we are not any more compelled to refer them to other Gospels than the verbal differences, expansions, and enlargements which modern authors and preachers constantly interweave in their productions. Such variations are as common now, as they were then, and they are less excusable now, for the circulation of the scriptures is incomparably greater now than it was at that early period. The fact, which even Strauss, with all his finessing, is compelled to admit, that unmistakable references to and quotations from the canonical Gospels occur, and, as we shall show, abound, in the writings of the apostolical Fathers, is sufficient for our purpose, for it proves that at that early period the Gospels were well known and quoted as authentic records of the sayings and doings of Christ. And if we find more in them than we are enabled to verify from the Gospels we have the remarkable saying of John that "there are also many other things which Jesus did, the which, if they should be written every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written" (John xxi. 25); and it must be confessed that this declaration of the beloved disciple, the bosom friend of Jesus, is at least as valuable as the oracular utterances of Strauss, and accounts for much which he declares to be unaccountable. What we mean is, not that the words of John cover *all* uncanonical notices of the sayings and doings of Christ, or of incidents in his life, but that they undoubtedly cover many; for that oral tradition influenced the writings of the earliest Christian authors cannot be questioned; nor does the presence of real apocryphal matter in the writings of the apostolical Fathers affect their

testimony for the genuineness of our canonical Gospels, for the fact that the apocryphal notices were at a very early period identified, and that many of them are manifestly the corruptions and interpolations of a later day, is of sufficient weight to cause us to attach the utmost value to the incidental and undesigned testimony for the genuineness of the canonical Gospels derived from the writings of the apostolical Fathers.

Passing on to Justin Martyr, the genuineness of whose most important writings is admitted even by Strauss, and who flourished under the reign of Antoninus Pius, A.D. 138–161, we have another illustration of the unfairness and one-sidedness characteristic of Strauss. That famous Apologist refers repeatedly to what he calls *ἀπομνημονεύματα τῶν ἀποστόλων*, the memorabilia of the apostles (e.g. Apol. II. 98; Dial. c. Tryph. pp. 328, 331, 332, 333, 334, etc.), which he calls also *εὐαγγέλια*, Gospels (Apol. II. p. 98: *οἱ γὰρ ἀπόστολοι ἐν τοῖς γενομένοις ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀπομνημονεύμασιν, ἃ καλεῖται εὐαγγέλια, οὕτως παρέδωκαν*), sometimes also *εὐαγγέλιον*, Gospel (Dial. c. Tryph. p. 227: *τὰ ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ εὐαγγελίῳ παραγγέλματα*), and declared to have been written by the apostles and their companions (cf. Apol. II. p. 98, and Dial. p. 331: *ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἀπομνημονεύμασιν, ἅ φημι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀποστόλων αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐκείνοις παρακολουθησάντων συντετάχθαι*), and to have been read publicly in the religious assemblies of the early Christians along with the prophetical writings (Apol. II. p. 98, *καὶ τὰ ἀπομνημονεύματα τῶν ἀποστόλων ἢ τὰ συγγράμματα τῶν προφητῶν ἀναγινώσκεται*). We give these passages in full in order to show that we do not wrong Strauss in charging him with unfairness, for in their face he deliberately states that Justin Martyr does not say that the sources to which he referred were any or all of our Gospels. He had no occasion to say so explicitly, but we think he says enough when he calls the memorabilia the Gospels, declares them to have been written by the apostles and their companions, and to have been held in such great esteem that they were read publicly at church along with

the prophetical writings, especially when it appears that Justin's citations from these memorabilia exhibit frequently a literal agreement with our Gospels. Of these citations we will speak more fully below, but the facts of the case as stated are sufficient to convict Strauss of unfairness, which is the more apparent from his convenient mode of suppressing the text of the aforesaid passages in Justin Martyr by stating in a foot-note that, as they may be found in any introduction to the New Testament, he need not specify them in detail. His book is expressly written for the benefit of the German *people*, as contrasted with theologians, and of course introductions to the New Testament, bristling with Latin and Greek quotations, are found in the libraries of the common people! When it suits the convenience of Mr. Strauss, he is ready enough to quote *in extenso*, with comment and digest, passages which may be found in those self-same introductions, but the nature of the above passages accounts for their non-appearance in his book, which instead gives us the oracular information that Justin took his term from the Memorabilia of Xenophon, that the passage Apol. II. p. 198 is regarded as an interpolation, and that the foundation for Justin's ascribing the authorship of the Gospel to the apostles and their companions was the natural supposition that memorabilia of Jesus could only have been written by persons who were on terms of intimacy with him. It would be satisfactory to have the foundations of Strauss's opinions, but as he does not condescend to furnish them, we prefer to receive the ancient and well-authenticated view, that the memorabilia of Justin designate our canonical Gospels.

After enlarging at length on certain incidents and events connected with the life of Jesus, which are not found in our canonical Gospels, Strauss concludes that he must have consulted other Gospels and sources of information. On this point we agree with him, but when he infers that the canonical Gospels and uncanonical writings were held in the same reputation, and that the origin of the former cannot be traced back to the apostles and their companions, and that therefore,

by implication, they cannot be received as authentic documents, he draws conclusions unwarranted by the premises. There are a great many considerations passed over by Strauss in silence which are of the utmost importance; e.g. those relating to early corruptions of the text of the canonical Gospels and to the corruptions and interpolations of the uncanonical writings; a thorough and searching examination of these questions, conducted on sound and fair principles of criticism, cannot fail to yield the most satisfactory results for the genuineness of our canonical Gospels; but we need not dwell upon this matter now, as we intend to conclude this Essay with a synopsis of the cumulative character of the evidence for the integrity of the canonical Gospels, and therefore pass on to a more detailed account of the citations from the canonical and uncanonical writings in the works of Justin Martyr.

Many passages in his works exhibit a *literal* agreement with our Gospels, e.g. Dial. c. Tryph. ed. Col. p. 301, with Matt. viii. 11, 12; p. 333 with Matt. v. 20; Apol. II. p. 64 with Matt. vii. 19; he also cites passages from the Old Testament as Matthew quotes them, cf. e.g. Apol. II. pp. 74, 75, 76 with Matt. i. 23; ii. 6; xxi. 5. In other passages there is an agreement in matter, with slight deviations in form, cf. e.g. Apol. II. p. 64 with Matt. vii. 21, where Justin has *οὐχί* for *οὐ*; Dial. p. 384 with Matt. xvi. 4, where Justin has *αὐτοῖς* for *αὐτῇ*; greater deviations of the same kind occur in Dial. p. 268, cf. with Matt. iii. 11, 12, and Apol. II. p. 63 with Matt. v. 34. Other passages give the idea in a condensed form; cf. e.g. Apol. II. p. 63 with Matt. v. 22, where Justin says: *ὅς δ' ἂν ὀργισθῇ, ἐνοχός ἐστιν εἰς τὸ πῦρ*, and Apol. II. p. 64 with Luke xii. 48, which Justin condenses into *ᾧ πλέον ἔδωκεν ὁ θεὸς, πλέον καὶ ἀπαιτηθήσεται παρ' αὐτοῦ*. In other passages, again, we have a combination of several and different gospel statements, e. g. Apol. II. p. 66 combines Matt. x. 28 and Luke xii. 4, thus: *Μὴ φοβεῖσθε τοὺς ἀναιροῦντας ὑμᾶς, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα μὴ δυναμένους τι ποιῆσαι· φοβήθητε δὲ τὸν μετὰ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν δυνάμενον καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα εἰς*

γεένναν ἐμβαλεῖν. Justin uses more freedom with historical notices, some of which are combinations from Matthew and Luke (cf. Dial. p. 303 with Matt. i. 18, etc. and Luke ii. 2, etc; also Apol. II. p. 75 with Luke i. 31, 32, 35, 38; Dial. p. 315 with Matt. iii. 13, 16, 17), while others are not recorded in our canonical Gospels (e.g. Dial. p. 303 seq. and p. 316). The latter probably flow from oral tradition, possibly from apocryphal Gospels, but the whole matter is too much veiled to warrant the expression of any positive opinion. Justin's quotations agree for the most part with passages in Matthew and Luke, sometimes with Mark (cf. Dial. p. 333 with Mark iii. 17) and occasionally with John (cf. Apol. II. p. 94 with John iii. 3; Dial. p. 342 with John iv. 10, etc.); his writings abound moreover with allusions to evangelical passages. His deviations, combinations, and contractions are accounted for from the fact that he quoted from memory; this is evident from his quoting Old Testament authors in the same manner (cf. e.g. Apol. II. p. 86, with Psalm xxiv. 7; Dial. p. 228 with Jer. xxxi. 31 etc.), and from the variations of the same passage quoted in different connections (cf. e.g. Apol. II. p. 62 with Dial. p. 324; Apol. II. p. 95 with Dial. p. 326; Dial. p. 308 with p. 253). Enough, we trust, has been said and shown to justify our remarks on the unfairness with which Strauss and others deal with the writings of Justin and other ancient authors. If they had written scientific treatises on the evidences, we should exact greater accuracy of statement, but writing, as they did, on the most diverse subjects, and mostly in a familiar style, their quotations from the Gospels have all the freedom which in conversation, in epistolary compositions, and even in sermons, are of daily occurrence. The incidental quotations, undesigned references, familiar contractions and combinations, are *prima facie* pledges of their genuineness. Were they spurious they would exhibit greater conformity to the language and context of the evangelical record; and when we find Justin silent as to the *names* of the evangelists, we expect that he had no occasion to use them, adding that it was his habit

to cite also other sacred authors, without mentioning their names (e.g. in Apol. II. p. 86 he quotes Psalm xxiv. 7; Dial. p. 295, Psalm xix. 5 and Isa. xxxv. 2; p. 315, Joel iii. 27, etc.).[1]

It is at this point in his work that Strauss pauses to sum up his argument against the genuineness of the synoptical Gospels thus:[2] "Even admitting the testimony of Papias on Matthew and Mark as authors of evangelical writings, whose credibility, as we shall show, leaves room for doubt, yet our first Gospel, in its present form, is neither the work of the Apostle Matthew, nor the second that of Mark, the assistant of the apostles, and, while as to the Gospel of Matthew we know not the relation in which it stood to the apostle's work, how much was added to it, and through how many recensions it did pass, as to Mark's Gospel we do not even know whether it has any connection whatever with the Gospel of Mark mentioned by Papias. As to the author of Luke's Gospel we know from his own prologue that he wrote rather late, as a secondary writer, who wrought up older materials; this opinion, as we shall soon see, is not in conflict with those passages in the book of Acts in which we seem to hear a companion of Paul. Certain traces that our first three Gospels existed in their present form we do not find before the middle of the second century, that is, a whole century after the time when the principal events of the history they contain took place; and nobody will be able to maintain with reason that that period is too short to render the introduction of unhistorical elements into every part of the evangelical history conceivable."

Our reply to this bold and bald assault has in part been given above under the respective heads; and as it has been made to appear, we trust, that the individual positions of Strauss are untenable, so we hope to show, after we have followed him in his assaults upon the fourth Gospel, that his aggregate position is false, and that the formidable citadel

[1] For further particulars, see Guericke, de Wette, etc

[2] Leben Jesu, p. 61.

which he vaunts to have erected, will prove to have been built in the air, without the foundations of truth and uprightness, and we have no doubt that the solid, strong argument in favor of the genuineness of the evangelical writings will grow stronger and assume more symmetrical proportions by every result of sound criticism, while the phantasm of Strauss will speedily dissolve into mist.

(*To be continued.*)

ARTICLE II.

THE BIBLE DOCTRINE OF DIVORCE.

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As preliminary to any investigation of this subject, it is necessary to remark that divorce, or "putting away," mentioned anywhere in the Bible, was not a judicial act performed by a court. The husband desiring divorce from his wife did not bring her into court, and charge her with some offence for which she ought to be divorced. No court inquired whether she had committed any offence, or if so, whether her offence was such as to justify a divorce. No court ever heard and recorded the husband's decision to divorce his wife. There was no statute authorizing any such proceedings. The husband himself, at his own discretion, or indiscretion, acted as complainant, witness, judge, jury, and clerk of the court. He made out the writing of divorcement, gave it to her in her hand, and sent her away, and that was all. From this she had no appeal, except to the day of judgment. It might be a very wicked proceeding on his part, but it was legally valid. It released her from the bonds of marriage, so that she might lawfully "go and be another man's wife" (Deut. xxiv. 1, 2). This implies that another man might lawfully take her to be his wife.

This law of Moses has the appearance of a restraint upon previous usage. There is no earlier statute on the subject on record; but, apparently, it was the usage for a man to "put away" his wife at his own pleasure, and without ceremony, if he durst risk a quarrel with her relatives. This law compelled him to wait till he could write a bill of divorcement, or rather, in most cases, as few could write, till he could get some learned man to write one for him. This gave time for consideration, and gave the writer an opportunity to interpose his good offices for the reconciliation of the parties. It also made the fact of divorce a matter of record, and placed the record in the hand of the person most interested in its preservation.

Still, under this law, with all its restrictive force, the husband had it in his power to do much that was wrong, and to do it without redress. But, considering the hardness of Hebrew hearts, it was deemed best to leave him in possession of that power, responsible only to God for his use of it. Probably, among such a people, a more stringent law would not have been so well enforced, and would have been less effective in restraining the evil, or perhaps would have led to other and greater evils.

With us divorce, in this sense of the word, is impossible. The husband cannot dissolve the bond of marriage by his own act. It can be dissolved only by a decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, for facts specified by statute, and after proof of those facts before the court. Such is our idea of divorce; but such were not the divorces spoken of in the scriptures.

It follows, that when Christ and his apostles spoke of divorce, they had no direct reference to legislative acts, specifying what should or should not be sufficient ground of divorce; or to decrees of divorce, granted by a court after trial; or to petitions for divorce, presented to a court for trial and judgment. These things were not in all their thoughts. They had never been in the thoughts of men anywhere. It is a gross anachronism to understand them as

speaking of divorce, or of proceedings for divorce, in our sense of these terms. Divorce, in the sense in which they used the word, we have utterly abolished. We do not allow a man to put away his wife, even for the one cause which Christ specified as sufficient. If he finds that she has been guilty, he must bring her before the proper court, with the proof of her guilt, and the sufficiency of the proof must be ascertained and the decree of separation pronounced by a disinterested tribunal, and not by the injured husband.

Still, our Saviour's instructions on this subject have application to us, as imperative as they had to those who first heard them. He laid down certain moral principles, which are as old as marriage itself, and which must be in force so long as men and women inhabit the earth; principles which no man can violate without doing wrong, whatever the law of the land may put in his power; principles, too, which legislatures cannot disregard without a violation of duty. Let us inquire what they are, and what is their just application to us.

Our Saviour's instructions appear to have been given at different times, and nearly, but not exactly, in the same words; and the several evangelists report the same conversation with some diversities of phraseology, showing that they intended to give us, not his exact words and all of them, but the sense and substance of his instructions. In such cases, the most full, clear, and precise report of the conversation must govern the interpretation of those which are briefer and less precise; and the same rule applies where one report gives a part of the conversation more fully than a longer report gives that part. Keeping this in view, let us begin with Mark x. 2–12: "[2] And the Pharisees came to him, and asked him, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife? tempting him. [3] And he answered and said unto them, What did Moses command you? [4] And they said, Moses suffered to write a bill of divorcement, and to put her away. [5] And Jesus answered and said unto them, For the hardness of your heart he wrote you this precept; [6] but from the beginning of

creation, God made them male and female. [7] For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife, [8] and they twain shall be one flesh. So, then, they are no more twain, but one flesh. [9] What, therefore, God hath joined together, let not man put asunder. [10] And in the house his disciples asked him again of the same matter. [11] And he saith unto them, Whosoever shall put away his wife and marry another, committeth adultery against her. [12] And if a woman shall put away her husband and be married to another, she committeth adultery."

Here we are plainly taught that the law of divorce, given by Moses under the guidance of inspiration, was not a perfect standard of righteousness. A man might act in perfect conformity to it, and his acts would be legal, valid in law, but yet they might be sinful, not being in conformity with God's design in creating man and woman. He created them, that they might be joined together as "one flesh" for life; and being thus joined, they could not be put asunder without sin, even if the putting asunder was done according to law. On account of the hardness of their hearts the inspired legislator left it in the power of Hebrew husbands to commit that sin; but it was a power that none but a hard-hearted man would use; which no man could use without offending God.

And here is an important lesson for legislators, everywhere and always. It may be their duty, in view of the hardness of the hearts of the people for whom they legislate, to make laws allowing divorces which no man ought to desire, and which no man can obtain without sin. And the same principle applies to legislation concerning other sins. How far the legislature shall absolutely forbid them, and how far it shall only restrain and limit what it cannot wholly prevent, is a question to be determined by the sound and honest discretion of the legislator.

It follows that, before any tribunal where duty to God is the standard of judgment, conformity to the law of the land is not always a sufficient defence. A man may obtain a divorce which will be valid, and ought to be recognized as

valid by all; but in obtaining it he may commit a sin for which God will condemn him at the day of judgment, and for which the church, if he is a member of one, ought to excommunicate him.

We must carefully observe that our Saviour does not say the inspired legislator ought to have made a more stringent law; nor does he repeal that law; nor does he enact any new law. There is not a word in his instructions to any such effect. He merely tells us why the law of the land was not made more stringent, and informs us what the law of perfect rectitude on this subject always was, and always will be. He condemns those who before his time had availed themselves of the law of Moses to put away their wives sinfully as really as he does those who should commit a similar offence after his time.

Exactly how the hardness of the Hebrew heart rendered it inexpedient to prohibit divorces altogether, our Saviour does not inform us. We can, however, imagine several evils which might have followed an absolute prohibition. A man dissatisfied with his wife might have taken another, — not without sin, but yet legally, — and thus polygamy might have been increased. He might treat her with what our laws call "intolerable severity," and thus compel her to abscond from his house. Or he might turn her out of doors without ceremony, to make room for another wife, or choosing to live without one. Such expelled wives would still be wives according to law, and other men could not take them, and be safe from the claims of their husbands who had driven them out. Thus debarred from second marriage, they would be peculiarly exposed to all the hardships and temptations attendant on enforced celibacy, and would therefore constitute a class dangerous to public morals. Some hard-hearted wretches might even murder their wives, rather than keep them for life. These and perhaps other evils were diminished, by giving legal effect to divorces executed deliberately, with due formalities, and securing to the divorced wife the right to marry again. The statute expressly provides that "she may go and be another man's wife."

The eleventh verse of the passage under consideration, as also the parallel passage in Luke xvi. 18, must be understood in conformity with the report of the same conversation in Matt. xix. 9, where a man is expressly allowed to put away his wife for conjugal infidelity (see also Matt. v. 32). We must either supplement the reports of Mark and Luke, by bringing in certain words reported by Matthew, but not by them; or we must assume that in Mark and Luke conjugal infidelity by the wife is considered as equivalent to putting away her husband, and leaving him at liberty to marry another. The twelfth verse in Mark seems to favor this last interpretation; but the language in Matthew seems to imply that in such a case the husband should "put away his wife," of course, in the legal form. But whatever mode of reconciliation we may adopt, our Lord certainly taught that, when a wife violates her conjugal duty and makes herself "one flesh" with another man (see 1 Cor. vi. 15, 16), her case is an exception to the general rule: her husband may rightfully be free from her, and take another wife. Even in such a case the rule holds good, that there can be no divorce without sin; but the sin is that of the wife, and not of the husband.

In the twelfth verse our Saviour applies the same law to the wife as to the husband. He forbids her to "put away her husband and be married to another." This certainly implies that a wife might possibly do such a thing. And we know, from other proofs, that Hebrew wives in our Saviour's time sometimes did it. True, commentators generally say that the law of Moses gave them no such power. Bloomfield, for example (*in loco*), says that, "strictly speaking, a Jewish wife could not divorce her husband; for, as to the example of Salome and others, *their* actions were done in defiance of all law, and in imitation of Roman licentiousness." Even this is an admission that the acts *were done;* that Salome and others *did* "divorce their husbands." Jahn, Biblical Antiquities, sect. 160 (Upham's translation), admits that "in the later periods of the Jewish state the Jewish

matrons, the more powerful of them at least, appear to have imbibed the spirit of the ladies of Rome, and to have exercised in their own behalf the same power that was granted by the Mosaic law to their husbands." He quotes Josephus, Antiquities, XV. 7, 10, and Mark vi. 17–29,—the case of Herodias, who had divorced her husband Philip, and married his brother Herod; for which John the Baptist reproved him. He quotes also this verse under consideration (Mark x. 12) as proof that such things were done.

And these "Jewish matrons" might have argued very plausibly, that, even under the Mosaic law, they had as good a right to divorce their husbands as their husbands had to divorce them. It is as equitable, they might say, that we should have that power as that our husbands should have it; and it is not unusual for Moses to state a law in its application to one particular case, which is to be taken as an example in all cases where the equity is the same. Especially, he makes laws for *men*, which are evidently meant to be applied to *women* also. In this same chapter which contains the law of divorce (Deut. xxiv.) he enacts (vs. 7), that if "a man" be found stealing and selling any of his "brethren," he shall be put to death. This law certainly applies equally to a woman, stealing and selling her sisters. In the law concerning pledges (vs. 10–13), only men are mentioned, but certainly women also are intended. Deut. xix. provides cities of refuge for a "man" who killeth his neighbor accidentally. Certainly, a woman, subject to the same misfortune, had the same privilege; and so in many other cases. Why, then, should not the law which enables a man to put away a disagreeable wife, be understood as enabling a woman to deliver herself from the clutches of an intolerable husband? True, we have no recorded argument of "Jewish matrons" to this effect; but some of them certainly acted as if they had reasoned thus.

We may consider it as certain, then, that the power of wives to divorce their husbands was sometimes claimed and exercised, and that our Saviour referred to it in this con-

versation. This point will be found important in our remaining investigations.

It is evident that when our Saviour says that "whosoever shall put away his wife and marry another, he committeth adultery against her," he has reference to the original and unchangeable law of marriage, and not to the law of the land as given by Moses. The divorce, if executed in due form, is legally valid, and he is not punishable by any human tribunal; but in the sight of God he has sinned, and must answer for it at the day of judgment. Nor does he say that the law of the land ought to be such as to punish him for that sin. He does not blame Moses for promulgating so lax a law, nor does he say that future legislators ought to be more stringent.

The report of this conversation in Matt. xix. 3–9 varies from that in Mark, now under consideration, somewhat in words; but the entire harmony of meaning is perfectly obvious, till we come to the ninth verse, where we find two points demanding attention.

The first is the exception to the general rule, that divorces are sinful. "Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery." As has been already observed, the exception is not mentioned in Mark; still, we must recognize it as a part of what our Lord said, and must supplement or interpret the report in Mark accordingly. We must understand that for this cause a man might put away his wife and marry another without committing adultery.

The other is the last clause of the verse: "Whoso marrieth her which is put away, doth commit adultery." The parallel clause in Mark reads: "And if a woman shall put away her husband and be married to another, she committeth adultery." Do these clauses refer to the same case and mean the same thing?

The Greek word translated "her that is put away" is *ἀπολελυμένην*. It is the perfect participle, middle or passive, of *ἀπολύω*, which signifies, when spoken of a wife or a hus-

band, "to let go free; i.e. to put away, to divorce" (see Robinson, Lex. *in verbo*, c.). In the middle voice it signifies *one who has set herself free from her husband*, or, as the idea is expressed in Mark, using the active voice, one who has put away her husband. Taken in this sense, the two passages agree exactly in their meaning; the only difference being that one expresses the idea in the active voice and the other in the middle. In the passive voice, the word means *one who has been put away by her husband.* In this sense the meaning is diverse from that in Mark, and difficult to reconcile with other passages of scripture. The language in Matthew is equivocal. It may have either of the two meanings above mentioned. That in Mark is precise, explicit, capable of only one of those meanings. Should it not control our interpretation of the language in Matthew?

That ἀπολελυμένην may be taken in the middle voice is certain. It is true that the Greek grammars fifty years ago and more, gave another form for the perfect middle; but that form is now regarded, in all grammars not obsolete, as a second perfect active. Only a few verbs — less than two hundred — have it all; and when found, it is always used in the active sense. On the other hand, the form which the old grammarians treat as the perfect passive exclusively, is often used by the best writers in the middle sense. Matthiae quotes Sophocles, Xenophon, Isocrates, Plato, Thucydides, Herodotus, Demosthenes, and Euripides as so using it. He quotes Demosthenes as using that form of λύω, and Thucydides as using the participle καταλελυμένος in the middle sense. Here are certainly authorities enough, and good enough, to settle the question; and two of them come very close to the word under consideration (see also Stuart's New Testament Grammar, pp. 74, 83, 92, *et al.;* and as to "the second perfect, formerly called perfect middle," p. 90). Our English translators seem to have felt bound, by the unanimous consent of all the Greek grammars of their day, to consider ἀπολελυμένην as passive, and translated accordingly; but certainly we have abundant grammatical authority for regard-

ing it as the perfect participle in the middle voice. There are grammatical reasons for preferring it.

If the woman in question were the same just mentioned, the wife whom her husband had put away, we should naturally expect the article to be used; that she would be called *τὴν ἀπολελυμένην*. The omission of the article suggests that the person spoken of is a different woman, not before mentioned; as she is, if she is one who has put away her husband. And the article is omitted wherever the expression occurs. In Matt. v. 32 and Luke xvi. 18 it is *ἀπολελυμένην*, without the article.

In Luke xvi. 18 she is called *ἀπολελυμένην ἀπὸ ἀνδρός*. *Ἀπό* signifies *from*, rather than *by;* especially "after verbs of loosing, i.e. *λύειν* and *ἀπολύειν*." It is, however, sometimes "put after neuter and passive verbs, to mark the author and source of the action; but not where the author is to be conceived of as *personally and immediately* active; this latter idea being expressed by *ὑπό* and *παρά*" (Robinson's Lex. *in verbo*). According to this definition, *ἀπολελυμένην ἀπὸ ἀνδρός* designates a woman divorced *from* her husband, by a divorce in which he was not "personally and immediately active"; i.e. a divorce of the husband by the wife, such as is mentioned and forbidden in Mark. This proves that *ἀπολελυμένην* in Luke must be taken in the middle voice, designating a woman who has set herself free from her husband. And if in Luke, then doubtless in Matthew; and the three evangelists agree perfectly in respect to our Lord's meaning.

Some may think that this is giving too much force to the preposition *ἀπό*; that *ἀπό* is here used merely to denote a state of separation *from* a husband, without any reference to the agent by whom the separation had been effected. But even if we admit this objection, *ἀπολελυμένην* cannot be taken in the passive sense. The passive *has* reference to an agent, and in this case would point out the husband as the agent by whose direct, personal act, the divorce had been effected. If that were the meaning, the use of *ἀπό* would be inadmissible, and *ὑπό* or *παρά* must have been used. The

passive sense, then, is plainly not intended. It follows that the word at least *may* be taken in the middle sense, as denoting a divorce by the wife.

And we claim the very highest possible authority for this interpretation, that of the Apostle Paul in 1 Cor. vii. 10, 11: "And unto the married I command, yet not I, but the Lord, Let not the wife depart from her husband; but and if she depart, let her remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband: and let not the husband put away his wife." The expression "not I, but the Lord," doubtless refers to what the Lord said in these instructions, reported by the three evangelists. If none of these Gospels had then been written, then Paul gives a fourth report of what our Lord said. He first forbids the wife to "depart from her husband." The departing which he forbids, is one which renders her "unmarried" (ἄγαμος, husbandless.) It is, therefore, a divorce. If she has already placed herself in this situation, he requires her to "remain" so, "or be reconciled to her husband." He forbids her to marry another man, as she might feel at liberty to do, but for this prohibition. It is remarkable that the Greek words here rendered "depart," are χωρισθῆναι and χωρισθῇ, in the passive form, but in the middle sense, though there is a middle form for the aorists. That they have the middle sense is certain, because they describe the act of the wife, taking herself away from her husband.

At the end of this tenth verse we read: "And let not the husband put away (ἀφιέναι) his wife." The word for divorce is changed, because the husband, being the posesssor of the house, would naturally effect a local separation from his wife, by sending her out of it (ἀφιέναι); whereas the wife, not having control of the house, could locally separate only by departing (χωρισθῆναι). The difference, however, is only circumstantial.

In the next verses (12, 13) the apostle applies the same term to divorces by the husband and by the wife. Our version reads: "If a brother hath a wife that believeth not, and she be pleased to dwell with him, let him not put her

away (*μὴ ἀφιέτω αὐτήν*). And the woman which hath an husband that believeth not, and if he be pleased to dwell with her, let her not leave him (*μὴ ἀφιέτω αὐτόν*)." Our translators vary the phrase, saying, "leave him" in the thirteenth verse, instead of "put him away," as in the twelfth. But the Greek word is the same in both verses, and means *to send away*. It is the same as that used in the eleventh verse of the husband divorcing his wife. Its application to the wife fixes the meaning of "depart" (*χωρισθῆναι*) in the preceding verses.

In the fourteenth verse he gives the reason why difference of religion should not be a ground of divorce; and then adds: "But if the unbelieving depart (*χωρίζεται*), let him depart (*χωριζέσθω*). A brother or sister is not under bondage in such cases."

Evidently, the same Greek verb, *χωρίζω* (to "depart"), first applied to the act of the wife in the tenth verse, is here applied to the act of the husband and the wife indifferently, and means, or implies, divorce. We have before seen that *ἀφιέναι* (to put away) is applied to both. Either party has the power, though not, in the cases here under consideration, the moral right, to divorce the other; and when this is done, though sinfully done, the unoffending party is at liberty. "A brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases," but may take cognizance of the act as legally valid; as releasing him or her from all conjugal obligations to the offender; and may therefore marry another person with a clear conscience.

And this harmonizes perfectly with the original law concerning divorced persons, as laid down by Moses (Deut. xxiv. 2): "And when she is departed out of his house, she may go and be another man's wife." It would be absurd to understand these words as meaning, "She may go and commit adultery." It means that she may become another man's wife without crime. It is equally absurd to suppose, that though she would be without crime in her second marriage, yet her second husband would commit adultery by

taking her. We are aware that the law of Moses, in several instances, assumes that, among such a hard-hearted people, certain morally wrong things will certainly be done, prescribes the limits within which the doing of them shall be restrained, and the mode and forms of doing them, if they are done at all, and defines the rights and duties of third parties, resulting from such acts. This very law, regulating divorce at the pleasure of the husband, is an instance. It is so in respect to polygamy, concubinage, and slavery. But in no such case does the language used give such express permission to go and do the act, as is here given to the divorced woman to "go and be another man's wife." The meaning is, that she may do it rightfully, and "another man" may rightfully take her for his wife. In the words of Paul, "A sister is not under bondage in such cases." She has been made ἄγαμος (husbandless), not by her own act, but by the act of another, which she could not prevent, and is free, legally and morally, to marry again. And if so, ἀπολελυμένην, in Matthew and Luke, must not be taken in the passive voice, as meaning one who has been divorced by her husband, but in the middle voice, meaning one who has "departed from," "put away," divorced her husband. In such cases she is the offending party, and can gain no rightful privileges by her own wrong act.

But could the offending party, who divorced the other wrongfully, marry again? On this point Moses is silent. So far as appears, he could contract a second marriage, which would be legally valid, and give to his second wife all the rights of a wife. But our Saviour teaches that in so doing he would be morally guilty; would "commit adultery against" his former wife, and must answer for it at the bar of God. Thus, all the teachings of scripture on this subject are found to be perfectly harmonious. The principal points are:

1. The original law of marriage, making it the union of a man and a woman for life. This is the rule of perfect righteousness on this subject, unchangeable in its nature, and incapable of being violated without sin.

2. Conjugal infidelity by the wife so violates this law that the husband may rightfully effect a divorce from her, and marry another; but the mode of effecting the divorce should be prescribed by the law of the land, and should be strictly observed. That conjugal infidelity by the husband gives the wife the same right is nowhere expressly asserted. Yet the general sense of Christendom is, that the equity of the case implies it.

3. The law of the land should provide rules regulating divorce; and in forming such rules the legislature should consider the character of the people, and if the hardness of their hearts is such as to render it expedient, may give legal validity to divorces which ought not, in strict righteousness, to be desired.

4. In such cases the party unrighteously divorced is at liberty, morally as well as legally, to marry again; but the party who unrighteously caused the divorce cannot marry again without sin.

5. It follows that, at the bar of God, the bar of conscience, or the bar of the church, conformity to the law of the land is no sufficient defence for effecting a divorce, even if the law of the land is exactly what it ought to be. At either of those tribunals a man must be judged, not by a statute devised to diminish as far as practicable the amount of evil done by a hard-hearted people, but by the perfect law of righteousness.

Exactly what the law of the land ought to prescribe in this matter the scriptures nowhere inform us; doubtless, because the statutes ought not to be the same everywhere, but should be such in each country as will, in practice, bring the people nearest to the original law of marriage. What that law was for the Israelites we know. Our legislators have judged, and we doubt not correctly, that with us it should be much more stringent. They have enacted, that the husband shall not put away his wife, or the wife her husband, for any cause whatever; that no divorce shall take place, except for a very few causes, which are specified by

law; and that where any of these causes exist, the divorce shall be effected only by a decree of the proper court, after the facts have been ascertained by judicial investigation. So it is, even in cases of conjugal unfaithfulness. Cases of "departing" and "putting away," such as Paul mentions, our laws call "wilful desertion," and treat them as offences. Paul permits the deserted party to consider himself or herself as divorced, and to marry again. Our laws consider such desertion as a valid cause of divorce, but do not allow the divorce to take place and the deserted party to marry again, till the fact of desertion, and not mere casual or temporary absence, has been established in court, and a decree issued accordingly. Our laws also allow a wife to obtain a divorce for "intolerable severity." If the "severity" is such that she cannot with safety remain in the house, it is equivalent to driving her out of the house, that is, putting her away; and in that case, as the husband cannot, if he would, give her a valid writing of divorcement, it is proper that the court should do it; but not till the facts have been investigated, and the severity is found to be such that the wife ought not to endure it.

Our laws, perhaps, are not the very best that could be framed for a people of our average hardness of heart; and if not, it would be well to amend them, if we can find legislators wise enough. But those who, on theological grounds, agitate for such a change as shall render divorce impossible except for adultery, are certainly wrong in principle. They overlook the distinction between what a man must do in order to be blameless before God, and what the state, for the good of society, ought to require on pain of punishment. In this, they differ radically from Moses, and from God, under whose inspiration he legislated.

The scriptures teach, as we have seen, that the party who has been actually "put away" by the other "is not in bondage," but may rightfully marry again. The strictest rule that can be required of human legislatures, therefore, is to allow no decree of divorce on the application of either party,

except for some act, or series of acts, equivalent, except in legal validity, to such putting away by the other. We say, except in legal validity, because no man under our laws can give his wife a writing of divorcement which shall make it lawful for her to "go and be another man's wife"; but he may do everything except this, which the Bible calls putting her away; and when he does it, it seems proper, as he cannot give her the document which she needs for her protection, that the court should give it. A divorce at the request of both parties, or for a cause which both parties have conspired in procuring, or for any act done by one party with the assent or connivance of the other, of course no law will permit.

The law of divorce where a man has a plurality of wives is of no practical importance in this country, where such cases can never occur. Under our laws, a man who, having one wife already, goes through the form of marrying another, does not thereby gain a second wife, but only commits a crime for which he is to be punished. The victim of his crime needs no divorce, for she has never been married to him. But in some countries where we have missions, cases are liable to arise, and occasionally do arise, in which the question is of great practical importance, and its consideration cannot be avoided.

There are those who attempt to avoid this question, by denying that any man ever had, or can have, more than one wife at a time. If any man has two women whom he calls wives, the second, they say, is not his wife, because she was taken in violation of the original law of marriage, which requires the union of one man to one woman, and to one only. They might as well argue that no other sin can be committed. Certainly, polygamy was always a sin against God, more or less heinous, according to the knowledge that a man had of his duty. But under the laws of many nations, and of Israel among the rest, the commission of that sin was possible, and it was sometimes committed, even by good men. Moses treated this subject as he did that of divorce, and

doubtless for the same reason — the hardness of their hearts. He gave no direct permission to take a plurality of wives, nor did he expressly forbid it. He gave them the origin of the practice, in the wicked family of Cain, before the flood; he showed them what troubles their father Jacob suffered from it; and he enacted that if, after all, any man would have two wives, he should treat them both, and their children, according to certain equitable rules which he laid down. But if, after this, a man took two wives, the second marriage was as valid, legally, as the first. The second wife had as valid a right as the first to all the privileges of a wife, and conjugal infidelity by her was adultery as really as by the first.

As some contend, in opposition to the plain meaning of the words of Moses, that he speaks only of successive, and not of contemporaneous, wives, we will quote an inspired comment. In 1 Sam. i. 2 it is said of Elkanah, the father of Samuel: "And he had two wives; the name of the one was Hannah, and the name of the other Peninnah." In verses 4–7, we learn that both were alive at the same time, and that Peninnah "provoked" Hannah for her barrenness, "to make her fret," and that this happened "from year to year." Notice carefully, the declaration of the inspired penman, that "he had two wives," both living with him as his wives at the same time. In 1 Sam. xxv. 39–42 we learn that after the death of Nabal, David sent servants to Abigail, his widow, with a request that she would become his wife, and that "she went after the messengers of David, and became his wife." In the next verse we read: "David also took Ahinoam of Jezreel; and *they were also both of them his wives.*" It is not at all to the purpose to say here, that David did wrong, sinned against the original law of marriage, in taking Ahinoam. Doubtless he did. Still, the inspired record informs us that he did it, and that when he had done it, they were "both of them his wives."

It is certain, therefore, that though taking a plurality of wives was always a sin against God, yet under the law of

Moses it could be done, and sometimes was done. Doubtless, polygamists were always greatly in the minority; for after furnishing each man with one wife, there would be but few women left to become second wives. Still such cases occurred. They continued till our Saviour's time, and later, as we learn from Josephus; and there was a true doctrine concerning them, so long as the law under which they were possible continued to be administered.

Literally taken, our Saviour's words forbid the putting away of the second wife, except for unfaithfulness, as much as that of the first; of Peninnah as much as of Hannah; of Ahinoam as much as of Abigail. "They were both of them his wives," and had equal right to conjugal privileges, while faithful to their conjugal obligations. Not a word can be found in any of our Saviour's discourses making any distinction between them.

Will any one attempt to evade this conclusion by saying such cases were rare, and he had no reference to them? The attempt will be vain. If he had no reference to such cases, then he did not authorize divorce in such cases, and his general prohibition of divorces of faithful wives must remain as it stands, as applicable to the second wife as to the first. By quoting the original law of marriage, he shows that the man has committed a sin in taking a second wife; but concerning his duties resulting from that sin he gives no instructions, unless they are found in his general prohibition of divorce. He leaves the offender much in the condition of a man who has begotten an illegitimate son. In begetting such a son he sinned, and involved himself in an inconvenient relation, from the disadvantages of which he cannot, and ought not, to extricate himself. He must suffer the consequences of his error, till relieved of them by his own death, or the death of the other party to the relation. As for withdrawing conjugal privileges from her, he cannot do it without subjecting her to discomforts and temptations from which she has a right to be preserved, and from which he has pledged himself to preserve her He has "sworn to his own hurt"; she

has trusted to his oath, and committed her all to his care, and he may not "change."

This view of such a man's duty is confirmed by Paul's instructions to Timothy and Titus, that a man having more than one wife should not hold office in the church (1 Tim. iii. 2): "A bishop must be the husband of one wife" (*μιᾶς γυναικὸς ἄνδρα*). Twelfth verse, "deacons," plural, must be "the husbands of one wife" (*μιᾶς γυναικὸς ἄνδρες*). Tit. i. 6: An elder must be "the husband of one wife" (*μιᾶς γυναικὸς ἀνήρ*). This rule plainly implies that among those from whom bishops and deacons were to be selected, that is, among members of the churches, there might be some having more than one wife. Such men might be found, if not among the Greeks, yet certainly among the Jews living among the Greeks according to their own laws, as they were allowed to do. Such men, hearing the gospel, might be converted, and giving evidence of faith and repentance, would be received as members of the churches. Some of them might be well qualified in other respects for the office of bishop or deacon, but they must not be elevated to those offices. There are obvious reasons for this restriction. A church teaching that the taking of two wives is a sin to be punished by excommunication, and yet having a pastor with two wives, would exhibit a very plausible appearance of inconsistency, of which its enemies would not fail to take advantage. Such a pastor would not "have a good report of them which are without." His family would not be a good model for other families, in the church or out of it. The case may be illustrated by one already mentioned, — that of a man who has an illegitimate son. He may have repented of his sin; he may, as to his present character and conduct, be a worthy member of the church; but he cannot be a pastor without extreme embarrassment to himself, and to the church over which he presides. "The young people will find it out," and will make remarks destructive of his influence and that of the church. And so it would have been with a pastor or deacon having two wives.

It seems, therefore, that a man who in the days of his unregenerate darkness had taken two wives, and afterwards, on evidence of faith and repentance, had been received as a member of the church, was expected to continue to be the husband of both. His second marriage was not reckoned as a nullity, nor could he relieve himself from his bad predicament by divorcing one of his wives; but besides the other disadvantages of his condition, he was disqualified for office in the church. In the eyes of all heathen of average candor this rule would vindicate the church from the charge of inconsistency.

Attempts have been made to give this rule some different meaning; but in vain. The Greek church interprets it to mean, that a bishop, or deacon, whose wife dies, may not take another. But this would be aside from the purpose for which the rule was given. Paul left Titus in Crete, that he should "ordain elders in every city" (Tit. i. 5), and this rule was given as a guide in the selection of men to be ordained. The similar directions given to Timothy were evidently given for the same purpose (see especially, 1 Tim. iii. 15). The rule, therefore, must refer to the candidate as he was at the time of his selection. He must be, at that time, "the husband of one wife," or be rejected. To say that he must be rejected because after the death of his present wife he would marry another, would be absurd; for the facts, the death of his present wife and his subsequent marriage, could not be foreknown.

Bloomfield suggests that the rule may be intended to exclude any man who, having lost his first wife, had married a second. He would understand *μιᾶς γυναικὸς ἄνδρα*, a man who has never had but one wife. He quotes, in confirmation, 1 Tim. v. 9: "Having been the wife of one man (*γεγονυῖα ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς γυνή*). But this passage, instead of confirming his interpretation, disproves it. If Paul had meant what Bloomfield supposes, he would have used the perfect participle, "having been." He would have written, *γεγονότα μιᾶς γυναικὸς ἄνδρα*. Instead of this he uses the present tense —

in Timothy δεῖ εἶναι, in Titus, ἐστίν; showing that he refers to the man as he is at the time of selection for office, and not as he had been at some time previous to his conversion.

In many heathen lands there is no such thing as marriage. A man buys or captures as many females as he can and chooses, cohabits with such of them as he pleases, and sells them or gives them away when he pleases. The scripture law of marriage and divorce has no reference to such cases, except to condemn them. If such a heathen becomes a Christian and wishes to have a wife, he must marry one, and one only, and must be faithful to her while they both live. In other lands there are laws which authorize and regulate polygamy. In such countries a man may take two, three, or even four wives, as in Turkey, and may believe at the time that he is doing right; and his wives may believe that the transaction is a right one, and may rely on it accordingly. The relation may be entered into according to well-known laws, and in good faith, by all the parties. In such cases, the Bible teaches that neither party has a moral right to dissolve the relation while the other remains faithful to its duties.

In most countries where polygamy is allowed concubinage also prevails, and cases are liable to arise in which it is not easy to decide whether the relation between a certain man and a certain woman is that of marriage or concubinage, or even something still more lawless. In a vast majority of cases, however, these loose connections may be dissolved without any violation of plighted faith, and ought to be dissolved; and in cases of any real difficulty no more can be required than a thoroughly honest inquiry after duty, and an honest performance of what duty seems to require.

If any one objects to our views, that they are too indulgent to the man who has taken two wives, allowing him the privilege of keeping both after his conversion, we have but one thing, in addition to the teachings of scripture, to say in reply. If he really, in his heart, believes his objection valid, it must be that he, in his heart, regards a permanent

connection with two wives as a *privilege*, rather than a punishment, and would have two wives himself, if he thought he could do it safely. With such a man we have no inclination to argue.

In these inquiries, we have been careful to base nothing on the authority of commentators. We may perhaps, however, afford relief to some minds by quoting a few words from Scott, whose evangelical piety and orthodoxy have never been questioned. On 1 Cor. vii. 15, he says: "The apostle further observed, that if the unconverted wife or husband chose to depart, and to disannul the marriage, according to the laws of the community, the believer was not required to act in opposition to it, or as if in bondage by the preceding contract." And more to the same effect. On 1 Tim. iii. 2, "The husband of one wife," he says: "Christ and the apostles expressly condemned polygamy, as well as divorces except for adultery; yet there was no direct command for a man who had taken more wives than one to put the others away when he embraced the gospel; and such a requisition might have produced many bad consequences in domestic life, and increased the opposition of the civil powers to the preaching of Christianity. But the rule, that no man, however qualified in other respects, should be admitted into the pastoral office, who had more than one wife, or who had put away one to take another, tended to show the impropriety of polygamy and divorces on frivolous pretences, and their inconsistency with the Christian dispensation, and concurred with other things to bring it into total disuse in the Christian church; yet without violence and confusion."

If the rule here laid down by the apostle excluded every man who had, before his conversion, "put away one [wife] to take another," it must be on the ground that such putting away, being sinful, was a nullity, and the woman thus put away, was still his wife, so that when he "took another," he was in fact the husband of two wives, and not of one only. Whether this construction is allowable, we leave to the reader's judgment, without expressing an opinion.

In other respects, the views of Scott on these passages of the apostle are evidently the same, for substance, set forth in this Article. Of course, he did not believe these views to be in conflict with the teachings of Christ, as recorded by the evangelists.

ARTICLE III.

CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAMISM.

BY REV. GEORGE F. HERRICK, MISSIONARY OF THE A. B. C. F. M.

CHURCH History fully details the relation which Christianity sustained to Judaism, whether of correspondence or of antagonism. The relation of Christianity to ancient forms of Heathenism also has been so elaborately sketched by Christian historians, that systems of heathen philosophy and belief, the nature of Paganism, and the state of the ancient pagan world, have never been more vividly and faithfully portrayed than in those portions of church history which describe the aggressive movements of Christianity. This is true also in reference to the latest onward movement of Christianity, which is even now making, and that too on a broader plane than ever heretofore. Christian enterprise, in the form of missionary effort, encounters the same forms of Judaism, which has been growing more dry and dead now for almost two thousand years, and meets with multifarious forms of heathen superstition and pagan cultus, and detailed accounts of these systems, and of the triumphs of Christianity over them, are added every year to the accumulating records of the militant, and to-be victorious, church of Christ.

But the relation which Christianity has held to Islamism occupies but little space in the annals of the church. Yet since the early conquests of the religion of the cross were

achieved, a religious system has arisen and spread over territory once conquered by Christianity, till its devotees are few less than the entire number of the professed adherents to the faith of Christ.

It is true that a ready general explanation may be given to this seemingly strange silence, in the statement that the relation of Islamism to Christianity, so far as it has not been one of absolute exclusiveness, has been of a worldly and political, not of a spiritual nature; and that its record should therefore be sought in the annals of the later Roman empire and of European and Oriental states, rather than in those of the Christian church.

But spiritual forces underlie all the great movements of human society; and it is hoped that a perusal of the following pages may assist in showing, both that Islamism held, in the outset, a more positive attitude towards Christianity, and was more indebted to Christian doctrine and the Christian scriptures than is acknowledged by Mohammedans, or generally supposed among ourselves, and also that the claims of the Mussulman — particularly the Turkish and Arabic Mussulman — portion of the "field" which Christ has assigned to the labors of his disciples are more actual and urgent, and the present aspects of the field more encouraging than is generally recognized, even by those who are interested in the aggressive or missionary work of the church. It is proposed to give:

I. Some account of the relation of Islamism to Christianity in its origin.

II. To glance at the development of Islamism as a religion.

III. To speak of the present relations of Islamism in Turkey to Christianity.

In the historical part of the subject, the principal authority, as the reader will perceive by the references, is Muir's Life of Mahomet, a standard work on this subject, recently published in London.

I. Some Account of the Relation of Islamism to Christianity in its Origin.

1. *Mohammed's early Acquaintances with Christians; his Journey to Syria.*

Mohammed, while still a youth, was accustomed to meet both Jews and Christians at the great fair held yearly at Ocâtz, three days from Mecca; and, notwithstanding the mutual enmity existing between Jews and Christians, he perceived that their sacred books were, in the larger part, one revelation; that both denounced the idolatry of his nation, and professed to worship one only God; and, what would be more impressive still, that both repeated with profound veneration, a common name, — the name of Abraham, whom the Arabs claimed to be the founder of their temple at Mecca. It is thought possible, although no certain evidence supports the supposition, that Mohammed may have in this way conceived the idea as early as his twentieth year, of establishing a new religion in which the common elements in the Christian and the Jewish faith should be in some way united to the old worship of the Meccan temple.[1]

At the age of twenty-five years Mohammed visited Syria; but the Christianity of that age, with which he there came in contact, was much perverted, both in doctrine and in life, from the purity of the gospel. "Lamentable indeed is it that the ecclesiastics and monks of Syria showed to the earnest inquirer so small a portion of the fair form of Christianity, and that little how altered and distorted! Instead of the simple majesty of the gospel, the sacred dogma of the Trinity was forced upon the traveller with the misguided and offensive zeal of Eutychian and Jacobite partizanship; and the worship of Mary was exhibited in so gross a form as to leave the impression upon the mind of Mohammed that she was held to be a god, if not the third person, and the consort of the Deity. It was by such blasphemous extravagances that Mohammed was repelled from the

[1] See Muir's Life of Mahomet, Vol. II. pp. 8, 9.

true doctrine of Jesus as the 'Son of God,' and led to regard him only as 'Jesus, son of Mary,' the sole title by which he is spoken of in the Koran."[1]

Zeid (a slave, and afterwards an adopted son of Mohammed), both whose parents were Christians, "though severed from his home at too early an age for any extensive or thorough knowledge of its doctrines, yet probably carried with him some impression of the teaching and some fragments of the facts or legends of Christianity. Among the relatives too of Khadija, Mohammed's first wife, there were persons who professed a knowledge of Christianity, and followed, perhaps, something of its practice." Two cousins are particularly mentioned as converts to Christianity.[2]

2. *Mohammed's Knowledge of our entire Scriptures derived mainly through Jewish Sources.*

It seems probable, however, that Mohammed's knowledge of our scriptures — of the New Testament as well as of the Old — was chiefly derived from Jews, with whom he had far more intercourse, especially at Medina, than he ever had with Christians. Some things in the Koran, and still more in current Mohammedan tradition, are adapted to make the impression that Mohammed had seen one or more of the apocryphal Gospels, and perhaps had come in contact with followers of the Gnostic heresy in some one of its forms; but, as will be seen below, the small space occupied in the Koran by an account of events of New Testament history, as compared with the numerous and reiterated references to matters of Old Testament history, are sufficient evidence that, aside from some stories and legends of Christian origin, with which Mohammed became acquainted through Christians, his information concerning our entire scriptures was obtained from Jewish sources; Jewish legends and traditions being strangely mingled in the Koran with narrative which closely corresponds with the narrative of the Old Testament.

[1] Life of Mahomet, Vol. II. pp. 19, 20.

[2] Life of Mahomet, Vol. II. p. 50.

Mohammed did not assert his divine mission with boldness and without hesitation till his forty-third year, although he had composed many of the shorter and better suras or chapters of the Koran (the arrangement of which is not at all in chronological order) previous to that time. It is in those suras composed between his forty-fifth and fiftieth years that most frequent reference is made to the scriptures of the Old Testament, so much so that these suras are often little less than a compilation from Old Testament history, diluted and perverted by unfounded traditions; and in the three following years, i.e. during the three years immediately preceeding the Hejira, the suras which mainly contain the references to New Testament history were composed.

In these suras the Bible is constantly mentioned as a revelation from God to Moses and to Jesus, and the object of the Koran is declared to be to attest and reiterate this former revelation, and especially so for the conversion of the Arabs to the "true faith of Abraham." The object in this was manifestly to conciliate and gain over the Jews to his interest.

The following illustrations will show how matters narrated in our own scriptures are treated in the Koran.

3. *References to Old Testament History in the Koran.*

The creation of Adam, and the conduct of Satan in reference thereto, is thus narrated in Sura ii: 11–26.

"And verily we created you, then fashioned you, then we said unto the angels, 'Fall down and worship Adam,' and they worshipped, all excepting Eblis [Satan], who was not one of the worshippers. He said, 'What hindereth thee that thou worshippest not when I command thee?' He answered, 'I am better than he; thou createdst me of fire, and thou createdst him of clay.' He said, 'Get thee down from heaven; it shall not be given thee to behave arrogantly therein: get thee hence; verily, thou shalt be amongst the despicable.' He said, 'Respite me unto the day when (all) shall be raised.' He said, 'Verily thou art of the number respited.' He said, 'Now, for that thou hast caused me to fall, I will lie in wait for them in the straight path; then I will fall upon them from before and from behind, and from their right hand and from their left, and thou shalt not find the most part of them thankful.' He said, 'Depart

from hence, despised and driven off; for those of them that shall follow thee, verily I will fill hell with you together.' 'And thou, Adam, dwell thou and thy wife in Paradise, and eat from whatever quarter you will, but approach not this tree, lest ye become of the number of the transgressors.' And the devil tempted them both, that he might discover that which was hidden from them of their nakedness. And he said, 'Your Lord hath only forbidden you this tree, lest you should become angels or become immortal. And he swore unto them, 'Verily I am unto you one that counselleth good.' And he misled them by ambitious desire; and when they had tasted of the tree, their nakedness appeared unto them; and they began to sew together upon themselves the leaves of Paradise. And their Lord called unto them, 'What, did I not forbid you this tree, and say unto you that Satan was your manifest enemy? They said, 'O our Lord, we have injured our own souls, and if thou forgivest us not, and art not merciful unto us, we shall be numbered amongst the damned.' He said, 'Get you down, the one of you an enemy to the other; and there shall be unto you on the earth an habitation and a provision for a season.' He said, 'Therein shall ye live, and therein shall ye die, and from thence shall ye be taken forth.'"

It will suffice, without quoting further at length, simply to allude to "the stories of Abraham, who broke the idols of his people, and miraculously escaped the fire into which the tyrant cast him" (Sura xxii. 52, 53), and again of his hand being stayed from the sacrifice of his son, who was ransomed by a "noble victim" (Sura xxxvii. 84); of Joseph, in envy of whose beauty the Egyptian women cut their hands with knives (Sura xii.); of Jacob, who, when the garment of Joseph was cast over him by the messengers from Egypt, recovered his long lost sight (Sura xii. 93–96); of mount Sinai, held above the heads of the terrified Israelites, to force their acceptance of the law; of the seventy who, when struck dead upon the same mount, were quickened to life again (Suras ii. 55, 63, 93; iv. 153; vii. 172); of David, whom the mountains joined in singing the praises of God; of Solomon, on whose gigantic works the genii and devils were forced to labor at his bidding; of the genii who brought the throne of the Queen of Sheba to Solomon in the twinkling of an eye, and of the lapwing that flew to her with the royal summons (Suras xxvii. 16–45; xxxiv. 10–14; xxxviii. 18–42); of the Jews who broke the Sabbath and were changed

into apes (Sura vii. 164); of Ezekiel, who quickened a great multitude of the dead (Sura ii. 244; cf. Ezek. xxxvii. 1–10); of Ezra, who, with his ass, was raised to life, after they had been dead one hundred years" (Sura ii. 260), etc.

"Some favorite passages in the sacred record are the subject of special amplification and frequent repetition. Such are the history of Moses, the catastrophe of the flood, and the overthrow of Sodom, through which the Arabian prophet, ever recurring to them with a wearisome reiteration, seeks to deal forth exhortation and warning to the Meccans." [1]

4. *References to New Testament History in the Koran are less numerous and less in detail.*

Christians and Christianity are however frequently mentioned, and accounts of the birth of John and of Jesus are given in a sura which is called, after Jesus' mother, 'Mary.' The account concerning John, and the antecedent prophecy made to Zacharias, are given in essential agreement, for the most part, with the account in the first chapter of Luke; and the supernatural conception of Jesus is acknowledged, but the circumstances of his birth are detailed in a manner totally different from that of the gospel history. From this passage it seems desirable to quote the following, from the account in Suras iii. 33–63; xix. 1–33:

"Verily the analogy of Jesus is, with God, like unto the analogy of Adam: he created him out of the dust; then he said unto him, Be; and he was. This is the truth from the Lord, wherefore be not thou among the doubters."

Jesus is said to have spoken thus in his cradle:

"Verily I am the servant of God; He hath given me the book,[2] and made me a prophet; and made me blessed wheresoever I may be; and hath commanded me (to observe) prayer and almsgiving while I remain alive; and made me dutiful to my mother, and not overbearing nor wretched.

[1] Life of Mahomet, Vol. II. pp. 185–188.

[2] Mohammedans believe that the true gospel was sent down to Jesus from heaven miraculously. They therefore reject alike our account of the origin of the gospel, as false, and the gospel, as we receive it, as spurious.

Peace be on me the day I was born, and the day I shall die, and the day I shall be raised alive. This is Jesus, the word of truth, concerning whom they are in doubt. It is not for God to take unto him a son; glory be to him! When he hath decreed a matter he only saith unto it, "Be; and it shall be."[1]

Concerning the teachings and miracles of Jesus, we take the following from Sura v. 118 seq.

"Then God shall say, O Jesus, son of Mary, call to mind my grace upon thee, and upon thy mother, when I strengthened thee with the Holy Spirit, that thou shouldst speak with men, in the cradle and in mature life; and when I taught thee the scriptures and wisdom, and the law and the gospel; and when thou formedst of clay like unto the figure of a bird, by my permission; and thou blewest thereupon, and it became a bird, by my permission; and thou didst heal the blind and the leper, by my permission; and when thou didst raise the dead, by my permission..... And when God shall say, O Jesus, son of Mary, didst thou speak unto mankind, saying: Take me and my mother for two gods, besides the Lord? He shall say, Glory be to thee! it is not for me to say that which I know to be not the truth. If I had said that, verily thou wouldst have known it..... I spake not unto them aught but what thou commandedst me, saying: Worship God, my Lord and your Lord."[2]

The teaching of the Koran, and the steadfast belief of all Mussulmans, is that Jesus was not crucified, but that "he was simulated (in the person of another)," see Sura iv. 155–158.[3]

5. *Christians warned against Extravagances in Religion.*

In view of the divine honor and reverence paid to Jesus by Christians, they are addressed thus in Sura iv. 169–170.

"Ye people of the book, commit not extravagances in your religion; and speak not of God aught but the truth. For verily the Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary, is an apostle from God, and his word, which he placed in Mary, and a spirit from him. Wherefore believe in God, and in the apostles, and say not, There are *three*. Refrain; it will be well for you. Verily the Lord is one God; Glory be to him! Far be it from him that there should be to him a son."[4]

[1] Life of Mahomet, Vol. II. pp. 282, 302.
[2] Life of Mahomet, Vol. II. pp. 284, 285.
[3] Life of Mahomet, Vol. II. p. 286.
[4] Life of Mahomet, Vol. II. p. 288.

6. *The Koran at first regarded as concurrent with, and auxiliary to, the Scriptures.*

The following extracts from the fifth sura show that the Koran was at first regarded as "concurrent with and auxiliary to the Jewish and Christian scriptures, and but gradually acquired a superior and superseding character, as the latest revelation of God's will." Jews and Christians were, at first, not only permitted, but urged, to adhere to and follow their own sacred books.

"Verily we have sent down the Old Testament, wherein are a direction and a light..... And whosoever doth not judge by that which God hath revealed, verily they are the unbelievers..... And we caused Jesus, the son of Mary, to follow in their footsteps, attesting the scripture which preceded him. And we gave him the gospel, wherein is guidance and light. ..... And whosoever doth not judge according to that which God hath revealed, they are the wicked ones..... To every one have we given a law and a way..... Wherefore, press forward in good works. Unto God shall ye all return, and he will tell you that concerning which ye disagree."[1]

Subsequently, when it became evident that the only instrument of conversion effective with Jews and Christians was the sword, which Mohammed unhesitatingly and unscrupulously employed, and when Islamism became a really formidable power, the authority of Mohammed and the Koran was boldly claimed to be superior to that of all preceding prophets and revelations. The equality of authority which was at first postulated by Mohammed between his own and antecedent revelations, and the respect for former revelations and for their adherents which he at first inculcated, tacitly and practically became a nullity before the haughty pride of power, which grew as the conquests of Islamism increased.

But never did Mohammed openly and formally declare that former revelations were cancelled or abrogated; and the testimony borne to our scriptures in "the divine and eternal Koran," which, to this day, every intelligent Mussulman, however illiberal towards Christianity, dares not refuse

[1] Life of Mahomet, Vol. II. pp. 293, 294.

to acknowledge, amounts, logically, to a full concession of both their authority and their genuineness as a divine revelation.

The reason, probably, why that which is contained in the Koran, derived from, and intended to be corroborative of, the Jewish and Christian scriptures, was all compiled during the space of some eight years, is, that previously to his forty-fifth year Mohammed had little acquaintance with the sources from which his information was derived, and, doubtless, had not distinctly and consciously formed for himself the design of gaining over Jews and Christians, as well as heathen Arabs, to his new faith. And in his later years his maturing system moved away from all sympathy with the purity of Christian doctrine.

It should not be omitted to notice that a favorite and oft-repeated claim of Mohammed himself, and of his followers till the present day, is that he was foretold in our scriptures, both of the Old and New Testaments. Prophecies in the Old Testament which refer to Christ, and those in the New Testament which refer to the Holy Spirit, were, with the help of obsequious and unscrupulous Jewish converts to Islamism, interpreted as referring to Mohammed.

7. *The Foundation Truth of Islamism borrowed from Jews and Christians.*

In concluding our account of the relation of Islamism to Christianity, in its origin, it is needful only to *state*, without enlarging upon the manifest and acknowledged fact, that it is to our scriptures that Islamism is indebted for that great foundation truth, to which it owes all the vitality it has ever possessed as a religious system, viz. the existence of one absolute, personal God.[1]

[1] Although this is a truth common to Judaism and Christianity, yet in the apprehension of Mohammedans it is regarded as derived, *not* from Christianity, but from Judaism, — from Judaism in opposition to Christianity; for, accustomed as the Mohammedans have been to associate ideas of Christian worship with idolatrous reverence to pictures of Mary and the saints, and totally misap-

II. Glance at the Development of Islamism, as a Religion.

1. *Inception of the new Religion in the Mind of Mohammed.*

It has been a much vexed question whether Mohammed was from the beginning an intentional deceiver. The position, however, which appears most defensible is, that the Arabian prophet, who was in early life of irreproachable moral character, and of a meditative and religious turn, was, before he ventured to declare himself a prophet from God, much agitated by inquiries and doubts, which arose in his own mind, concerning the true faith. "The debasement of his people, his own uncertainty as to the true religion, the dim and imperfect shadows of Judaism and Christianity, exciting doubts without satisfying them, pressed heavily upon his soul; and he frequently retired to seek relief in meditation amongst the solitary valleys and rocks and caves near Mecca." [1] His longing for light and guidance, his reverence and his high aspirations are expressed in snatches of true poetry, preserved in the Koran, with which the heavy, prolix, and even grovelling, effusions of his later years form a melancholy contrast. One short passage, originating at this time, which has been inserted as the first sura of the Koran, and which is, as we believe, the best thing in the book, might, with no impropriety, be adopted by the devoutest Christian. It is as follows:

> "Praise be to God, the Lord of creation;
> The All-merciful, the All-compassionate!
> Ruler of the day of reckoning!
> Thee we worship, and thee we invoke for help.

prehending, as they always have done, the true Christian doctrine of the Trinity (a trinity *in* unity, and not *opposed* to unity, in the Godhead), they have not regarded Christians as really holding to the doctrine of one only absolute, personal God. But when the difficulty of the elucidation of this subject, even for Occidental minds, is duly considered, and when it is remembered that Orientals generally, besides the force of ancient custom, lack the moral earnestness and patient mental application necessary, or are too flighty and capricious for the intellectual apprehension of so recondite a subject, — we wonder less at the misapprehension to which we have referred.

[1] Life of Mahomet, Vol. II. p. 55.

Lead us in the straight path;
The path of those upon whom thou hast been gracious,
Not of those that are the objects of wrath, or that are in error."

In this spiritual aspiration — this rising above the superstition and idolatry of his people — a few of Mohammed's nearest friends joined him. But the people generally would reply: "It is well for Jews and Christians to follow the purer faith thou speakest of. If a prophet had been sent unto us, we should, no doubt, have followed his directions, and been equally devout and spiritual in our worship." [1]

2. *Mohammed assumes a Divine Commission, and makes a Compromise between Good and Evil.*

The Arabian prophet thus saw the necessity of a divine commission; and for this he longed and prayed, in alternate hope and despair; sometimes believing himself guided of God, and sometimes fearing himself under the influence of the evil one. It would seem that at this juncture ambition — the ambition of being a leader and a prophet — fired his soul; and he assumed henceforth to speak in "the name of the Lord." Muir has drawn a parallel between the temptation of Christ and that of Mohammed, from which we quote. That Mohammed himself believed in the personality and influence of Satan is undoubted.

"Satan, taking advantage of the cravings of hunger, tempted Jesus to contravene the laws of his human existence by supplying his temporal wants through his supernatural powers. But sternly did he throw aside the suggestion, and throughout his life appears to have refrained from bringing the divine power which he possessed to the relief of his personal wants.

An analogous temptation was ever ready to entrap the footsteps of Mohammed. He, indeed, was not possessed of any inherent supernatural ability. But as a teacher who professed himself inspired, he arrogated a spiritual power, which he was continually tempted to misuse in subservience to his personal necessities, and even to his erring desires. The subsequent records of his life too plainly show that he fell into the snare.

In the second scene, our Lord was tempted to seek spiritual and lawful ends by unlawful means, — to manifest his Messiahship by a vain-glorious

[1] Life of Mahomet, Vol. II. p. 67.

display of supernatural energy..... What a melancholy light does the comparison cast upon the career of Mohammed. He was tempted to assume a forged weapon of fearful energy and temper by which to work out his ends. That instrument was the name of God.

Again, the devil tempted Jesus to fall down and worship him by the promise of the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them..... To the world's end the power of darkness would form an awful antagonism to the power of Christianity..... Was it possible to compromise the struggle? Would Satan abate the fierceness of his opposition?..... But Jesus knew of no compromise with sin, even in its most hidden form, and, fully conscious of the fearful nature of the approaching combat, rejected the alluring offer.

So did not Mohammed. He listened to the suggestion, and was tempted to seek a compromise between religion and the world. The result was a politico-religious system, forming the closest combination imaginable between worldliness and spirituality, between good and evil. Barely so much of virtue and spiritual truth is retained as will appease the religious principle which exists in man, and his inward craving after the service of his Creator; while the reins of passion and indulgence are relaxed to the utmost extent compatible with the *appearance* of goodness. Mohammedanism, indeed, presents a wonderful adaptation to fallen humanity. The spurious imitation of godliness satisfies the serious; the laxity of its moral code and the compatibility of its external observances with inner irreligion present no barrier to the sensualist..... Ambition, rapine, assassination, lust, are the undenied features of Mohammed's later life, openly sanctioned by the assumed permission, sometimes even by the express command, of the Most High!..... What an assimilation must gradually have been wrought between the promptings of the evil one from without and the subjective perceptions of Mohammed within, when he could imagine, and with earnestness and sincerity assert, that the Almighty had sanctioned, and even encouraged, his debased appetites."[1]

3. *The first Successes of Mohammed.*

It is far from our purpose to give in any detail the account of the early progress of the religion thus established in Arabia, — of its conquests or its political relations.

As was natural, when Mohammed had assumed his prophetical mission, and a few beyond the circle of his immediate friends and dependants became converts to the new faith,

[1] Life of Mahomet, Vol. II. pp. 91–96. It is due to Muir to remark that, in the passage from which these extracts are taken, he is advancing a hypothesis, — is making a suggestion by which the course of Mohammed *may* be explained.

persecution arose, and, by the prophet's advice, his followers took refuge from the storm in Abyssinia. It was then that Mohammed well-nigh jeopardied the very foundation of his new system, by a compromise with the ancient idolatrous worship of the temple at Mecca. He soon saw, however, that he had conceded too much, and retracted all; standing again, as at first, on ground hostile to idolatry, — on the exclusive postulates of Theism. The converts returned from Abyssinia, and were unmolested.

Meantime the new religion began to spread, at first gradually, and soon more rapidly, at Medina, till the number of Mohammed's adherents having reached nearly a hundred, he was compelled to fly from Mecca (date of the Hejira A.D. 622), in order to be within the protection of his followers where their number was greatest. It was a little more than two years previous to that event that Khadija, Mohammed's first wife, died. With her he had lived till his fiftieth year in fidelity, but from that time forward we find little to approve in his private life, his teachings, or his public acts. In two months after his wife's death he was again married, and about the same time betrothed to Ayesha, then a mere child, whom also he married two or three years later, thenceforth increasing the number of his wives and concubines according to his own pleasure; and he soon unsheathed the sword, which both himself and succeeding Khalifs most successfully wielded for the extension of the new religion through Arabia.

Yet it is this man that Mohammedan writers, to this day, hold up as the pattern of the faithful, in such terms as the following, which we have translated from a book on theology in Turkish: "Especially that prince of all apostles and joy of prophets, the confidence of the devout, the pride of the creation, the prophet of the world, the beloved of the great, the apostle of the latter times, — Mohammed Mustapha [chosen]; upon him be peace and the blessing of God, in great measure. He is the priest and pattern of the pious," etc.

Having thus given some account of the inception of Islamism; let us now briefly review

4. *The Religious System of Mohammed.*

What we are here to examine, is the system in its completeness, and before a rest from the early conquests achieved by its leaders gave scope for those literary labors and theological speculations which resulted in the accumulation of a vast amount of traditional matter concerning the prophet and the Koran, which was eagerly received by his devoted followers, flushed with the pride of success and victory; and in the accumulation also of equally large and equally, perhaps still more, various explanations of the Koran, upon which arose large and important divisions among those who were regarded as orthodox Mussulmans; and still more numerous divisions among those who, while going under the general name of Mohammedans, deviated widely from the original faith.

(*a*) Doctrines:

(1) With regard to the great fundamental doctrine of the being and attributes of God the Mohammedans are, and have always been, at essential agreement with us, with two exceptions, viz. first, their idea of unity in the Godhead is that of an absolute and *unqualified* unity — a unity which totally excludes all distinctions of personality; and second, they have no adequate conception of the divine holiness. This will be more evident from what we remark below, with regard to their view concerning predestination, sin, and the existence of evil. It is true that there has been among Mohammedans much profitless discussion concerning the mode of the Divine existence, essence, and attributes; but perhaps not more than may be found in the history of Christian speculation on the same subject.

(2) Of the Mohammedan idea concerning revelation perhaps enough has been said already. They have no difficulties on the matter of inspiration, and no divisions of any moment. According to their belief, all the contents of our own scriptures, as well as of the Koran, have existed from eternity by the throne of God, and were sent down by the hand of the angel Gabriel to the prophets.

(3) Their doctrine of Decrees, or Predestination, is as *absolute* as any Christian predestinarian could wish, and is made to cover *more ground* than any Christian would be willing for a moment to allow. They hold God to be the author both of good and of evil; that his positive decree includes the latter just as really as the former. Logically, we hardly need remark, this is the baldest fatalism; and it is only because even the Mohammedan's conscience and consciousness of personal responsibility, dull and perverse though it is, is still stronger than his logic, that he is not an unqualified fatalist. But what a conception of the character of God must those have — albeit they far surpass us in the numerous and exalted terms in which they express his attributes — who make God the author of all evil, and that, too, without seeming to perceive that they thus introduce an element into the character of God which is annihilating to every moral attribute.

It is plain from what has already been said that the Mohammedan idea of human will or freedom is exceedingly defective. They really hold that men possess only a partial and *quasi* will, i.e. doctrinally they occupy this ground; for of course, the social and civil fabric does not rest upon any such impracticable basis. If a criminal pleads that it was *decreed* that he should commit the crime of which he has been convicted, the judge does not hesitate to reply that it has been also decreed that *he* should inflict punishment for that crime, and he proceeds accordingly. But still the practical effect of the doctrine held, certainly is to deaden and silence the conscience, and close the inner eye to the real fountain and source of moral evil.

(4) Of Sin and Atonement. — No man is more ready than a Mohammedan to acknowledge, either in the general for all men, or specifically for himself, the place of a sinner before God, and just exposure to condemnation; but the conviction is a shallow and surface conviction. It does not put a guilty, polluted soul into contrast with the infinite purity and holiness of a God who cannot *look* upon any iniquity but with the

deepest abhorrence. Sin, therefore, in the apprehension of a Mohammedan, may be forgiven on mere repentance, for "God is gracious and merciful." Therefore we search in vain for any doctrine of atonement in the creed of the Moslem. They have indeed some customs, borrowed from the Jews, which look toward such a doctrine; but they are out of place in the system, — accretions, not developments.

In this vital point Islamism stands in marked contrast with a Christianity whose very life and soul is salvation from sin through the atonement, the expiatory sufferings and death of the God-man, — God manifest, and suffering for men in the flesh; and in the contrast how hollow and cold and dead does Islamism appear.

The doctrine of Regeneration, too, finds nothing corresponding to it in Islamism; only a counterfeit, a travesty almost, in the rhapsodies of certain visionaries and mystics.

(5) In the general doctrine concerning the resurrection and the judgment the Mohammedans are at essential agreement with us, but differ in many, in almost all, of the details, concerning which they have very confident, and often very puerile and foolish notions. But it is in the minuteness with which the delights and sensuous — rather sensual — joys of the paradise of "the faithful" is delineated, that one of the chief attractions and distinctive features of Islamism is to be traced. The popular impression among ourselves on this subject is, however, so generally correct that we need not enlarge in detail. The hell of Islamism is a place of material and minutely-described torments, such as might have been gathered from ancient heathen sources. There is considerable diversity, however, and obscurity in the writings and in the belief of Mohammedans on this subject.

(6) Mohammedans believe in the existence of good and evil angels, and also of another order of beings between men and angels, called genii. They believe these to be possessed of souls, and that Mohammed's mission was to them as well as to the human race. The great multitude of traditions, and superstitions founded on traditions, in which the mass

of Mussulmans implicitly believe, it would be impossible to notice, much less to explain in detail, within the limits of an Article like this. These traditions, affecting every tenet of their faith, and every item of their history, are even more familiar to the great majority of orthodox Mohammedans, and particularly so to the Mohammedans of Turkey, who do not generally understand the Arabic, their sacred language, than the teachings of the Koran itself.

(*b*) The religious institutions or practical duties of Mohammedanism are chiefly these:

(1) Prayer, to be formally observed, at stated seasons, five times a day, either in a mosque or in any other place, to be preceded by lustration, complete or partial, notified by the call of the muezzin; and designed to be accompanied once, on Friday, — although it is not always, not indeed commonly, — by a sort of sermon, with reading from the Koran. In the beginning the Kibla (or place toward which Moslems turn when they pray) was Jerusalem, but afterward, when there was no longer any hope of gaining over the Jews, Mohammed courted favor with his own countrymen by making the Meccan temple his Kibla.

(2) Fasting also is a binding duty upon every Mussulman; but it is a fasting which unites the worst characteristics of feasting with the most irrational and unprofitable method of fasting, viz. abstaining altogether from all food and drink from early morning till sunset, and then feasting and engaging in pleasure, *ad libitum*, during the night, and this for one entire month every year.

(3) Almsgiving and pilgrimages also are institutions of Islamism; but for those who are acquainted with Oriental and Romish Christianity there is nothing sufficiently peculiar here to require explanation. Both these duties are a source of merit, — a merit which may be accumulated to any extent to which the zeal of "the faithful" may prompt them to engage in the performance of them.

(4) The merely outward and totally unspiritual character of Islamism in the whole sphere of moral and religious duty

is most clearly seen from an examination of any popular book prepared for the use of the faithful in explanation of the Mussulman faith, and of the duties, moral and religious, of its adherents. These books are filled with the most minute and elaborate directions for the formal observance of regular duties, of prayer, etc., with wearisome and senseless, and sometimes positively disgusting, distinctions drawn between what is lawful and what is unlawful, what is permitted and what is forbidden, and the most puerile directions about outward and formal matters pertaining to good behavior and the common decencies of life.

5. *Mohammedan Sects.*

Mohammedans began to be divided up into sects before the first century of Islamism had passed away. The principal sects among the orthodox are four, these again being subdivided into several smaller sects; and, although among heterodox Mussulmans there are four principal sects, these are subdivided, and we may say compounded, up into very many — some say seventy — minor sects, distinguished by some real or fancied difference, great or small; and, besides these, it would be impossible to even mention here in detail the various sects of dervishes, etc., which are an out-growth of Islamism, and the adherents of which are Mohammedans in name, in some sense and partially so, perhaps, in doctrine also. The brief account of Mussulman sects given below (for which we are indebted mainly to the Preliminary Discourse of Sale's Koran), taken together with the statement just made, is at least sufficient to show how mistaken is the notion of some, that, while there are divisions among Christians, the ranks of Islamism have never been broken by schism and opposing sects.

(*a.*) Orthodox Sects:

The orthodox Mussulmans are all called by the name Sonnites, or Traditionists, because they hold to the traditions as a sort of supplement to the Koran (like the Mishna of the Jews), and treat them with corresponding respect. The

founders of each of the principal sects are held to have been men of great devotion, and profoundly versed in the knowledge of spiritual truth.

The first sect originated early in the second century of the Hejira. Its adherents are called Hanefites, from the founder, and it is that sect of orthodox Mussulmans which is least bound by the authority of tradition, and which gives largest scope to the exercise of the individual reason in understanding and explaining the Koran. The number of the adherents of this sect is large among the Turks.

The sect of Malekites was founded a little later than the former, and, in contradistinction to that sect, gave the most absolute respect to the authority of tradition. The founder of the sect is said to have exclaimed, in his last illness: "Would to God that for every question decided by me according to my own opinion I had received so many stripes. Would to God I had never given any decision of my own." This sect is chiefly followed in Barbary and other parts of Africa.

The sects of Shafeïtes and Hanbalites were founded near the end of the second century of the Hejira, and the followers of these sects seem not to be distinguished so much by different doctrines or practices, as by the fact that they claimed to be followers respectively of different, but mutually friendly and very illustrious, teachers. These teachers both, and about equally, respected the traditions as of high authority. The sects still exist in Arabia, and to some extent in Persia.

(*b.*) Heterodox Sects.

The oldest heterodox sect is that called Kharadjîtes, or Revolters, because they, to the number of twelve thousand, revolted from the Khalif Ali, in the thirty-seventh year of the Hejira. The heresy of this sect consists chiefly in these things, viz. they hold those who have committed grievous sins as infidels; and they believe it right to resist a prince when he transgresses the law. The reason of the revolt of those in whom the sect originated was that, as they alleged,

Ali was guilty of sin in leaving an affair to the judgment of men which ought to have been determined by God alone.

Opposed to this sect is the large sect of Shiites, which has a wide-spread influence in Persia and elsewhere, and consists of those who are followers of Ali, and pay him especial honor, holding him on an equality with, or even superior to, Mohammed, and blasphemously applying to him many things said in the New Testament of Christ. They do not acknowledge that Abu Beker, Omar, and Othman were legal successors of Mohammed. This sect is subdivided into numerous smaller sects, characterized by minor differences.

The Motazalites, or Separatists, rejected entirely the doctrine that the divine attributes, or any of them, are eternal. Only the divine essence is eternal. They seem to have taken up this position from discussions with Christians, and as an extreme recoil from the doctrine of an eternal distinction of persons in the Godhead. They believed that to assert the eternity of any of the divine attributes is opposed to the doctrine of unity. They denied that God is the author of both good and evil; that is, they held that he is not the author of evil. They held also that if a professor of the true religion commits a grievous sin and dies without repentance, he will be eternally dammed, though his punishment will be lighter than that of the infidels. In this sect is said to have originated the scholastic divinity of Mohammedanism. It is divided into some twenty smaller sects.

The doctrine of the Sefatians, or Attributists, in opposition to that of the Motazalites, was, that all the attributes of God are eternal. They also believed God to be possessed of certain attributes which they termed "declarative," and, starting from human modes of conception in regard to God's seeing, hearing, etc., many of the followers of one or other of the minor divisions of this sect came to believe in some sort of corporeal resemblance between God and men, and some of them carried this gross mode of conception so far as to describe, with minute and blasphemous familiarity, the members of God's corporeal organization.

III. The present Relation of Islamism in Turkey to Christianity.[1]

1. *The practical Acquaintance of Turks with Christianity derived through the corrupt Oriental Churches.*

From the very rise of the Ottoman empire to the present time, Turkish Mussulmans have been acquainted with Christianity chiefly as represented by Greek and Armenian Christians. The latter have long been a subject race; the former have been, for five centuries, the hereditary enemies of the Turks.[2] And for four centuries Turkey has had a most powerful enemy, professing the faith of the Greek church, on her northern borders; and her fiercest and most paralyzing encounters in war have been with her Russian foe.

But it is not mainly because nations professing Christianity have been the public enemies of Turkey that Turkish Mussulmans have stood in such unqualified hostility to our faith; although the severity of the prohibition which has, till within ten years, excluded all conversions from Islamism to Christianity, has doubtless been more rigid on this account. The causes of this hostility and aversion are rather to be sought in the character of Christianity as represented in Turkey, and in a consideration of the way in which such misrepresentations of our faith must impress a people like the Osmanly Turks.

In character the Turk is, indeed, haughty and domineering, capricious, and fond of ease and the pleasures of sense; but he is generous and reverent, and, according to the Oriental standard, highly honorable, conscientious, and trust-

[1] In speaking of Turkey it is understood that we do not speak particularly of Syria and Egypt, although much of what is here stated would equally well apply to those provinces.

[2] It is only because there is among the Greeks, with all their national vanity and tenacious attachment to their own church, no real unity, no mutual confidence, no forgetfulness of low, narrow, and selfish aims, in the interest of their nation and their faith, that the multitude of Greeks, scattered all through the Turkish empire, have not always been a formidable and dangerous power, inimical to the government to which they yield an unwilling allegiance.

worthy.[1] In intellect he is neither an imbecile nor a sluggard. He has no sympathy with that form of wily cunning, deceit, and treachery in which the Greek is an adept; nor with the hypocritical sycophancy often found in the Armenian, nor with the low sordidness of the Jew; and, however great the defects of his social system, the Turk occupies a much higher place of moral purity, and holds far worthier ideas concerning woman and domestic life, than his neighbor, the unprincipled Persian, the very high priest of whose religion makes a jest of the holy tie of marriage, and scouts the very idea of female chastity.

Every orthodox Mohammedan, as bound by faith, tradition, and custom, holds in utter detestation the worship of images and pictures, — until very lately carrying this so far as to forbid even the possession of pictures of any kind.[2] The Mussulmans themselves have at least the merit of purity and simplicity in their worship, and in their places of worship. It is natural, therefore, that they should recoil with extreme aversion from a religion which appears to them, as regards its form of worship, to consist of idolatrous reverence paid to pictures of saints; a religion, too, whose grandest and holiest doctrines have been, through the ignorant and culpable misrepresentations and perversions which they have suffered at the hands of priests and higher ecclesiastics, grossly misapprehended by Mohammedans. Moreover, Turks have seen that this religion does not save its votaries from vices and sins the most offensive, rather that they are especially prevalent among the very priests of the religion itself; and they have

[1] The conduct of too many high Turkish officials has, in the estimation of Western Christian nations, fixed upon the entire Turkish character a charge of rapacity and venality which it does not deserve; for the tendency of high office and of power to blind and blunt the moral sense has less to restrain it in Turkey than in England or America.

[2] There is a curious supposition among Mohammedans that paintings and statues will, in the future world, surround the artist whose creations they are, and clamorously demand of him to endow them with souls, and will thus secure the unhappy artist's condemnation. Such superstitions are, however, now rapidly vanishing before the photographic art.

naturally concluded that if Christianity countenances such practices, the claims of its votaries that it is superior to their own faith is unsupported.[1]

This impression, on the part of the Turks, concerning Christianity has not been materially improved by the Roman Catholic element, which has acquired considerable strength in various parts of the empire. It is only a pure Christianity, — pure in doctrinal teaching, and faithfully illustrated by living examples, — that has the fitness or the power to correct the erroneous impressions made by a corrupted Christianity. It is, therefore, only as the gospel and Protestant Christian teaching, with its purer faith and form of worship, gains a foothold and disciples in Turkey, that the Turks can be disabused of their erroneous notions concerning the true faith of Christ. This influence is as yet too feebly and imperfectly exerted in any except a few cities and villages of the empire to do much toward correcting the impressions of centuries.

2. *The present Attitude of Mohammedans in Turkey in relation to their own Faith and Material Reform.*

It is within the memory of men still living that the old exclusiveness of Mohammedanism in Turkey, which extended even to political and commercial relations, began effectually to be removed, and that foreigners began to reside, to any extent, even in Constantinople. It is little more than twenty years ago that the first important concessions to religious liberty were made. A little later, at the close of the revolutionary movement in Hungary, many Hungarians and Poles took refuge in Turkey, and many of them were employed in the Turkish service; and later still the memorable Crimean war deepened and strengthened and greatly increased the in-

[1] The use of intoxicating drinks, even of wine, is prohibited by Islamism; but the practice is so common, and often carried to such excess, among Christians, particularly Greeks, that it has come to be regarded, in the eye of Turks, almost as a custom of Christianity. On the other hand they have learned to distinguish the native Protestant Christians by their honesty and sobriety. It must, however, be acknowledged that, especially within a few years, many Turks also can no longer cast the stone of judgment, for they are not without sin in this matter.

fluences tending to break up the old intolerance, and to throw Turkey open to the influences of European civilization. Within this period also, many Turkish youth have been educated in the schools of Europe, mostly in Paris, and these men are now filling, to a great extent, the offices of government. The schools which the government has established at Constantinople also (all the pupils in the medical and military schools acquiring the French, and all those in the naval schools the English language), together with newspapers, magazines, public lectures, literary societies, are more and more every year bringing the Turks of this generation into acquaintance with the science and literature, the customs and inventions, the useful arts of the nations of Europe.

But it must not be supposed that changes like these can take place, almost within the limits of a human generation in an Oriental state, without opposition. It is to be expected that such radicalism will evoke the most determined and obstinate conservatism. And so it is. The Mohammedans of Turkey are to-day divided into two parties by a line of incomparably greater breadth and importance for the future interests of Turkey, than all the differences which separate the sects and schools of Mussulmans. The liberal party is doubtless, numerically, much the smaller. It is much concentrated at the capital, and at present holds many of the highest and most influential offices of the government, including the grand vizirate. In the provinces, its influence is naturally far stronger in European than in Asiatic Turkey. It is because the influence of this party is in the ascendant at the centre of the empire, where also it derives most efficient and needed countenance and support from European representatives and residents, that Turkey has, within a few years made such rapid progress in reforming and extending her educational system, and in the creation of a periodical and a permanent literature, the *source* and *material* of which is *very largely* of European origin. It is this party which forces the government to construct roads and telegraph lines, and to foster the useful arts and material improvements.

National exhibitions, steamboat companies, and every sort of organization which has for its object the development of the resources of the country and the improvment of its people, owe their origin to this young but enterprising party.

In religion, while nominally Mohammedan, — because the state of which they form a part and in which they aspire to influence is a Mohammedan state, — the adherents of this party are, to a very great extent, imbued with the shallow and materialistic philosophy, the infidelity, and the pantheism with which they have come in contact in their acquaintance with the civilization and literature of Southern Europe. Recognizing this form of civilization as better than that of their own people, they have adopted it, together with its grievous errors and weakness in the higher matters of faith and religion. The scepticism and pantheism, or the religious indifference, of these men is not, therefore, generally that which results from thorough examination and conviction, but rather incidental, and consequent upon their acquaintance with Europeans holding to these modes of thinking and speculation. Science has shown them the falsity and absurdity of many of the dogmas and traditions, and the puerility of many of the superstitions, of their hereditary faith, and many of them acknowledge that, at heart, they have no attachment whatever to the religion which they outwardly profess. The vigorous effort making for the appropriation and use, in the civil department of the government, of a large portion of the immense property belonging to the mosques, is indicative of the spirit and temper of this party.

The rising influence of the liberal party is jealously watched by the whole body of the Ulema (which corresponds to the clergy in Christendom) and by all their dependants and followers, and by the whole body of fanatical Mussulmans, throughout the country. This party would gladly restore the old prestige of Islamism, with all its exclusiveness and bigotry. With all their might they oppose the reforms that are making, and for essentially the same reasons as influenced the conduct of the clergy in European states at the

time of the rise of modern science. The Ulema see that the tendency of such progress is to weaken their own influence and the influence of their religion over the people, and they are joined by the mass of the people in protesting against these innovations, because they tend to weaken the advantage hitherto possessed by themselves, as the dominant race, over their Christian subjects, by fostering ideas and (so-called) improvements of Christian origin, many of which it can with difficulty be disguised, are really in the face of their hereditary religion, its cherished dogmas, traditions, and superstitions. The most effective argument in the possession of the liberal party with which to silence these objectors is the undeniable dependence of Turkey for her very existence upon the Christian powers of Europe.

3. *Attitude of the Mohammedans of Turkey toward Protestant Christianity.*

The early converts from the Oriental churches to Protestant Christianity found the Turks almost uniformly friendly to them. This was both because the Turk soon discovered that the new form of Christianity was purer, — "nearer to their own religion," as they have always delighted to express it, — and so in its simplicity and purity of worship it truly is; and also because Protestantism had a powerful supporter in the representative of England at the Porte. But, at a later period, when a few from the ranks of the Turks themselves passed over, to be reckoned among the converts of the gospel, the attitude of Mohammedans materially changed. Were religion unconnected with the state, and were there no relation between a man's hopes of advancement in rank and influence and fortune and his creed, the liberal party would probably have been found showing the utmost friendliness to the new form of Christian faith and worship, even though the rigid Mussulman party might violently oppose. In fact, however, while the opposition of the latter party has always been experienced, it has not been in forms grievously oppressive, until, about two years ago, exaggerated and essentially false

accounts of movements among Mohammedans toward a change or reform of their own faith, or toward Protestant Christianity, were circulated both by leaders in hostile Christian sects and by fanatical Mussulmans, with the design of compelling the liberal party, who mainly hold the reins of power in the government, to lay aside the attitude of indifference or of positive favor, which some were willing to show, to Protestantism, and to cast the power of the government against any defection from the ranks of Islamism. This attempt succeeded for the time, and its effects, in the intimidation of inquirers, still remain. The character of the two parties into which Turks are divided remains essentially unchanged, and, with suitable firmness and fidelity on the part of Protestant England's representative at Constantinople, favor, at least the negative favor of indifference, may be expected from the one party and a troublesome but not very harmful opposition from the other, to any efforts of Protestant missionaries to circulate and preach the gospel among the Turks, and to any Mussulmans, who from honest conviction, become followers of the gospel. The Protestant Christian missionary still finds those of the one party of Turks approachable, friendly, eager to listen, so long as he speaks of the science, the customs, the material benefits of the civilization he represents, but generally shy, inattentive, uninterested, if he speaks in his proper character, as an expounder and advocate of the truths of the Christian faith.

For the adherents of this liberal party, a prime and most necessary service to be rendered by the missionary of the gospel, is to furnish a check and an antidote against the pernicious speculative systems which have gained so many followers already in Turkey; to show that there is a faith which is not only not opposed to reason, — as they have seen their own to be, — but demanded by right reason and conscience; a religion which alone can satisfy their own deepest wants. And if the minister of the gospel can gain little access, at present, to the party of rigid Mussulmans by direct and personal contact with them, he must be content, at first,

to speak to them through the printed page, — for some will read, — and he may perhaps hope to reach a less callous religious sense, and, by the blessing of God, a fitting spiritual soil, certainly a soil comparatively uncumbered with the thorns of ambition, worldliness, and a materialistic philosophy. For the masses, who for the most part may be reckoned in the larger of the two parties, the mission of a pure Christianity is to break the fetters of superstition, ignorance, and sense, to exalt in the idea of the Turk that which is spiritual, and to lead him to the honest examination of that truth which makes free; which is itself light and life and salvation.

It is plain, then, that there is here a field for missionary effort which claims the prayers, the faith, and the earnest, patient labors of the church of Christ. It is true that many think the "time" of the Mohammedans has not yet come; "There are yet *four months*, and *then* cometh harvest." But the attentive ear may hear the master's voice: "Lift up your eyes and look on the fields, for they are white *already* to harvest."

And it is not civilization, nor the introduction of material improvements, nor the infusion of European science and literature which is to regenerate the Mohammedans. It is the gospel, and the gospel only, clearly explained and illustrated in the lives of those who receive and exemplify it, which can pour into Turkey such a flood of light that neither Greek nor Romish machinations, nor the fanaticism of the illiberal among the Turks, nor the indifference of the liberals, shall be able to quench its rays.

[Note. — It has been thought advisable to retain, in the preceding Article, the *popular* term Islamism, instead of the more *correct* one, Islam.]

ARTICLE IV.

UTILITARIANISM.

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THERE is no question in modern philosophy more fundamental than that relating to the sources of knowledge, and none whose decision will more seriously affect all subsequent thought. The two answers given to this problem are now as distinct and hostile as ever before; while opposing views are sustained with increasing clearness and force of presentation.

Mr. Mill, a leading advocate of one theory, asserts its increased prevalence, and anticipates its final success. The two opinions require but the briefest mention. The one, that of Locke, Heartly, the Mills, Bain, Spencer, refers knowledge to perception and reflection; the other, that of Kant, Coleridge, Reid, Hamilton, Hickok, refers knowledge to perception, intuition, and reflection.

These systems have very different affinities by inherent tendencies, by the circumstances which have occasioned and accompanied their development, and the persons through whom they have arisen. The first is more immediately connected with the scientific and positive tendency of human thought — that which finds the analoga of mind in the physical world, and interprets the problems of philosophy by extension of the methods and ideas developed in science. Of this class of thinkers are Buckle and Draper, explaining social and intellectual phenomena by physical and physiological forces, and by these material connections, not simply reaching, but completely expounding, the spiritual world.

The second system, on the other hand, has been developed largely in the interest of religion, of our higher nature, and stands associated with a devout spirit, putting itself in communion with God, and resting on a providence more immediate and personal than that of law. Of writers of this char-

acter, Dr. Bushnell furnishes a most apt illustration. We shall not insist on any inherent necessity in these connections of the respective theories. We might adduce most notable exceptions. We merely remark these relations of the discussion as lending to it additional interest and importance.

As a chief argument for the first opinion is, that it postulates no new power till an absolute necessity is shown, we shall, if we establish any one idea as intuitive, virtually break down the entire line of defence, and resolve the question into one of details, — how many and what ideas are to be attributed to this intuitive faculty, in one case recognized.

The notion now offered for discussion is that of right; not because the battle can be any more advantageously waged at this point than at many others; but because the doctrine of secondary, derivative obligation has received an enlarged, thorough, and powerful restatement at the hands of a chief advocate.

In the three volumes of discussion by John Stuart Mill, we meet with several critiques on the intuitive philosophy, while they are concluded with an elaborate and careful treatise on the doctrine of utility. That the two systems may on this point fairly confront each other, we shall first give, in a condensed form, yet with as much fairness of presentation as possible, Mr. Mill's view, feeling assured that not much more can be said, or that which is said be better presented, than by this remarkably clear and candid thinker. None can assay the task of philosophical presentation and advocacy with more hope of success than Mr. Mill. We shall only depart from his words as the exigency of our limits requires. The quotations are all from the essay which closes the third volume. The doctrine is thus defined:

"According to the greatest-happiness principle, as above explained, the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality; the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, being the preference felt by those, who, in their opportunities of experience — to which must be

added their habits of self-consciousness and self-observation — are best furnished with the means of comparison. This being, according to the utilitarian opinion, the end of human action, is necessarily also the standard of morality; which may accordingly be defined, the rules and precepts for human conduct, by the observance of which an existence such as has been described might be, to the greatest extent possible, secured to all mankind; and not to them only, but, so far as the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient creation." — p. 315.

There is no intention on the part of Mr. Mill to overlook our higher, our intellectual and moral pleasures, or weigh them out, pound for pound, with our lower enjoyments. This point is fully discussed:

"If I am asked what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer: Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all, or almost all, who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity, as to render it, in comparison, of small account. Neither pains nor pleasures are homogeneous, and pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure. What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except the feelings and judgments of the experienced? When, therefore, these feelings and judgments declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to be preferable *in kind*, apart from the question of intensity, to those of which the animal nature, disjoined from the higher faculties, is susceptible, they are entitled on this subject to the same regard." — pp. 310–311.

He rejects strenuously the conclusion that this doctrine is incapable of producing heroism:

"Meanwhile, let utilitarians never cease to claim the morality of self-devotion as a possession which belongs by as good a right to them as either to the Stoic or to the transcendentalist. The utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself a good. A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to increase, the sum total of happiness, it considers as wasted. The only self-renunciation which it applauds is devotion to the happiness, or to some of the means of happi-

ness, of others, either to mankind collectively, or of individuals within the limits imposed by the collective interests of mankind. I must again repeat what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As, between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility." — p. 322.

That the notion of utility underlies all sacrifice is strongly asserted:

"It is noble to be capable of resigning entirely one's own portion of happiness, or chances of it; but, after all, this self-sacrifice must be for some end; it is not its own end; and if we are told that its end is not happiness, but virtue, which is better than happiness, I ask, would the sacrifice be made if the hero or martyr did not believe that it would earn for others immunity from similar sacrifices? Would it be made if he thought that his renunciation of happiness for himself would produce no fruit for any of his fellow-creatures but to make their lot like his, and place them also in the condition of persons who have renounced happiness? All honor to those who can abnegate for themselves the personal enjoyment of life, when by such renunciation they contribute worthily to increase the amount of happiness in the world; but he who does it, or professes to do it, for any other purpose, is no more deserving of admiration than the ascetic mounted on his pillar. He may be an inspiriting proof of what men *can* do, but assuredly not an example of what they *should*." — p. 321.

Neither would he for an instant accept any conflict between this doctrine and the Christian system:

"Whatever aid religion, either natural or revealed, can afford to ethical investigation, is as open to the utilitarian moralist as to any other. He can use it as the testimony of God to the usefulness or hurtfulness of any given course of action, by as good a right as others can use it for the indication of a transcendental law having no connection with usefulness or with happiness." — p. 330.

These last words afford an illustration of one of those rare cases in which Mr. Mill misrepresents his opponents, at least, a part of them.

Having thus stated the doctrine, Mr. Mill proceeds to give the sanctions to moral precepts so established. The external sanctions are the same as in any system of morals; the difference and the difficulty lie with the internal sanction. At

this point there seems to be a little more hesitancy and uncertainty than in any other part of the treatise. The doctrine is hardly carried boldly and explicitly to its full form and logical completeness. The symmetry of the system would seem to require that the sense of obligation which accompanies a moral duty should be attributed solely to association, to education; that all deeper lodgment in our nature than that of the perception which it accompanies should be denied it. This view some passages seem to take:

"Like the other acquired capacities above referred to, the moral faculty if not a part of our nature, is a natural outgrowth from it; capable like them, in a certain small degree, of springing up spontaneously, and susceptible of being brought by cultivation to a higher degree of development. Unhappily, it is also susceptible, by a sufficient use of the external sanctions and of the force of early impressions, of being cultivated in almost any direction; so that there is hardly anything so absurd or so mischievous, that it may not, by means of these influences, be made to act on the human mind with all the authority of conscience. To doubt that the same potency might be given by the same means to the principle of utility, even if it had no foundation in human nature, would be flying in the face of all experience."—p. 342.

"We may remember that virtue is not the only thing originally a means, and which if it were not a means to anything else would be and remain indifferent, but which, by association with what it is a means to, comes to be desired for itself, and that, too, with the utmost intensity. What, for example, shall we say of the love of money? There is nothing originally more desirable about money than about any heap of glittering pebbles. Its worth is solely that of the things which it will buy; the desires for other things than itself, which it is a means of gratifying. Yet the love of money is not only one of the strongest moving forces of human life, but money is, in many cases, desired in and for itself: the desire to possess it is often stronger than the desire to use it, and goes on increasing when all the desires which point to ends beyond it, to be compassed by it, are falling off. It may, then, be said truly, that money is desired, not for the sake of an end, but as part of the end. From being a means to happiness, it has come to be itself a principal ingredient of the individual's conception of happiness."—p. 351.

"Virtue, according to the utilitarian conception, is a good of this description. There was no original desire of it, no motive to it, save its conduciveness to pleasure, and especially to protection from pain. But, through the association thus formed, it may be felt a good in itself, and desired, as such, with as great intensity as any other good."—p. 352.

"The sentiment of justice appears to me to be the animal desire to repel or retaliate a hurt or damage to one's self, or to those with whom one sympathizes, widened so as to include all persons, by the human capacity of enlarged sympathy, and the human conception of intelligent self-interest." — p. 374.

"To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can give him no other reason than general utility. If that expression does not seem to convey a sufficient feeling of the strength of the obligation, nor to account for the peculiar energy of the feeling, it is because there goes to the composition of the sentiment, not a rational only, but also an animal element, — the thirst for retaliation; and this thirst derives its intensity, as well as its moral justification, from the extraordinarily important and impressive kind of utility which is concerned." — p. 376.

These passages taken by themselves would seem to make the view of the author sufficiently plain. In other statements, however, he appears to be unwilling to deny an innate sense of obligation. He recognizes something somewhat akin to the moral instinct of Spencer:

"I see nothing embarrassing to those whose standard is utility in the question, What is the sanction of that particular standard? We may answer, The same as of all other moral standards, — the conscientious feelings of mankind." — p. 339.

"If there be anything innate in the matter, I see no reason why the feeling which is innate should not be that of regard to the pleasures and pains of others. If there is any principle of morals which is intuitively obligatory, I should say it must be that. If so, the intuitive ethics would coincide with the utilitarian, and there would be no further quarrel between them." — p. 341.

These statements can hardly be regarded as expressing the view of the author, but must be expounded by the fuller passages given above. If insisted on to their full extent, they are ruinous to the belief of which they form a part. We look upon them merely as the wavering of the mind under the pressure of adverse truth.

Mr. Mill, in a fourth chapter, proceeds to a proof of the doctrine, affirming that the facts of consciousness and of the world show that man loves happiness, and only happiness.

"It results from the preceding considerations that there is in reality nothing desired except happiness. Whatever is desired otherwise than as

a means to some end beyond itself, and ultimately to happiness, is desired as itself a part of happiness, and is not desired for itself until it has become so. Those who desire virtue for its own sake, desire it either because the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because the consciousness of being without it is a pain, or for both reasons united." — p. 353.

We have presented thus fully the utilitarian system, that we may the more fully and understandingly contrast it with the doctrine of right which springs from the intuitive philosophy. Let us first, as concisely as possible, present this doctrine.

Right is a simple quality, seen directly by the mind in certain actions. It is of the nature of the idea to impart a sense of obligation. This is as inseparable from it as the feeling of excellence from beauty. The power of mind by which we perceive this quality is intuitive, and is the foundation of our moral nature. The synthesis of perception and feeling is as complete in the act of mind by which we discern the right and become aware of its claim upon us, as in that of taste by which we discern the flavor of fruit and are delighted with it. This intuitive action, however, being that of the mind, is not the discernment of a quality inhering physically in an external object. For this a sense, and not an intuitive faculty, would be requisite. The mind perceives the quality in a mental product, — in an intellection. The action on which judgment is pronounced as right or wrong is not contemplated merely as a physical fact, as when we say of it, that it was done quickly or slowly, with ease or with difficulty, but as presented by the mind in its relation to the parties concerned, the motives which led to it, and the results to which it gave rise. This work of the intellect, by which the perception is transformed into an intellection, by which the act, as understood and expounded by the mind, is made ready for the intuitive faculty, precedes intuition, and gives that in which the quality of right inheres. Right is not a physical, but a moral quality, and must, therefore, so to speak, inhere in a moral substratum, — in an action at once rational and free. That the quality may be seen, that in the action which gives rise to it must be seen ; to wit, its rational relations.

But an action presented in its rational relations is an intel-

lection, a perception received into, enlarged and explained by, the mind. The intuitive faculty then perceives the quality of right in certain intellections, that is, in free, rational acts, which have already entered the mind, come under its contemplation, and been more or less fully comprehended by it.

A great variety of judgments may be pronounced by the same intuitive faculty, at different times, and by different persons at the same time, concerning a single action; since it is not the external action as *seen*, but as *thought* of, weighed in its motives and probable results, that is the object of intuition; and this intellection, to which the eye of the mind is directed, is capable of endless variety with the same external occasion. The reasoning processes, the systematic and faithful unfolding of consequences, by which our moral judgments are so profoundly affected, come in to modify our estimates of action, by presenting new and more full and more correct intellections, by bringing out more clearly those rational relations on which the presence of right depends. Diversity of judgments, therefore, present no difficulty under this theory of right, since there is really, with apparent identity, endless diversity of objects; the intellectual presentation and exposition of the same action being very diverse at different times and with different individuals.

The greater force which moral precepts gain by obedience is referable at once to the larger and clearer view of consequences which the mind acquires, and also to the growth in conviction which with all knowledge accompanies familiarity. The power of habit, like an unperceived ocean current, sets strongly in to float us to our destination.

The relation of right to utility is this: all that ultimately occasions pleasure is useful, and useful in proportion to the quality, degree, and permanence of the pleasure secured. Right action, under God's government, will ultimately attain the highest pleasure; that is, will perfectly coincide with utility; so far, therefore, as we can determine what is truly useful we know what is right, as the one is a criterion of the other. When, however, it is said that what is useful is right,

the assertion is not a disguised truism. There is something added to the judgment of utility by that of right, and the action is taken at once under the sanctions of our moral nature. The law of utility, therefore, if wisely and perfectly obeyed, would lead to results practically the same as those which follow right action, though destitute, as we shall show, of any internal sanction wherewith to enforce the conduct it prescribes. An inquiry, therefore, into the utility of actions is not only a desirable, it is an indispensable, antecedent of perfect moral judgments, since that which makes them useful shows them also to be right. Extension is always accompanied by some resistance and some weight, though the three qualities are merely co-existent, not identical.

The relation of right to wisdom is that of a more immediate, instinctive, and authoritative guide. Wisdom inquires into the ends of action, and seeks that inclusive end which best harmonizes all others. It discovers that the lines of right action are those of highest utility; that the worth of the individual and the highest happiness of all are involved, each in each, and that in fully meeting the claims of our own nature upon us we shall also meet the claims of all. These discoveries give the rational, philosophical character of the right, and confirm its hold on the conscience, yet are not the ground of its first authority. Right runs before philosophy, from the earliest dawn of intelligence giving clues to action, and laying its authority on the conscience. The mind may not see the harmony of philanthropy and self-interest, and yet feel the claims of benevolence. When philosophy does at length reveal the perfection of the moral law, when it points out that the highest happiness — the blessedness of all — is thereby secured, it does not reflexively give to the more limited judgments of right, which have somewhat blindly and obscurely labored towards this end, their authority, nor can it even enforce its own claims without a direct appeal to conscience, bringing forward its primitive, independent sense of obligation.

Men have not to wait for philosophy to give them the laws

of life; a more immediate and authoritative tribunal, able to handle successfully limited and partial judgments, and evolve a rule of life out of the present character and obvious results of action, is found in the conscience of man. Wisdom, therefore, enters to reveal the character of a law that the moral sense has already established; to cast light on a moral universe whose forces of order are already at work.

Such are the two theories of right. How stands the argument between them? The chief consideration in favor of utilitarianism is, that it conforms to the law of parsimony, postulating in the explanation of moral phenomena no new faculty. This argument is of entire force if the phenomena are adequately explained, but, the theory failing of such explanation, is of little or no force. The completeness of the explanation rendered is, then, the true test of the two theories.

The point at which the utilitarian theory signally fails to recognize in their full force the facts under consideration is that of obligation. It does not account for that profound sense of duty which accompanies the notion of right. It attempts this in two ways. The first method is glanced at, and apparently accepted as admissible, in one of the passages taken from Mr. Mill. It is this: that a feeling of obligation is native to the mind, and attaches directly to the perception of utility. Thus the emotional and the perceptive element, so indissolubly united in the notion of right, are violently rent asunder, the latter cast away, and the former united to the independent, though associated, idea of utility. Thus, this analysis of right ends in discarding it altogether, in substituting for it a familiar and perfectly explicable generalization, and in connecting with this those feelings which have arisen in the minds of men from the discarded intuition.

It is a very strong fact in the history of the human mind, in language, and in polemics, that men have distinguished from every other notion this notion which they have called right; that they have maintained the distinction in word and action, and that, when for a moment, it has been lost in the confusion of controversy, they have speedily restored it, and

begun again to perplex themselves with the old inquiry: What is right? Is it a satisfactory and adequate exposition of these well-known and wide-spread facts to affirm, that there neither is nor has been such an idea as that of right; that a notion always familiar and no wise complicated has, by some concealed trick, some legerdemain of the mind, been played off as new and very peculiar; and that this mistake has been obstinately and perversely insisted on, though carefully and adequately pointed out? Truly such a result in psychology would be a very startling one, and reflect great uncertainty on all the distinctions of thought and language. If the world has meant nothing more in saying that an action is right than in saying that it is useful, it has certainly not understood its own words, and mistaken the most perfect of synonymes for the most diverse of ideas. That such an error still clings to all classes of minds after its faithful exposure, shows it something more than an error. True theories do not explain facts, distinctions, in this way — distinctions that have arisen in thought, word, and action unconsciously, and in the interest of no theory. To affirm the identity of right and utility is in opposition to the testimony of language, and therefore of those who use it. Especially is it contrary to the facts of mind that the sense of obligation attaches to the notion of utility merely. Utility is a notion reached by generalization; it marks as a common quality of many actions, that they impart some kind of pleasure. A sense of obligation, therefore, cannot belong to utility, except as it belongs to the pursuit of pleasure, on which the useful rests. The affirmation then is, that we feel a native obligation to seek pleasure, our own and that of others. It would seem sufficient to refer this affirmation to the consciousness of each individual for decision; but as philosophy rests such a variety of facts on the testimony of consciousness, we make the appeal more carefully by pointing out some of the results involved.

The doctrine of utility implies that all pleasure, no matter of what kind or how sensual, unless distinctly opposed in the

mind to a higher pleasure, is not merely optional, but obligatory. It becomes our duty to give way to every appetite and impulse which is not seen to forfeit a higher good. Or, if indolence brings more enjoyment, then this also is a duty. There is no option in our pleasures; we violate conscience, according to the estimate of pleasure present to the mind, alike in not eating or drinking, walking or sleeping, as in not loving man or honoring God.

As the malevolent passions afford some pleasure in their indulgence, these become obligatory in the degree of that enjoyment, and are only wrong when seen to take the place of a more deep satisfaction — a satisfaction that would never arise without the moral sense. If a being could be so thoroughly malignant as to make malice a constant, an intense, source of pleasure, this fact would go far to abate his criminality. Nay, if he were able to show that to him, so constituted, malice was, and would remain, a greater enjoyment than benevolence, the moral sense must approve his action, and give him the satisfaction of moral integrity. Virtue is lost in the pursuit of pleasure only as we see that which is pursued to be less than some other enjoyment open to us. We are to weigh the joys of lust with those of love; and holiness has no other advantage over sin than that of more liberal pay.

The test of the quality and quantity of pleasure which Mill gives seems, on this theory, to lose much of its force. Those who have experienced the higher pleasures, so called, of an intellectual and aesthetical taste may, indeed, pronounce decidedly for them; but as this is a question of opinion, how shall their judgment be made obligatory on the majority who reject it? May these not answer that there is no disputing concerning tastes, and that our natures, grosser if you will, realize a most sensible and weighty satisfaction in the line of prudent, physical indulgence we have assigned ourselves? Remember that the moral sense cannot enter in to decide this controversy. If greater pleasure does, in the judgment of any human being, lie in the direction of physical

rather than of intellectual tastes, then he has a right to add thereto all the satisfaction of a gratified conscience, and stanchly maintain it as his duty to pursue this method of gratification. Moral joy and peace wait to add themselves to the winning pleasure, be that what it may. They cannot throw themselves into the balance to decide the conflict in favor of mental and spiritual impulses, but must wait, and drop as an extra burden into the descending pan, though it be that of sensual pleasure. Grant that wisdom and the largest experience do pronounce in favor of the mind as opposed to the body; with the tribunal before which the case is to be tried, there is often no such wisdom, no such experience, neither, with the majority of those whose testimony is to be taken. How, then, can the bewildered judge come to a conclusion approximately just? Yet, wherever his honest verdict shall fall, there conscience will give approval; and he may be as moral in his brutality as his neighbor in his spirituality.

It is a point which does not receive sufficient weight, as between the two views, that in the one the moral satisfaction of obedience can come in to decide the judgment, while in the other it cannot. The mind is left by utilitarianism to judge between pleasures independently of morality, — to measure them in quantity before it can secure a moral verdict for either. The theory of an intuitive right affirms that the sense of obligation arises becauses of a primitive perception, and accounts therein for the firmness and decision with which the balance is brought down. Utilitarianism, affirming that this sense attends on all pleasure, cannot call it in to determine in favor of any one pleasure, till this has been shown, on independent grounds, to be greater than any and every competing good. This fallacy of including moral satisfaction in one of the forms of happiness, and on that ground deciding it to be the greatest, and hence obligatory, often enters very subtilely into ethical statements, and deceives even those who make them. A holy blessedness is spoken of, the fruit and crown of all virtuous and holy activity,

which has in itself an infinite worth. It is this blessedness which is made to give rise to the sense of obligation. But honest analysis can only resolve this holy blessedness into some intellectual good, since the moral nature does not come into play till it has seen and chosen the highest pleasure, and waits to add its resultant satisfaction to any choice in the circle of its gratifications which it can pronounce the wisest and best. Where does the preponderance of experimental pleasure settle before the choice, not after it, is the question.

This utilitarian view of our moral nature makes it no clue or rule of action. We are left to do what every man is inclined to do — seek pleasure. The additional obligation that conscience imposes, only serves to increase the stakes at issue, and therefore to make prudence more necessary. Right wages no warfare with appetite, has no predilection for spiritual tastes, throws in no intuitive perception to anticipate wisdom, guide and restrain the ignorant wanderer, but simply confirms him in any judgment he is able at the time to make of what his highest enjoyment requires. It gives no more safety or wisdom in deciding issues, but merely deepens the danger, enhances the liabilities, which accompany them. It adds a moral motive to natural desire, and leaves both to be guided and governed by reason.

In putting this point to consciousness, there is one further consideration. The moral sense, it is usually felt, especially enforces the pleasures of others, as against our own; and future, as against present pleasure. Ought not the reverse to be true, if the mere notion of a good to be obtained by an action gives rise to the sense of obligation? Our satisfaction is much more keen in that which pertains to ourselves than in that which belongs to another; in a present enjoyment than a remote good. If, then, the sense of obligation keeps pace with the clearness of the perception which calls it forth, morality, as well as appetite and passion, should favor present and personal indulgence.

But there is a second explanation which the doctrine of

utility offers of moral obligation, one which Mr. Mill seems on the whole to accept, and certainly one which is exposed to less difficulty than that now presented. It is this. There is no original sense of obligation. Our moral nature has neither in perception or feeling any peculiar, primitive foundation. Its present power is due to association. Men soon discovered that certain actions were useful. Their interest prompted them to exact these of others, and to condemn the opposite. In furtherance of this, they strove — more or less unconsciously — to impose a sense of obligation on others in regard to these lines of action, and thus arose a new word, "right," with a new hold on the mind of man. The sense of obligation has sprung, then, from the interests of men, leading them to enforce certain views of conduct on their fellows. An inseparable association has at length come to unite specific actions with a feeling of obligation, and laid, in habit and conventional opinion, the foundations of our moral nature.

To this view we oppose a few of many phenomena not accounted for by it. The feeling of obligation is greater, more universal and authoritative, than mere association can explain. We see in the laws of fashion, in social customs, what uniform opinion and practice can enforce; and though the laws they impose are strong, they are by no means as strong as those of morals.

Consider the illustration Mr. Mill offers of a feeling admittedly resting on association — an association most powerful and universal, the passion of avarice. How very partial is its government as an excessive and ungrounded force in our constitution, when compared with that of the moral sense! How steady and certain the victory the latter is able to acquire over it; how adequate and just the foundation on which it really rests in our experience and nature; and how quickly would it give way if gold were to lose that substantial value from which its extravagant estimate springs! The fact of avarice, a simple excess of native desires, affords no color to a theory of right which makes the most weighty and permanent of all sentiments a mere illusion, created in the interests

of men, with no native, valid foundation in their feelings. We do naturally, inevitably desire good, and thus, those things, like gold, which minister to it. But the theory under discussion recognizes no native sense of obligation, less or more, in view of the useful; and is compelled, therefore, to provide, both for the incipiency and growth of a sentiment which is at length to rule the world. Here is a result totally beyond that revealed in the passion of avarice.

Again, those who have especially broken away from the law of morals, from the conventional opinions and influences of society, are very suddenly and very violently arrested by the force of conscience. Such a phenomenon as remorse finds meagre explanation in a theory which gives our moral nature no foundation, save in the interested opinions of our fellows. This violent feeling could find no adequate spring in the influence of the sentiments of others over a mind which has habitually and protractedly despised them. We might as well look for repentance and remorse on the part of one who is reminded that his hat is unfashionable, having never cared to wear any other.

So, too, the sudden power of the moral nature, as developed in the savage by missionary labor, is unexplained by this theory. The whole force of the most protracted and thoroughly sustained customs, as those of caste, are instantly thrown off, indicating the presence of a power greater than any which the sentiments of one's fellows can exert, and arising immediately and independently of any such influence.

We must also look upon the explanation given by Mr. Mill of the sentiment of justice as exceedingly weak, so much so as to cast suspicion on the entire theory which leads to it. Is, then, the foundation of justice in our constitution the desire of retaliation enlarged by sympathy? If so, in proportion as the Christian precepts, Love thy neighbor as thyself, Overcome evil with good, prevail, justice and the love of justice should disappear. Enlightened ages should show the least, and barbarous periods the fullest, response to the claims of law. Better, by far, let this sentiment rest back on the sense

of obligation, and consequent guilt of disobedience, though we have for these, on the theory of Mr. Mill, no foundation, except a prevalent opinion disseminated and enforced by the interests of men. At these points utilitarianism signally fails to explain the facts.

The notion of utility is so intimately associated with that of right, that it is possible, by giving wider and wider range to the first, making it more and more inclusive of every form of good, to cause it to seem the perfect counterpart of the last — the good plainly expressed which is latently lurking in our moral sense.

A shaft may be introduced through the partition into the chamber we occupy. It may there find its bearings, and, by bevel gear, be coupled to a second shaft passing from the chamber at right angles to the first. As we look at the two, it may not be possible to tell by which the power finds entrance, and by which, exit. If one revolves, the other revolves; if one stops, the other stops; if the revolution of one is quickened or reversed, that of the other is similarly affected. Yet, it is most certain that force enters by one, and passes out by the other, and is a fact most material to the order and purpose subserved by them. We may be compelled to look away from their exact interaction, to leave the chamber, and determine more broadly their connections before we can decide the question. If we still abide in the room, and gaze with philosophical abstraction on the point of contact where the two interlock, we may, perchance, adopt the notion that the shaft to the left impels the one to the right, and thus send back the power from the looms to the engine; but this will not affect the fact, nor cause the piston to drive the steam, instead of being driven by it. Right and utility are thus securely coupled, each with each. But the line of power lies from the first to the second; thence comes the ruling force. Utility is perfectly met, because right is met, and because right reigns in the human constitution and in the divine government. If we will look beyond the point of simple contact we shall be able to see whence power proceeds,

and on what it expends itself. The spiritual worth of man, which is that of a moral being, gives to him the law of action, the only applicable estimate of utility. That line of action, and that only, is useful to him which is right. The absolute, perfect utility of holiness grows out of the nature of virtue, and all the mechanism of man and society is attached to and revolved by this shaft.

ARTICLE V.

LIFE OF THE PATRIARCH CYRIL.

BY DR. A. G. PASPATI, CONSTANTINOPLE.

[NOTE. — This Essay was forwarded for publication in the Bibliotheca Sacra by Dr. Hamlin, of Constantinople. It is interesting as the production of a foreigner, writing in a language foreign to him, and containing various intimations in regard to the history of the Greek church; its relations to the Catholic and Protestant churches; the advantages which it has enjoyed, as well as the disadvantages which it has suffered, for attaining a correct faith, etc. The Essay was originally read, in March 1864, before the Literary Society of Bebek; and, contrary to our usual practice, we have retained its original form of direct address. We have chosen to publish it precisely as it was delivered, with the exception of a slight verbal change made here and there, in order to remove some obscurity resulting from the author's foreign idiom.]

IT was with a feeling of reluctance that I accepted the invitation to address an English and American audience. As the proposition, however, came from Dr. Hamlin, a friend endeared to me by an intercourse of many years, I felt it a duty to accede to his wishes. Knowing that I was to address you in a language foreign to me, it seemed very natural that I should choose a subject familiar to me, so as to compensate for the uncouthness of my style and diction.

I intend this evening to invite your attention to an episode in the history of the Greek church of Constantinople at the beginning of the seventeenth century, when a battle was fought in this city between Catholics, Greeks, and Protes-

tants, and sustained for many years, until the disappearance of the hero of the battle. It was a mighty struggle, which would have been full of eventful consequences for the Greek church had the champion been permitted to live.

Why have I chosen a subject of this nature? Why talk on ecclesiastical matters, and ecclesiastical strifes, that have marred the beauty and embittered the sweetness of the Christian faith! It is because Constantinople has been, from the earliest ages, one of the great nursery-places of Christianity. Even in a political point of view it has been acting a prominent part in the history of the world for the space of sixteen hundred years. First, an insignificant city, it became the capital of a Christian and Turkish empire. Rome and Athens are revered for what they were; but Constantinople is still full of life. No traveller passes its solitary streets to look at decayed monuments or vestiges of past glory. It still lives a life of bloom, a life of its former days. Can the same be said of its sister cities, Rome and Athens?

Those of you who have visited the heights of Chánlitza, over Scutari, know that above the fountains and the ordinary lounging-places of visitors is a cluster of trees, under which find shelter from the scorching sun the flocks that graze upon those treeless hills. What a magnificent view! How lavishly beautiful is the scene before you. How solemn for a Christian! On your left are the hills of Bithynia, at the foot of which stand the poor and neglected hamlets of Nice, where, in 325, was drawn up by Christian fathers the Nicene Creed, dear to all Christians. Under your feet stands Cadykivy, where, in 451, was assembled the fourth Ecumenical synod. Look now over to the city, that portentious city, so quiet, so still, so beautiful, that you would willingly blot from the book of history the numberless crimes that have contaminated it. There before you, as though cringing before the majestic dome of St. Sophia, stands the church of St. Ireni, now the armory of the Turkish government. In these halls, now filled with spears, battle-axes, guns, and rusty armor, was settled, in 482, the sacred dogma of the

Trinity, left incomplete by the fathers of the Nicene Synod. An immense cross still stands over the place where the fathers officiated on that day. Look now at St. Sophia, and gaze upon the square in front of it, where have walked nearly all the Fathers of the Christian church. Look not at the majesty of the massive structure, and the inestimable riches of its antique columns, that once served to support and embellish heathen temples. In that church Chrysostom has preached; there he thundered against the vices and profligacy of the Byzantine court and the cold indifference of the Christian public. In that church, three hundred years afterwards, officiated the patriarch Photius, under whose patriarchate began the schism which has divided for ever the two sister churches, Roman and Greek; schism, that originated from interested, worldly motives, and finished in a series of anathemas between the pope and patriarch.

The crusaders, in 1204, ejected the Greeks and their patriarch from this church, till, fifty years afterwards, the Greeks, on repossessing it, purified it anew from the pollution of a foreign and hated religion. This was its third consecration. There would not be place enough to write upon those marble walls the iniquitous deeds that have been perpetrated under that unparalleled dome. Allow me now to tell the Christian spectator the last heart-rending scene, which no one should forget on entering this magnificent temple.

Fourteen years before the fall of Constantinople, the Greek emperor, with his nobles and clergy, went to Rome, to effect the union of the two churches, which time had sadly alienated from each other. The object of the Greeks was not so much the union of the church, as the promised help against the hordes of Turks that were closing in upon the doomed city and empire. The pope and his clergy thought that by offering them protection and armed assistance they would overcome the stubbornness of the Greeks, and easily induce them to enter into union with the Catholic church. Their patriarch would then become a suffragan bishop of the pope. The truth is, that no human aid could have saved Constan-

tinople in those times, when the Greeks, instead of betaking themselves to arms, and fighting their own battles, preferred monasteries and nunneries, where unworthiness and indolence revel to their utter satisfaction.

They went to Italy as humble supplicants. Their souls were bent down by the danger from the Turks, and the antipathy of their nation to a union with the Latin church; for most of the Greeks were ignorant of the true motives of this extraordinary mission to foreign lands. Much they accepted, much they discussed; but they could not bend their necks in abject servitude to the pope of Rome. They left, despised and scorned, hooted as heretics and schismatics, fit to be an easy prey to their Turkish enemies.

On the twenty-eighth of May, 1453, the Greeks, perfectly conscious of their inability to prolong their resistance against the hordes that were preparing for a final and desperate assault on the next day, assembled for the last time in the church of St. Sophia. There the emperor, with his nobles, generals, and all the distinguished inhabitants of the city, came together for the last time, to partake of the communion, and to prepare for death. The patriarch officiated. Only a small number of those who were seeking protection in the precincts of St. Sophia (according to a popular belief that an angel from heaven would there protect them) could enter the church. The scene was of solemn interest. All over the church resounded prayers, such as the human soul offers only in times of danger. Sobs and tears, wailings and heart-rending cries, filled the vast church, from its outer portico to its inner temple. Before partaking of the communion for the last time they pardoned each other, and were reconciled man to man. It was the most solemn day in the history of this far-famed church. That night an empire was to fall. The emperor, his warriors, and ministers were to die upon those walls. That church was to become a mosque. Those women were to become widows, and many a maiden, wife to her dreaded enemy. Before the morrow's sun set upon that lost city Mohammed II. was to pray upon that Christian

altar. More than this, — with him was to come the grim angel of destruction, and, sitting upon that Christian altar, would be defying the whole of Christendom for ages to come, mocking her armies, and insulting her kings.

The next day, at three in the afternoon, the Turkish emperor prayed in the inner sanctuary, and the voice of the muezzin was heard from the pulpit where Chrysostom and Photius preached.

Such was the last and fourth consecration of this magnificent church. Did the Catholics, in their imprecations against the stubbornness of the Greeks, and in their refusal to afford them protection against the Turks, ever dream of the horrors which Constantinople, in passing into Ottoman hands, would bring upon their own heads? That small point of land which we call the Seraglio, and which incloses the imperial Ottoman residence, has been for more than three centuries the most unmerciful scourge of the Christian name. Hungary, Transylvania, and Bohemia for many years trembled at the name of a Turk.[1] Such was the alarm in Christendom occasioned by the incursions of the Turks, that Rodolph II., in 1592, instituted, in the Roman and Hungarian empire, the bell of the Turks, which morning, noon, and evening summoned the faithful to the church, to ask God's aid against such a terrible enemy as the Turk. Their cities were ruined; their inhabitants butchered, flayed, and quartered; their women and maidens led into ignominious slavery; their churches turned into mosques and stables; their ambassadors imprisoned and slaughtered. Austria itself was for many years obliged to pay a large tribute, in order to save its frontiers from the continual depradations of its Ottoman neighbors. Every time that the treaty of peace was renewed, it concluded with this phrase: "Graciously accorded by the sultan, always victorious, to the infidel king of Vienna, always conquered.[2]

Venice itself, the powerful republic of the Middle Ages,

[1] Von Hammer (French translation), Vol. VII. p. 264.
[2] Von Hammer, Vol. VIII. p. 73.

trembled at the thoughts of a Turkish war. Her maritime cities were devastated by the Turkish navies and the daring corsairs of the African coast. A Turkish fleet arrived at the very door of Rome, and, after ravaging the coast of Italy and Sicily, came triumphant into Constantinople, richly laden with spoils and comely maidens from Christian lands.

Am not I justified in saying that Constantinople has acted a prominent part in the history of the Christian world? Was it not in this city that originated that division which has kept asunder the two great families of the Christian world? What a fiendish spirit animates, to this day, the two churches against each other? In the time of the crusades the spirit of opposition to the Latins knew no bounds; for those who have studied their history know that the object of these daring and fanatical men was not only to retrieve from the hands of the Moslems the sacred cities of our religion, but to subject, if possible, the Christians of the East to the dominion of the pope. The ill-success of the Synod of Florence still more embittered the Greeks against the Latins, till the former publicly declared that it were better to wear the Turkish turban than the Frank cap. Besides all this, the Venetians, long before the Turkish dominion, and for years afterwards, occupied many of the islands of the Archipelago, and were so impolitic as to appropriate to themselves the best churches of the Greeks; promoting to public offices every Catholic, and entirely neglecting those of the inhabitants who preferred remaining faithful to the religion of their fathers. Why, then, did the Venetians complain that their Greek subjects always favored the Turks against them, and often betrayed them, to their utter surprise? The Greeks as a body were not so harassed by the Turks as they were by the Venetians. The Turks rarely molested their religion. In times of trouble, they might easily quiet the avarice of their rulers by presents and money. It was natural for a Turk to despise their religion; but that a Christian nation should profane their churches, and exert itself to the utmost to deride what to them, in their slavery, was

the greatest boon of heaven, was an insupportable offence. To this day the Catholic of this country calls the Greek a schismatic, which the Greek readily repays, calling him a dog.

I have been thus prolix in my observations on this division of the two churches, in order to show whence has originated the feeling of animosity which is still very violent between these two churches. You will, I think, better understand the spirit which actuated the patriarch Cyril in his connections with the Latin church.

Cyril Lucar, or as the Greeks call him *Κύριλλος Λούκαρις*, was born in the island of Candia in 1572. The island was then in the hands of the Venetians, and enjoyed, under the rule of that despotic government, more liberty than was to be found in other parts of Greece subject to Turkey, and more security from the lawless incursions of the Turkish corsairs.

All the Greeks of those times who were desirous of obtaining a liberal education repaired to the universities of Venice and Padova, where they studied general literature, mathematics, or medicine. Cyril, in pursuing his studies, became extremely interested in the reformation of Germany, as it appears from his subsequent letters to many distinguished Protestants. Knowing that there was little truth in what he heard or read of them in Italy, he determined to travel to Germany in order to study their opinions, and thence return to his native country. He had studied the Italian and Latin, with both of which he appears by his correspondence to have been very familiar. After completing his course of study in Italy, he repaired to Geneva, where he became acquainted with many of the leading Protestants. Here he had ample opportunities of familiarizing himself with the opinions of the Reformers. From Geneva he travelled to Holland, Germany, and England, where the Protestant religion was highly favored by Queen Elizabeth. We know little more than the simple itinerary of Cyril through these countries, where his sole object was to study the sayings and doings of the Protes-

tant Reformers, and to peruse their various polemical works, that absorbed the minds of Europeans at that age. What we know of these travels is collected from his letters to different individuals in the latter part of his life. On his return from Europe, he sailed directly to Alexandria, where a near relative of his, Meletius Pigàs,[1] was occupying the patriarchal throne of Alexandria. Meletius, though born in Candia, and under Catholic rule, was all his life warring against the Latin church. He also was educated in Padova, for the medical profession, but, at the close of his studies, left the university without his medical degree, because it was required of him to take an oath of allegiance to the Latin church. I mention this fact because the character of Meletius may have influenced the subsequent life of Cyril.

Soon after his arrival at Alexandria, Cyril was ordained priest. On the death of the patriarch of Constantinople, Meletius was called to occupy the vacant throne till the election of a new patriarch. Cyril accompanied him to Constantinople. Here he became acquainted with the principal men of his nation, who had occasion to admire the talents of Cyril as a pulpit orator at the patriarchal church of Phanar.

While he resided in Constantinople Meletius sent Cyril to Poland, to prevent, if possible, the union of the Greek churches with the Latins. Sigismond, king of Poland, after many ineffectual efforts, found it impossible to persuade Cyril to accede to his wishes. The king was afraid of Cyril's influence with the neighboring Cossacks, who were not only ready to take up arms in defence of their tenets, but to unite with the Protestants against the fanatical Sigismond. The king, however, baffled all their efforts, for he routed the assembled Cossacks, pursued Cyril and his colleague, the latter of whom he arrested, and immediately quartered. Cyril barely escaped with his life. He arrived in Constantinople with the firm conviction that the Greek church cannot cope with the Roman, unless a union be effected with the Protestant powers. Such seems to have been the result

[1] Μελέτιος Πηγᾶς.

of this mission to the Polish churches upon the mind of Cyril.

Cyril succeeded Meletius to the patriarchal throne of Alexandria in 1602, being then thirty years old. From this date to 1621, when he was first called to the see of Constantinople, there is very little to be said of the tranquil life of Cyril. In 1612 he was called to Constantinople by the unanimous voice of his nation, to occupy the throne till the election of a new patriarch. After his vicarage, he travelled to Wallachia, and thence to mount Athos, examining the monasteries and their libraries. Thence he sailed directly to his see in Egypt. Leaving now Cyril in Alexandria, allow me to say a few words on the busy stage of Eastern affairs.

It was in the year 1602, when Cyril was elected patriarch of Alexandria, that the Jesuits for the first time established a school in Galata, under the protection of the French ambassador. Up to this time all the permanent resident ambassadors in Constantinople were Catholics, representing Catholic powers. No ambassadors were so well treated or so highly favored as the French, for Turkey and France were always political friends, both interested in subduing Charles V. and his successors on the throne of Austria. Some years before, the Christian world, according to the expression of Von Hammer, saw with amazement a French and Turkish fleet, under Barbarossa, ravaging the coast of Italy. With the exception of France, every other Catholic power was at enmity with the Turks, paying at times a tribute to keep off marauding parties from its territories. On this account all foreign subjects frequently demanded French protection, and the Latin church wisely from the beginning sheltered itself under the banner of France. This explains the preponderance of France in all litigious religious questions in the East.

Queen Elizabeth for the first time in 1579, sent three English merchants to the sultan, demanding protection for their vessels and their traders in the Levant. Following the usages of all European ambassadors to the Porte, she fur-

nished the first regular ambassador in 1583, William Harebone, with sundry presents to the sultan and his officers, among which stand conspicuous nine bull-dogs. Edward Burton, the successor of Harebone, was extremely well treated by the sultan and his officers.

Soon after the arrival of the English ambassador, envoys came to Constantinople from the States-General of Holland and from Sweden, who, together with the English ambassador, stood aloof from their colleagues of the Catholic emperors.

It appears from what we know of the instructions of these ambassadors, that they were recommended to promote, by all the means in their power, the Catholic faith among the Christians of the East. In fact, as the Catholic faith had been sadly weakened and exposed in Europe, so much the more did it exert itself to compensate its loss in the East. In India, China, and among the Mongols, the Jesuits were strenuous in their efforts, converting and baptizing in such a loose manner, that their converts, after their reception in the Christian church, were neither heathen nor Christians. This untiring activity of the Jesuits soon showed itself in Constantinople, where their influence was frequently counteracted by the interposition of the Protestant ambassadors. In their newly established school of Galata they received children of all classes, but particularly of the Greeks. Some of the Greek clergy repaired to hear their instruction, as no other school in Constantinople was open for instruction in European learning and science. The Jesuits hoped that in this school they might educate some of the Greek clergy, and by their means bring about the much-desired union of the two churches, or rather the subjection of the Greeks to the pope. Cyril seems to have been studying all these movements of the Catholics; not only in Constantinople, but in Syria and Palestine.

It is extremely fortunate for the history of the Greek church in those days that Cyril's correspondence with many Protestants has been preserved and published at different times. A very important letter is the one written to John Nytterbogaert, from Wallachia, in 1613, when Cyril was

returning to Alexandria from Constantinople. It appears from the text of this letter, published in Amsterdam, 1718, that Nytterbogaert had demanded Cyril's opinion on the state of the Greek churches. The following is the title of the letter, written in Latin. "Cyril, pope and patriarch of Alexandria, to the most learned and revered John Nytterbogaert, minister of the divine word in the Christian church of Hague. Beloved brother in Jesus Christ: Salutation and peace from the Lord Jesus Christ." A few extracts will answer our purpose. Says Cyril: "In these days of calamity we cannot openly speak or declare the truth. In communicating, however, with you, and your church, I can speak with confidence; I can unite with you, because you act in a Christian manner, you love the peace of Christ, and desire a true union in the Lord. Should I err in whatever I write, you will not on this account burn me in a cauldron, or stretch me upon burning embers, or terrify me by the sight of the executioner. The church of Christ cannot be supported by such torments; on the contrary, they weaken it. Admonish me in brotherly love. Whatever man declares to be true and infallible, let us examine by the scriptures and the gospel. I am fully persuaded that I ought not to neglect those duties of friendship and Christian charity which have so happily commenced between us, and by the means of which, we may increase in the knowledge of truth and piety. We should pray to the all-merciful God to assist our designs by his grace, and that his Holy Spirit may never depart from our hearts. You ask that I should write to you what is our confession of faith. Please favor me by your first letter with *your* confession of faith, for which you have so much suffered."

Cyril, in giving to the Dutch minister the confession of his church, says: "Substantially, there is no difference between us. Our sentiments are the same." There is a remark of Cyril on the minor ceremonies of the Church which I consider extremely important. It is this: "Though the members of the church of Rome profess that human institutions are

so necessary that those who trespass against them cannot be saved; we, however, believe that only the divine institutions are certain and infallible, and the human, indifferent, subject to fallacy. On this account we subject them to the word of the scriptures, the gospel, and the Holy Spirit. Should they be found good and useful, we accept them; if not, we certainly reject them."

Hear now what Cyril says of the patriarchate of Constantinople, which he occupied ten years afterwards: "The patriarch of Constantinople is the most powerful, and at the same time the most unhappy, of the four patriarchs; for the Turks, not regarding the fitness of the candidate, confirm the one who gives them the largest sum of money."

Cyril, after describing the manner in which the patriarchs are elected, and the sects with whom the Greek church has no communion, says, that he often talks on religious matters with the members of his flock, and his bishops, whose ignorance he everywhere bitterly deplores. On account of this ignorance, says Cyril, the Jesuits have been allowed to establish themselves in Constantinople for the instruction of the youth. Their gain is the gain of the fox among the poultry.

After describing the persecutions of the Greek church in Muscovy and Poland, of which he was an eye-witness, and the wicked machinations of the Romish church against the unprotected Greek churches established in Turkey, he says: "We hope to be always united with you; we depend upon your spiritual admonitions, as we also give you our spiritual benediction in your opposition to the Roman church. So that united, and embracing in our spirit the orthodox faith of Christ, we may be able to accomplish the duties of our high vocation, combating in faith, and always defending the truth, for the increase of the Catholic church, for the everlasting glory of God the Father, and his only Son and Holy Spirit, whose blessing and grace may always be with you, so that it may bless your exertions in the accomplishment of your pious duties, and for the spiritual benefit of those who hear your mellifluous discourses."

In finishing his letter, he thanks the States-General for the books which they sent to him. He demanded as a special favor from Nytterbogaert, to have a collection of Protestant works, and a short history of their authors, sent to him in Cairo. There is a spirit of love and Christian affection in this long epistle. Cyril is violent only when he talks of the Catholics, and their emissaries the Jesuits. Now, had this letter been translated and published at that time among his countrymen, he would certainly have been deposed, and probably excommunicated. A Greek patriarch giving the right hand of fellowship to a Protestant minister, telling him that there is no great difference between us, and fraternizing so heartily with the Protestants against the Catholics, would have wounded the Greeks and the Turks. From the earliest times to this very day, it has been the custom among the Greeks in upbraiding each other to use the term "Pilate" and "Arius." At this time, however, the greatest miscreant was termed "Lutheran," or, as the Greeks generally pronounced it, "Luterano"; evidently derived from the Catholics of these countries, who cannot pronounce the θ of the Greeks. Think now of a distinguished Greek patriarch, of a highly educated man, uniting himself with Protestant Lutheran communities!

In another letter to the same minister, written in Constantinople the year before, he tells him that it is difficult to introduce in these countries anything new in the church. "We," says Cyril, "will never consent to it, for it would scandalize all Christianity."

Cyril, a few years afterwards, became acquainted with a distinguished traveller of those times, David de Wilhelm, member of the council of the Prince of Orange. He was born in Hamburg, of a distinguished family. After studying in various universities of Germany, he travelled in the East, and visited Egypt and Jerusalem in 1617-18-19. Cyril became intimately acquainted with him. Maurice de Wilhelm, his brother, has published numerous letters of Cyril to the traveller, written in 1618 and 1619. It appears from these

letters that Cyril had frequent conversations with the accomplished traveller, who furnished him with the latest works on the Reformation. In these letters religion is the principal topic. In one of them, Cyril says: "If I could reform my church, I would do it with all my heart; but God knows that it is impossible." Before entering upon the eventful history of Cyril's patriarchate, I must not omit to mention a letter which Cyril wrote to George Abbot, in 1616, then archbishop of Canterbury. Abbot advised the patriarch to send to England some of his clergy, to study theology at the expense of the English government. Cyril selected a certain Metrophanes, who afterwards occupied the patriarchal see of Alexandria. He travelled through Germany, and became acquainted with many distinguished individuals of that country. While in Europe, Metrophanes wrote, at the request of the Protestants, a confession of faith, which is highly esteemed by the Greeks themselves. It appears by the letter of Cyril to the archbishop, that James I. was graciously pleased to invite Cyril to send a young priest to study in the English universities, in order to be able on his return to confound the Jesuits, who were disputing with the Greeks. It was on the recommendation of the archbishop of Canterbury that the ambassador of England exerted himself in favor of Cyril in after years. In a letter of the archbishop to Cyril, he thus expresses himself about James (I quote his words): "He not only is a diligent hearer of holy discourses, and a guest at the tremendous table of the Lord, but also, which is more than example, and the greatest thing in this great monarch, he discusses learnedly the most abstruse mysteries of the school with the bishops best practised in the arena of divinity."

In 1621 the patriarchal throne of Constantinople became vacant by the death of Timothy. By the exertions of the English and Dutch ambassadors, and the efforts of the Greeks, among whom Cyril enjoyed a high reputation, as a pious and learned prelate, he was unanimously elected to the vacant throne, of which he took possession on the fifth of November.

Rome and the Jesuits were extremely disappointed at the election of Cyril. He was a declared and open-faced enemy to them, and in public he openly advised his nation to keep aloof from the society of the Jesuits and the instructions of the Roman Catholics, which were perverting the Greek nation. But the Jesuits raised enemies against him from his own clergy, and, by bribing the government officials, and promising aid to a new candidate favorable to their views, they obtained his deposition, and exile to the island of Tenedos, after a patriarchate of sixteen months.

Two patriarchs occupied the throne of Constantinople after Cyril. Gregory IV., after a patriarchate of seventy-three days, was exiled to Rhodes, and there put to death. His successor, Anthimus II., gave his resignation, and retired to a monastic life on mount Athos. Cyril was recalled for the second time in the beginning of 1624, and, occupying the throne for a number of years, had time and opportunity to counteract the pernicious influence of his mortal enemies, the Jesuits. It appears that the ambassadors of England and of Venice were divided as to the successor of Cyril. Of the French ambassador, Count de Cesi, the English envoy, Sir Thomas Roe, says, in the memoirs which he has left of his residence in Constantinople: "The French ambassador was as much too precipitate in complaining of me as he is in all his actions."[1] On this subject, the Venetian archives say: "The patriarch has made known to the baylo that he has discovered a plot of the Jesuits in order to depose him, and elect, with the assistance of the French ambassador, a certain Caloyer, or monk, their dependant"; and again, "the Greek patriarch was deposed by the machinations of the Jesuits, aided by France." Von Hammer says: "The ambassadors of England and Holland were actively engaged at the Porte for the re-election of the Greek patriarch Cyril, who had been deposed by the intrigues of the Jesuits."[2] Their united efforts destroyed their credit. It was a great subject of dis-

[1] Von Hammer, Vol. VIII. p. 344.
[2] Von Hammer, Vol. IX. p. 30.

cord between the Dutch and French ambassadors, the latter of whom protected the Jesuits, out of hatred to the Venetians. France not only pretended to exclude the republic from the protection of Jerusalem and Bethlehem, from the churches of Pera and Galata, but she exerted herself to put the Jesuits in the place of the Franciscans, and establish a school of that order in Pera. It appears that the republic in all these troublesome times was represented by men of high political character. It was continually opposing the influence of the French ambassador. The Venetian archives in speaking of the baylo, Simone Contareni, say: "The baylo prevents the erection of a school in Pera by the Jesuits for the instruction of the children of the Perotes. On account of its proximity, and for other reasons, I considered it pernicious, and have prevented it." The English ambassador then in Constantinople was Sir Thomas Roe, who has left us, in an antiquated style, many particulars of the petty strifes of the ambassadors. He had instructions from his government to protect Cyril to the utmost, and to thwart the influence of the Jesuits in the East. Of Cyril he says: "As for the patriarch himself, I do not doubt but that in opinion of religion he is, as we term him, a pure Calvinist, and so the Jesuits in these parts do brand him."

The Dutch ambassador, Cornelius Haga, is principally known by the writings and correspondence of Cyril, who speaks of him as a man of learning and piety. He was untiring in his efforts to promote the welfare of Cyril, and to propagate Protestant principles in the Greek community. This ambassador established for the first time a Protestant church in Galata. Cyril had been for a long time acquainted with Haga, whom he first met, years ago, at the island of Patmos, on a visit to the famous monastery of that island. A French ambassador resided permanently in Constantinople, and his residence seems to have been the general rendezvous of the Catholics, in their endeavors to separate the Protestants from the Greeks, and bring them over to their own faith.

Besides these ambassadors, there generally resided in this

city an ambassador from the state of Ragusa, and the Austrian, called in those days the Caesarean, orator. In speaking of these ambassadors, I quote a part of the instructions given to the baylo of Venice: "He was enjoined to oppose the designs of the Jesuits who had established a seminary, and to protect the Greek church." Though the Jesuits had been established in Constantinople ever since 1601, when they first opened a school in Galata, in the church called St. Benoit, there had already settled before them the Franciscan and Dominican orders, who were growing jealous of the influence of the Jesuits, who pretended to have, besides their other privileges, the sole guardianship of the sacred church of Jerusalem. They had already, in 1616, suffered dire persecution, were cast into prison, and by the incessant intercessions of the French ambassador, and a present of thirty thousand ducats, were finally set at liberty.[1] Such, in a few words, were the combatants who strove for a supremacy in Constantinople; often, however, being thwarted in their designs by the independent and ferocious character of the reigning sultan, Murad, the most sanguinary ruler that ever sat on the throne of Turkey.

It appears from a curious document written by the Greek chancellor of those days, and happily preserved in the papers of David de Wilhelm, that in the school of the Jesuits, there were very few Latin scholars. As the instruction was gratuitous, and the difficulties of obtaining instruction elsewhere extremely difficult, it was soon filled with Greek scholars, and by their means the Jesuits ingratiated themselves in the favor of the Greek people.

Cyril and his bishops prudently advised the parents of the children to avoid the Jesuits and their school, as it could not but be a cause of serious disturbance to the peace of the church. There were no public anathemas, no scandalous libels, to wound the feelings of the Jesuits and their protectors.

The Roman Catholic party who had previously deposed

[1] Von Hammer, Vol. VIII. p. 219.

Cyril, saw with no favor his installation at the cost of sixty thousand rix-dollars to the Greek community. Never before was such a sum paid to the Turkish government; and it is true to say that, even to this day, immense sums are expended on such occasions. It was about this time that the court of Rome sent to Constantinople a Greek priest, Archimandrite, an apostate from his faith, who came to lodge at the residence of the French ambassador. This emissary of the Propaganda declared to the Jesuits that they need not despond or lose courage; that twenty thousand dollars would soon be transmitted to them from Rome, in order to depose Cyril, and elect some one in his place, whose filial obedience would be indubitable; that for this object, they were authorized by the pope to make use of the ten thousand rix-dollars that had been bequeathed by a French widow for charities.

In the month of February 1624 a certain Bérille was sent to Constantinople to accuse Cyril of a treacherous connection with the Cossacks, who were then infesting and plundering the coast of the Black Sea with their armed war-boats. Soon after arrived in Constantinople a certain Cannachio Rossi, of Levantine extraction, and of the Catholic faith, with a mandate signed and sealed by Cardinal Brandini in favor of Cyril. Sir Thomas Roe, speaking of this man, says: "Instructions given to Cannachio Rossi, a Greek undertaking to reconcile the Greek church with the pope." This mandate, written in Italian, and in seven articles, is without address. I will not weary your patience by the recital of the whole. Some paragraphs are curious and worthy of note. For example, in the second article: "The church of Rome has always desired union and fellowship with all the churches, particularly with the Eastern, which has received so many marks of favor from the Catholic church. For this end it has established and maintains a college for young Greeks at her own expense, so that this nation, so noble and ingenious, may again flourish in piety and literature, as in former days. . . . . Our lord the pope, protector and father of the Greek

nation, as you yourselves particularly know, and have remarked with your own eyes, would spend immense sums of money to reconcile such a noble member to the church, and assist that patriarchal see on which depends the rest of the East. ..... We hear that he sends young men to study new doctrines in the university of England, and disseminate them afterwards in the Levant. ..... Should these reports be calumnious, and should he be able to exonerate himself before his holiness the pope, then let him prove this before the ambassadors of France and Austria. ..... Through these let him send to his holiness his confession of faith, in which he accepts the Council of Florence, and condemns the errors of the Calvinists and Lutherans. ..... His holiness demands no other condition but the simple acceptation of the Council of Florence, provided that the Greek church condemns and anathematizes, as it has done to this day, the blasphemies of the northern heretics,—Lutherans, Calvinists, and the like."

I am writing history, such as has been transmitted to us by Greek and Catholic historians. Von Hammer, the profound historian, plainly relates the facts. Think of a mandate of this nature sent to the descendants of those very men whose ancestors preferred death to a union with the Latin church. Think of a man like Cyril, whose whole life was spent in endeavors to check the influence of the Catholic faith among his people, called in such haughty terms to announce publicly the rejection of his faith, and anathematize the whole body of Protestants! Well, indeed, he acted in not taking the least notice of this mandate.

But the Jesuits insisted on having his answer; and not being able to persuade the patriarch himself, betook themselves to a fraction of the Greek bishops, some of whom are always ready to enter into plots for the deposition of the patriarch, as they do to this very day. Twenty thousand rix-dollars were offered to them, should they succeed in deposing Cyril.

Soon after the arrival of Rossi the court of Rome sent an

antipatriarch to Constantinople, who, conjointly with the Jesuits, took all ecclesiastical matters into his hands. It was then that the Franciscans and Dominicans, always jealous of the Jesuits, in unison with the baylo of Venice, and assisted by the influence of the patriarch and his friends, pushed the Turkish government to imprison all the emissaries of the pope. Thus fell for a time the machinations of the Jesuits against Cyril and his church. Cyril, who had often lamented the ignorance of his people, and observed how inferior in ecclesiastical knowledge were his bishops, determined to introduce a Greek printing-press into Constantinople, as the means of instructing his people and disseminating books among them. This was the first printing-press established in Constantinople. In June 1627, a monk of Cephalonia, Nicodemus Metaxá, arrived in Constantinople, in an English merchant vessel, with the Greek types, cast in Holland and England under his personal superintendence. On his arrival Metaxá sent immediately to the patriarch, to obtain his assistance in the establishment of the printing-press. Cyril warmly recommended him to Sir Thomas Roe, the English ambassador, by whose interest, the press and all his books passed the custom-house without noise and loss of time.

The ambassador thought that the enterprise, though honest in itself and highly conducive to the welfare of the Greek nation, could not prosper unless it enjoyed the special protection of the patriarch. Cornelius Haga also aided powerfully the establishment of the press. Sir Thomas Roe, after obtaining the public permission of the grand vizier, received at his residence the books and types, and took under his special protection Metaxá and the whole establishment. Cyril demanded as a particular favor that the press might be set up in the English embassy. The ambassador having refused from private motives, rented a house, which he paid, and protected as his own.

The house was soon prepared, not far from the English embassy, but nearer the residence of the French ambassador. Scarcely had Metaxá arranged his establishment, when the

Jesuit party invited him to their convent, declaring that should he unite with them, he might be able in this manner to confound the reports current in the city, of his having studied in England and become tainted with Lutheran heresies. Metaxá however, intent, on following up his plan, was not in the least discouraged by the reports of his being a heretic and a Lutheran, and of his types having been cast with the arms of the king of England. Finally Metaxá was warned to take care of himself, as emissaries were paid to stab him at night, in bed, or in the street, on leaving the English embassy. These reports induced the ambassador to take Metaxá into his own house; from thence in the morning he repaired to his establishment, and returned late in the afternoon, accompanied by guards of the embassy.

Thus far the enemies of Metaxá had not been able to obtain any palpable proofs of his guilty machinations. At this time Cyril printed in Metaxá's press a small treatise on the faith of the Greek churches. The treatise abstained from controversy, or criticism of others' opinions. In fact, it was an apology to his people, among whom it was rumored that the patriarch was introducing new doctrines, to the great scandal of his flock. He intended to dedicate the work to the king of Great Britain, and was writing the letter of dedication while the work was going through the press. In the meanwhile, the Jesuits could not brook the idea of a Greek patriarch dedicating a religious book to the heretical king of England. As the work was not in their hands, they brought forward another work, written by Cyril against the Jews, printed in England, and imported to Constantinople by Metaxá. According to this book, his enemies declared that the patriarch, in speaking against the Jews, blasphemes the religion of the Koran; that Metaxá is a personage versed in the science of arms and war; that, under the semblance of instructing his nation, he is undermining the Moslem religion; that many of the books composed by the patriarch were sent to the Cossacks, to ferment an insurrection as soon as the sultan should undertake his expedition

into Asia; that all these infamous proceedings against religion and the peace of the empire, were silently concocted under the auspices of Sir Thomas Roe, the English ambassador. The man who was the means of communicating these accusations to the grand vizier, was a Turk, formerly vayvode of Galata, and highly esteemed by the vizier for the amenity of his conversation.

The grand vizier, highly exasperated by these reports, determined to surprise Metaxá in his iniquitous proceedings. He therefore ordered a band of Janissaries to proceed to Metaxá's house and press, and seize all his papers and proof-sheets, in order that they may be examined at the Porte. It was agreed to effect all this in great secrecy, on Friday, the 4th of January, 1628. In the meanwhile, the French ambassador, having learned that Sir Thomas Roe was to have a party at his hotel on Sunday, the 6th of January, day of Epiphany, and that among his guests, were the patriarch Cyril, and the baylo of Venice, postponed the attack to that day.

About noon on that Sunday, one hundred and fifty Janissaries surrounded the house of Metaxá, putting at the same time sentries at all the gates of the English embassy. At that very hour, Metaxá, in company with the secretary of the English ambassador, was returning to Pera from the church in Galata. The Janissaries fell upon them, and mistaking Metaxá for a secretary of the ambassador (for he seems to have worn a similar dress), he was suffered to escape in safety to the English embassy, whose gates had been abandoned by the guards. Frustrated in their attempts to seize Metaxá, the Janissaries repaired to his establishment, broke up all his chests, carried off his furniture, tables, presses, papers, books, silver cups, and money, to the value of four thousand rix-dollars. This foraging party was met in the street by a French dragoman, who told the Janissaries that Metaxá was in the English palace. The captain of the Janissaries wisely answered: "my orders do not go so far."

Sir Thomas Roe, who knew whence all these scandalous

proceedings had originated, entertained his company through the day, as though nothing had happened. The next day Metaxá's books were examined by two renegade Greeks. Cyril's treatise, which had been particularly complained of by the Jesuits, was the object of a most severe examination. The contents of the books were explained to the grand vizier and the moolahs, and all the obnoxious passages translated to them. Nothing was detected that, according to Musulman law, could subject the author or the printer to capital punishment. There was no proof to the accusations brought against the patriarch. The final decision of the mufti is remarkable. "Dogmas against the precepts of Mohammed cannot be accounted blasphemies or crimes. As the sultan has graciously permitted the Christians to profess their doctrines, they cannot be accounted guilty in printing or preaching publicly whatever they believe. It is not the difference of opinion, but the scandal, which is punishable by the laws."

Three days after the attack on Metaxá's house, the ambassador of England paid a visit to the grand vizier, accompanied by the customary retinue of state representations. He seems to have spoken with a freedom which injured innocence only employs. He told the vizier that his highness had given permission to the establishment of the printing-press, that he knew Metaxá, and the business which he conducted so honorably; that the insult was as though perpetrated against the embassy itself; that up to that day nothing had been printed in the press without previous consultation with him. He hoped, finally, that his highness would be satisfied, after the examination of the books, of the innocence of their contents. Finally, Sir Thomas, in a firm manner, told the vizier that it was his duty to exonerate himself from the accusations which would be brought against him, should he believe the reports of the true enemies of the state, the Jesuits.

These observations of the ambassador seemed to have stung to the quick the irascible vizier. He promised to punish the instigators of these foul proceedings. The ambassador left, assured of the grand vizier's affection for him and his friends.

The mufti seem from this day to have become particularly friendly to Cyril, who on all occasions was highly extolled by the English. The day after the attack on Metaxá's printing-press, Cannachio Rossi called on the patriarch, to ascertain his opinion on the seven articles of the mandate. At the same time there arrived from Rome new emissaries, accusing the patriarch of seditious attempts to overthrow the Ottoman empire, and of a secret correspondence with the Protestant ambassadors. A league seems to have been formed about this time by the Catholic ambassadors against the influence of Cyril. The relations of the Catholic ambassadors fully confess it. Cyril at this time was very intimate with the English ambassador; they were often to be seen in the streets together, to the great annoyance of their enemies, the Jesuits.

The English ambassador could not resent the affront of the Jesuits. He could not but perceive their bitter animosity, and the assistance afforded to them by the Catholic ambassadors, and by Rome itself, through its continual emissaries. Sir Thomas, uniting his efforts with the venerable baylo of Venice, determined to show the Jesuits that if their assault upon Metaxá and Cyril had remained unpunished, it was not on account of weakness, but from an unwillingness on their part to do harm.

After the examination of Metaxá's books and the sentence of the mufti, the Jesuits retired to the French embassy, where they remained hidden for two weeks. A few days after, they were seized by Janissaries, their convent of St. Benoit ransacked, and they themselves put in irons, and imprisoned for a whole month. Cannachio Rossi was also arrested and put in chains. Finally, Sir Thomas Roe and his friends, fearing lest the Jesuits should be put to death, interceded for them. After many deliberations, the Turkish government expelled them from all the dominions of the sultan. It demanded, moreover, that all Metaxá's books and furniture confiscated at their request should be returned to him. The Turkish government sent commissioners to

Scio, Smyrna, Aleppo, and Cyprus, in order to banish all the members of this order who were to be found in these and other provinces of the empire. All the influence of the French ambassador could not prevent the execution of this measure. He even demanded his passports. The grand vizier, according to Sir Thomas, told the French envoy, "That the grand signor did esteeme the French kyng an ancient and a good friend, and could not believe that his amitye depended upon the necessity of protecting traitors by force, against the rule of buon governo." [1] Of the Jesuits, in this part of his memoirs, Sir Thomas says: "I hope they shall little trouble the poor Greek church, hereafter who hath spent, and is indebted by their practices, twelve thousand dollars, besides this last insurrection against the stamp, the life of the patriarch, and my honor." [2] In these infamous proceedings against the printing-press, established for the instruction of the Greeks, it is painful to observe the efforts of European ambassadors pushed to such Vandalic acts by religious fanaticism. I will give you the text of the Austrian and Catholic historian, Von Hammer; he says: "Austria sent as her representative, Jean Louis, baron de Kuefstein. The instructions of the new ambassador contained many points relating to the Franciscans and Jesuits. He demanded for the Franciscans the body of the Saint, John Capistran, fallen into the hands of the Greeks at Vilak, and for the Jesuits their admission to the empire, in virtue of the seventh article of the Treaty of Vienna. He failed in both, as well as in his efforts to unite the two churches, and to prevent the establishment of a Greek printing-press. Austria was not more fortunate in its efforts to obtain the election of a Catholic patriarch, a demand inserted in the instructions of the ambassador at the instigation of Lamormain, confessor of the emperor."

Such is a short account of the first introduction of the printing-press into Constantinople. Only a single copy of its few publications has been saved, and is to be seen in the

[1] Von Hammer, Vol. IX. p. 113. [2] Ibid.

public library at Athens. The attack of the Janissaries, and the subsequent expulsion of the Jesuits, produced an immense sensation in Constantinople. The Greeks, in their exultation at the defeat of the Jesuits, were unanimous in their praise of Cyril, whose influence had done much to defeat this order.

It is well to remark, that in reading Turkish history of those days, you should bear in mind that Turkey was then a powerful despotic power, ruled by a capricious and cruel sultan, and that the European ambassadors then residing in Constantinople enjoyed very little consideration. In corroboration of this sentiment, I may mention here, that in 1581 the Porte determined to transform into mosques three Latin churches of Galata. No arguments or political threats had any effect. The execution of this order was delayed by a timely present of some thousand ducats to Turkish officials. In no other empire in the world, having relations with the European powers, has money acted such a political role as in Turkey.

Two years before these events took place James I. of England died, and was succeeded by Charles I. On the accession of the new king, Cyril sent a letter of congratulation to Charles, accompanied, soon after, by a precious Greek manuscript of the Bible, which, according to tradition, was written at the time of the Nicene Synod. It is to this day the most precious jewel of the British Museum, called the Alexandrine Codex. This letter of Cyril to Charles ends thus: "May the Lord grant you a prosperous and long reign in the flourishing kingdom of Great Britain; and on my knees I pray to God, the Father of our Saviour Jesus Christ, to preserve your royal majesty for many long years, and guide you by his Holy Spirit, and pour upon you every blessing." Such was the letter of Cyril to Charles. Both suffered a violent death by the hands of their enemies. It was the misfortune of Cyril, in 1628, to lose his greatest patron, Sir Thomas Roe. George Abbot, the archbishop of Canterbury, was exiled, and his place given to Laud, who leaned to the Catholics, and who was sometime after condemned and executed. Cyril and

his party were neglected in the eventful reign of Charles. In this emergency, the States-General of Holland sent to Constantinople, as pastor to the Protestant church in Galata, Anthony Leger, from Piemont. He became very intimate with Cyril, and seems to have had an extraordinary influence upon the mind of the patriarch.

The Dutch ambassador, together with Leger and Cyril, thought of extending their influence to the patriarchal see of Alexandria. They wrote to the patriarch Gerasimus, that they would undertake to establish schools in Alexandria, and a printing-press, at the expense of the Dutch government, in case the church of Egypt would receive the Calvinists in its communion. The sad fate of Metaxá's printing-press probably induced Cyril to attempt the same in Egypt, far from the influence of the Jesuits. To this proposal Gerasimus answered: "That the union of different churches from political motives was conducive to the fall of both. It was better to live divided in harmony, than united on mere earthly principles."

Cyril, thus frustrated in his exertions to establish a printing-press, engaged a certain Maximus of Gallipoli, to translate the New Testament in Modern Greek, which translation was published, with a preface by Cyril, at the famous Elzencis press, in 1638, at the expense of the Dutch government. I am sorry to say that the British Bible Society was badly advised to republish this translation at the beginning of the Greek revolution. It is very faulty, and exhibits signs of the grossest ignorance.

We come now to an important event in the history of this partriarch. So much was said about Cyril, his religious opinions, and violent opposition to the Catholics, that the Protestants of Geneva were naturally anxious to know his opinions on religious matters, and to have a confession of faith from his hand. Whether Cyril wrote this on his own accord, or whether it was drawn up at the request of his Protestant friends in Constantinople or elsewhere, is not known. Leger forwarded the manuscript to his friends in

Geneva, which was there published in Latin, with this title: "Confession of Faith of the Most Reverend Lord Cyril, Patriarch of Constantinople, 1629." Four years afterwards the Greek text was published in the same city. This extraordinary document, coming from a man so highly placed in the Greek church, produced immense sensation among the Protestant churches of Europe. Though the Protestants had formerly demanded from the Greeks some exposition of their opinions, up to this day nothing of this form had appeared. The Greeks not well acquainted with the tenets of the Protestants, and fearing the jealousy of the Turks, and the animosity of their countrymen against all foreign sects, had given evasive and dubious answers to many distinguished Protestants, who often demanded their confession of faith. But here was a document written and signed by a patriarch of note, fully explaining all the dogmas and opinions of his people. It was thought that he must know what the Greeks believed. It was a powerful organ in the hands of the Protestants, who saw what an insignificant difference existed between them and the Greek church. The partizans of the Roman church were confounded, for they saw, to their utter surprise, the inefficacy of their efforts to gain over to the pale of the Roman church a nation so closely united with the Reformers in matters of faith.

Cyril himself declares that he wrote his confession of faith in Latin, and then translated it into Greek. He thus finishes it: "We bear witness that this short confession of faith will be opposed by those who take pleasure in unjustly calumniating and persecuting us. But, strengthened by the Lord, we are sure that he will not neglect or desert his own; that he will not permit the rod of the wicked to fall upon the inheritance of the just." This confession was a bold act of Cyril. Up to his time the Greeks had never put their belief in such a form. So that Cyril, influenced probably by the advice of his Protestant friends, has published to the Christian world dogmas which stand in opposition to many points of belief common among the Greeks.

Rome attempted to refute this confession of faith, by a certain Caryophillus. It was said that the work was due to the pen of the Dutch ambassador Haga, as Cyril was not able to write in Latin. The new French ambassador, the Marquis of Marcheville, was requested by the pope to have a personal interview with Cyril on the subject. Cyril, in a letter to Professor Diodati, at Geneva, dated April 15, 1632, relates his interview with the ambassador. He says: "When on a visit to the illustrious Marquis of Marcheville, now ambassador of France, his excellency, after the usual complements, showed me my confession of faith, and asked me whether I really were the author of it. I answered that it was my confession and profession. His excellency then showed me a letter written by the French ambassador at Rome, in which it was said that his holiness the pope sent the confession to the ambassador in Constantinople, in order to know whether it was mine, and whether I intended to persevere in the opinions therein exposed. I boldly replied, that it was mine; that I was the writer of it, because it is what I believe and profess; that should any one detect any errors, and would prove them to me, I would answer in a Christian manner, and with a good conscience."

Cyril in this same letter thus writes about the Catholics: "We hope, with the aid of God, to be able to convince the whole world that we desire no kind of fellowship with the Roman church, as it is the mother of errors, falsifying the word of God, the nest of superstition. As to my own self, let the world know, that I am old. My desire is to die, according to my appointed time, with the truth of Jesus Christ in my mouth, and with his seal upon my conscience." Such was Cyril's confession of faith, which was scattered in Constantinople in manuscripts, many copies of which, at the particular request of the writers, were undersigned by him. This confession of faith became now a powerful instrument in the hands of the Catholics. The French ambassador, with the ambassadors of Austria, were too powerful for Cyril and his faithful protector, Haga. The venerable baylo of

Venice seems to have entirely retired from Cyril's party as soon as his great object was obtained, — the expulsion of the Jesuits.

About this time arrived in Constantinople Paul Strasburg, the envoy of Gustavus Adolphus. Cyril had frequent relations with this ambassador, who brought him letters from Gustavus. Strasburg, in the relation which he has left of this embassy, speaks of Cyril as a man of profound learning (vir profunde doctus), bent on the propagation of the Christian religion.

A new actor now comes forward in this troublesome period of Cyril's history. The Jesuits had educated a young Greek, called Contarí, in their school in Galata, who evinced from the very first years of his career, a strong leaning to their church. He seems to have acted the part of a spy upon Cyril, and ingratiating himself in his favor, was sent for a time to fill the vacant bishopric of Salonica. Contrary, however, to his expectations, the place was subsequently given to a countryman of Cyril, Athanasius. Contarí returned to Constantinople, and Cyril was induced to send him to Russia, to collect the contributions that were annually sent to the church of this city. On his return, Contarí, aided by the French ambassador and the Catholic party, but most effectually by the use of the money collected in Russia, and freely offered to the Ottoman officials, deposed Cyril, and was elected in his place. He did not long enjoy his victory; for Cyril, by the aid of his numerous friends, was recalled, and Contarí in his turn exiled. One of the first acts of Cyril was to pardon Contarí, and recall him from exile. About this time there was a violent dispute in this city; both parties claiming the sole possesssion of the sacred places of our Saviour's life. Cyril, assisted by the Protestant ambassadors, attained a firman, according to which the guardianship of these places was given over exclusively to the Greeks. The Greeks in this manner took from the Franciscans the Temple of the Resurrection, the Stable of Bethlehem, the Monastery of Nazareth, and the Garden of Gethsemane. The Marquis of Marcheville,

in this long question, became extremely unpopular, and was frequently insulted by the Turks.

By money and intrigue, so rank in this great and wicked city, Cyril was again deposed, and in his place was elected his friend Athanasius, who, after occupying the patriarchal see for a few weeks, was again deposed, to make place for Cyril. Again Cyril was deposed, Athanasius elected. Athanasius soon falls, and Contarí, Cyril's enemy, elected. But Contarí was too unpopular, and too despicable as a favorite of the Catholics, to be long on the throne, and Cyril's friends soon after re-elected him, in 1637; the fifth and last time that he occupied the patriarchal throne of Constantinople.

In the relation of Cyril's fourth exile to the island of Scio, it appears that a plot was organized by his enemies to seize him, and carry him to some distant port. By the good offices of his friend, the vice-admiral Bekir Pasha, he was allowed to lodge in the strong castle of Rhodes, until his recall to Constantinople. Von Hammer relates a similar fact. The Armenian patriarch Avedik, who strenuously opposed the encroachments of the Catholics among his people, was carried away from Scio by the efforts of Ferriol, ambassador of Louis XIV. Nothing has ever transpired of the ultimate fate of this patriarch. Cyril was now in his sixty-sixth year. For many long years he had been battling against the Jesuits and the whole Catholic party. To the Catholics it was discouraging to see an enemy rising higher after every defeat, and haughtily rejecting every proposition on their part. Cyril was accused of a secret connivance with the Cossacks, who captured the city of Azof. It was feared that they would fall on Constantinople with their destructive war-boats, as they had done some years before. This idea of the Catholic party was successful. The governor of Constantinople hinted to the sultan, then absent in Asia, the suspicion of Cyril's connivance. An order was immediately forwarded by the sanguinary sultan to execute the patriarch. On the twenty-seventh of June, 1638, the Porte sent a band of Janissaries, who seized the patriarch, and embarking in a large boat,

sailed for the Bosphorus. At Roumeli-hissar the Janissaries announced to the patriarch the fatal sentence. Knowing his hour had arrived, he kneeled and prayed, and, rising, surrendered himself into the hands of the Janissaries. His body was thrown into the Bosphorus, and, floating towards the Asiatic shore, was found the next day by fishermen, and buried in great secrecy on the shores of the Gulf of Nicomedia. No stone ever marked the place where this distinguished patriarch reposes.

Think, now, of the fate of this great patriarch, whose body, like that of a criminal, floated on those same waters, where, two hundred years afterwards, floated the body of another patriarch, executed after celebrating the great day of our Lord's resurrection.

A strange coincidence marks the death of both these patriarchs, whom the Greeks consider as martyrs in their nation's history. Both are justly revered by their people; for both died in a noble cause. In Cyril's death were hushed for ever Rome's bland propositions to the Greek church. Gregory's death, on the day of resurrection, was a breath from heaven to light up a conflagration that burned intensely for years. Thus considered they stand in history as the champions that have sealed with their death their nations liberation from religious and political thraldom.

Were I to address a Greek audience on Cyril's eventful life, it would have been my duty to explain to them the opinions and conflicts of the Reformers in Central Europe. But in addressing an audience to whom this portion of history is familiar, I will merely state what the Greeks themselves say of Cyril.

His successor to the patriarchal throne, Contarí, the despicable man by whose influence Cyril, his benefactor, was ignominiously strangled, was deposed and executed the next year. Rycant the historian says: "At the expense of fifty thousand crowns, one moiety whereof was paid from Rome, the whole design against Cyrillus being managed by the Jesuits, and other religious living at Galata, who accused

him before the Turks of keeping a secret correspondence with the Muscovites and the Cossacks." The Venetian archives say "for the deposition of whom Rome paid forty thousand scudi."

Much has been written by the Greeks on Cyril, the Calvin-minded (*Καλβινόφρην*). A synod collected by his enemies accused him of heresies and leaning to Protestantism. Time has done justice to this distinguished patriarch. His confession of faith is of the purest Christianity. It is a simple and faithful exposition of the fundamental truths of Christianity, common to all Christians. His confession is faulty, if fault it be, in leaving out what he often in his letters calls human institutions. Though allowed by his countrymen to have shown a leaning to the opinions of the Protestant divines in Geneva; though known as a friend and correspondent of their ministers here, and their pastors in Geneva and Germany, still they love him, because he was always with them; fighting their battles against the most hated enemy of their church.

Enter into the feelings of an oppressed people, who in the time of Cyril had lost all, oppressed by all, whose condition was sorely embittered by the recollection of what they once were, upbraided by travellers, ignorant and unlettered, now subject to the Turks, now to the Venetians, looked upon as a pitiful race, whose only inheritance was the bare name of their ancestors. Could they but revere a man like Cyril, universally esteemed, who for many years fought their greatest enemy, the pope? Even to-day, this very year, Cyril is considered as a distinguished prelate, in a Greek Ecclesiastical history published by the learned secretary of the Greek synod.

Could Cyril have become a Luther to his church? I answer, No. He was too earthly in his aspirations. He clung to his Protestant friends to defend his church from the influence of the Catholics. His friends one by one left him. He never imitated the spirit of the German Reformers, who began their work in the heart and conscience of their Christian

fellows. Cyril's work failed, as every similar work must fail. No religious impression was ever made on the minds of his people after his death. He knew how jealous his people were of foreign influence; how the Protestants had been sadly calumniated by the Catholics, and branded as the vilest of heretics.

Though to this day Cyril may be regarded as a partisan of Protestant doctrines by European writers, this short notice of his life, I presume, will convince you that his whole bent of mind was to counteract the influence of the Catholic church assisted by his Protestant friends.

ARTICLE VI.

THE INSTRUMENTALITY OF TRUTH IN REGENERATION.[1]

BY REV. AUSTIN PHELPS, PROFESSOR AT ANDOVER.

It is the misfortune of some of the doctrines of our religion that theological inquiry has often confounded their speculative with their practical elements. Questions respecting them, which never can be answered in this world, have stood side by side, as if of equal moment, with those which must be answered, if an earnest mind would find peace. The views of truth which are commended to the faith of an inquirer often exhibit, therefore, a singular medley of knowledge and conjecture. Volumes have been compiled of the Curiosities of Literature. A good service would be rendered to practical religion if the curiosities of theology could be detached from its essential facts; yet without abridgment of legitimate theological inquiry.

The necessity of such a distinction becomes the more obvious the nearer we approach to any one of those centres of theological thought which represent an intermingling of

[1] A Discourse preached in the Chapel of Andover Theological Seminary.

agencies in human destiny. Such a centre of truth is the doctrine of The New Birth. In the spirit of these remarks, it is my desire to consider in this discourse:

The Instrumentality of Truth in Regeneration.

I. We shall reach the objects of this discussion most directly, by first observing the Biblical modes of representing Truth as an instrument of God. The scriptural representations on this subject are not recondite; yet they cover all those points of inquiry on which we need instruction, that we may form a consistent theory of the working of Divine Grace. They may be cited, not so much for their force as proof-texts, as for their pertinence in giving us the inspired doctrine in inspired expression. Fortunately, the most salient of the passages declarative of this doctrine need no comment. To utter them is to explain them. It is difficult to mistake the import of the text[1]: "Of his own will begat He us with the word of truth." To the same effect is the Psalmist's declaration: "The law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul." The entire burden of the one hundred and nineteenth Psalm is a tribute of adoration to Truth, as an instrument of Divine purposes. Why was Paul "not ashamed of the gospel of Christ?" Because "*it* is the power of God unto salvation."

Dogmatic statements of doctrine, however, are not the favorite forms of inspiration. The most emphatic representations of doctrine in the scriptures are pictures. Their forces of expression depend on the significance of figurative language. Scriptural style is thus hieroglyphic. "I have heard of Thee," one might say, in comparing the biblical revelation of God with uninspired theology, "I have heard of Thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine *eye* seeth Thee." We must, therefore, often interpret calm and literal declarations by the light of other texts, in which the same truths are more intensely expressed or implied in metaphor.

[1] James i. 18.

We must gain vividness of impression, at the expense of literal accuracy of formula.

Thus Truth, as an instrument of God's will, is at one time a lamp to the feet of a wanderer; it is a light shining in a dark place. Then, it is a voice from heaven; it crieth at the gates of cities; it is more, it is the rod of God's mouth; yet, it is songs in a pilgrimage. Again, it is an incorruptible seed; seed sown in good ground; it is an engrafted word. Martial images and mechanic powers and the elements of nature are laid under tribute to express it. It is a sword, the sword of the Spirit, sharper than any two-edged sword; it is a bow made naked; the wicked are slain by it. It is a helmet, a shield, a buckler; it is exceeding broad; it cannot be broken. Goads, nails, fire, a hammer are its symbols. It breaketh the flinty rock; it is mighty to the pulling down of strong holds. Opposite and contrasted emblems are tasked to portray its many-sided excellence. It is a fountain; it runneth very swiftly: yet it standeth forever; it is settled in heaven; it cannot be moved till heaven and earth pass away. It is of ancient birth; before the mountains were settled, it was brought forth; when there were no fountains, it was there. The choicest and most fascinating objects of man's desire are the imagery of its magnificence. It is a revenue, better than choice silver; men shall buy and sell not again; happy is the man that findeth it. It is a pearl of great price; better than rubies; like apples of gold: yet to him that thirsteth, it is wine and milk, which, in the affluence of the supply, shall be given away without money and without price. The senses of the body and its most necessary functions are made to set forth the efficacy of truth. Men taste it as a luscious food; it is sweet to the taste; sweeter than the honeycomb. Their hands have handled it, as a work of rarest art. They have walked in it, as in a path at noonday. Yet they have hidden it in their hearts; and there it quickeneth, it strengtheneth; it hath made men free; it giveth life; men are born again by the Word. Even the most daring mysteries of speech are resorted to, to inten-

sify truth as a power in the universe. It dwelt with God. Before the hills, and when there were no depths, there was it by him, as one brought up with him; it rejoiced always before him. And more, it *is* God: "I am the Truth;" again, it *is* God: "the Spirit is Truth."

By such versatility and boldness of imagery do the sacred writers pour out in profusion their conceptions of truth as an instrument in the execution of God's will. And it is by the aid of these picturesque scriptures that we must vivify our interpretation of those declarative passages which, like the text of this discourse, express logically the instrumentality of truth in regeneration.

It is very obvious that the inspired writers have not thought it essential to the objects of their mission to measure and weigh their words, to meet exigencies suggested by metaphysical inquiry. They have spoken as freely, as boldly, with as spontaneous and unguarded speech, on this subject, as on that of the holiness or the love of God. Theirs is the dialect of song, rather than of diplomacy. They have spoken as if they were not thinking of any philosophy to be defended or destroyed, or of any polemic strategy to be executed or evaded, by the doctrine they should teach. They have spoken like plain men talking to plain men. They have uttered truth vividly rather than warily. They evidently trusted much for the correct interpretation of their language to the common sense of their readers. They have assumed many things, they have omitted to guard against many misconstructions, because of their confidence in common sense. The necessary beliefs of the race, of which common sense is the exponent, lie back of inspired language, as of all language.

We must bear this in mind in any attempt to reduce the scriptural declarations to the formulary of a creed. With this precaution, we may safely infer from them all that we need to know respecting both the fact and the mode of the action of truth in regeneration.

1. Inspiration has established beyond reasonable question the *fact* of the instrumentality of Truth in changing the

human heart. It is scarcely possible to reverent inquiry to err on this point. This is an elemental fact in scriptural theology, which no necessities of philosophy should tempt us to fritter away. Specifications of it may be concisely stated in the following form :

First, that God employs in regeneration Truth as distinct from instruments of physical power. God is wisely studious of congruities. He adapts the instrument to the effect. He selects that which in its nature is fitted to act upon mind, not upon matter. He chooses that which is pre-adjusted to the regeneration of mind, not to its creation. He calls to his service that which intelligence can perceive, heart can feel, will can choose ; that which, therefore, the whole man can accept, trust, love, obey.

Again, God employs in regeneration Truth as distinct from falsehood. Not a shadow of evidence appears in the scriptures that a human heart was ever changed from sin to holiness by the force of error. No man was ever moved aright by wrong. No soul ever thrived upon lies. Profound and honest belief of the false can never, in its own proper drift, save a man. If it seems to save, there is a way that seemeth right, but the end thereof are the ways of death. If the man *is* saved in his error, he is not saved by it, but by truth lodged somewhere in it. Pure error tends to destruction as inevitably as fire. An echo comes down the ages of inspiration : " that they all might be damned who believe not the truth."

Furthermore, God employs in regeneration religious Truth as distinct from all other truth. Not the axioms of mathematics, which appeal only to man's sense of the true ; not truths which address only man's sense of the beautiful ; not truths which move only man's sense of grandeur ; not truths which gratify only man's love of mystery ; not truths which quicken only man's sense of honour; not truths which take possession only of man's social affections ; not these are the causal instrument of the new birth. Right, holiness, law, love, God, — such are the rudimental ideas of truth in this divine renewal. Primarily and ultimately they appeal

to conscience. Through this regal faculty they command the whole soul.

Moreover, in the regeneration of those to whom the Christian revelation is given, God employs as his chosen and final instrument Truth as it radiates from the person and the work of Christ: "I am the Truth; I am the Life"; "The Gospel of Christ is the power of God unto salvation"; "Nothing, save Jesus Christ, and Him crucified."

Yet once more, so far as we can know, God never dispenses with the instrumentality of Truth in renewing the hearts of men. If a question be raised here, it should concern, not the power of God, but the facts of his working. So far as any essential doctrine of theology is concerned, it may or may not be true that infinite power *can* regenerate a soul by other instrumentalities, or without the intervention of instrument. For the purposes of a practical faith, it may or may not be true that, in the nature of things, regeneration is an act which apart from the instrumentality of truth sustains no relation even to omnipotence. Be it so, or be it not, that to the divine mind truth and regeneration — the instrument and the effect — stand in relations of necessity immutable and eternal, like the laws of numbers or of diagrams. We need not affirm or deny. The theological question, if any exists, is a simple question of fact. Does God in the renewal of a human soul ever dispense with truth as the instrument of the change?

The answer to this question is not wholly unimportant to consistency of faith. It can be given in few words. It is comprised in two positions which a moment's reflection will establish.

One is, that if God does in any instance dispense with truth as his moral instrument in the new birth, the evidence of this fact must be a subject of pure revelation. Experience, from the nature of the case, cannot prove it. No man can intelligently affirm himself to be conscious of a divine fiat thrilling his nature, making a new man of him, with no instrumental agency, or with other instrumentality than that

of truth. The only evidence any man can have from experience that his heart is changed is the evidence of actual exercises of heart in view of truth. Divine power in the change is, to all consciousness, so blended with the force of truth,—in other words, the efficient cause so interpenetrates the instrumental cause — that no mind can intelligently separate them. Indeed, consciousness gives us no hint of the Divine Cause, except through the success of the instrument. I cannot go back of my own conscious exercises in view of truth, and affirm that God has changed my heart by sheer will, independently of truth. It is plainly impossible; as absolutely so, as that my eye should detect the undulations of sound, or my ear those of light. Regeneration, the divine act, is evidenced to consciousness only by conversion, the human change; and this, again, discloses itself only in responses of the soul to truth. Experience can go no further back than this; and if experience cannot, observation cannot. If, then, God has ever wrought the renewal of a soul in such anomalous manner as that implied in the inquiry before us, the evidence of the fact must be a subject of direct and supernatural revelation; we can *know* it only from the scriptures.

The second position, then, in answer to this inquiry is, that the scriptures are silent as to the occurrence of any such instance in the history of redemption. They do not explicitly deny, but neither do they affirm. They inform us of many instances of regeneration by means of truth; and of not one without the truth. They proclaim indubitably the *law* of divine working in this phenomenon of human experience; and they neither by assertion nor hint point us to a solitary exception. They record none in the world's history; they predict none in its future. Here, therefore, argument on this topic may legitimately end. In all our positive reasonings upon it we must assume that no such exception exists. In our practical uses of the doctrine we must assume that none will exist to the end of time. We cannot logically found any article of our faith on the hypothetical possibility that the fact is otherwise.

But if conjecture, wiser than truth, must still press inquiry and ask: "How are infants regenerated who die before moral responsibility commences?" we respond by inquiries which are at least as wise; though for ourselves we do not revere them, nor are our dreams troubled if we cannot answer them. We respond by asking: How do you know that they are regenerated? How do you know that irresponsible beings are proper subjects of "regeneration" in the sense in which the scriptures apply the word to adult sinners? Who has told you that the new birth has any relation to irresponsible infancy, more than to irresponsible idiocy? Is a change of heart conceivable in a being who has no heart? What *is* regeneration in an irresponsible soul? What authority have we for believing anything of such a nondescript? Shall the whole drift of the scriptures be held in check by conjectural philosophy?

But again, how do you know that there are any such infants? Where is it revealed that a soul has ever left this world, or ever will, with moral nature absolutely undeveloped? Who can assure you that moral birth and physical birth are not simultaneous? Who can prove that because a a being cannot discern between its right *hand* and its left, therefore it cannot in any respect or in any degree distinguish right *thought* from wrong? How much do we know of the possibilities of infantile intuitions? Besides, who knows what the process of dying is, as a means of moral development? Have we never seen an *aged* infant in its coffin? Moreover, is not the death of an infant, itself an abnormal event? May it not then be one of a group of anomalies which involve an anomalous probation and an anomalous qualification for heaven?

Yet once more, if infants *are* proper subjects of the same change which adults undergo in regeneration, then are they not sinners? If sinners, have they not sinned? If they have sinned, can they not repent? If they can either sin or repent, can they not know right and wrong; therefore may not they too, in a future world, declare gratefully: "Of his own will,

begat he us with the word of *truth*?" Have ye not read: Out of the mouth of babes and sucklings thou hast *perfected* praise? Who shall dare to limit God's power of converse with the tiniest image of his own being? Are not the whole heavens mirrored in the retina of a single eyeball? How much greater is the distance — and what matters it to his resources — between God and a speechless babe than between God and you or me? How do we know that in the world of infantile seclusion, before speech has broken the eternal silence from which that world has sprung, God has not ordained a system of moral correspondences with heaven, on which he administers a government of freedom, of law, and of grace as perfect in its kind as that of Eden; a system which he guards as lovingly as ours; and a system, before the mysteries of which angelic wisdom bends reverently, as we stand in awe around the marvels of the microscope? Is such a system any more incomprehensible or incredible than the laws of communication by instinct in humming-birds? Is it any more marvellous than the autocracy of a beehive?

We confess to an aesthetic sympathy with Wordsworth's fancy in the lines,

> "Thou who didst wrap the cloud
> Of infancy around us, that thyself
> Therein with our simplicity awhile
> Mightest hold on earth communion undisturbed."

Theologically, we see no absurdity in the hope that this may be more than poetry. Yet we cannot fortify the hope by revelation or by reason. The proof-texts — where are they? The logic of the facts — to whom has infantile experience disclosed it? Our memory is very reticent; our observation is very ignorant. To our reason, "the cloud of infancy" is very dense. To our faith, the Bible is very still. What moral mysteries are latent in infantile mind we therefore do not affirm or deny. We do not know. If revelation had been addressed to infants it might have made us more knowing than we are; but, alas, we cannot be wise above

that which is written for *our* admonition. Yet, if the scriptures had answered the "obstinate questionings" of wise men on this theme, could the world have contained the books which should be written?

2. Assuming, then, the fact of the invariable instrumentality of Truth in regeneration so far as we know, we are prepared to observe further such intimations as the scriptures give us respecting the *mode* in which Truth operates in the change.

Here, again, the Bible can scarcely be said to affirm anything except by implied assumption. One vital principle is thus affirmed. It is that of the coincidence of the operation of truth with the laws of the human mind. Truth is everywhere *used* in the Bible precisely as men are wont to use it in persuasive speech. There is a freedom in its use; there is a skill in its use; there is a mingling of boldness and adroitness in its use; there is a studious care to adjust it to its use; there is a wise control of it, now by utterance, now by reserve, in its use by inspired minds; and there is a confidence, yes, a triumph, in their assertions of its power, which appear to assume that truth has intrinsic fitness to move a human mind; and if to move it, to move it aright; and if to move it aright, to move it in genial consistency with its own laws.

Where do we find in the scriptures disparagement of truth as a power over unregenerate mind? Where is the proof that the divine choice of it as an instrument was arbitrary? Where is a hint given of its being a fictitious or a factitious means to the end it is used for? Why should we search for it as for hidden treasure, if intrinsically it has no worth, or if any other instrument divinely chosen could be as worthy? That is not a salutary faith which depreciates the inherent potency of truth. Divine sovereignty gains no honor, and needs none, from the reproach of its instrument. Are God and Truth rivals in our esteem? That is not a rational fear, then, which shrinks from "means" of regeneration, and especially from "natural means." Not so do we read the Word of

God. The change from sin to holiness as portrayed in biblical speech strikes us as a restorative, not a destructive process. It may be tumultuous, but it is not therefore discordant with the laws of mind. Truth energized by the Holy Spirit may take possession of a man impetuously, so that whether he is in the body or out of the body he cannot tell; but his experience is not therefore unnatural, or even extra-natural.

The usages of scriptural appeal are conclusive in their implications on this topic. How do inspired men preach? They reason with men; they invite men; they instruct men; they urge men; they entreat men; they warn men; they rebuke men; they accumulate and reiterate all the legitimate arts of persuasion in addressing men; as if *men*, regenerate or unregenerate, elect or non-elect, were proper subjects of persuasion; as if they were complete *men* in their endowments; and therefore as if it were the normal action of their being to obey the truth. The Bible assumes that man everywhere, under all conditions of probation, has intellect which can receive truth, sensibilities which can respond to truth, a will which can act in view of truth, and act aright. So far as the philosophy of the operation of truth is concerned, we cannot see that the scriptures make any distinction between fallen and unfallen mind. We cannot discover that the methods of speech chosen by Isaiah, Paul, John, are not precisely the same in addressing men before regeneration as after. What is the difference? Where is the proof of it?

Nothing but the necessities of a philosophical theory can extract from the scriptures the dogma that truth is an instrument, arbitrarily chosen by divine wisdom, or chosen for unknown reasons, or chosen for no perceptible fitness to move, and move aright, the most guilty and hopeless specimen of depraved mind. True, inspiration preserves a wise silence, in direct instruction, on the whole subject of the philosophy of regeneration; but its assumptions of the correspondence between truth and mind are as unqualified as the boldest

assertions could be. So versatile is its use of truth, so many-sided does truth appear in inspired forms, so affluent in its resources, so intricate in its evolutions, yet so direct in its aim, and so exultant in its consciousness of power, that we cannot but infer the existence of versatile and profound susceptibilities to that power in the soul to which it is addressed. So exquisite is the mutual adjustment of mind and truth as represented in the biblical forms of speech that the entire science of persuasion might be illustrated by those forms; even by such as are addressed to fallen, depraved, unregenerate, non-elect souls. The theory of all that the world has felt to be eloquent is realized in them.

From the scriptural uses of truth, therefore, we cannot but infer that in regeneration its action is perfectly normal to the soul. Truth and mind, in this divine change, come together not as metals held in a vice and riveted; they come as light and the optic nerve. Like seeks its like. Truth acts thus not by contravention, not even by suspension, of the laws of fallen mind. It acts in harmony with those laws, in obedience to those laws, by means of those laws. They are laws which no fall can dislocate. No degree of guilt can suspend them. Truth is thus God's instrument in effecting a change which it never could of itself effect; but the soul on which it operates is never in more healthy concord with its own being than when it yields itself to truth, and becomes a child of God. God thus wisely honors the laws which his wisdom ordained.

II. In the views thus far presented certain collateral principles are involved, which are of practical importance to the preaching and the hearing of the gospel.

1. Of these may be named, first, the simplicity of the work of God in the change of a human heart. We see in this mysterious act the same unostentatious blending of divine efficiency with instrumental agency that we see, the world over, in other departments of God's working. For the purposes essential to faith in the doctrine of the new birth, the change is as intelligible as vegetation. It is as comprehen-

sible as the phenomenon of sleep. The change from sleep to waking is no less mysterious. The beating of your heart is no less incredible. The laws of mind are as benevolently guarded in the one case as those of vegetable and animal life in the others.

This view should specially commend itself as a corrective of certain prejudices which may be fatal to religious life. Is there not a class of solidly built minds which are constitutionally incredulous of a supernatural regeneration, because they have no conception of it as anything else than the effect of a shock inflicted upon the spiritual nature? They imagine it as involving a suspense of conscious personality. They have heard believers affirm that it may be imparted to a man in sleep. The creation of Eve seems to them not an inapt symbol of it. Hence, they rank faith in it with other eccentricities of dreams. Their good sense revolts from the whole thing. Have we not known certain timid minds which have believed, indeed, but only to shrink from their faith as a practical experience, because their faith also is steeped in materialism. Regenerating grace as they conceive of it is spiritualized electricity. They recoil from a religious life, for a reason analagous to that which leads them to draw back from a voltaic battery. Contortions, spiritual or muscular, are alike repulsive. Some, too, believe only to despair of salvation; others, only to live in sullen impenitence, because they are not conscious of the infusion of new vitality into their moral being. Do not pastors often encounter sad inquirers, whose minds are saturated with conceptions of the new birth scarcely more spiritual than those of Nicodemus? Are not these conceptions in part the result of accepting literally the symbolic language of the pulpit in the enforcement of this doctrine? I have known a man to watch and pray for palpable concussion with the regenerating Power, as he would spread his sails to catch the winds if he were becalmed at sea. Such unfortunate experiences are the legitimate fruit of any theory of regeneration which reduces a change of heart to an infraction of nature.

But viewed as the normal effect of truth energized by the will of God, this divine renewal falls into the same plane with other phenomena in which cause and instrument work blended to one end. The greatness of the change is not violence of change. Supernaturalness of cause is not unnaturalness in effect. Deity in the power is not miracle in the result. In material nature are not the most profound phenomena the most simple? The very mystery of their causation enhances by contrast their lucidness as facts. What is the most sublime change the physical world ever undergoes? Is it an earthquake? Is it not rather the noiseless change from night to day? The mightiest forces in the universe are silent forces. Who ever heard the budding of an oak? Who was ever deafened by the falling of the dew? Who was ever stunned by a solar eclipse? So is it with the august phenomenon of a change of heart. So far as we know, it is the most radical change a human spirit can experience. It is a revolutionary change. Disembodiment by death, morally estimated, is not so profound. Still, a change of heart is not an unnatural change. It is never miraculous. It is not necessarily convulsive. It is not necessarily even destructive of self-possession. God employs in it an instrument exquisitely adjusted to the mind of man as an intelligent and free being. Truth may act in it with an equipoise of forces as tranquil as that of gravitation in the orbits of the stars.

No, it is not of necessity a tumultuous experience to which God calls us when he invites us to be saved. By what emblem have the scriptures expressed the person of the Holy Ghost? Is it an eagle? "And John bare record, saying, 'I saw the Spirit descending from heaven like a *dove*.'" "Come," is the select language of inspiration; "come, and I will give you" — what? a shock, the rack, a swoon? No; "I will give you — rest. "Come, and ye shall find" — what? struggle, terror, torture? No; "ye shall find — peace. Come ye," — come who? — Come, ye strong, ye men of valor, ye mighty men armed, ye heroes? No; "come, ye that labor and are heavy laden; come, ye bruised reeds; come, ye bro-

ken-hearted; come, ye whose whole heart is faint; come, ye poor in spirit; come, ye blessed ones who hunger, who thirst, who mourn, who weep; come, ye old men whose strength faileth; come, ye youths who are as when a standard-bearer fainteth; come, ye daughters of my people who are girded with sackcloth; forbid not little children to come."

2. A second principle involved in the doctrine of the Instrumentality of Truth in regeneration, is that of the rational nature of all trustworthy evidences of religious character. A change of heart, from the nature of the case, must manifest itself. Regenerate character, like all other character, will act itself out. Like all other character, its evidences will be intelligible and forceful to the common sense of men.

Christianity, in this respect, vindicates its superiority to other systems of religion. In its tests of character, as in its doctrines, it makes less demand on the credulity of men than is made by any other religion which this world has known — less even than is made by atheism. Monstrosities of life, as of belief, have been the invariable characteristic of infidelity whenever it has existed on a large scale. It appears to be growing more inane and senile as the world grows older. The early paganism had scarcely so wild a development of lunacy in religion as that which our age witnesses in Mormonism, in Spiritualism, and in philosophic Pantheism. Beside everything that man has originated in religion, christianity is alone in the fidelity with which it stands by the convictions of the human conscience, and in the severity with which it applies the laws of good sense to the judgment of character.

The vital test of what a man *is*, in the divine judgment of him, is truth acting by the common laws of mind, and therefore working out effects intelligible to common sense. Presentiments, irrational impressions, apocryphal revelations, ridiculous prodigies, and outrages upon the moral sense of mankind, find no place in the Christian groundwork of experience. Marvellous excitements, as such, have no significance in the Christian philosophy of conversion. Incontrollable

or unreasonable excitements in religious life are no more commendable than any other form of frenzy. The pathological phenomena sometimes witnessed in revivals are a misfortune, perhaps a satanic infliction. The divine ideal of regeneration provides no place for them, except as it tolerates compassionately the infirmities of our nature. He remembereth that we are but flesh.

So, Christianity is silent when an adulterous generation seeketh after signs from heaven. When men hear voices in the air, and stare at visions in the night, and read handwritings on the walls, and "seek unto them that have familiar spirits, and unto wizards that peep and mutter," and frame creeds out of the antics of "household gods"; the spirit of Christian faith looks down calmly, and says: "The prophet that hath a dream, let him tell a dream"; and then goes on its way. If a Christian believer lingers, trusting in prophets of lies, who say: "I have dreamed, I have dreamed"; it turns and looks upon him as our Lord looked on Peter. The tests by which it would try the spirit of a man all assume that God works with natural means, by natural laws, and for results signalized by their purity and their dignity. Intelligent faith in God; an honest discovery of sin; spiritual craving of holiness; the trust of penitence in the blood of Christ; the dependence of guilt upon the Holy Ghost; and a giving of the whole soul in eternal consecration to God's service, and acceptance of God's love, and joy in God's being — these are pre-eminent among the responses which a regenerate heart makes to truth as the instrument of the divine change within. They are intelligible responses. They are reasonable, natural, honorable responses. They constitute a new life in the soul, which honest men cannot help trusting, and wise men cannot help revering. "And God saw that it was good."

3. A third principle inferable from the doctrine before us, is that of the importance of truthfulness in theological opinion. The new birth as represented in the scriptures gives no support to the theory so natural to superficial thought,

that belief, as such, is of little moment in religion; that God will judge characters, and not creeds; that we shall not be held responsible for obeying another man's faith in preference to our own. On the contrary, in regeneration character and creed are indissolubly united. God's instrument in effecting the change is truth. Falsehood finds no place there. Truth in caricature finds none. The less a man believes of truth, the more distant is he from the probable range of regenerating grace. The more distorted a man's opinions are, the more fearful are his perils. The more negative his convictions become, the more faint becomes all reasonable hope that he will be saved. In terrific consistency with this principle is the scriptural representation of the most hopeless depth of sin, as that of those to whom God sends delusion, that they may believe a lie. God acts in regeneration where truth can act; not elsewhere. The mind that witholds itself from truth is witholding itself from God.

There is reason to believe respecting many constant listeners to the preaching of the gospel, that here is the exact point at which lies the chief obstacle in their way to heaven. They will not assent to certain truths, the force of which is essential to draw them within the range of God's regenerating decree. They are repelled by one truth; they are heedlessly confused by another; they are uninterested in a third; perhaps in part persuaded of many, they are advancing in consolidation of character with hearty opinions upon none. The Holy Spirit passes them by, because they will not credit his truth. They thrust the instrument of his grace from them, and he leaves them in their sins. He does not there his mighty works, because of their unbelief. That is in reality a delicate and perilous work which a man performs when he adopts his religious opinions. In that process often occurs the very crisis of his destiny. At that point in his experience may the contending forces for good and evil meet in fearful equipoise.

In this view also, the varieties of opinion in evangelical theology are not unimportant. That theology which is most

truthful, other things being equal, will be most successful in the salvation of souls. Every distortion of theological faith is perilous, we may be assured, somewhere in the progress of its history. False combinations of doctrines which isolated are true, or false isolations of doctrines which in combination are true, are obstructions to the work of God at some point in the development of their sequences. A disproportioned shading of a single doctrine will surely attract some mind, whose way to heaven it will darken. The foreshortening of a single group in the representation of scriptural theology may so impair its truthfulness of perspective, that to some soul, somewhere, at some time, in some juncture of probationary discipline, that shall seem to be a distorted theology, a caricature of theology, a hideous theology, and therefore a false theology — a theology which no amount of evidence can prove to a sane mind, and no authority can enforce upon a sound heart. That soul, such a theology — no matter what extreme of opinion it represents — may consign to perdition; yet it may be a gospel which angels have seemed to preach.

4. A fourth principle collateral to the doctrine we have considered is, that the life of Christian institutions is in great degree independent of the auxiliaries of Fine Art. Two theories respecting the relations of Christianity to Art are affecting the taste and the practice of the Protestant Christian world. The one theory assumes that Religion and Art go hand in hand, and are equally interdependent. Certain imaginative minds even conceive of them as substantially identical. They are at least so far interchangeable that enthusiasm in the one slides naturally into enthusiasm in the other. Taste and conscience are indistinguishable. Beauty and God are one. Accordingly, it is believed that to secure to Christianity any high development in the life of a people, pre-eminence must be given to music, architecture, painting, and statuary. These, again, must be seconded by scenic forms of service and by priestly attire. A preacher must become as a lovely song and one that playeth well upon an instru-

ment. The simple meeting-house of the fathers "should be turned end for end"; the organ should be the cynosure of attraction, and "the pulpit nothing but an organ." This theory, with variations, lies at the foundation of the popular taste of our own day for the revival of certain forms of mediaeval architecture in the construction of churches.

The other theory, without condemning one variety of Art or another, as such, and as in some sense a handmaid of Religion, still assumes that in the very nature of Christianity there lies a certain independence of all forms of Art. The *vital* resources of religious power are not in them. Christian truth is sovereign over them. It uses them in their grand and spiritual dignity, but refuses to subject itself to their scenic and sensuous frivolities. This view is obviously sustained by the doctrine of divine instrumentality in regeneration. The gospel presents itself to men by that noble title: "The Truth as it is in Jesus." Its power lies in the clear, calm conceptions which mind forms of truth. Through truth thus received by a human spirit, God breathes regenerating efficacy, and man becomes a living soul.

We need not, therefore, throw back the support of Christianity upon the appendages of Fine Art. We care not to clothe our clergy in classic or sacerdotal robes. We must not burden our worship with responsive liturgies. We will not employ, or vie with, operatic troupes in our service of song. We dare not crowd our sanctuaries with the masterpieces of the studio. We cannot enjoy a dim religious light. We tire of the gorgeousness of mediaeval ornament and the cumbrousness of gothic columns in the structure of our churches. The kaleidoscope of memorial windows does not quicken in us a devout spirit. Why should we struggle to reproduce, in place of our plain meeting-houses, the temples of Greece, or the basilicas of Rome, or the cathedrals of Central Europe? We will not abjure these resuscitations of Art, except so far as they become substitutes of Truth. But as such they minister to an imaginative, and therefore an effeminate, and at length a corrupt, religionism. We must say

of them, "Let the dead bury their dead." We prefer, indeed, that Art should await the bidding of Christian Truth to originate new forms more becoming than these to Christian maturity. Has Christian Art no resources in reserve for a millenial future? Even in this work, let it be but a modest handmaid of the Christian conscience. Let it follow in the train of instrumentalities auxiliary to the gospel, as Miriam followed the ark of bulrushes in the flags by the riverside—afar off, to see what would be done unto the child; and, like the Hebrew maiden, let it be content to do humble and *incidental* service. Then that service shall work in with laws of invisible and eternal Providence.

We must not, we cannot, make the gospel dependent on any of these subordinate aids. Its great strength lies in God's independence of them. It leans to severity of tastes, and to simplicity of usages, and to forms of worship uncomplicated and unimposing to the senses. This it does through its awe-struck sympathy with the spirituality of God. The glory of its work on earth is, that, as the Truth of God, it can go *anywhere* in the strength of God. In Grecian temples, in Indian pagodas, in barbarian amphitheatres, in Turkish mosques, in mediaeval cathedrals; in puritan conventicles, in quaker meeting-houses, in floating bethels, in barns, in lumber-rooms, in log-huts; in the forests, at the seaside, on the prairie; everywhere, it can be itself the power of God and the wisdom of God. Its preachers need not be learned in the millinery of churchly costume; nor careful to know whether vaulted roofs, or painted panels, or plain ceiling, or unhewn rafters, or green leaves, or the stars of heaven are over their heads. If they can but speak God's truth as God bids them, it will do God's work.

5. In sympathy with this view, the Instrumentality of Truth in regeneration suggests the scriptural theory of preaching. In the light of this doctrine, preaching is a perfectly natural work, successful through supernatural power. Its object is to instruct men in the knowledge of truth, to impress truth on the conscience and the heart, and to win to

obedience of truth the estranged human will. To these ends it is a perfectly philosophical means. Its action is normal to the constitution of the soul. Its aims and its methods commend themselves to the good sense of all candid minds. They are not philosophically different from those of honest speech in other forms. But unlike those, preaching is overshadowed, in the very conception of it, by the Divine Presence. There lies the sole hope of its success. Finite instrument in the hand of Infinite Power; Nature used by Him who made it: such is the true ideal of the pulpit.

Preaching, then, is no idle play for the amusement of idle minds. Its design is not to fascinate men by euphony of speech, to startle by oddity of conceit, or quaintness of imagery, or boisterous declamation. It is not to work upon the magnetic organism which unites body and mind, so as to excite sensibility not sustained by thought. Still less is it to soothe the religious instinct of men, while evading or stupefying those cravings which forecast eternity. A genuine preacher will engage in his work with intense intelligence of purpose. He will preach truth to the calm, sober judgment of men. He will lead men to a right life by implanting within them right convictions of truth. He will kindle their sensibilities by so presenting truth as to set their minds to thinking. Vividness of belief, depth of feeling, holiness of will, all borne up and ruled by truth, — these will be the object of a wise preacher's aim. These he will strive to weave into the homeliness of real life. He will preach to men's wants rather than their wishes. The *wholeness* of his soul in its co-working with God will revolt from making the pulpit anything less than a regenerating power.

He may, indeed he must, employ varied and skilful methods of address. Things new and old he will bring from his treasure. Acceptable words even, he will seek out diligently. No art of orator or poet or moral painter is unworthy of him. But the crowning feature of his work is, that it breathes with the singleness and the intensity of his desire to make truth reach and sway the whole being of his hearers,

through time and in eternity; and with the courage of his faith that, in God's strength, and in that only, it will do this. This ardor of devotion to Truth, and to God in Truth, palpitates all through the structure of a Christian sermon. This makes preaching seem intensely alive and concrete. This sanctifies all art in the work of the pulpit. It subordinates art, and conceals it from obtrusion. The hearer sees no art; the preacher is conscious of none. Only God in Truth is felt in living presence. Such is the theory of preaching as implied in the divine instrumentality of the new birth.

This theory is specially opposed to a certain construction of discourses, some varieties of which, we have reason to fear, are craved by the popular taste of our own day, and are sometimes given from the pulpit.

Here let us distinguish precisely the evil; for I must believe that undeserved censure has been broadcast upon both the pulpit and the popular taste, by indiscriminate rebuke. That is not a healthful caution, for it is neither reasonable nor scriptural, nor true to the teachings of history, which decries the careful, the studied, the elaborate, the anxious use of what are ambiguously called "natural means" in preaching. God recognizes no other than natural means. Supernatural power acting through natural means, is the divine ideal of successful preaching. So far as we have anything to do with it, the means are as essential as the power. Philosophically speaking, indeed, we have nothing to *do* with anything but the means. Prayer is but a means auxiliary to truth. That is a perfectly legitimate taste, therefore, which demands *thought* in the pulpit, as everywhere else where mind attempts to influence mind. That would be a criminal weakness in the pulpit which should fail to meet such demand. We must commend the alertness of the popular mind which requires penetrative and suggestive preaching. Men always require this when they are in earnest. They have a right to it. We should not be fearful of "great sermons." We are in no peril of greatness above measure.

It would be more becoming to our modesty to stir up each other's minds in remembrance of the evil wrought by small sermons. But the truth is that, in this work of preaching Christ, "great" and "small" are impertinent adjuncts. In such a work nothing is great but God; nothing small in his service. That is not only a hopeless, it is a positively false, policy which, in its fear of an excess of stimulus in the pulpit, would put down the popular craving for thought, by inundating the pulpit with commonplaces whose only claim to attention is that they are true. Even that which is so severely and justly censured as "sensational preaching" is not *so* unworthy of respect as that preaching which popular impatience describes by the use of an old word in our English vocabulary, and calls it "humdrum."

The policy of frowning upon the raciness of the pulpit as an unholy thing is not the policy commended in the scriptures; nor is it the policy which historically God has blessed. Apostles charge us: Be strong; quit you like men. The Bible itself is the most thrillingly living volume in all literature. Why do philosophers turn to it when all other wisdom is exhausted? Yet savages have wept, entranced by it when they would play with their plumes under the reading of Pilgrim's Progress or Robinson Crusoe. The testimony of history is that in every period of religious awakening in the world the pulpit has been intellectually awake. Preaching has been thoughtful, weighty, pungent, startling, and timely; so broad awake as to impress the world as a novelty. At such times there is very little of conservative tranquility in it. It seems rather to be turning the world upside down. It has always been thus; it always will be. Cannot the depth of revivals of religion be generally measured by the weight of the discussions in which the pulpit has pressed down truth into the popular heart?

The principle, in brief, which should decide all questions respecting the intellectuality of preaching is this: that the popular mind will always demand, and ought always to receive, so much of weighty, racy, penetrative, original

thought as the popular conscience is sufficiently educated to appropriate; and it should receive no more.

But there is a style of preaching which is regardless of this principle, and of all others that concern the necessities of souls. I refer to that structure of discourse in which the sacredness of truth as the divine instrument of salvation is buried beneath the display of artistic skill. There is a mode of preaching in which a sermon becomes purely a work of art, and nothing more. This error exists in a variety of forms. Sometimes it is the art of constructing authoritative formulae of theology. Doctrines are defined and defended with reference to nothing but their orthodoxy of statement, and their place in a catechism or a creed. Again, it is the art of scholastic reasoning. Argument is constructed with care for nothing but its logical rigidity — and, we may blandly add, its aridity. In other cases it is the art of transmutation of truth from the dialect of experience to the dialect of philosophy. Sermons are framed in morbid fear of cant and commonplace. Without one new thought, or new shading of an old thought, the preacher would fain lift up his weary and bewildered hearer from the language of life, that is, the language he has *lived* and therefore knows, to the language of the "higher thinking," whatever that may be. He preaches as if the chief end of man in the pulpit were to evade the peculiarities of Christian speech. In its best interpretation, his discourse is only an exchange of the cant of the church for the cant of the school.

In a still different form this clerical affectation becomes the art of elegant literature. The graces of composition are elaborated with solicitude for nothing but its literary finish. They are drawn, like the lines of an engraving on a plate of steel, with fastidious and mincing art, studious only of their effect in a scene which is to be set in a gilded frame, and exhibited to connoiseurs. Application of truth is made, if it be made, to an imaginary audience or to an abstract man. It is clothed in archaic speech, which no man, woman, or child of a living audience will take to heart. An exhortation

to repentance even, may be so framed and uttered as to be nothing but the closing scene of a drama.

Perhaps the most vapid variety of these affectations of the pulpit is that which, for the want of a more significant name, may be termed the art of churchly etiquette. This is an inheritance from a dead age. Its chief aim is to chain the pulpit fast to its traditional dignity, to protect it from plebeian excitements, and specially to seclude it from the vulgarity of participation in the conflict of living opinions. With this ambition, the clergy assume the style of reverend fathers in God, and *talk down* to their hearers. Their dialect is that of affectionate patronage. They preach as an order of superior beings. At a sublime altitude above living humanity, they speak benignly to the condition of buried centuries. They discuss extinct species of thought. They exhort to untimely forms of virtue. They prop up decaying usages and obsolescent rites of worship. They are absorbed in the romance of priesthood. It may happen as an incident to their ministry that they tread delicately through the thoroughfare of a bloody revolution, affecting to ignore the forces which are embattled in the popular heart, and counting their mission successful if they keep the pulpit intact from the great agonies which are seething around it.

In a word, under such theories of preaching a sermon becomes a catechism, or a disquisition, or an essay, or an allegory, or a poem, or a painting, or a reverie, or an "encyclical letter," or a nondescript beneath all these, and nothing more. Preaching is literally reduced to an art, and religion is degraded to a science — reduced and degraded, not because of science and art, but because they are made nothing else than a science and an art, or are even made caricatures of both. The intense sacredness of truth as God's instrument in the quickening of dead souls, and in satisfying the cravings of their awakening, is lost out of sight in the preacher's solicitude for certain accuracies, or prettinesses, or dignities, or oddities, or distortions of artistic form.

We are accustomed to condemn such preaching as defec-

tive in religious spirit. It is so. We say in that most expressive dialect of Christian experience, that it wants "unction." It does so. We whisper that it betrays a moral delinquency in the preacher. We are right in this. But are we not often guilty of a fallacy in the commendations bestowed upon the very thing against which our religious instinct has hurled the heaviest anathema that can be uttered in criticism of the pulpit? Such preaching is often approved for its orthodoxy, for its science, for its literature, for its churchly dignity. You hear it commended as good doctrine, good philosophy, good logic, good rhetoric, good poetry, good painting, good acting, good manners, good art in all its forms, and yet you cannot feel it to be good preaching. It is fancied to be good for every purpose except that of doing good. The intellect, it is affirmed, approves it, imagination delights in it, sensibility revels in it, taste courts it, culture craves it, everything in man that is worthy of respect, makes obeisance to one form or another of it, except his conscience; and this stands by as a disconsolate monarch, lamenting his impotence to put down as a sin that which by the consent of all allied powers is exalted as an accomplishment. Confusion follows, therefore, in clerical practice. False art comes to be recognized as the legitimate fruit of a sound faith, or a scholarly training, or a churchly taste in the pulpit. Yet the obstinate conviction is underlying all the while, that this does not meet the responsibilities of the pulpit, nor do its work. Thus a divorce at length comes about, in the very theory of what the pulpit should be, between the moral usefulness of preaching and all its other excellences.

To illustrate the truth of this in but a single phase of it: have we not learned to speak of a certain class of ministers, in tones of compassionate criticism, in which our culture and our conscience give the lie to each other? We say of one of these brethren in Christ: "He is a useful preacher, but he is not eloquent. He is a good man; he is an earnest man; he is a devout man; but — he is not eloquent. He is a faithful pastor; he is a laborious pastor; he is a successful pas-

tor; but — he is not eloquent. He is a truthful preacher; he is a sound preacher; he is a solemn preacher: flippant men are awed by the earnestness of his discourse; thinking men are strengthened by his faithful words; proud men sit as children at his feet; scoffers rage at his plain speech; men who rail at him are held, year after year, beneath his pulpit, as by an invisible hand; but — he is not eloquent. Souls are converted under his timely ministrations; somehow — you cannot tell how, the wind bloweth where it listeth, but somehow — he hath the tongue of the learned; he knoweth how to speak a word in season to him that is weary; the common people hear him gladly; woman discerns of what spirit he is, and follows him, as she went early to the sepulchre; and little children come running unto him and praying that he will take them in his arms and bless them; but, this man, so honored of God; this man, so revered by ministering angels; this man, so much like Christ; this man, we cannot, Oh no, we dare not, pronounce — an eloquent preacher!"

Never was a more egregious error committed, than in this whole style of criticism, in judgment of the pulpit. If nothing is beautiful but truth, neither is anything respectable which is not true to God's thought. A sermon which is only a model of orthodoxy, or of science, or of literature, or of churchly conservatism, and which shoots by or vaults over the plain, living applications of truth as God's instrument in meeting the actual condition of souls, has no qualities which should win for it the respect of an earnest man. For the great uses of the pulpit it is an abortion. The falseness of it to the mission of a preacher vitiates its very virtues. Good taste condemns it as violently as conscience. All noble culture cries out against it as sternly as the word of God. No tribunal is more fatal to its claims than that of Christian scholarship. No voice is more indignant in the rebuke of it than that of the most accomplished manhood. Such preaching is not only not good preaching, but it is not anything else which a symmetrical and earnest soul can approve.

Demosthenes, Chatham, John Adams, had they been preachers of the gospel, would never have preached thus, any more than Paul. They would not have listened to such preaching any more complacently than John Knox.

Let us bring our ministry, my brethren, to its true test, though our work be burned, and we be saved as by fire. Lay it open to the light, as it appears by the side of the simplicity, the directness, the timeliness, the sacredness, and the intensity of truth as used by the Holy Spirit in the salvation of souls. There lies the proof of a living pulpit. Confronted with such an ideal, the affectations I have described shrivel into nothingness. Vanity of vanities, saith the preacher; all is vanity! They are false to the very titles in which their praise is so often vaunted. They are not "sound"; they are not "scholarly"; they are not "eloquent"; they are not "churchly"; they are not "beautiful"; they are not "finished"; they are not "in good taste"; for — they are not good sense. And they are not good sense because they are not subdued by awe of truth, as God's instrument, put into the preacher's hand for ends which it is impiety to neglect. No matter how much truth may be wrapped up in these false arts, souls never feel it; the preacher does not feel it. Neither can be quickened by it, any more than corpses in arctic seas can feel the latent caloric of the ice-fields which have congealed their life-blood.

When one of those useful pastors, who are "not eloquent," encounters ungenial criticism, it is his right to rest calmly upon his calling of God to the preaching of truth. No secret distrust should impair the joy of such a preacher in his work. There is a certain trust in God's word that truth shall do its work in the hearts of men which every preacher needs to make him a man of power. It is an equable and joyous trust. It is a spirit of repose in the *destiny* of the instrument which God has chosen. Once possessed of it, and possessed *by* it, a preacher feels that he can afford to preach truth truthfully. He need not exaggerate truth. He need not distort it. He need not deck it with meretricious ornament. He need not surround it with eccentric illustration.

He need not swathe it in transcendental speech. He need not belabor it with theatrical declamation. He need not mince it, nor trim it, nor inflate it, nor paint it. He has only to preach it, thoughtfully, vividly, variously, and with the singleness of an intense soul living in communion with God, and then let it do its own work. It will do its work. He may have faith in it. In the midst of exhausting toils, when wearied with that stern suppression of fitful hopes and apprehensions which must enter largely into every intense life, he may find this spirit of repose in truth falling upon him like the mantle of a prophet. He may *know* then that his words are the wisdom of God and the power of God. He will often speak with the consciousness of that which is a pledge of his success. He will speak with a daring neglect of false expedients and conventionalities, which will astonish men who do not know where is the hiding of his power.

We are told that Napoleon in battle used to be restless, anxious, irritable, and taciturn till a certain critical point was reached in the execution of his orders; but that after that crisis was past, — a crisis invisible to all eyes but his, — and long before any prospect of victory appeared to his subordinates, he suddenly became calm, bland in his manners, apparently careless in his maneuvres, even jovial in his conversation; and at the battle of Eylau, at the risk of defeat, as others judged, he lay down to sleep on a hillock, which the enemy's grape-shot grazed without wakening him. In explanation of his hardihood, he said that there was a turning-point in all his plans of battle beyond which, if it were safely reached, he deemed victory secure. He knew then that he could not lose the day. His work was done.

The repose of genius in the assurance of results which are invisible to inferior minds, can bear no comparison with that rest in the power of truth which a preacher may feel, and which if he does feel it reasonably, will go far towards realizing his expectations of success. The secret of his power will be simply that he is proclaiming God's truth, at God's bidding, and in God's methods. He gives to men that which

God has given to him. The cloud of the Divine Presence envelops him. Within that august protection he performs his life's work. He cannot but achieve results which God will own. He may labor trustfully, for he must succeed. No man ever failed who preached thus. The world may never know his power; but he shall know it; and God shall one day proclaim it, at that tribunal at which shall be fulfilled those words so pregnant with the decisions of eternity upon the history of the pulpit: "There are last which shall be first, and there are first which shall be last."

ARTICLE VII.

BIBLICAL NOTES.

BY H. B. HACKETT, D.D., PROFESSOR IN NEWTON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

1. Where was Candace Queen?

Dean Alford writes the brief Article in Dr. Smith's Dictionary of the Bible on Candace, who, in Acts viii. 27, is said to have been "queen of the Ethiopians" (*βασιλίσσης Αἰθιόπων*). The name, as nearly all admit, is not that of an individual, but a dynastic title, like Abimelech, Pharaoh, Ptolemy, and others. This critic follows those (Kuinoel, Winer, DeWette, Meyer) who suppose that the Candace to whom Luke refers reigned in Meroe, lying within the modern Nubia, not exactly an island, as often represented, but a peninsula, formed by the confluence of the Nile and the Astaboras. It is usual to appeal in confirmation of this statement to Strabo, XVII. 2; Dio Cassius, LIV. 5; and Pliny, Hist. Nat., VI. 35. But some difficulties lie in the way of this opinion. First, Strabo, in the passage referred to, says expressly (for it seems necessary to regard *οἱ δ' ἐν Μερόῃ* as the subject of *καθιστᾶσι*) that the inhabitants of Meroe appoint kings (*βασιλέας*) as their sovereigns, and appoint them for their personal qualities, so that they are elective; not hereditary. Second, Strabo declares that the royal residence of Candace was Napata (*τοῦτο ἦν τὸ βασίλειον τῆς Κανδάκης*), which was a different place from Meroe, eighty-six geographical miles farther north; and Dio Cassius (LIV. 5, though he writes erroneously *Τανάπη*) makes the same distinction, referring the queens who bore this title to Napata, and not Meroe. In accordance with these notices, Rawlinson (Herodotus, Vol. II. p. 411) makes Napata the capital of one part of Ethiopia, and Meroe the seat of another independent kingdom. The passage in Pliny does not disagree with this conclusion, though it is chiefly his language that has misled readers, if they have fallen into error here. His words are the following: "Inde Napata LXXX. mill. oppidum id parvum inter praedicta solum. Ab eo ad insulam Meroen CCCLX M. Herbas circa Meroen dermum viridiores, silvarumque aliquid apparuisse et rinocerotum elephantorumque vestigia. Ipsum oppidum Meroen ab introitu insulae abesse LXX mill. passuum: juxtaque aliam insulam Tadu dextero subeuntibus alveo, quae portum faceret. Aedifica oppidi pauca. Regnare feminam Candacem; quod nomen multis jam annis ad reginas transiit." If "aedifica oppidi" refers to "Meroen," just before, then "regnare Candacem" does of course, and Candace reigned in the city and island of that name. But, on the other hand, Meroe was an important city, and could not well be said to consist of "a few buildings," and

Napata, might in a comparative sense be so described; and hence at this point we may suppose Pliny to go back to the remoter Napata, of which he has already spoken as "parvum," and so much the more as that is uppermost in the mind, as being the point from which he reckons the situation of the other places named.

According to this view Candace was queen in Napata, and not Meroe, precisely as the distinction which Strabo and Cassius make between them would also lead us to suppose. Add to this, as mentioned before, that Strabo speaks of the rulers of Meroe as kings, not queens. For a fuller statement of the case, the reader is referred to T. C. M. Laurent's Neutestamentliche Studien, pp. 140–146 (Gotha, 1866). It is proper to add that some, as, for example, Ritter (Erdkunde, I. p. 491) assume that Napata was only a province of Meroe, and that Strabo and Cassius speak of Candace in connection with the former place rather than the latter, because she had a noted palace there. It follows, then (to make the conciliation here complete), that Strabo must mean by "kings" rulers of both sexes.

The name Candace, says Rüetschi (Hertzog's Real-Encyklopädie, Vol. VII. p. 243), appears not to be of Shemitic origin, at least no satisfactory etymology has yet been assigned for it. The supposition that the Candace in Acts viii. 27 was the one who fought against the Romans B.C. 22 (Strabo XVII. 1, 54) is just possible, so far as the dates are concerned, but has every presumption against it. Some of the commentators suppose her to have been the same; in which case she must have reigned under the emperor Claudius, and have been nearly ninety years old at the time of Philip's baptizing the eunuch. Pliny's statement that Candace was a transmitted title of these Ethiopian queens renders so violent a supposition needless.

2. The Situation of Emmaus.

The reference here is to the place of this name from which the two disciples returned to Jerusalem after the Saviour's appearance to them, on the evening of the first day after his resurrection (see Luke xxiv. 13). On his first journey to Palestine, Dr. Robinson was not inclined to identify this Emmaus with the present 'Amwâs, the ancient Nicopolis, at the foot of the mountains on the way from Yâfa to Jerusalem (Researches, Vol. III. p. 66). But on his second journey he was led to adopt that view, and defends it at length in his Later Researches (Vol. III. pp. 146–150). But for this purpose he must arbitrarily change the text of the Evangelist; for this Emmaus, on the border of the plain, is a hundred and sixty stadia from Jerusalem, whereas that of Luke is said to be only "threescore" or sixty stadia. The distance from Jerusalem would not be less than twenty miles, and could not be traversed in the time that Luke's narrative allows for that purpose.

New interest has been given to this question by a monograph on the subject by Dr. Herman Zschokke, entitled Das Neutestamentliche Em-

maus beleuchtet (Schaffhausen, 1865). He is a Catholic (Rector des Oesterreichischen Pilgerhauses in Jerusalem), and has made the subject a special study. He decides that the Emmaus of Luke (xxiv. 13) must have been el-Kubeibeh, about nine miles northwest of Jerusalem, where the Franciscan monks have placed it. Rector Zschokke relies on three main arguments for his conclusion. First, the distance agrees with that of Luke and Josephus (Bell. Jud. VII. 6, 6), viz. as a round number, sixty stadia or "furlongs" (in the English Version), as ascertained by actual measurement, i.e. taking the shortest of three ways, which differ only by a single stadium, it amounts to thirty-eight thousand and twenty English feet, equal to sixty-two stadia and five-eighths. Secondly, the two disciples of Jesus could easily return from Emmaus to Jerusalem after sunset, or from the close of the day (κέκλικεν ἡ ἡμέρα), and rejoin the apostles there in their secret meeting on the evening of the same day (John xx. 19). The journey was performed lately without difficulty within the time required, by Madam Anna C. Emmerich. Thirdly, the crusaders (though really, as appears from the author's own figures, not earlier than the eleventh century) were led to fix on Kubeibeh as the New Testament Emmaus, in consequence of finding the name applied to it by the native inhabitants, though the name, it is admitted, no longer exists among them. If this last link in the chain of evidence could be made stronger, it would almost settle the question in favor of Kubeibeh. It must be confessed that the existence of this early currency of the scripture name outside of the Christian communities of the East is not so fully made out as the confident tone of the writer would authorize us to expect. The Catholics, in their assurance that they have found the genuine spot, have recently bought the ground of the old "Castrum Arnoldi" (Kubeibeh), and are converting it into one of their holy places. Rector Zschokke makes it evident enough that the 'Amwâs (Nicopolis) at the foot of the mountains cannot be the New Testament village of that name. That there was such a village in the time of Christ "sixty stadia" distant from Jerusalem, is evident from Josephus as well as Luke; but the site has been lost to us.

It seems there is a little history behind this brochure of the German author, which explains why this investigation has called forth so much earnestness. A rich and pious lady, a pilgrim to the Holy Land from Paris, inquired at Jerusalem for the site of Emmaus, with the view of erecting a sanctuary or chapel there. The Franciscans, in accordance with a tradition long maintained by them, referred her to Kubeibeh as the place in question. Accordingly, to obtain the desired spot on which were a few old ruins, she was required to pay Abu Ghosch, the owner, one hundred and seventy thousand piasters, i.e. about eight thousand five hundred dollars. It was of little consequence that Protestant travellers held a different opinion; but as Dr. Sepp of München (Jerusalem oder Pilgerbuch, I. p. 55; 1862) and the Parisian Jesuit Bourquenoud, Catholics, also rejected

that tradition, it was necessary to find good reasons for Kubeibeh, in opposition to the testimony in favor of Kulonieh, on the route from Ramleh to the Holy City. To settle this question the special investigations referred to above were set on foot.

3. Dispute respecting Capernaum.

The later travellers in Palestine leave the question as to the spot on which Capernaum stood hardly less perplexed than it was before. "The disputed sites of the cities of Genesareth," says Dean Stanley, after his second visit to the East (Notices of Localities, etc., p. 195), "must still remain disputed." Porter (Handbook of Syria, II. p. 425) accepts Dr. Robinson's conclusion in favor of Khan Minîyeh, so called from an old caravansary near a heap of ruins, on the northern edge of Genesareth. 'Ain-et-Tîn is only another name for the same place, derived from a fig tree which overhangs a fountain in the neighborhood. Dr. Thomson (Land and the Book, I. pp. 542–548) and Mr. Dixon (Holy Land, II. p. 173; London, 1865) decide for Tell Hûm, at the head of the lake, about three miles northeast of Khan Minîyeh. The claim of 'Ain Mudawarah, or the Round Fountain, near the south end of the Plain of Genesareth, and so named from being "enclosed by a low circular wall of mason-work," has for some time past been kept in abeyance; but Mr. Tristram (Land of Israel, p. 442; London, 1865) has brought it forward once more, and certainly with reasons for it which are not without weight. He speaks with greater authority on some branches of the argument from his character as an eminent naturalist. Josephus states (Bell. Jud. III. 9, 8) that the fountain of Capernaum produced the κορακῖνος, a fish like that of the lake near Alexandria. Mr. Tristram now maintains that neither of the places except the Round Fountain furnishes this mark of identification. "The remarkable siluroid, the catfish or coracine (κορακῖνος), abounds to a remarkable degree in the Round Fountain to this day. We obtained specimens a yard long, and some of them are deposited in the British Museum. The loose, sandy bottom of this fountain is peculiarly adapted for this singular fish, which buries itself in the sediment, leaving only its feelers exposed..... Here, in the clear shallow water, it may, when disturbed, be at once detected, swimming in numbers along the bottom. But it is not found at 'Ain-et Tîn, where the fountain could neither supply it with cover nor food; nor could we dissover it at 'Ain Tabighah" (the nearest fountain to Tell Hûm, though distant two miles to the southward), "where the water is hot and brackish." For other details of his able argument the reader is referred to his work, as above. Mr Tristram thinks it worth while to mention that fever is very prevalent at this day at 'Ain Mudawarah (the Round Fountain), whereas "the dry, elevated, rocky ground of Tell Hûm" would be comparatively free from it. "Peter's wife's mother lay sick of a fever" at Capernaum (Mark 1, 30).

Dr. Thomson (Land and Book, I. p. 544) admits that "this fish (coracinus) was actually found in the fountain of Capernaum," and says "that this is a valid reason why the Round Fountain could not be" that of Capernaum, that is, because it contains no such fish. Dr. Robinson makes a similar statement. It will be seen, therefore, that there is a flat contradiction between different travellers as to the fact in question; and the dispute having assumed this form will no doubt be soon brought to an issue, so far as this point is concerned. It may be mentioned with reference to Khan Minîyeh that the English Exploring Expedition in Palestine have been making excavations there, but (as reported in the Athenaeum, March 31, 1866), have discovered no remains of antiquity, but only some "masonry and pottery of comparatively modern date."

4. Place of Bethabara in the Harmony.

The situation of Bethabara or Bethany (since they denote the same place) beyond the Jordan, excites the greater interest from its supposed connection with the place of our Lord's baptism. The question is important also for the harmonists in settling the order of certain events at the beginning of the Saviour's ministry. There are two views here. One is that Jesus after his temptation returned to John at Bethabara, where he had been previously baptized; and the other is that John in the meantime had changed the scene of his labors, so that when Jesus rejoined him it was at a different place from the one where he himself had been baptized. The determination of this point depends chiefly on the situation or limits of "the wilderness of Judea" (Matt. iii. 3), where John made his first public appearance. Bleek (Synoptische Erklärung der drei ersten Evangelien, I. p. 141) states, undoubtedly the only reliable conclusion respecting this somewhat controverted phrase. He represents it as designating the plain, not exactly desolate, but yet little cultivated, and serving as pasture land, on the east side of Judah and along the Dead Sea, in which, according to Josh. xv. 61, Engedi and other towns were situated. It is natural enough, he adds further, that the phrase thus defined should occur with some fluctuation; and hence the region to a certain extent north of the Dead Sea on the west of the Jordan, which Josephus likewise designates as ἔρημος (Bell. Jud., IV. 8; II. 3; III. 10, 7), might be reckoned as belonging to the "wilderness of Judea." According to this view, the wilderness (Matt. iv. 1 and Luke iv. 1) into which Jesus went to be tempted, could be either the desert in this wider sense, or the northern part of it, viewed as distinct from the other. See also Winer's Realwörterbuch, II. p. 699. But if John baptized in this desert, we must infer that Jesus himself was baptized there; for, after reading that the forerunner baptized the crowds who came to him "in the wilderness of Judea" (Matt. iii. 1, 5), we read also, without any intimation of a change of place, that Jesus came to him and was baptized in the Jordan (Matt. iii. 13).

On the other hand, Bethabara or Bethany (as the case may be) was "beyond the Jordan," i.e. on the east side (John i. 28); and hence, must have been a different place from that of the Saviour's baptism, where the first interview occurred between him and the Baptizer. Stanley (Sinai and Palestine, p. 304) represents the places as one and the same; but for this purpose he must, contrary to the evidence, make "the wilderness of Judea," lie in part on the east of Jordan. It is not just to regard ἡ ἔρημος τῆς Ἰουδαίας (Matt. iii. 1) as explained by ἡ περίχωρος τοῦ Ἰορδάνου (Matt. iii. 5); for the latter, which describes no doubt the Ghor or Valley of the Jordan in general, denotes in that passage the region from which the people resorted to John's baptism, and not that to which they came; and as used in Matt. iii. 5, points out the entire circuit of John's labors, which he performed now on this side of the river and now on that; the Judean desert being a part only of this more extended region. We must rely, of course, on the usage for the exact extent of these geographical terms; but it deserves to be noticed that the different expressions differ in such a way as to indicate their application; the one (περίχωρος) being territory about the Jordan i.e. on both sides of it; and the other (ἔρημος τῆς Ἰουδαίας) territory limited to Judea.

To understand that John not only baptized Jesus at Bethany, but baptized him there at the time when he received the deputation of priests and Levites (recorded only in John i. 19 seq.), leaves no interval for the temptation, which Mark says (i. 12), took place immediately after the baptism, and continued forty days. We thus not only array the sacred writers against each other without reason, but overlook the distinct allusion which John makes to the Saviour's baptism as a previous occurrence, when he reminds those present of the descent of the Spirit on Jesus, which had been vouchsafed to him as a sign that he was the expected one (John i. 32). This would be even less correct than to suppose that Jesus was baptized at Bethany, and then, after the forty days, returned to him at the same place. Stier (Reden Jesu. I. p. 27) notices the use which a captious criticism has made of this failure to recognize the baptism and temptation of Christ as antecedent to the events related in John i. 19 seq.

A few recent writers, as Stanley, Ellicott, incline to place the temptation on Mount Nebo, east of the Jordan. This would be possible, and perhaps not improbable, if Jesus was baptized at Bethany, as the wilderness of Nebo then might be sufficiently near to be the one into which he was led by the Spirit to be tempted. But the ground for this opinion falls away if John was preaching in Judea when Christ came to him to be baptized. The desert where he was already, afforded retreats which he would naturally seek for fasting and prayer, without crossing the Jordan into the wilds of Moab, and thus deviating so far from his more direct course in returning to Galilee. The part of the desert which lies back of Jericho, and

is known as Kŭruntŭl or Quarantana, a corruption of quadraginta, with reference to the duration of the fast, may well have been the spot where the Son of God was to show, in the words of Milton:

> "his filial virtue, though untried
> Against whate'er may tempt, whate'er seduce,
> Allure or terrify or undermine."

It is a mountain cut off from the plain by a wall of rock twelve or fifteen hundred feet high, is frightfully desolate, is infested with wild beasts and reptiles, and thus answers fully to Mark's significant intimation (i. 13) respecting the wildness of the scene (*μετὰ τῶν θηρίων*).

As to the more precise situation of Bethany or Bethabara there is nothing to add, except it be that if Jesus went from there to Galilee in a single day (John ii. 1), it must have been on one of the upper fords of the Jordan (Bethabara signifies such a place), not far from the south end of the sea of Tiberias, and not so low down as opposite to Jericho. Stanley urges this note of time as a decisive reason for placing Bethany there. But the mode of reckoning "the third day" in John ii. 1 is uncertain. On Kiepert's Wandkarte des Palästina, Bethany or Bethabara appears farther south, on the opposite side from the plain of Jericho. The "third day" may be the third after the arrival in Galilee, and not the one spent on the way thither; or, as Lücke thinks (Evangelium des Jóhannes I. p. 467), "the third" from the calling of Nathanael (John i. 45 seq.) With these last computations as our guide, we have two days or more for the journey back to Galilee, and must place the site of the lost Bethabara much further south than the position below the sea of Tiberias. After all, it will be seen that the question *where* Christ was baptized is a distinct one from that of the situation of Bethany or Bethabara, though so often confounded with it.

5. The "Quarries" near Gilgal.

It is stated in Judges iii. 18, 19 that Ehud, after bringing his present to Eglon king of Moab, withdrew in order to dismiss his attendants, whom he accompanied a short distance, and then returned "from the quarries that were by Gilgal" (as rendered in the English version) in order to execute the meditated murder. It is not known to the writer that any remains of "quarries" have been found in that vicinity, and the meaning of the word so translated is obscure. Professor Cassel, in his note on this passage (Richter und Ruth, p. 37, in Lange's Bibelwerk, 1865), offers another explanation. He understands that the פְּסִילִים were landmarks (consisting of pillars, or heaps of stone, *στῆλαι*) which marked the boundary between the territory of the Moabites on the west of the Jordan (held by them as conquerors at that time) and that of the Hebrews; and it was "from" these stone heaps or pillars (not "the quarries") that Ehud turned back

after parting with his servants, so as to have the advantage of greater secrecy. "Pesilim," in this sense, would be nearly allied to that of "images," idol-gods (compare Deut. vii. 25 and Isa. xlii. 8), since boundaries (lapides sacri, termini) were regarded as properly inviolate, consecrated. To the heathen they were hardly less than objects of religious veneration. The Hebrews would naturally speak of them with reference to the feelings of their foreign oppressors, though we need not altogether acquit the Hebrews of a similar superstition.

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTICES OF RECENT GERMAN PUBLICATIONS.

FROM OUR GERMAN CORRESPONDENT.

Die Christologie des neuen Testaments (The Christology of the New Testament). *Ein biblisch-theologischer Versuch.* Von Prof. Dr. Beyschlag, Halle. Berlin: L. Rank; London: Asher and Co. 1866.—Professor Beyschlag's work comprises a long preface, in which he defends himself against ungenerous attacks on the lecture delivered last year before the Kirchentag, in Altenburg (noticed in a previous number of the Bibliotheca Sacra), an introduction, and the following chapters: The Idea of the Son of Man; The Testimony of Jesus concerning himself, according to the Synoptics and John; the Christology of Peter, of the Apocalypse, of John, of the Epistle to the Hebrews, of Paul.

We shall best employ the limited space at our disposal by describing Professor Beyschlag's point of view. While believing firmly — what we beg our readers carefully to remember — that Jesus Christ is the living, personal bond between God and man; that in his person Deity and humanity are perfectly united; he is of opinion that the formula, "Two natures in one person" — a formula which originated in the endeavors of the Council of Chalcedon to reconcile the two opposed schools of Alexandria and Antioch — can no longer be received as a satisfactory expression of the facts of the case. At the time when it was adopted, the divine and the human were regarded as two incommensurable, mutually exclusive quantities. Whereas the true teaching of the scriptures, of Christianity, and of the most enlightened modern theologians is that humanity is essentially related or akin to deity. On the one hand, God bears within himself an image of himself, in the likeness of which he created man; in other words, his own eternal image is the archetype of man. On the other hand, that which constitutes man a person, that which makes him man, is the divine image implanted in him in the form of a capacity, that breath

of God which constituted the earthly form a living soul (Gen. ii. 7). Inasmuch, now, as human nature in itself bears the image of God, and is of divine origin, we only need to conceive of the divine idea of man as absolutely realized, of human nature as existing in ideal perfection, and we have the God-man. A man in whom the absolute *capacity* to resemble God had become an absolute *reality* through his absolute obedience, would be able to say, "he that seeth me, seeth my Father"; "I and my Father are one." In him God must dwell with his entire fulness; he would be a human translation of God's eternal essence. Such a God-man would unite God and man far more completely than the God-man of the traditional doctrine. We should then have no need to say "this he did or said in his divine nature, that in his human nature"; but simply Θεῖα πάντα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα πάντα." This view our author seeks to establish by an examination of the various writings of the New Testament. In our opinion, however, the New Testament, while naturally containing much that will bear such an explanation, contains quite as much that points in the direction of the traditional doctrine. But though we dissent from Dr. Beyschlag, we shall be glad to see his work find candid and thoughtful readers; for he errs as a friend, not as a foe, to Christ and Christianity.

Die Wunderthaten des Herrn in Bezug auf die neueste Kritik betrachtet (The Miracles of our Lord considered in relation to the latest criticisms). Von Prof. Dr. F. L. Steinmeyer. Berlin: Wiegandt und Grieben; London: Asher and Co. 1866. — The object of this latest publication of the able and acute Berlin professor is to show, first, the probability that Jesus should work miracles at all; and secondly, the probability of each particular miracle reported in the Gospels. The critical attacks referred to are principally those of Strauss, in his new "Leben Jesu." The following are the main sections. Introduction: 1. The Problem; 2. The Method of Solution; 3. The Worth of the Solution. I. Jesus as a Worker of Miracles. II. The Miracles of Jesus: Group first, The Miracles which were Tokens that the Kingdom of Heaven was at hand; Group second, The Miracles which were Symbols of the Blessings of the Kingdom of Heaven; Group third, The Miracles which testified that the Power of the Kingdom of Heaven was already at work; Group fourth, The Miracles which prophesied the Future Rule of the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth. In the first group occur such miracles as the healing of the woman with an issue of blood; in the second, as the cleansing of the leper; in the third, as the casting out of devils and raising the dead; in the fourth, as the feeding of thousands.

Professor Steinmeyer's object is not to explain (erklären) miracles; but to understand (begreifen) them. With regard to attempts at explaining miracles, he accepts Rothe's excellent remark: "It is involved in the very idea of a miracle that it should be absolutely inexplicable; for it is an

effect produced directly by God, without the intervention of second causes; and to explain a fact is to bring to light what has intervened between it and its cause." To understand a miracle, on the contrary, is to ascertain its significance and design. It is our duty, too, to try to understand them, for only thus can we assure ourselves of their divine origin. Inexplicability alone does not prove an event to be the direct work of God. The significance and purpose of the miracles of Christ, Prof. Steinmeyer draws from the narratives themselves, from the circumstances, and so forth. To discover their significance and design is to put them in the light of probabilities. We are of opinion that our author's procedure is occasionally too subtile and rather artificial; but the work as a whole is a thoroughly valuable contribution to the apologetics of Christianity. The method adopted is healthful and sensible. We have read the introduction with special interest, and only regretted that it was not longer. We sincerely trust that the author's next contribution, which is to treat of our Lord's passion, will soon appear. Price 1 thaler.

Selbstzeugnisse Jesu (The Testimony of Jesus concerning himself). Von Prof. Dr. Held, Breslau. Zürich: C. Meyer; London: Asher and Co. 1865. — This is also an apologetical work, by the author of "Jesus the Christ."[1] It consists of fifteen meditations on various passages from the Gospel of Matthew, and nine sermons on miscellaneous texts. The general character and tendency of the meditations are well indicated by the opening words of the first. "The apostles have spoken and written so many strange and marvellous things about Jesus Christ, that a man who does not merely live for the present moment, blindly and without feeling, but reflects on what he sees and hears, must be excited to musings and questionings. If we had not learned these things from childhood — if we had first heard of them when we were old enough to reflect — we should be filled with still greater astonishment." The question running through the whole book is that old, wierd, seemingly needless, and yet fascinating question: Who and what was Christ? We earnestly commend the discussions as both warm and thoughtful, to all German readers. It would be a good present for a really enquiring doubter.

Die Wissenschaft der Religion (The Science of Religion). Von W. Tölle. Vol. I. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht; London: Asher and Co. 1866. — The aim of this work is a lofty one; we wish the execution were worthy of the aim. The aim is to show that religion is the absolute and central principle in the life of man as a spiritual being; to win back for religion and the church those posts which they are asserted by opponents to have lost; to demonstrate that a regeneration of the people is impossible save on the basis of faith; that religion is the source

[1] Noticed in No. 88, Oct. 1865, p. 695.

of all true science, art, and morality; that apostasy from religion involves the destruction of all the ideal forces of human history. This first volume treats, in two books, of the "fundamental forms of the religions relation," and of the "history of religion." With the spirit and general tendencies of the writer we fully harmonize; he is undoubtedly a thoroughly Christian thinker; but we have not been able to avoid the feeling, in looking through his work, that he lacks some of the qualifications necessary to such an undertaking. His style is flowing, many striking and suggestive thoughts are advanced, and good use is made of old material; but he takes far more for granted than his aim allows, and does not evince that measure of clearness, vigor, and logic that one has a right to expect in a philosophical treatise on so weighty a theme.

Allgemeines über die hebräische Dichtung und über das Psalmenbuch (General Observations on Hebrew Poetry and on the Book of Psalms). Von Heinrich Ewald. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht; London: Asher and Co. 1866. — This is the second considerably enlarged edition of the first volume of the author's great work on "The Poets of the Old Testament." The name of Professor Ewald is so well known, and his authority stands so high, that we need do little more than indicate the principal contents of the work before us. No Hebrew scholar can afford to disregard his views, even where he may differ from them. The work treats of the origin of poetry, and the peculiar character of Hebrew poetry; of the History and various species of Hebrew poetry; of the various parts of a Hebrew poem; of song and music among the Jews; of the substance and aim, the origin, the inscriptions, and the historical explanation of the Psalms. Professor Ewald thinks that we have four species of poem in the Old Testament: lyrical, didactic, dramatic, and epic poems. The Song of Solomon he treats as a dramatic poem, in five acts, illustrative of faithfulness in love; he considers it to have been played at some country festival, probably by three players, one representing Solomon, the second the Sulamite, the third a chorus of women; and believes that it was written not long after Solomon's death. If our space allowed, we would gladly give a full account of the very interesting and instructive section on the history and species of Hebrew Poetry. Price 1 thaler, 10 sgr.

Vindiciae Lucanae seu de itinerarii in libro Actorum asservati auctore. Scripsit Aug. Klostermann. Gottingae: Vandenhoeck et Ruprecht. 1866. — A careful inquiry into the probable authorship of the itinerary contained in the twenty-seventh and the twenty-eighth chapters of the Acts. The writer arrives at the result, that the itinerary was written by the author who wrote the rest of the book, and that this author was the companion of Paul, who speaks of himself in the first person in chapters twenty-seven and twenty-eight, that is, Luke. The principal questions discussed

are the following: Whether the account was written by an eye-witness; whether the two chapters form an inseparable whole; what the relation is between chapters xxi. 26–xxvi. 32 and xxvii. 28; the relation between the style of the itinerary and Luke's other style, and so forth. The little book comprises seventy-two pages, and costs twelve silver groschen.

Characteristik der Theosophie Franz von Baader's (Characteristic of the Theosophy of Baader). Von Prof. Dr. Fischer, Erlangen. Erlangen: Biesold. 1865. — This is a brief but interesting account of the religio-philosophical views of Franz von Baader, with notices of their relation to the systems of Schelling, Hegel, Daub, and Schleiermacher. Professor Fischer's spirit may be judged by the closing words of his preface: "In seeking to exhibit the merits of this excellent theosopher, I believe I shall do honor to Him — Jesus Christ — of whom Baader was a free, loving, and enlightened witness." Price 12 sgr. pp. 71.

Verfassung und gegenwärtiger Bestand sämmtlicher Kirchen des Orients (Constitution and present Position of all the Oriental Churches). Von Prof. Dr. Isidor Silbernagl. Landshut: Wölfle; London: Asher and Co. 1865. Price 40 silver groschen. — The churches whose constitutions and position Dr. Silbernagl describes are, the Greek church in Turkey and Egypt, in Greece and the Ionian Isles, in Russia, in the Danubian Principalities, in Servia, in Montenegro, in Austria; the Armenian church; the Coptic church in Egypt; the Monophysite church in Abyssinia; the Jacobite church; the Thomas Christians in Malabar: further, the various united churches, as Greek, Greek Catholic, Coptic and Abyssinian, Armenian, Chaldaean, Syrian Catholic, and the Maronite church. The author is a Roman Catholic, Professor of Law in Munich; but seems to have done his work thoroughly and impartially.

Kritisch-Exegetisches Handbuch über die Offenbarung Johannis (Critico-exegetical Handbook of the Revelation of John). Von Dr. F. Düsterdieck. 2d. ed. pp. 583. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht; London: Asher and Co. 1865. Price 2 thaler. — Dr. Düsterdieck's general position he himself candidly describes in the following words: "I have no doubt of the Apocalypse being an inspired book, and that on this account it justly has a place in the canon. At the same time as I consider it to be of far lower dignity than the writings of the apostles, and entertain the conviction that the form of visions under which the revelation has been given us, is far inferior to that of oral converse between God and man; I hold to a view of inspiration in particular and of theology in general, which lead me to expect attacks both from the right and the left." He defends the unity of the book; denies that it was written by John the author of the Gospel and Epistles; and assigns it rather a deutero-canon-

ical than a properly canonical position. The key to its purport and intent he finds in the expression ἃ δεῖ γενέσθαι ἐν τάχει, "things which must *shortly* come to pass" (Rev. i. 1), laying stress on the word "shortly," "speedily," whose significance has either been overlooked or undervalued by too many commentators. In other words, the theme is the shortly expected second coming of Christ, and the consequences thereof to Jerusalem and the Jews, to Rome and the world, and to the church. The reference of the various seals, trumpets, vials, and so forth, to single events in the general history of the world and the church he regards as unwarranted, and as, to use Calvin's expression, a "ruinosa aedificatio."

Neutestamentliche Studien (New Testament Studies). Von Dr. I. C. Laurent. Gotha: F. A. Perthes; London: Asher and Co. 1866. Price 1 thaler, 10 sgr. — These studies are mainly reprints from the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken;* and are on the following subjects: 1. Marginal Notes of the Apostle Paul (he is of the opinion that Paul dictated all his letters and afterwards made marginal notes, consisting of additions and corrections. This, Dr. Laurent thinks, furnishes an explanation of many difficulties of construction, etc.); 2. The Order of the Books of the New Testament (he thinks, for example, 2d Thessalonians ought to be before 1st Thessalonians); 3. The Chronology of the Acts; 4. The Chronology of Paul's Epistles; 5. Explanation of particular passages (mostly philological); 6. On the Brethren of Jesus (he believes that the brethren in question were real brothers, the sons of Joseph and Mary); 7. The actual text, a revised text and a German translation of the Fragment of Muratori on the Canon of the New Testament.

Vorlesungen über die christliche Dogmengeschichte (Lectures on the History of Christian Doctrine). Von Dr. F. C. Baur. Vol. I. Abth. I. Das Dogma der alten Kirche. 1 Abschnitt. Von der apostolischen zeit bis zur Synode in Nicaea. pp. 738. Leipzig: Fues; London: Asher and Co. 1865. — Deducting his tendency to an Hegelian construction of history in general, and of the Christian history in particular, no man was so competent to write the history of Christian doctrine as the late Dr. Baur of Tübingen. His immense learning, clear and vigorous style, capability of selecting what was of importance and leaving aside useless details, and his systematic power, alike qualified him for the task. His method of treatment in this new work is the usual one of periods; within each period the history of each doctrine is given in agreement with the order of dogmatic theology. Judging from the present volume, the work will be an extensive one; indeed, this constitutes part of its value; for we have handbooks enough. It is said by scholars to bear comparatively few marks of the imperfection usually characteristic of lectures published after the writer's death.

ARTICLE IX.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

We have space to notice only the following American publications:—

Life of Benjamin Silliman, M.D., LL.D., late Professor of Chemistry, Mineralogy, and Geology in Yale College: Chiefly from his Manuscript Reminiscences, Diaries, and Correspondence. By George P. Fisher, Professor in Yale College. 2 Vols., 12mo. pp. 407, 408. New York: Charles Scribner and Company. 1866.

Prof. Fisher has been fortunate in finding so good a subject, and Prof. Silliman has been fortunate in finding so good a biographer. These two volumes possess peculiar interest, as they describe a man who had peculiar relations to society. One fact illustrates this peculiarity. Prof. Silliman's grandmother was the granddaughter of John Alden, the Pilgrim of the Mayflower. He "well remembered his grandmother," and "she was fourteen years old when *her* grandmother died. On her who caressed him in his childhood had rested the hands of one who was nurtured by emigrants in the Mayflower" (I. p. 5). It is fascinating to peruse the Memoir of a man whom we have long known as a friend, and who has held personal intercourse with Dr. Priestley, Sir Humphrey Davy, Sir Joseph Banks, Benjamin West, Dugald Stewart, Dr. Thomas Hope, Dr. Darwin, Dr. Gregory, and other eminent scholars of a bygone age. Prof. Silliman has formed the nucleus around which various natural sciences have clustered during the last half-century, and his own enterprise has been intimately associated with their progress. He was many-sided, and his biography has a political and religious as well as philosophical interest. Prof. Fisher has allowed him to speak for himself, and has thus permitted us to read a substantial *anto-biography* of a man whom all American patriots will honor; whom the friends of science will admire; in whom Christian scholars will feel a deep interest; in whom thousands of pupils, and especially the alumni of Yale College, will feel a personal, filial interest; with whose prolonged labors some of the most eminent men of this and of other lands, in our own age and in preceding times, have been closely connected. The volumes are not only well edited, but well printed, and must hold a prominent as well as high rank in American biography.

An Examination of Mr. J. S. Mill's Philosophy; being a Defence of Fundamental Truth: By James M'Cosh, LL.D. 8vo. pp. 424. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1866.

We have already expressed our general agreement with the writings of Dr. M'Cosh. We need not repeat the commendations which we have so often uttered. The present volume is a worthy successor to the "Intuitions of the Mind," the "Method of Divine Government," and other works of the same judicious author.

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE ORIGIN OF THE GOSPELS.

BY REV. J. ISIDOR MOMBERT, D.D., LANCASTER, PA.

(*Continued from page* 384.)

TURNING to the fourth canonical Gospel, Strauss says it would be well for it if the external evidence for its genuineness were as good as that for the synoptical Gospels. He begins with an attempt to invalidate the notice of Eusebius (Hist. Eccl. III. 39), that Papias cited the first Epistle of John (*κέχρηται δ' ὁ αὐτὸς μαρτυρίαις ἀπὸ τῆς προτέρας Ἰωάννου ἐπιστολῆς*), 1, by aspersing the scholarship and judgment of Eusebius, who may have been mistaken in identifying the citations of Papias with passages in the first Epistle of John; 2, by denying that the first Epistle of John and the fourth canonical Gospel had the same author. But since his first assertion is purely arbitrary, the notice of Eusebius, who was a learned man and saw the writings of Papias, has its full weight of importance; and since his second assertion is contradicted by the facts of the case, resulting from the closest scrutiny of both writings, and concurred in by the most competent and reliable authorities from the earliest times, his objections fall to the ground. His conclusion that the silence of Papias concerning John's authorship is unfavorable to its genuineness amounts to nothing more than a subterfuge, for, apart from the incidental character of the notice in Eusebius,

the silence of Papias cannot be of any moment to a man like Strauss, who refuses to believe Papias when he breaks silence and speaks in plain terms.

Strauss notices the argument for the authenticity of this Gospel based on the passage John xxi. 24, and rejects it. That passage is generally regarded as an addition made by foreign hands, probably the presbyters of the Ephesian church; but without discussing the theories of the authorship of the last verses of that chapter, and indeed of the last chapter itself, one fact speaks for itself, that the testimony it gives for the veracity of the record of the fourth Gospel has stood the ordeal of the criticism of the early church, and cannot be invalidated by the arbitrary tests of the Tübingen school; they must first get rid of the whole Christian literature of the first three centuries, before they can touch the Gospel of John on internal grounds; but as they have not yet accomplished that task, even formidable to hands so well skilled in destruction, we need not further enlarge upon this particular point.

The testimony of the apostolical Fathers is unceremoniously set aside by Strauss, on the ground that, if the fourth Gospel had been acknowledged and received in the church for fifty years as the work of the apostle whose name it bears, its influence on the writings of the apostolical Fathers and other works of the second century ought to have been greater, and to have appeared in a more distinct form than mere superficial allusions or references. This remark of Strauss rests on the supposition that the Epistles of Ignatius originated in the middle of the second century, whereas the martyrdom of Ignatius is generally believed to have taken place some time between A.D. 105 and 108, probably A.D. 107; so that the Epistle bearing his name, if authentic, must have been written not later than that period; the Epistle of Barnabas was written between A.D. 107 and 120; the Epistle of Polycarp not long after the martyrdom of Ignatius (cf. Polyc. Ep. c. XIII.); now if the fourth canonical Gospel was written about A.D. 90, the supposed interval of fifty years between

the publication of the latter and that of the Ignatian Epistles dwindles down to a period not exceeding seventeen years. This simple comparison of dates, derived from the most authentic sources, puts an end to the Straussian argument, and renders any and every allusion or reference in these writings to the fourth Gospel of the utmost importance; for such allusions and references clearly show that the fourth Gospel was received as an authentic document immediately after the death of the evangelist. Ignatius (ad Philad. c. 7) says: *οἶδεν γὰρ (τὸ πνεῦμα) πόθεν ἔρχεται, καὶ ποῦ ὑπάγει*, in manifest antithesis to John iii. 8, and thus exhibits a familiarity with the fourth Gospel; while the following quotation (ad Rom. c. 7) contains evident allusions to passages in this Gospel; *Ἄρτον θεοῦ θέλω, ἄρτον οὐράνιον, ἄρτον ζωῆς, ὅς ἐστιν σὰρξ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ . . . . . καὶ πόμα θεοῦ θέλω, τὸ αἷμα αὐτοῦ κ.τ.λ.* Polycarp (ad Philipp. c. 7) has a distinct reference to the first Epistle of John, whose author is manifestly identical with that of the fourth Gospel; the reference is to 1 John iv. 3, and the passage reads thus: *πᾶς γάρ, ὃς ἂν μὴ ὁμολογῇ, Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθέναι, αντίχριστός ἐστι.* Even Barnabas (Ep. c. VI.) contains an allusion to John i. 14, and (cap. XII.) to John iii. 14. We may also add the manifest allusion to John x. 7, 9 in Ignatius (ad Philad. c. IX.), where Christ is called *θύρα τοῦ πατρός*.

In the middle of the second century we meet with clear traces of the use of the fourth Gospel as the work of an apostle in the writings of Catholic, Heretical, and even Pagan authors. First we have the testimony of Justin Martyr, which Strauss rejects chiefly on the ground that his phraseology, which exhibits a most striking resemblance to that of John the evangelist, may be accounted for from his familiarity with Philonic ideas, although he is evidently at a loss to find an explanation of Justin's conception of the Logos, which in the main agrees with that of John, and seeks to cover his perplexity by laying stress on the term *παράκλητος* not being found in the writings of Justin; the coincidences he thinks may be accidental, or sufficiently explained by the

supposition that John and Justin had recourse to the same sources of information, viz. the Alexandrian philosophy of religion and the Jewish-Christian typology of that age. It is by no means uncommon to hear such references to recondite literature, which may impress the illiterate with a sense of the author's learning, but can hardly satisfy scholars, who want proofs, and not oracular sayings founded on a literature which the author fails to verify by explicit reference to the particular work, book, chapter, and verse. As a rule, such vague references to entire classes of works without any specification, may be set down as a *deus ex machina* and a *petitio principii*, and as a strong proof of the author's consciousness of the weakness of his position.

Strauss considers only one passage in Justin of importance; it occurs Apol. I. 6, and reads thus: *ὁ χριστὸς εἶπεν, ἂν μὴ ἀναγεννηθῆτε, οὐ μὴ εἰσέλθητε εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν· ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἀδύνατον εἰς τὰς μήτρας τῶν τεκουσῶν τοὺς ἅπαξ γεννωμένους ἐμβῆναι, φανερὸν πᾶσιν ἐστί.* Here the reference to John iii. 3–5 is unmistakable and undeniable. Strauss says it is only apparent, because the first part of the passage is found in the Clementine Homilies (Hom. XI. 26) thus: "If ye are not born again with living water, in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven," with the remarkable variations, that Justin and the Clementines have *ἀναγεννηθῆναι* instead of John's *ἄνωθεν γεννηθῆναι*, *βασιλεία οὐρανῶν* instead of John's *τοῦ θεοῦ*, the second person plural instead of John's third person singular in the verb, etc.; and the last-named variations are also found in Matt. xviii. 3: "Verily I say unto you, except ye be converted and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven"; that we have obviously the same saying in various forms; man's indispensable beginning *de novo* is expressed in Matthew by men becoming as little children, in Justin by being born again, in the Clementines by being born again in baptism, and in John by being born from above of the Spirit; that this spiritual birth would be contrasted with natural

birth is self-evident, and that since we find, both in the Clementines and in Justin, an expansion of that idea to which the turn of the impossibility of a real return into the mother's womb may readily be conjectured to belong, and that if the Gospel according to the Hebrews was the original source of that expansion, the agreement of Justin with the fourth Gospel might be readily accounted for by both having derived their information from said apocryphal Gospel, without the necessity of Justin's acquaintance with the fourth canonical Gospel.

This accumulation of conjectures based on conjectures, Strauss wants us to receive as a satisfactory account of a most striking coincidence of thought and language between John's Gospel and Justin's apology; but as the conclusion he draws is purely arbitrary, it is not necessary to enter upon a detailed discussion of the particular links in his chain of reasoning, and we think that the variation in unimportant terms of Justin's language from that of John is satisfactorily explained by its being a free quotation, which is manifest from the explanation with which he introduces the passage, which must be considered to exhibit an unmistakable and undeniable reference to John iii. 3–5. But all doubts of his acquaintance with the fourth Gospel must vanish if we find him, in addition, ascribe his doctrine of the divine nature of Christ to *τοῖς διὰ Χριστοῦ διδαχθεῖσι*, and perceive in the statement of his idea of the Logos predicates such as *μονογενής*, etc., which cannot well be derived from another source than the Gospel of John. He has, moreover, many other references to that Gospel, e.g. his comparison of the church of Christ to a vine, planted by God and the Redeemer (Dial. p. 337), his statement that the living water is given by Christ to those who through him love the Father (Dial. p. 342), and his designation of the miraculous birth of Jesus as that of one not born of human seed, but of the will of God (Dial. p. 286), cannot be explained as coincidences, but argue a thorough familiarity with the fourth canonical Gospel; this is quite clear from the last reference, which contains a variation from

the present Greek text of John i. 13, but exhibits a conformity with an ancient reading ὅς ..... ἐγεννήθη, instead of οἱ ..... ἐγεννήθησαν.

The proof for the early existence of the fourth Gospel derived from the recently discovered Philosophumena, falsely ascribed to Origen, is by no means convenient to Strauss, who tries hard, but ineffectually, to nullify it. It is immaterial whether the author of the Philosophumena was Cajus of Rome, who flourished at the end of the second century, or Hippolitus, who flourished at the beginning of the third century, for they contain information drawn from Gnostic writings with indubitable quotations from John's Gospel, taking us back to A.D. 125, and showing that those early Gnostic authors were in the habit of quoting this Gospel. These extracts in the Philosophumena (ed. Em. Miller. Oxon. 1851) furnish distinct references to our fourth Gospel. Those from an Ophitic writing cite John iii. 6; i. 3; vi. 45; iv. 10, and v. 37 (Philos. V. 7, pp. 106, 107, 112; c. 9. p. 121; c. 8. p. 109); those from the περάται, another Gnostic sect of that age, cite John iii. 17; i. 1–4; viii. 44, and x. 7 (l. c. V. 12, p. 125; c. 16, p. 134; c. 17, pp. 136, 137); in the account of the Docetae we have a quotation of John iii. 5, 6 (l. c. VIII. c. 10, p. 267); we further learn from L. VII. c. 38, p. 259 that Apelles, the Marcionite, used the Gospel of John, from L. VII. c. 35, p. 194 that Valentinus refers to John x. 8, and Basilides to John i. 9; ii. 4, and viii. 56 (l. c. L. VII. 22, p. 232; VII. 27, p. 242; VII. 27, p. 270). The strictures of Strauss exhibit great weakness and much sophistry; e.g. when he says that although the references in the Ophitic writing are unquestionably to John's Gospel, they do not amount to much, because the age of that writing is not given, it is manifest that this is a question of secondary importance, because the Philosophumena are known to have been written either at the end of the second or at the beginning of the third century, and the fact that this and the other Gnostic writings are referred to by name affords sufficient evidence that they were well known,

and that they were genuine productions; or when commenting upon the passage relating to Basilides (l. c. VII. 22, p. 282), "and this," says he, "is what is said in the Gospels: He was the true light that lighteth every man, coming into the world" (cf. John. i. 9), which shows that Basilides, writing about A.D. 125, knew and received the fourth canonical Gospel. Strauss says that the formula of quotations "says he," or "he says," is used rather vaguely in the Philosophumena, because it sometimes occurs in connections either where an individual had not been mentioned by name or where several persons had been introduced; we have a clear case of sophistry, because Basilides had been named. The same remark applies to his other strictures in which he endeavors to mystify clear and plain references by the introduction of irrelevant matter. All these labored efforts of mystification, of confusing what is plain, of mixing up irrelevant matter with the subject in hand, show the weakness of his position and the strength of the proof for the early existence of the Gospel of John from the Philosophumena.

The fact that Valentinus designated his æons by the terms λόγος, ἀρχή, μονογενής, ζωή, χάρις, κ. τ. λ. affords proof of his familiarity with the fourth Gospel, notwithstanding the assertion of Strauss, that Irenæus fails to specify passages from John on which the Valentinians based their theory; whereas he cites many such passages from the synoptical Gospels and the Pauline writings, and that the Johannean references appear only in a postscript from Ptolemæus; for the fact is that Irenæus (adv. Haer. III. 11. 7) describes the Valentinians (qui a Valentio sunt) as "eo, quod est secundum Johannem, plenissime utentes," and furnishes (l. c. I. 8, 5) a full account of the Valentinian exposition of the prologue to John's Gospel. The fact that Heracleon, the disciple of Valentine, wrote a commentary on John's Gospel early in the second century, important fragments of which are preserved in that of Origen on the same Gospel, is the strongest kind of testimony for the high authority which that Gospel enjoyed at that early period; a testimony which cannot

be affected by the attempts of the infidel school to assign to it the latest possible date, in order to make to appear that the Valentinian system was not indebted to John's Gospel, but had an independent origin.

It is an undoubted fact that the Montanists drew largely on the Gospel of John for their peculiar views of the Paraclete; and although Strauss positively asserts that it cannot be shown that they made use of that Gospel, we have the testimony of Irenaeus to the contrary, that certain antagonists of Montanism rejected the Gospel of John as spurious because it favored the Montanistic doctrine; if the antagonists of Montanism rejected this Gospel on that ground, it is surely logical to infer that the Montanists used it, and as Irenaeus flourished some twenty years before the end of the second century, his testimony must be regarded as decisive on this point; his words are: "Ut donum spiritus frustrentur, quod in novissimis temporibus secundum placitum Patris effusum est in humanum genus, illam speciem non admittunt, quae est secundum Joannis evangelium, in qua Paracletum se missurum Dominus promisit." This fact is of the utmost importance for the early existence and genuineness of the Gospel of John, seeing that it virtually involves the testimony of the whole church of the second century, for if the church had doubted the genuineness of that Gospel, the assertion of such doubts would have been the most complete and effectual reply to the views of Montanus. These facts are sufficient, we think, to upset the fine-spun theory that the Gospel of John was the product of the gnostico-montanistic movement (Strauss, l. c. p. 69).

As the existence and acknowledgment of the fourth canonical Gospel at the time of the later Gnostics and Montanists are placed beyond all doubt, Strauss feels constrained to admit it; but concentrates all his powers on the demolition of the testimony of Irenaeus and other witnesses, in order to pave the way for his rejection of the Gospel as the work of the apostle John.

He admits that the recently discovered conclusion of the

Clementine Homilies contains undeniable references to John ix. ; x. 3 ; that the fragments of Apolinaris, bishop of Hierapolis (A.D. 170), have unquestionable allusions to 1 John v. 6 seq. and John xix. 34, or both ; that Tatian and Athenagoras make unmistakable reference to our Gospel, and that Theophilus of Antioch (about A.D. 169) cites it formally thus: *ὅθεν διδάσκουσιν ἡμᾶς αἱ ἁγίαι γραφαὶ καὶ πάντες οἱ πνευματοφόροι, ἐξ ὧν Ἰωάννης λέγει· ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν κ. τ. λ.* (ad Autolyc. II. 22), but seeks to nullify his testimony by finding fault with him for not telling us how he knew that the Gospel whose opening words he cites was composed by John. The value of this objection may be determined by the consideration that this selfsame Theophilus wrote a commentary on the four Gospels, which was read by Jerome (ep. 53, vir. ill. 25), and that the positive statement of so well-informed a man will be received as important testimony by all critics who do not ask for impossible information. After this slur on the testimony of Theophilus, Strauss proceeds to tear to pieces that of Irenaeus, which, to judge from the amount of labor bestowed upon it by him and kindred spirits, is a veritable bugbear to them. It is indeed very direct, clear, and weighty, as the reader may judge for himself: *Ἰωάννης, ὁ μαθητὴς τοῦ κυρίου, ὁ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ στῆθος αὐτοῦ ἀναπεσὼν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐξέδωκε τὸ εὐαγγέλιον κ. τ. λ.* (adv. Haer. III. 1, 1). This testimony Strauss rejects on the following grounds :

1. Because Irenaeus does not tell us *how he knew* that John was the author of the Gospel, and because, while he justifies his exposition of a passage in the Apocalypse (xiii. 18) by an express reference to " the testimony of those who had seen John face to face " (adv. Haer. III. 3), he does not say that he had the notice in the above extract from Polycarp.

2. Because even if he did authenticate his statement by reference to those who knew John, such reference would be inadequate, for he cites the authority of the selfsame witnesses for matters which nobody believes.

We reply, 1. That Irenaeus in a letter addressed to Florinus, his friend, and former fellow-disciple of Polycarp, states

that he remembers distinctly "the very place where the blessed Polycarp was accustomed to sit and discourse; his coming in and going out, his manner of life, the form of his body, his addresses to the people, how he dwelt upon his familiar intercourse with John and others that had seen the Lord, how he used to relate their discourses, and what things he had heard from them concerning the Lord, of his miracles and doctrine, all of which Polycarp used to declare, agreeably to holy writ, as he had received it from those who had been eye-witnesses of the Word of Life. These things I then heard attentively, according to the mercy of God vouchsafed to me, noting them down, not on paper, but in my heart, and these same facts I am always in the habit, by the grace of God, to call faithfully to mind" (Euseb. Hist. Eccl. V. 20). The information contained in this extract specifies explicitly the source of Irenaeus's knowledge; Strauss finds it convenient to suppress the salient point of this passage, although he cites from the same epistle to Florinus a phrase which occurs only two or three lines before it, and actually introduces it. Irenaeus says that he saw his friend when he was quite young (*παῖς ὢν ἔτι*, Euseb. Hist. Eccl. V. 20, 5; *ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμῶν ἡλικίᾳ*, adv. Haer. 3, 4, and Euseb. Hist. Eccl. IV. 14, 3), and Strauss argues that the recollections of so young a person could have been of no weight in determining the question of the genuineness of the fourth Gospel, even if he did see it, because the circumstance of his not remembering in old age any notice of Polycarp respecting that Gospel would hardly have deterred him from pronouncing it of apostolical origin when he saw it, if it suited him in other respects. This singular chain of reasoning is contradicted, (*a*) by the statements of Irenaeus himself that John wrote the fourth Gospel, and that he *did* remember the oral testimony of Polycarp with minute accuracy of details, attaching so great a value to it as to be always in the habit of faithfully calling it to mind; (*b*) by the circumstance that *παῖς* does not necessarily denote a young boy, but here plainly designates a young man in the first

flush of early manhood; (c) by the general character for fidelity which history has handed down to us concerning Irenaeus, of which Eusebius has preserved a remarkable illustration in a postscript to his treatise on the Ogdoad, to wit: "I adjure thee, whoever thou art that transcribest this book, by our Lord Jesus Christ, and by his glorious appearance when he shall come to judge the quick and the dead, to compare what thou hast copied, and to correct it by this original manuscript, from which thou hast carefully transcribed. And that thou also copy this adjuration, and insert it in the copy" (Euseb. Hist. Eccl. V. 20). Is it probable, we ask, that so cautious and faithful an author would exhibit the easy and accommodating spirit which Strauss insinuates him to have possessed? Thus much for his first objection.

We reply, 2. The Rabbinical description of the kingdom of God which Irenaeus gives on the authority of the ancients who had heard John (adv. Haer. V. 33, 3), and which Strauss adduces in justification of his sweeping judgment, was delivered by Irenaeus as an oral tradition, doubtless because it favored his chiliastic opinions; and if, misled by those opinions, he gave currency to that tradition, he simply shares the fate of all men — he erred, and *errare humanum est;* and the fact that this tradition is neither found in John's Gospel now, nor reported to have ever been found in it, is really an argument in favor of the integrity of that Gospel, and does not affect his statement that John was its author, nor does it affect his testimony that the preaching of Polycarp was in agreement with holy writ, for in the latter case he had the evidence of his own senses, while in the former he simply reports a floating tradition, without specifying that *he* had it from Polycarp, or that it formed part of John's Gospel. The circumstance that an author has here and there erroneous statements cannot affect those parts of his writings whose truthfulness can be established by the clearest evidence. If occasional errors or mistakes in a writing are to be deemed sufficient grounds for its rejection, there is perhaps not a single work extant that would not be wiped out of existence.

The circumstance that the Alogi seem to have denied the apostolicity of the fourth canonical Gospel was mainly, if not wholly, the result of their peculiar tenets, which were utterly incompatible with the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ, so emphatically taught in the Gospel of John. Strauss thinks, however, that they had other reasons besides those arising from dogmatical prejudices for the rejection of that Gospel. These reasons, which he considers cogent, relate to alleged discrepancies between the Gospel of John and the synoptical Gospels. They noticed the omission of the narrative of the childhood of Jesus in the Johannean Gospel, which after stating that the Word had become flesh and dwelt among us, and noticing the testimony of John the Baptist and the gathering of the first disciples, passes at once to the account of the marriage at Cana; that in the Johannean account of the baptism of Jesus connected with his journey to Galilee no room is left for the forty days of the temptation inserted by the synoptists, and lastly, that while John makes our Lord keep two passovers, the synoptics mention only one passover. The first point is sufficiently answered by the scope and complementary character of John's Gospel, the second, by the fact that a careful comparison of the Johannean and synoptic Gospels shows that while John omits the history of the temptation he also omits the detailed account of our Lord's baptism furnished by the synoptists, so that the complementary character of the fourth Gospel applies also here, and that the order of the Johannean account, so far from contradicting that of the synoptists, corroborates it, for it represents Jesus coming to the Baptist (on his return from the wilderness) at chap. i. 29, and the Baptist bearing record to the miraculous phenomena which accompanied the baptism of Jesus; the Baptist refers to them in the past; the baptism of Jesus must therefore have taken place before he bare witness of him, and as we learn from the synoptists, that immediately after being baptized Jesus was led by the Spirit into the wilderness, and from John that before setting out for Galilee he was with the Baptist, while the synoptists make

him return to Galilee at the end of the temptation (Luke iv. 14), the narrative of the latter might appropriately be inserted before John i. 29. In John we have simply an incidental reference to the baptism of Jesus in a conversation of the Baptist with his disciples, while the synoptical Gospels give us a distinct history of it; Strauss finds it convenient to represent that incidental reference in the testimony of John as a history of the baptism of Jesus, and thus to manufacture a discrepancy.

Concerning the last of the above objections of the Alogi, and of course adopted by Strauss with emendations and variations, we will speak presently, and dismiss their objections with the remark, that the alleged discrepancies, every one of which can be explained and accounted for by the complementary character and general design of the fourth Gospel, are really proofs of the genuineness of our Gospel, because a forger would have studiously avoided all such discrepancies for fear of exciting suspicion.

Strauss, however, considers the Alogi to have greatly erred in rejecting on dogmatical grounds not only the Gospel but also the Apocalypse of John, because he considers it an established fact that the two works are so radically different in point of animus and form, that if the apostle John is the author of the Gospel, he cannot be the author of the Apocalypse, or if he is the author of the latter, he cannot be the author of the former. This lever, which the Alogi failed to use, Strauss is not slow to apply; his object being to justify his rejection of the Gospel, he reiterates the argument of the Tübingen school based on the alleged irreconcilable differences betwen the Gospel and the Apocalypse, however, without committing himself to the adoption of their conclusion, that John being the author of the Apocalypse cannot be the author of the Gospel, and puts the case hypothetically, that if John be the author of either work, it is more probable that he is the author of the Apocalypse than of the Gospel. There is nothing new in his statements, which are vague enough, and hardly deserve any notice at our hands. He

thinks the religious point of view of the two works irreconcilable, and affirms that the author of the Apocalypse exhibits the narrowest Jewish exclusiveness, while the author of the Gospel manifests the broadest liberality. No contrast could be more perfect, he says, than that while the author of the Apocalypse sees in Jerusalem the centre of the millennial reign of Christ, the author of the Gospel declares the difference between Jerusalem and Gerizim annulled in respect to God being worshipped in spirit and in truth, that while the former represents Paganism as the antichristian principle, the latter regards Judaism as the proper kingdom of unbelief.

The arbitrariness of this supposed contrariety may be illustrated by a single reference. Take, e.g. the prophecy of the new Jerusalem (Rev. xxi.), which has no temple, for the Lord God Almighty and the Lamb are the temple of it (vs. 22). Is this Jewish exclusiveness? Is this representation of the heavenly city not diametrically opposed to the Jewish idea of the temple being the centralization and highest type of the worship of God; and does it not illustrate in the sublimest manner the words of Jesus to the Samaritan woman, that they that worship God must worship in spirit and in truth (John iv. 24)? Again the solemn invitation (Rev. xxii. 17), "And the Spirit and the bride say Come; and let him that heareth say Come; and let him that is athirst come: and whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely," cannot be interpreted as an expression of Jewish exclusiveness, but has its perfect counterpart in the words of Jesus to the Samaritan woman (John iv. 10, 14), and especially in his exclamation at the feast of tabernacles: "If any man thirst, let him come unto me and drink" (John vii. 37).

Equally just and true is the alleged diversity of temperament and tone which Strauss sees in the Apocalypse and the Gospel. He says that the epithet "apostle of love," which has been given to John, is derived from the character of the Gospel and the first Epistle, for the character of the Apocalypse would rather award to him the epithet "apostle of wrath and vengeance." He admits, indeed, that the Gospel

also exhibits a spirit which sternly insists upon the exclusion of all ungodly elements, but maintains that, while the evangelist dwells chiefly on the redeeming, gathering, and uniting activity of Christ, the author of the Apocalypse takes peculiar delight in the delineation of the divine judgments on an ungodly world.

But it is apparent that John as evangelist reports what Christ said, whereas in the Apocalypse his sole duty is to do what he is bidden, and faithfully to communicate what had been revealed to him. In the Gospel he is the biographer; in the Apocalypse, the prophet. The spirit of the Apocalypse is the spirit of prophecy, and the author of that book records with fidelity the divinely ordered course of events. And those who find fault with the severity of the divine judgments in the Apocalypse, will and do equally censure that severity in other portions of the sacred scriptures. The individuality of John, from the nature of the case, is more strongly marked in the Gospel, written ἐν τῷ νοΐ, than in the Apocalypse, written ἐν τῷ πνεύματι; and we will show that the points of agreement in the two works are infinitely greater than the differences.

The contrast, finally, which Strauss observes in the language of the Gospel and the Apocalypse, and on which he seems to lay peculiar emphasis, can be easily accounted for by the circumstances of the case as well as by analogy. He admits that the Apocalypse was written sometime between June A.D. 68 and January A.D 69: the Gospel was most probably written between A.D. 90 and 100. We have, therefore, an interval of from twenty to thirty years between the date of the Apocalypse and that of the Gospel; and that interval is surely sufficient to explain the greater readiness and freedom of language characteristic of the latter as compared with the less flexible Greek of the former, for John's protracted residence and labors among Hellenists must have rendered him familiar with their language (Greek), while the peculiar speculative tendencies of Asia Minor which he combated and made tributary to the Gospel, abundantly

account for the philosophical terminology of his Gospel as contrasted with the Hebraistic terminology of the Apocalypse. The former, moreover, was written *ἐν τῷ νοΐ* (1 Cor. xiv. 14), the latter *ἐν τῷ πνεύματι* (Rev. i. 10); that is, the language of the Gospel conformed to the language of the world and to the habits of thought current among Hellenists, while the language of the Apocalypse conformed to the language of the inspired record of the Old Testament, to the cherished associations of the Jewish Christians, their theocratic origin, and the habits of thought current among Hebrews. Lastly, a similar difference in language, style, and even range of thought, in works of one and the same author, produced at different periods of his life, is by no means uncommon, and holds especially good of the very best authors.

We said above that the individuality of John is more strongly marked in the Gospel than in the Apocalypse. This is emphatically denied by Strauss, who strives hard to make him a violent, vindictive, bigoted zealot, and to show that some of the notices in the synoptical Gospels relating to the temperament of John have their counterpart in the Apocalypse; thus he sees in the vials of the wrath of God and the lake of fire of the latter the same spirit which animated the sons of Zebedee to ask the Lord whether they should command fire to come down from heaven to destroy a village of the Samaritans that refused to receive Jesus. On such accommodating principles of exegesis and such one-sided views there is no telling what may not be accomplished; we are therefore by no means surprised to hear Strauss assert that there was a bitter jealousy between Paul and John; that the former says *ironically* of the latter that he seemed to be one of the pillars of the church (Gal. ii. 9), while the latter (whom for convenience sake he now supposes to be the author of the Apocalypse, although he plainly disbelieves that also) is made to return the compliment by designating Paul and his followers as Nicolaitans and Balaamites, on the supposition that Paul is intended to be hit in the words "which say they are apostles, and are not" (Rev. ii. 2). With such an

exegesis it is not difficult to supply any portraiture; but we need hardly enter upon a detailed examination of the data on which Strauss bases his portraiture of John, and may content ourselves with saying that in the Gospel and the Epistles of John we see his individuality come out in almost feminine receptivity (e.g. in his tender relation to the Saviour, who singled him out as the guardian and protector of Mary), blended with a masculine firmness and decision well comporting with the synoptical notices and the spirit of the Apocalypse. He was a whole-souled man who knew no middle course; he was wholly for or against a thing; his character may be described by the French phrase "*il est entier*," as Ebrard puts it in an interesting article on John, in Herzog's Real-Encycl. VI. p. 723; or be forcibly illustrated by the ancient hymn:

"Volat avis sine meta,
Quo nec vates nec propheta,
Evolavit altius.
Tam implenda, quam impleta,
Nunquam vidit tot secreta
Purus homo purius." —

lines which Olshausen appropriately selected as the motto of his commentary on John.

Before we pass on, the resemblances of the Gospel, the Epistles, and the Apocalypse may be briefly referred to in justification of the ground we have taken in animadverting upon the objections of Strauss. The three works exhibit:

1. Identity of doctrine, e.g. Christ is represented as the eternal Son, one with the Father, the Only Begotten; as Light, Truth, and Life; as the Spiritual Food of men (Rev. ii. 17); as the Logos, the Sole Revealer of the divine counsel (Rev. v. 5); as the Lamb of God, the future Judge of the world. They teach his atoning sacrifice; the work of the Holy Spirit; the ceaseless enmity of Satan, whose appearance in serpent form is recognized in all three (cf. Gen. iii. 1, etc., with John viii. 44; 1 John iii. 8; Rev. xii. 9).

2. Identity of temperament, as disclosing the profound,

ardent, all-absorbing, and pure love of John (cf. Rev. vii., xxi., xxii.).

3. Identity of language, statement, and diction. Compare, e.g. the terms *μαρτυρία* and *μαρτυρεῖν* in Rev. i. 2, 9; vi. 9; xi. 7; xii. 11, 17; xix. 10; xx. 4, with John xix. 35 and 1 John i. 1, etc. *ὕδωρ ζωῆς*, Rev. xxi. 6; xxii. 17, and John vii. 38. *λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ*, Rev. xix. 13, and John i. 1; 1 John i. 1. The most remarkable agreement in point of language and subject-matter is the result of comparing John xix. 37 with Rev. i. 7. In quoting Zech. xii. 10 the evangelist has a striking deviation from the LXX.; and the author of the Apocalypse, citing the same passage, has the same deviation from the LXX., and a perfect agreement with the evangelist. These are only a few illustrations; many others may be found in Guerike, Einleitung, pp. 550, 551, and the works cited by him. This identity is the more valuable because it is purely incidental and undesigned, because the scope and form of the several works are as different as they can well be, and because there are obviously many differences of thought and language, which in their turn furnish a new argument for the authenticity of the respective writings.

We come now to the last objection of Strauss, founded on the alleged discrepancy in the account of Polycarp, the disciple of John, as to the proper time for the observance of the Passover and the notice in the Gospel. The Christians of Asia Minor were wont to celebrate the Lord's supper (the Christian paschal feast) on the fourteenth day of the month of Nisan, because they held that our Lord ate the paschal supper on the evening with which that day commenced. On the other hand, the bishop of Rome maintained that this day was not binding on Christians; that as it might fall on any day of the week, the eucharist ought not to be celebrated on that day, but on the following Sunday, as the day of the resurrection. This controversy came up for the first time in the year 1621, when Polycarp, bishop of Smyrna, visited Anicetus, bishop of Rome. The former appealed to the circumstance that he had always observed it on that day with

John, the disciple of our Lord, and the rest of the apostles with whom he associated (Euseb. Hist. Eccl. V. 24, 16). Strauss maintains that this declaration of Polycarp is in manifest conflict with the fourth Gospel, according to which Jesus did not partake of the paschal supper at all, but instituted the holy supper on the evening of the preceding day, that is, on the thirteenth day of the month of Nisan. In reply we have the authority of Maimonides and Appolinarius of Laodicea (Greswell, Diss. XLI. Vol. III. p. 170 seq.), that the proper beginning of any feast-day was reckoned from the night which preceded it. The fourteenth of Nisan, though not strictly considered a portion of the festival (cf. Joseph. Antiq. III. 10, 5) was popularly regarded as such, and from the putting away of leaven, which took place as soon as it commenced, and the cessation from servile labor (cf. Mishna, "Pasach," IV. 5) was usually spoken of as the "first day of unleavened bread (Matt. xxvi. 17; Mark xiv. 12. See Joseph., Antiq. II. 15, 1, who speaks of the festival as lasting *eight* days, and cf. Lightfoot in Marc. XIV. 12; Friedlieb. Archaeol. § 17, p. 42; Ellicott, Life of Christ, p. 291). On that evening, that is, the beginning, and not the end, of the fourteenth of Nisan, our Lord sat down to supper, and that supper (John xiii. 1) cannot be regarded as different from that referred to by the synoptists, whose language precludes the possibility of its being another than a paschal supper. The alleged discrepancy falls therefore to the ground. Our limits forbid the discussion of this difficult subject, but we refer the reader to the valuable notes in Elicott (l.c. pp. 291–293) and the able article "Pascha," in Herzog's Real-Encyclopaedie.

The irrepressible Strauss, having spent almost all his ammunition, reserves for a parting salute sundry objections; e.g. that the evangelist refers twice to "the high priest of that year" (John xi. 49–51; xviii. 13), which statement could not mean anything else than that the incumbents of the high priest's office changed every year, whereas a Palestinian apostle ought to have known better, and recollected, in particular, that Caiaphas remained a number of years in

office. The inference of Strauss is by no means conclusive, for the words "of that year," τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἐκείνου, are emphatic, and equivalent to "of that memorable year, the year of the Redeemer's death," so that the specification of the person who filled that office was important; the evangelist simply referred to the prophetical character of the high priest, without the design of indicating the duration of his office. The disparaging remark of Strauss that the evangelist's obvious familiarity with the Old Testament does not necessarily imply his being a native of Palestine, or even a Jewish Christian, because the originally Jewish basis of the Christian churches and the important bearing of the Old Testament on the new faith might induce and enable Gentiles, e.g. men like Justin Martyr, to acquire such familiarity, amounts to nothing, for it is purely arbitrary, and a poor way of dealing with an important fact, which stubbornly resists the blows of the German destroyer. Equally insignificant and arbitrary is the remark that the apostle, of humble origin and originally a Galilean fisherman, could not have acquired in old age such an intimate acquaintance with Alexandrian and Philonic speculation as the author of the fourth Gospel manifestly possesses. From what we know of the receptivity of John's character, of his long residence in Asia Minor in the midst of theosophizing Jews and Jewish Christians, of Gentiles and Gentile Christians, of the complementary character of the fourth Gospel, of the deep and passionate love of the Redeemer, which glows in it, we should indeed be surprised at any other result than that which we possess in it, and, putting together all the varied objections, strictures, and criticisms, are at a loss to form even the remotest conception of the character of a Gospel which Strauss would require John to have furnished. We are satisfied that he himself does not know; for his vocation seems to be to destroy and not to build up. He revels in delight at the thought of having destroyed the foundations of our belief, and is utterly indifferent about everything else. He bids us fling aside the Gospels as ecclesiastical fabrications, and gives

us the consolations of his own creed — *credo nihil* — a nothing, a dream, a universal blank.[1]

He now reaches the conclusion, — how logical the reader will be prepared to determine, — that, while the examination of external testimony yields the result that the first three Gospels show traces of their existence, although not in their present form, soon after the beginning of the second century, sufficiently plain to indicate that the rudiments of their subject-matter emanated from the country where the events recorded did take place, the fourth Gospel did not become known until the middle of that century, with plain marks that it did originate on foreign soil, under the influence of a philosophy unknown to the first followers of Jesus; so that, if in the former case, it is possible that in the interval of several generations lying between the events and their record in its present form, mythical and unhistoric elements did creep in, in the latter case the admixture of philosophical

[1] Let the reader judge from the following extract whether our opinion of Strauss and men of his stamp is not well founded. Lützelberger (Die Kirchliche Tradition über den Apostel Johannes und seine Schriften in ihrer Grundlosigkeit nachgewiesen. Leipzig. 1840) says that his investigations have convinced him that it is a fixed and indisputable fact "that all our Gospels are merely the productions of the later theology in the Christian church, which represented the life of the Lord, as faith, the times, and circumstances brought it about"; that, indeed, "the whole so-called history of the kingdom of God is the product of theological imagination, and the events the result of the doctrines"; and that also "the main point" of Christianity is nothing but "a dream"; "*I mean the doctrine of Christ.*" Or hear the confessions of a former disciple of the Tübingen school (H. Merz, die Jahrbücher der Gegenwart, p. 16. Stuttgart, 1845): "I wanted with the one hand to seize Christ, reluctant to abandon Hegel with the other. But whence was to come a vitally strong historical portrait of the Saviour, after it had been for four years critically dissolved for us? Matthew, Mark, Luke: mythical poetry! John: didactic poetry! The Acts: a diplomatic record of Jewish and Gentile Christianity; the last two chapters spurious! Ephesians: spurious! Philippians: spurious! Colossians: spurious! Thessalonians: the second, at least, spurious! Timothy, Titus, and Philemon: all spurious! The Epistles of John: spurious, if the Apocalypse is genuine! The first and second Peter: spurious! Hebrews: spurious! Jude: spurious! Revelation of John: genuine — genuine Jewish; genuine Ebionite; genuine unevangelical! This was our biblical theological school-satchel which we carried away from Tübingen; this was the food for heart and spirit which we received in the hospitable house of speculative criticism."

construction and conscious fiction becomes highly probable (Leben Jesu, p. 79).

The conclusion we reach after an examination of the external evidences for the authenticity and genuineness of the canonical Gospels is, of course, diametrically opposed to that of Strauss, and will be given in a synoptical form after one or two opinions on the fourth Gospel, which fully corroborate the position we occupy. They relate rather to internal than external evidence; but as Strauss, as we have seen, constantly trenches upon the former, we need hardly apologize for their production. "Were we wholly ignorant concerning the author of the fourth Gospel and without a single external testimony, the whole impression it produces upon us, — the deep, ardent love to the Redeemer, carried by a holy enthusiasm and disclosed in every word; the fulness of the Holy Spirit which that Gospel exhibits; the fidelity which conforms even the minutest traits to the whole portrait of Christ, — all would constrain us to conclude that this Gospel could only have been written by an eye-witness of the glory of the only begotten Son, by a disciple familiar with and near to the events of his life, by the disciple, in short, who did lean on the bosom of the Lord" (Krabbe, Vorlesungen über das Leben Jesu). And once more: "Had we remained without any historical notices concerning the author of the fourth Gospel, internal grounds, such as the nature of its language; the freshness and vivacity of its narrative; the accuracy and precision of its statements; the peculiar manner in which John the Baptist and the sons of Zebedee are referred to; the enthusiastic love and whole-souled attachment which the author evinces for Jesus; the irresistible charm which is shed over the whole, ideally-conceived, evangelical history; the philosophical contemplations at the beginning of the Gospel — would yield the result that the author of such a Gospel could only have been a native of Palestine, an immediate eye-witness, an apostle, a favorite of Jesus; only that John whom Jesus held bound to himself by the whole heavenly charm of his doctrine; that John who did

lean on the bosom of Jesus, stood by the cross of Jesus, and whose later abode in a city like Ephesus proves that philosophical speculation not only attracted him, but that he also understood how to keep his ground among philosophically educated Greeks"[1] (Credner, Einl. p. 208). The author of the last extract is far from what we should call orthodox; he is, in fact, noted for arbitrariness and scepticism; but on that account his opinion is all the more valuable.

We now proceed to a synoptical review of the external evidence in favor of the genuineness and authenticity of the four canonical Gospels; adopting the order pursued by Tischendorf in his able and timely phamphlet (Wann wurden unsere Evangelien verfasst? Leipzig. 1865). With him, then, we start with the indisputable fact that our four Gospels were known and received in every part of the church during the last decades of the second century; according to the concurrent testimony of Irenaeus at Lyons (last decades of second century), Tertullian at Carthage (last decade of second century), Clement of Alexandria about the end of that century, and the probably Roman author of the so-called Muratorian Canon, about 170.[1] To the same period the Syriac version known as the Peschito takes us, although the date of its origin cannot be verified by positive proof; the Itala, however, the oldest Latin version may be proved to belong to even an earlier date; for the translator of Irenaeus (about the close of the second century) and Tertullian (in the last decade of that century) follow one and the same text, so that it must have had considerable authority at that time and consequently have been several decades old (l. c. p. 7).

We learn that Theophilus, bishop of Antioch in Syria, and Tatian (who flourished about 170) wrote harmonies on the Gospels. Jerome designates the work of the former as a joining together of the sayings of the four evangelists into one work, and seems to refer also to a commentary, which, however, was either identical with, or part of one and the

[1] This date is derived from the author's reference to the episcopate of Pius (about 142–157) in the words temporibus nostris and nuperrime.

same work.[1] One of his works, still extant, "Ad Autolycum" contains citations from Matthew, Luke, and John. For the notices of Tatian's work we are chiefly indebted to Eusebius[2] and Theodoret,[3] the latter of whom was personally acquainted with it. Tatian, like Theophilus, seems to have made a harmony of the Gospels, which he called by the significant name Diatessaron, "the gospel formed of four"; although his heretical notions may have led him to take unwarranted liberties with the text in that work (see Eusebius, as cited below), his apology (λόγος πρὸς Ἕλληνας), which has come down to us, has unmistakable references to the Gospel of John. The two lost works, however, are more important by far than simple quotations, for both having the design of producing the evangelical history in the form of a harmonious whole, the inference is inevitable, that the works themselves fall into a period when the four Gospels were already considered to constitute a finished whole, and that if the date of both works connot be put much later than the middle of the second century, the use and reception of all four Gospels had been decided long before (Tischdf. p. 11).

Without laying stress on the citations from the synoptists in the work of Athenagoras of Athens (A.D. 177) and the language of his contemporary, Dionysius of Corinth (A.D. 170), who designates the writings of the New Testament as "the sacred writings of the Lord" (Euseb. Hist. Eccl. IV. 23), or the evangelical references of two apostolical Fathers, Polycarp and Ignatius, the unquestionable reference in Polycarp's Epistle (ad Phil. c. 7) to 1 John iv. 3 is of great importance, because it is an indirect testimony as early as the second decade of the second century (the Epistle having been written soon after the death of Ignatius, A.D. 115) for the existence of the fourth Gospel, as the Gospel and the Epistle must have the same author.

[1] Jerome, Ep. 151, ad Algas, 9. 5. Theophilus ..... qui quatuor evangelistarum in unum opus dicta compingens ingenii sui nobis monimenta reliquit, haec super hac parabola in suis commentariis locutus est.

[2] Hist. Eccl. IV. 29.

[3] Theodor. Haeret fab., I. 20.

The testimony of Justin Martyr, however, is most valuable. His second apology (A.D. 161) has comparatively few references to the evangelical writings, but the first (A.D. 138) and his dialogue, lying about midway between the apologies, abound in citations from and allusions and references to the synoptists and also to John, which, as well as the general term by which he is wont to designate the Gospels (*ἀπομνημονεύματα*), render it highly probable that their canonical authority was fully established in his time.

Passing on to heretical testimony, we have the significant statement of Irenaeus (in the second half of the second century) that "the Gospels are so firmly established that even the heretics are witnesses for them and that every one starts from them in order to establish his doctrine" (adv. Haer. III. 11, 7 "Tanta est autem circa evangelia haec firmitas, ut et ipsi haeretici testimonium reddant eis, et ex ipsis egrediens unusquisque eorum conetur suam confirmare doctrinam"). We know from Irenaeus that the Valentinians freely used John's Gospel (adv. Haer. III. 11, 7), and that they derived the doctrine of their first Ogdoad from the first chapter of this Gospel (adv. Haer. I. 8, 5); and Hippolytus gives us Johannean sayings of the Lord as used by Valentinus (VI. 35, "He [Valentinus] says, the Saviour says: 'All that ever came before me are thieves and robbers,'" John x. 8). But the Valentinian system affords equal evidence for the synoptical Gospels; e.g. Valentinus saw his demiurgus[1] in the centurion of Capernaum (Matt. viii. 9; Luke vii. 8), made the dead and resuscitated daughter of Jairus (Luke viii. 41) the symbol of his Achamoth,[2] applied the words of Jesus (Matt. v. 18) to his ten aeons as represented by the numerical value of the Iota,[3] and turned the case of the woman diseased with an issue of blood twelve years, and healed by our Lord, into a figurative representation of the sufferings and deliverance of the twelfth aeon.[4] Surely this marvellously fantastic transformation of the simple words of the Gospel affords a

[1] Iren. adv. Haer., I. 7, 4.
[2] Iren. adv. Haer., I. 8. 2.
[3] Iren. adv. Haer., I. 3. 2.
[4] Iren. adv. Haer., I. 3. 3.

striking proof of their canonical authority as early as the first decades of the second century (Tischendorf, p. 22).

Ptolemaeus, in his Epistle to Flora, preserved by Epiphanius, has several citations from Matthew and one from John, and Heracleon actually wrote a commentary on the latter, a fact which proves not only the indubitable authority of that Gospel about the middle of the second century, but confirms also the statement of Irenaeus, that the Valentinian system was dependent on John's Gospel. (Epiphanius [Haer. 41] makes Cerdo, who, according to Irenaeus [III. 4, 3], was with Valentinus at Rome during the episcopate of Hyginus, the successor of Heracleon.)

Hippolytus shows as much for the first half of the second century, since the Naassenes and the Peratai, two of the most ancient Ophite sects, were wont to incorporate passages from the Gospels with their doctrines; he produces, in the case of the former, citations from Matt. vii. 13, 14, and from John i. 3, 4; iv. 21 seq.; iv. 10 (Philosophum., V. 6, 8, 9), and in that of the latter, John iii. 14; i. 1–4; iii. 17; viii. 44 (Philosophum., V. 12, 16, 17).

The dependence of the Montanists for the idea of their paraclete on John is highly probable, more especially since the Alogi, their opponents, rejected his Gospel, and ascribed it, as well as the Apocalypse, to Cerinthus, the heretical contemporary of John. This latter circumstance is certainly a very strong argument for the great antiquity of the Johannean Gospel.

Basilides, who lived in the reign of Hadrian, but whose commentary in twenty-four books on the Gospel can not be proved to have related exclusively to our Gospels, has verbal citations from John and Luke (Philosophum., VII. 22, 27, where John i. 9; ii. 4 are undeniably used, and Philosophum., VII. 26, where Luke iv. 35 is applied), and refers to Matthew's account of the star of the wise men (Philosophum., VII. 22).

Marcion, as we learn from Tertullian, originally acknowledged all our Gospels, and only afterwards presumed to change and amend them (Tertull. adv. Marc. IV. 3; de carne Christi, 2).

Celsus wrote his book against Christianity about the middle of the second century. We are indebted to Origen, who answered it, for many passages from his work which show that the substance of his assaults was chiefly drawn from our Gospels. He seems to refer to the four Gospels in his strictures on the presence of angels at the resurrection, saying that according to some two angels were present, according to others only one. Origen understood the first of Luke and John, the second of Matthew and Mark. He made a similar use of other accounts in the Gospels; e.g. he cites and criticises, after his manner, the narrative of the worshipping magi, whom he calls Chaldeans (I. 58), the flight of Jesus to Egypt (I. 66), the appearance of the dove at the baptism of Jesus (I. 40), his miraculous birth (I. 40), our Lord's charge to the disciples in Matt. x. 23 (I. 65), the agony in the garden (II. 24), the Saviour's thirst on the cross (II. 37), the words of Jesus, that it was easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, etc., in which he pretends to recognize a garbled Platonic saying (VI. 16), and many other passages. He refers to John by saying that Jesus had been asked by the Jews to work a miracle in the temple (I. 67), he finds fault with Jesus being called the Logos (II. 31), and mocks at the flowing of blood from the side of Jesus (II. 36), etc.

That Celsus did not quote from oral tradition, but from the evangelical writings we know from himself, for he says (Origen, 2, 74): "And all this we have taken from your own writings; we want no other testimony, for you fall on your own sword"; and plainly intimates that, although he had other sources of information, he discriminated between them and the writings of the disciples of Jesus, in the words (Origen, cont. Cels. 2, 13): "I might adduce many things that have been written of Jesus according to truth, but very different from the writings of the disciples of Jesus; but I will let this alone" (See Tischendorf, l. c. p. 28).

The preceding testimony of the early Fathers, heretics, and an acknowledged enemy of Christianity yields the result that the synoptical Gospels, as well as that of John, were used and recognized as authentic as far back as A.D. 125.

The argument for the still higher antiquity of the four Gospels drawn from the early existence of the apocryphal Protevangelium Jacobi (*Διήγησις καὶ ἱστορία, πῶς ἐγεννήθη ἡ ὑπεραγία Θεοτόκος εἰς ἡμῶν σωτηρίαν* is its complete title), the Acta Pilati (the first part of the so-called Evangelium Nicodemi), and the more heretical Evangelium Thomae has been developed with great skill by Tischendorf (l. c. pp. 29–41), with the general result that the first two of these apocryphal works must have been composed during the first decades of the second century, that they are substantially identical with the writings, known by those names, which are still extant, and that the evident reference of the former to the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, brings the date of their composition down to the last decades of the first century, while the equally manifest dependence of the latter on the Gospel of John lays the date of that Gospel in the last years of that century.

This result is reached by the following considerations: Justin Martyr, in his Dialogue with Tryphon, and in his first Apology (A.D. 138), furnishes several notices relating to the birth of Jesus which agree only with the Protevangelium Jacobi, and not with the Gospels of Matthew and Luke. The hypothesis that Justin may have drawn his information from another source, e.g. the lost gnostic work, *γέννα μαρίας*, and the Evangelium Petri, is purely arbitrary and untenable, while the whole tendency of the Protevangelium indicates the prior existence of the canonical Gospels; and if the date of the Protevangelium seems to fall in the first decades of the second century, the gospels of Matthew and Luke, to which its references are limited, cannot have been composed later than during the last decades of the first century.

The same Justin refers twice in his first Apology (A.D. 138) to the Acta Pilati, for the confirmation of the various incidents of the crucifixion and the predicted miraculous cures of Jesus (see Apol. I. 35 and 48). In the former passage Justin cites Isa. lxv. 2, lviii. 2, and Ps. xxi.16, 18, affirming the fulfilment of those prophecies, and concluding thus: "And that

this did happen, you may see from the acts written under Pontius Pilate"; in the latter he cites Isa. xxxv, 4-6, and concludes: "And that Jesus did this, you may see from the Acts written under Pontius Pilate." A similar, but still more explicit reference to the Acts of Pilate, may be seen in Tertullian's Apologeticus, 21. Tischendorf, who has diligently compared the ancient MSS., and given us the result of his collations and investigations in his text of the Evangelia Apocrypha, reaches the conclusion that our present Acta Pilati are in the main identical with the work used by Justin and Tertullian, and as the work itself is manifestly dependent in its account of the judicial proceedings on the Gospel of John, and in that of the crucifixion and resurrection on the synoptical Gospels, and as that work was cited by Justin as early as A.D. 138 in a manner showing that it was considered authoritative in his time, the date of its composition must belong to the beginning of the second century, and is of the utmost importance with respect to the date of the canonical Gospels, and especially of that of John, which must have been written before the beginning of that century (cf. Tischendorf, Evangelia Apocrypha, Prolegg. p. liv sqq.).

The Evangelium Thomae, in use among the Marcosians and Naassenes (as testified by Irenaeus, adv. Haer. I. 20, and Hippolytus, Philosophum., p. 101, coll. p. 94), originated about the middle of the second century. Although we know it only from fragments which have come down to us, and more or less deviate from one another, yet their contents constitute an important testimony for the genuineness and early antiquity of our Gospels, for they show plainly that the book was designed to fill up the gap in the early life of our Lord which exists in the four canonical Gospels, and that the evangelical canon of that age was such as to encourage historical invention in that direction.

Another testimony in favor of the canonical Gospels is the general character of the aforesaid apocryphal writings, which Tischendorf (l. c. p. 40) puts thus: "The great contrast of the latter to the former, in form and substance, in language

and thought, in conception and treatment, bears testimony for the holy origin of our canonical Gospels, compared with which the apocryphal writings appear like the last, limping followers (of an army)."

The recent discovery of the Codex Sinaiticus by Tischendorf furnishes additional and incidental testimony for the existence of the evangelical canon at the beginning of the second century. That famous and most ancient manuscript on parchment extant, contains the entire Greek text of the Epistle of Barnabas, the first five chapters of which were, until that discovery took place, only known from an old Latin Codex. In that Latin text, occurs the following passage at the end of chap. iv: "Adtendamus ergo ne forte, sicut scriptum est, multi vocati, pauci electi inveniamur." The words *sicut scriptum est* were regarded as the interpolation of a Latin translator, but the original Greek text in the Codex Sinaiticus has the passage from Matthew with the introductory words, "as it is written"; and this vindication of the Latin text of an Epistle which cannot have been composed later than the beginning of the second century, yields the important result that its author cited the first canonical Gospel as *scripture*, for this formula was used to distinguish holy writ from other writings (cf. Matt. iv. 1, etc., Luke iv. 1, etc.), and that consequently at that early date the Gospel of Matthew had canonical authority.

The absurd re-assertion of the long since discarded notion that the passage from Matthew, "multi vocati, pauci electi," in the Epistle of Barnabas is a citation from the fourth book of Ezra, viii. 3, which reads, according to the Latin and Ethiopic texts, "nam multi creati (Eth. adds *in eo* [*i.e. mundo*]), pauci autem salvabuntur," carries its refutation on the face, and requires the inventive faculty, or "faith," of a Strauss, to be seriously entertained.

Tischendorf (l. c. pp. 46–50) very justly maintains that this direct, canonical authentication of Matthew's Gospel really involves that of the other Gospels. The circumstance that during the first three quarters of the second century

the balance of testimony seems occasionally to favor Matthew or John or Luke, or two of them together, does not prove that at the same time the one was authenticated and the other not authenticated. The comparatively scanty monuments of the literature of that period which have come down to us, and the characteristics of the several Gospels which made Mark incomparably better adapted for purposes of citation than Matthew, conduce to the probability that they render mutual testimony each to the rest. This probability is increased by the early references to the Gospels as one harmonious whole, without any specification of the authors of the respective Gospels, as well by Justin Martyr's allusion to Tertullian's distinction of the evangelists, according to which some were the disciples of the Lord and others companions of the apostles. In this way only can we account for the existence of harmonies of the four Gospels soon after the middle of the second century, and understand the symbolical argumentation of Irenaeus, why there were just four Gospels, neither less nor more. The absence of all controversy on the evangelical canon in the second century, moreover, is a significant fact, taken in connection with its universal reception at the close of that century.

The question of the canonicity of our four Gospels must have been settled at the beginning of the second century. During the fearful struggles and commotions of the infant church, at the time of her rapid extension, the church canonized the Gospels and other apostolical monuments from the hands of Paul, John, and Peter, not, however, in a formal manner by resolutions or decrees, but in the simple order of nature. The notices of the life of Christ from the pen of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John would be eagerly received as authentic records, and regarded as precious legacies left to the church. Luke sent both his works to Theophilus, and his circulation of them surely would not excite doubts of their genuineness in the minds of those who received them from him. The same holds good of the Epistles of Paul, the first of John, and the first of Peter. If John composed his Gospel

in Asia Minor, would those churches to which he ministered and gave his Gospel, which were the immediate sureties of its genuineness to all the rest, entertain any doubts of its genuineness? There is no valid reason to question the correctness of the account of the origin of John's Gospel which Eusebius gives us on the authority of ancient notices (Hist. Eccl. III. 24); viz. that when John saw the first three Gospels, which had been distributed among all, he testified to their truth, but missed the history of the beginning of Christ's ministry; and being urged to supply the deficiency, acceded to the request of his friends.

"The four Gospels and the other monuments of the apostolical age must have been extant during the last decades of the first century. Their authority was immediately vouched for by the names of their authors, and the apostolical churches in their turn were sureties for them. With the death of the authors their writings became still more sacred and precious, and, after the emancipation of the church from the synagogue, were necessarily regarded worthy to complete and enlarge the canon of the Old Testament. Warranted as this supposition is *per se*, it could not be confidently asserted if it were not confirmed by multiform considerations belonging to the history of the canon of the second century" (Tischendorf, l. c. p. 50).

The testimony of Papias, which Tischendorf omitted in its proper historical place, and on account of its vagueness considers separately, with results similar to those given above, need not be repeated here; we enter, therefore, the domain of the textual criticism of the New Testament, where the opinion of no living author is entitled to greater respect than that of Tischendorf, to whose indefatigable labors we are indebted for a species of evidence for the genuineness of the New Testament canon which can hardly be said to be generally known to scholars, and still less to those who depend for their information on their public teachers. It is to be hoped that the evidence of textual criticism, so happy in the results it has already produced, may speedily occupy

a prominent position in the lectures of professors of Christian evidences in our colleges and seminaries. These results are as follows; there is no doubt that the earliest Latin version of the Gospels was made soon after the middle of the second century, for the Latin translator of Irenaeus (just before the close of that century) and Tertullian (during the last decade of that century) wrote in undeniable dependence on that text. That earliest version,[1] at least in its main features, is still extant;[2] "for our oldest documents for that text emanating from North Africa, the home of Tertullian, receive for many of their readings the confirmation of two ancient witnesses (Irenaeus and Tertullian), so that even those sections of the text which are not found in their writings, must be supposed to agree with, or at least come very near to, that oldest redaction. But the discovery of the Codex Sinaiticus carries us much further, for the Sinaitic text, which competent scholars on paleographical grounds pronounce to have been written in the middle of the third century, exhibits so striking an affinity with the oldest Latin version, that it must be considered to be in essential agreement with that text from which the first Latin translator, the originator of the so-called Itala, made his translation; and that this text was not of an isolated character is evident from the agreement with it of the recently discovered most ancient Syriac text of the Nitrian MS. of the beginning of the fifth century, of Origen, and others of the earliest Fathers. This Syriac text is analogous with the Itala in the twofold proof to be noticed forthwith, for the most

[1] It had to pass through many stages. Revised by different hands in the third and fourth centuries with reference to the Greek text, Jerome, towards the close of the fourth century, made it the basis of his text, with diligent comparison of the most authentic codices of the old Latin version and those Greek codices on which that ancient Latin version was based. This version of Jerome gradually became the Romish Vulgate, whose text had, again, experienced many modifications and corruptions, when it was finally set forth as the only authorized version of the church of Rome, by Clement VIII., A.D. 1592.

[2] Tischendorf's Evangelium Palatinum, Lipsiae, 1847, edited from a MSS. of the fourth or fifth century; also Codex Graeco-Latin. D.

recent investigations place it beyond all doubt that the Peschito version, commonly said to belong to the close of the second century, presupposes the existence of the Nitrian text, so that this latter must have originated about the middle of the second century" (Tischendorf, l. c. pp. 63, 64).

We have, therefore, the important fact that about the middle of the second century the four Gospels were translated into Syriac and Latin. These translations, however, prove more than the harmonistic works of Tatian and Theophilus on the Gospel (of about the same period), viz. that the Gospels of Matthew and Mark, as well as those of Luke and John, were at that time extant in the forms in which they are known to us now. The hypothesis that insulated citations of the earliest period seem to have been taken from the Evangelium Secundum Hebraeos, and not from Matthew, and that the third Gospel continued at that time in the supposed original form, to which the modern interpretation of the testimony of Papias has given rise, is completely set aside by the oldest Latin text of these Gospels, at least as far as the middle of the second century is concerned; nor is there left room for the supposition that the Latin text had then only been recently made by an unknown hand from earlier materials different in form, and that their disfigured recensions were unskilfully considered by the Latin church as the originals, for in this respect the Nitrian Syriac text supports the Itala, except that its Gospel of Mark has been lost with the exception of the last four verses. Cureton, who discovered and edited the Nitrian text, supposed that the Gospel of Matthew in that text "was built upon the original Aramaic text" (Preface to Syriac Gospels, p. iii); but his supposition is contradicted by the agreement of the Syriac text of Matthew with the most ancient Greek and Latin documents. But we have still a far more important result of textual criticism, which in the opinion of Tischendorf affords evidence that all our Gospels have to be brought down to the beginning of the second, if not to the end of the first, century.

"For while on the one hand the text of the Sinaitic MSS., as well as the oldest Itala text, belong to the use of the second century, it is on the other hand by no means difficult to prove that the same text — its superiority over other documents notwithstanding — has in many respects departed from original purity, and presupposes an entire text-history. Here we are not exclusively limited to the Codex Sinaiticus, this or that MS. of the Itala, with Irenaeus and Tertullian, but we may include all those text-vouchers which in part are necessarily, and in part most probably, to be traced back to the second century, and reach the result of the undeniable fact that a rich text-history lies already back of it. We mean to say that even before the second half of the second century, when repeated copies of our Gospels were made, not only many mistakes of transcribers took place, but that sometimes also the expression and sense of single passages were changed, and sometimes greater or smaller additions from apocryphal or oral sources were made, not excluding even those changes which testify in particular for the early collection of our Gospels into a canon and originated in the collocation of single parallel passages. If this is really the case, if an important stage of the text-history of our four Gospels lies really before the middle of the second century, before the time when canonical authority and the more firmly established ecclesiastical order cast up an ever-growing dam against arbitrary modifications of the sacred text (and we engage to furnish elsewhere full proofs on his head), we have to claim at least half a century for this history. Are we therefore not constrained to fix the beginning, for we dare not say the origin, of the evangelical canon at the end of the first century? and does not this result grow more certain from the fact that all the historical factors of the second century, which we have produced without holding anything back, have been formed to agree with it" (Tischendorf, l. c. pp. 66, 67)?

We have now fulfilled our promise, and given the result of our investigation of this most important, most interesting,

and very difficult subject. This result cannot be considered in any other light than that of a triumphant vindication of the genuineness, authenticity, and canonicity of the evangelical writings. We have followed Strauss step by step through his labyrinthine wanderings; we have given him a fair and patient hearing, and endeavored to meet his objections, strictures, sophistries, and perversions with calmness, to expose their fallacy and, we are sorry to say, not unfrequently their dishonesty, by an appeal to the very record which in his judgment is fatal to the genuineness of our Gospels. How far we have been successful the reader must determine from the *pros* and *cons* as they lie before him. We have also given a synopsis of the whole evidence in the order of Tischendorf, and carried, we hope, conviction to the minds of our readers that the boasted impregnable fortress of Strauss cannot hold out against the truth; that on the testimony of the early Fathers, on the testimony of heretics, on the testimony of Jewish and Pagan enemies of Christianity, and lastly on the testimony of textual criticism, the four canonical Gospels are the genuine products of the evangelists whose names they bear; and that the chain of evidence for their genuineness, consisting of so many and apparently incongruous links, is nothing short of wonderful, and affords a striking illustration of the manner in which God's never-failing providence overrules evil for good, and makes all things work together for good to them that love him.

ARTICLE II.

THE ANCESTRY AND EDUCATION OF THE ORATOR AESCHINES.

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THE opinions of modern times respecting Aeschines have been formed chiefly on the representations of his great rival and political enemy, Demosthenes. The biting sarcasm and contemptuous raillery in the Oration on the Crown has been accepted very generally, with slight abatement, as trustworthy history. Thus, the father of Aeschines appears as a slave of the lowest character, and his mother, for the basest and most disgusting conduct, as destitute of all claim to respect; while their son, in poverty the most abject and vices the most degrading, grew up without any of the refining influences of education and good society. Perhaps no orator, of ancient or of modern times, ever had at his command a more inexhaustible fund of the most terrible invective than Demosthenes; and on no other occasion in his life did he draw so largely on this fund as in the last great contest with his mortal enemy. For all this we may not condemn the orator; but are we to accept the delineations of hatred, roused to its fullest intensity, for calm and faithful historic portraiture? Must we not carefully distinguish in all cases between the language of passion and that of reason? No man who reads Burke's celebrated "Speech on the Nabob of Arcot's Debt," how much soever he may admire the wonderful power of the orator, would for a moment think of finding there a true portrait of the younger Pitt. The premier who so long stood at the helm, and so faithfully as well as skilfully guided the ship of state through the most perilous seas, there appears as a monster of iniquity, without parallel in history. We by no means condemn the orator. We may even accord the highest praise to his delineations, viewed as oratory; but we can never

accept them as history. Now the principles of historic evidence do not change. If we are to distrust the representations of a violent political adversary in one age, shall we not also in another? Does it not become us, then, to review some of the current opinions in regard to the great rival of Demosthenes; to challenge them anew; and to endeavor, if possible, to gain fuller and more truthful views?

Not only does historic justice demand this, in an age when nearly all the great questions relating to antiquity are subjected to a more careful scrutiny than ever before; but aside from this consideration, we think a true understanding and just appreciation of Demosthenes himself depends to a large extent on a correct idea of the character and standing of his great rival.

Have we then any trustworthy means of ascertaining in how far the hideous picture of Aeschines and his ancestors in the Oration on the Crown is true or false? This question has lately been examined critically by Arnold Schaefer, Professor at Grimma, in his work entitled, "Demosthenes and his Time" (Demosthenes und seine Zeit). In this work, an entire chapter is devoted to the ancestry and life of Aeschines up to his entrance on his political career (Herkunft und Lebensweg des Aeschines bis zum Eintritt in die politische Laufbahn). We propose in the remainder of this Article to follow the course of thought and to present the views of Schaefer in the main on this subject. In so doing, our only apology is the fact that the entire question is here subjected to a more searching examination and rigid analysis than in anything we have before seen.

I. Family Connections of Aeschines.

Aeschines claimed a lineal descent from one of the ancient and honorable families of Athens — the priestly family of the Butadae. This claim was established by the fact that his father belonged to a phratria, which took part in the same sacrifices as the Eteobutadae; from whom the priestess of Athena was chosen — a circumstance mentioned by Aes-

chines not more to exalt the dignity of his phratria, than to indicate that to his family access was offered to the highest priestly offices. That he belonged to the *deme* of the Cothocidae, who were in the same *phyle* with the Butadae, is shown by Demosthenes. Accordingly Aeschines, in contrasting his origin with that of his great rival, whom he considers inferior in rank, prides himself on the sacred offices and graves of his ancestors. Of a family thus honorable was Atrometus, father of Aeschines, who was born six years before the Peloponnesian war. In his youth he devoted himself to athletic exercises, without concern respecting a livelihood until his fortune was lost by the war. From the thirty tyrants he escaped and fled to Corinth. He next engaged as a hired soldier in Asia, where he served with distinction. Returning from thence, he fought under Thrasybulus for the restoration of the democracy. Thus much we learn from Aeschines in his Oration on the Embassy. The picture which he there draws of the public misery at the close of the war derives its coloring from the narrative of his father, who had lived through those unhappy times. Obtaining his information from the same source, Aeschines vividly describes, in the Oration against Ctesiphon, the new life at Athens after the return of the fugitive citizens. In what way Atrometus supported himself and family after this period Aeschines does not inform us; still he leaves us to infer, in speaking of the loss of property, that his father after the war lived in indigence. He means nothing else than this, also, when he speaks of himself as being in his lot a private citizen, and on an equality with the middling classes. Reference is evidently made again to his own ancestry when he speaks of the lawgiver as not excluding from the *bema* those who are not descended from generals, nor those who may have labored for their own support. These intimations are all that we can gather on this point from Aeschines himself. At the age of ninety-four Atrometus, perhaps the oldest citizen then living, appeared in court at the trial respecting the embassy (343 B.C.), and pleaded for his son. He died a year afterwards.

He witnessed, therefore, at the extreme limit of human life, the escape of his son from the punishment of treason, and the influential position which he had acquired through the friendship of the powerful Macedonian King.

The statements of Aeschines, considered by themselves, present nothing contradictory or incredible. That wealthy citizens were reduced to poverty in the course of the Peloponnesian war appears from numerous testimonies. The devastation of the Athenian territory, the loss of foreign possessions, the total destruction of trade and commerce, in connection with the extraordinary sacrifices demanded by the war, had deprived many a family of hereditary comfort and standing. In this general distress Atrometus left his native city, to seek his fortune elsewhere. Aeschines speaks of this departure as a banishment, without mentioning the cause. One might conjecture that he had been involved in the fall of some kindred house ; but since we have no knowledge that he ever mingled in politics, it seems more probable that Aeschines speaks of a voluntary absence as a forced departure from home. If Atrometus sought foreign military service, the best opportunity was offered in Corinth, at that time a principal place of enlistment. It is not improbable that he then, as conjectured in the scholia (Aesch. II. 147), entered the service of a Persian satrap. Soon, however, the course of events at Athens encouraged him to return home, and seek his fortune there anew.

More than this Aeschines does not communicate concerning his father. It is now in place to consider how Demosthenes describes him. In the Oration on the Embassy the orator relates what he had heard from elderly people — that the father of Aeschines had obtained a pitiful living as schoolmaster, and he even mentions the place of the school. If such had been the fact, a long time must, meanwhile, have elapsed ; since, if old age had not brought with it repose, the advancement of his sons would at least have ameliorated his condition. In another passage of the same oration Demosthenes calls to mind the condemnation of men who had rendered

the state eminent services; also of those who were sprung from eminent families; and then continues thus: "The son of Atrometus the schoolmaster, and of Glaucothea — a child of such parents, a man who in nothing ever showed himself useful to the state; neither he himself, nor his father, nor one of his brothers — such a man, will you suffer to escape from your hands! Since, what horse, what trireme, what military expedition, what chorus, what liturgy, what voluntary contribution, what of all these things, has ever been furnished to the state by these men" (Dem. p. 432). Here also the reproaches cast on Atrometus spring from the fact that he had been a schoolmaster, and had not participated in honorable services in behalf of the state. In keeping with this view, Demosthenes speaks of Aeschines and his brothers as commonplace men (*τοὺς τυχόντας ἀνθρώπους*).

This is all that Demosthenes has to say of Atrometus in the Oration on the Embassy, in which he certainly does not spare his antagonist. Nothing really dishonorable is here brought forward; nothing that contradicts the statements of Aeschines. Since, in the time about which Aeschines is silent—that is, after the return home—might we suppose his father to have been a schoolmaster. Ever afterwards might the ancestry of Aeschines appear ordinary, but not vulgar.

In the Oration on the Crown Demosthenes tells a very different story, when it serves his purpose to meet the groundless reproaches of his enemy in the same vein. We need not repeat his words; they are in the memory of every reader of Demosthenes; since more effective scorn has seldom been poured forth by any orator. He here paints the father of Aeschines, under the name Tromes, as the vilest slave, so little trusted that he must wear a wooden collar and clogs. In this character he serves the schoolmaster Elpias; and Aeschines must attend his father to prepare the ink, scour the benches, sweep the schoolroom. Thus is he brought up in the most abject poverty by his beggarly parents. Late in life does Aeschines elevate himself above this condition. He

becomes at the same time an Athenian and an orator. Then he transforms his father Tromes into an Atrometus.

The orator presents here in the strongest colors a picture, whose outlines correspond as little to the sketch in the earlier oration as they do to that which Aeschines himself makes of his father. Instead of an Athenian citizen who is not in a condition to make special offerings to the state, we find a pitiful slave; instead of a schoolmaster, a schoolmaster's menial; instead of Atrometus, one Tromes. Do we now inquire which of these two views is the more truthful, we shall be compelled to adopt the earlier. It is supported by the testimony of the older citizens; it was presented while Atrometus was still alive; finally, it is not in conflict with the statements of the son. The later invective has nothing of all this in its favor. Even if we assume that Demosthenes did not in the Oration on the Crown purposely give loose reins to his bitterly provoked hatred in the utterance of groundless reproaches on the ancestry of Aeschines, but that all which he brings forward had been received through popular tradition, we must not by any means, even in that case, forget how impure a fountain of information this always is. Furthermore, in this case also, the statements were made thirteen years after the death of Atrometus, an ordinary citizen, who had attained the great age of ninety-five years. The popular account would naturally become the more exaggerated, the higher the eminence reached by the man at whose low origin rumor darkly hints.

The earlier representation is consistent with all our other knowledge on the subject, while the later invective presents only contradictions. The name Tromes (the trembler) would be given even to a slave only as a particular stigma; and if Aeschines's father was called Tromes as a slave, he would be very unlikely, on stealing into the rank of citizen, to assume a name which would remind every one of his former servitude. The name "Tromes" would come much more naturally from Atrometus, than the latter from the former. Besides, the name Atrometus for a free-born Athenian is

made quite certain by other and similar formations, as Adeimantus and Aphobus; also the names of his sons, Philochares, Aeschines, Aphobetus, the last being formed after the analogy of the father's name.[1] But if the representation of Aeschines concerning his ancestry was all false, and he was really sprung from "those whom the people curse," why did not Demosthenes at once put an end to the ruinous influence of such a man, by calling him to an account for his unwarrantable assumption of the rights of a citizen? It has been mentioned above that Aeschines brought his aged father into court in the trial on the embassy, to move the pity of the judges; would he have ventured to do this, if thereby he should bring fresh to mind a disgraceful origin? It is scarcely credible; and we find in this fact another proof that the invective of Demosthenes in the Oration on the Crown is without foundation, and in contradiction to the earlier statements; in short, that the orator has drawn a caricature to serve his purpose at the time. Hence, we cannot safely take a single feature as a correct delineation of the character and life of Atrometus. He might indeed have been an assistant teacher under the schoolmaster Elpias, — an explanation found in the scholia, — and afterwards, as Passow supposes, might have become the head of the school; but this point is of but little importance.

Thus much of Atrometus. We come now to the inquiry respecting the mother of Aeschines. She also, if we accept the statements of her son, was descended from an honorable family, being the daughter of Glaucus of Acharnae, and sister of the general Cleobulus. So it appears she was at least free-born. Her name, Glaucothea, is mentioned by Demosthenes in the Oration on the Embassy. It is derived from that of her father, and is as purely Attic as any name can well be. Her brother, with Demaenetus as fellow commander, defeated the Lacedemonian fleet under Chilon. Respecting this Chilon, as a naval commander, we have no further infor-

[1] Atrometus, from α privative and τρόμος, *trembling*. Aphobetus, from α privative and φόβος, *fear*.

mation. He was probably no other than the brother-in-law of king Archidamus, who commanded the Spartans in the battle with the Arcadians at Cromnus (364 B.C.). Chilon fell in this battle, and is mentioned by Xenophon as one of the conspicous men whose loss was severely felt by the Lacedemonians. Thus it appears that Cleobulus, brother of Glaucothea, had contributed towards a victory over an eminent Spartan, at a time when the Athenians were first learning again to conquer. In a similar way, in another passage also, Aeschines speaks of his kinsmen on his mother's side as free-born Athenians.

With this, let us compare what Demosthenes in the Oration on the Embassy says of Glaucothea; for this is the name by which she is there called, and no doubt of her rightful claim to it is expressed. She is alluded to in three passages, each time indeed as conducting dishonorably and unlawfully in the office of priestess. For this she had deserved death as much as any other priestess for like misconduct.

These charges of Demosthenes can hardly be considered without foundation; especially as Aeschines passes them over in silence. But whatever conclusion we may arrive at respecting the actual conduct of Glaucothea, whatever may have been the peculiar aggravations or palliations in her case, the fact is to be noted that no formal accusation was ever made against her; also that Demosthenes does not question the fact of her being an Athenian and a priestess.

How different is the picture in the Oration on the Crown! How is everything which before was only ambiguous, suspicious, or at most punishable, now painted in the most glaring colors, as mean, vulgar, and loathsome! We need not here repeat in full the circumstantial description, how Aeschines's mother lived as a common harlot, ready for all wantonness, and hence received the name Empusa; or how the galley-piper Phormio, himself a slave, raised her up from this occupation; or how, afterwards, when Aeschines became enrolled among the citizens he changed the name of his mother (as also that of his father), so that the hag Empusa

was very reverently named Glaucothea, *blue-eyed goddess*. Demosthenes explains the significance of the former name: "Having obtained," says he, "this appellation from the fact of her doing and suffering everything." But Empusa can only be regarded as a nickname; and in such a change of names as Demosthenes alleges — Tromes becoming Atrometus — we should anticipate some name sounding similarly to Glaucothea. Now, what would be more natural than Glaucis? — a supposition already made in ancient times. But this name would not serve the purpose of Demosthenes; for, though not so high sounding as Glaucothea, it was yet a good citizen name. He therefore seizes on the offensive appellation Empusa.

This description of the mother of Aeschines also contradicts the earlier implications of Demosthenes. In the Oration on the Embassy Glaucothea appears as an Athenian; in that on the Crown, as among the lowest of the rabble, mingling only with slaves. Was her conduct as priestess formerly liable to suspicion, perhaps punishable; now the orator knows how to paint, even to a hair, her outrageous improprieties. Proofs, such as to settle the quesion of fact beyond a doubt, are not in existence. Aeschines had no occasion in the Oration against Ctesiphon to speak of his mother, and we are consequently limited to his former oration, and to those of Demosthenes, for our information on this point. Is it said that Demosthenes would not have dared to draw such a picture without good reason; that the simple fact of his venturing thus far is a proof of the unfavorable opinion of his hearers? This is not quite so clear; and even if his hearers did hold such views, the question still arises: were they truthful?

That Glaucothea was not a slave, but a free-born Athenian, as Aeschines affirms, obtains confirmation, as we saw before, from the earlier oration of Demosthenes himself. Thus, the imputation in the later oration of a change of names, and of obtaining the rights of citizen by stealth, falls to the ground. But what of her abandoned private life? This charge also

does not appear in the Oration on the Embassy; though we may safely assume that Demosthenes omits in that speech nothing disgraceful to his adversary which "the information obtained from elderly people" would offer. No such testimony is alluded to in the Oration on the Crown. The assumption is that all acknowledge the truthfulness of the picture. Not, therefore, from actual observers, but, we may suppose, from common gossip, Demosthenes took the features of that picture which he sketches. Almost seventy years had elapsed since the putative facts; and in popular tradition the memory of a woman, whose name was frequent in the city, whose children had but lately risen to eminence would be at least liable to erroneous delineations. Even definite witnesses of the supposed deeds might be found, who had never even seen her; and reports current in the city, arising from more recent events, might easily become connected by an anachronism with her memory. Thus a picture of the parents of this upstart might be found ready made; and Demosthenes adds to this, from the gossip which he had himself collected, whatever suits his own fancy. He spins out the scandalous story of the mysteries, by attributing to Glaucothea all the excesses which had ever been practised in them. In this way she is held up for scorn and derision; but if we inquire after the truth or credibility of such a representation, the evidence all falls to the ground.

The question may perhaps occur to some minds: why did Demosthenes change the invective against the parents of Aeschines found in the earlier oration into such contemptuous reproaches in the later speech? Here we must first consider, that in the Oration on the Embassy Demosthenes is the accuser; Aeschines the accused, to whom the right of making the reply belongs. Thus it was important to present only facts, so as not to expose weak points which his adversary might attack, and by this means divert the attention of the judges from the real issue. A like necessity to weigh his words did not exist in the delivery of the Oration on the Crown, since he was now in the position of defendant,

and had no fear that his opponent would afterwards examine and refute what he brought forward only as a digression. This fact presents to our view the later representation as less trustworthy. Again, we can readily see why Demosthenes in his defense pours out such unmeasured reproach and scorn on Aeschines. He wished to brand him as the venal traitor of his country, and the personal enemy who, in public and private, had embittered his life, and had never ceased, with impudent front, to slander him. If we, then, read in Aeschines's speech against Ctesiphon that Demosthenes is descended by unlawful wedlock from a traitor condemned to death, if we weigh fully such a charge, we shall be prepared, if not to justify, at least to comprehend, the invective of Demosthenes. In general, however, such license of speech ought not to be looked at from the point of view of an Athenian, to whom an unbridled tongue was not displeasing; much rather may we adopt Plutarch's opinion, which he had just illustrated by the case of Aeschines and Demosthenes, that vituperation and invective are least of all suited to a statesman. Such vulgar pastime, says he, does more harm to him who introduces it than to the one who is compelled to be the victim; frustrates the object of the business in hand, and disturbs the assemblies both of senate and people. The contemporaries of Demosthenes were not of this mind. In the pleasure arising from a good joke they forgot, or little cared, whom it hit. From such indulgence Demosthenes abstains entirely in his popular harangues.[1] He complains also in the Oration on the Crown, that the people bartered away the interests of the state for the pleasure of listening to raillery. He disapproves of this popular tendency in emphatic terms. "I have supposed," says he, in another passage, "that our ancestors established these courts of justice, not that we may assemble you here, and utter against one another, from our privates grievances, words that are not to be spoken; but rather that we may bring proofs, if any one has in anything

[1] The Oration on the Crown, it must be recollected, was delivered in a court of justice.

wronged the state." But when at last Demosthenes has himself set aside all proofs, and, though not a friend of vituperation, as he affirms, repels the attacks of his adversary with like weapons, he declares more than once that he is forced to such language only through the lavish abuse of Aeschines. This proud favorite of foreign kings, whose powerful voice had just rung out in pompous speech, Demosthenes now seeks to hold up for derision, and thus to obliterate the impression which the invective of Aeschines had made. Testimony is not brought forward; rebutting testimony is not expected. This invective assumes fully the character of that personal ridicule which abounds in the Athenian comedy. That, indeed, is the source from which it comes. From comedy it was transfered by a laughter-loving people to oratory; and if we will estimate it correctly, we must weigh it in the same scales with Aristophanes's ridicule of Cleon, Euripides, or Socrates. Whatever in it is blameworthy must be charged, not on any individual, but on the entire period. In the scorn which is heaped on Aeschines, the nickname Empusa, given to his mother, points directly to the comic stage. Demosthenes reminds his auditors of the comic mask simply to excite their laughter. But for earnest and entire truth, the Athenians themselves would never think of taking it.

Accordingly we must not picture to ourselves Glaucothea, any more than Atrometus, as the orator has chosen to do; but must limit ourselves to the better grounded statements in the Oration on the Embassy, remembering always that her character as priestess was not above suspicion.

That the parents of Aeschines were Athenian citizens appears further confirmed when we consider what is said of his brothers; since against these, even Demosthenes can say nothing worse than that they had no special claim to the high honors which they had received. According to him, Philochares had once devoted himself to the painting of drums and of alabaster boxes, while Aphobetus, like his brother Aeschines, had been employed as a scribe, from which occupations

both had been called, without any special deserts, to the most honorable offices — those of general and ambassador. A scholiast undertakes to defend Philocares against Demosthenes. Starting with the very just thought, that the orators shamelessly disparage the praiseworthy efforts of their opponents, he falls into the absurdity of comparing Philochares with the most celebrated painters, Zeuxis, Apelles, and Euphranor. This requires no refutation, and would not have been alluded to, but for the fact that Maussac adopts the idea as truthful.[1] Aeschines introduces his eldest brother, in the Oration on the Embassy in this manner: "This Philochares, our eldest brother, not following ignoble pursuits, as Demosthenes injuriously affirms, but passing his time in gymnasia, and having joined in a military campaign with Iphicrates, after serving three years continuously as general, has now come to entreat you to save me." Now it may be that Philochares was not distinguished as a general; yet it is clear that his election and his conduct in office gave no special offense. Of Aphobetus Demosthenes says, that together with his brother Aeschines he had earned money by holding subordinate positions as scribe; afterwards both were promoted by the people to a higher place in the same occupation, and lived two years at the public expense. This may all be true, as Aeschines does not contradict it; but it also remains true that Aphobetus was afterwards honored with the highest offices of the state. We learn from Aeschines that he was sent as envoy to the Persian king, and at another time was entrusted with the care of the public revenues. Granting now that Aphobetus and his brothers owed their promotion to the patronage of Eubulus, still it does not appear that their conduct was unworthy of their official stations. On what ground Demosthenes casts suspicion on the private life of Aphobetus is not known. Aeschines on this point simply says he had children by a lawful marriage. The name of another brother, Eunomus, is given by a later grammarian. But in all probability this is an error, since there is no mention of a

[1] Annotat. ad Harpocr. lex. ἀλαβαστοδῆκαι, p. 13, 7.

third brother in the works either of Demosthenes or of Aeschines; and the biographers expressly state that Aeschines had but two brothers. From the orations of Aeschines and Demosthenes on the Crown, we learn nothing additional, save that Demosthenes simply alludes to one of the brothers, doubtless Aphobetus, as statesman and orator, without attributing to him anything dishonorable.

The remaining family connections of Aeschines seem also to prove his Athenian descent. He married the daughter of Philodemus the Paeanian, whom he mentions as a man of distinction in his own deme, and as having aided Demosthenes to obtain an enrolment among the citizens. His brother-in-law Philo, is praised as a brave hoplite, and Demosthenes mentions that more than five talents fell to Aeschines from this kinsman. Philo, therefore, appears to have been a man of wealth and of good character. Another brother-in-law Aeschines has occasion to defend against the attacks of Demosthenes. In the Oration on the Embassy Demosthenes speaks of the execrable Cyrebion, who marched riotously in the Dionysiac processions without a mask. To this, Aeschines replies, that Demosthenes misrepresents the good conduct of Philo's brother Epicrates; for who ever saw him in the daytime in a Dionysiac procession, or at night, conducting improperly? It appears from this that Epicrates and Cyrebion denoted the same person; and we know that Alexis, in a comedy, used the latter name for a parasite. Demosthenes mentions still another brother-in-law of Aeschines, Nicias by name, who in a love intrigue accompanied Chabrias to Egypt. Of all this Aeschines says nothing whatever, and only mentions Philo and Epicrates as brothers of his wife. It appears that he was married before he went on the embassy to Macedonia, since in the trial that resulted from this embassy he brought into court his three children to move the compassion of the judges.

The ancient biographies throw little light on the question of Aeschines's ancestry, since they are founded entirely on the statements in the speeches still extant. It is not, however,

irrelevant to remark that they regard all which is said of the slave Tromes as mere fiction, and represent Aeschines the Cothocidian as sprung from a house not distinguished either for noble rank or for wealth. Herein we find a proof that the reproaches of Demosthenes were taken in ancient times for what they are worth.

The result of our inquiry may be thus summed up. Aeschines was an Athenian by birth, from the deme of the Cothocidae, the son of Atrometus and Glaucothea. His father boasted of relationship to the most ancient families of Athens, but was so far impoverished at the close of the Peloponnesian war that he betook himself to Corinth, and, as a hired soldier, engaged in military service in Asia. Thence, on the expulsion of the thirty tyrants, he returned home and supported himself as a schoolmaster. In his old age he saw all his sons elevated to public offices. He died at the advanced age of ninety-five, a year after the acquittal of Aeschines from the charge of misconduct in the Macedonian embassy, during which trial he had himself pleaded for the life of his son. His wife Glaucothea, daughter of Glaucus, had occasion to be proud of her brother Cleobulus, who as naval commander successfully and honorably withstood the Lacedaemonians. She herself held the office of priestess, but not without the suspicion of having used it for dishonorable gains. The brothers of Aeschines rose to the highest positions. We hear, however, as little of their special services to the state as of malversation in office. Finally, Aeschines was connected by marriage with a family of wealth, but not of marked distinction in other respects.

II. Early Education of Aeschines.

In considering the question how Aeschines was educated for his later career in life, we need not enter particularly on the account in the Oration on the Crown; since we have already considered somewhat at length the invective of Demosthenes as it is there found. It is also, in fact, a matter of secondary importance to us whether Aeschines assisted

his parents with domestic service, as they brought up their children under many privations; more important is it to know what incentives he had for the cultivation of his native powers, and in how far the ordinary education of an Athenian youth was denied him. We naturally think, first of all, of his father's instruction; and with this thought we may connect the fact that he more than once alludes to his father's narratives of earlier times in Athens. That Aeschines was not brought up in vulgar and rude society is manifest from his orations. And though we may concede the truth of Isocrates's complimentary language: "to all those who know how to speak, our city has been a teacher"; yet we may also affirm that no man could become a secretary of the city, nor an actor, without particular instruction, even if a brilliant natural eloquence might dispense with such aid. It is also noticeable that Aeschines himself is fond of alluding to his education, not to say of parading his learning. In the Oration against Timarchus he cites passages from Homer, Hesiod, and Euripides, and addresses the advocates in these words: "But since you call to mind not only Achilles and Patroclus, but also Homer and other poets, as though the judges were without education, while you claim to be yourselves persons of high culture, and in your learning despise the common people; in order that you may know that we also have heard and learned a little, we will rehearse something of these things." These words appear the more remarkable, when it is considered that no speech had preceded; but Aeschines, in anticipation of what the other party might say, takes occasion to display his learning in all its length and breadth. In a similar way, in the Oration against Ctesiphon he quotes from Hesiod: "And I will cite the words," says he, "for on this account I suppose we as children learn the sayings of the poets, that as men we may make use of them." Whenever Demosthenes cites passages from the poets, the thought does not occur to us that he wishes to show us what he has learned. He uses them as tributary to the end in view, and they never fail in their effect. Aeschines, on the other

hand, uses them for parade; sometimes very inopportunely. When he wished to establish before Philip the claims of Athens to the possession of Amphipolis, he spoke of the ancient times, how Acamas, son of Theseus, had received the land as a dowry with his wife. If this instance is considered excusable and proper, from the Grecian custom of establishing their land-titles by an appeal to the mythical age, then we may refer to the ostentatious speech before Philip on the origin of the Delphian sanctuary, and to the speech before the Amphictyonic council on the Cirrhean territory. True, Aeschines does not make these learned digressions without an object; but the manner in which he speaks shows his self-satisfaction. This feeling is apparent in the peroration of his speech against Ctesiphon, and exposes a weak point to the keen glance of his antagonist. To strengthen his appeal, he resorts to this apostrophe: "O earth and sun and virtue and understanding and education, by which we distinguish the honorable and the base." Demosthenes suggests that Aeschines cries out as if in a tragedy, and appeals to that which does not belong to him; that being in reality without culture, he grasps at the appearance of it; and that any man who was really well educated would blush to hear such things spoken of himself by another. We must not suppose that Demosthenes, just for the sake of bearing hard on his antagonist, claims a delicacy of feeling which no doubt was further removed from the Greeks in their free speech than from us. This want of delicacy according to our standard often appears in the Greek orators. Thus Isocrates, in his address to Philip, in which he claims the right of speaking on public affairs, though neither a general nor statesman, nor otherwise invested with authority, uses this language: "In respect to good judgment and education I dispute the palm with any one, though he pronounce my declaration lacking in delicacy." Demosthenes did not attack Aeschines for that which innocently fell from his lips on a single occasion. We have already cited passages in which he boasts of having learned something, and these are a fair specimen of his

prevailing character. He is in fact never weary of alluding to his superior culture and education.

We may conclude, therefore, from all that has been said above, that Aeschines came from his father's school well instructed in the rudiments of an education, and that he was acquainted with the poets and with ancient histories; also, that while he followed the profession of actor he may have learned much more of the same kind; but we may also conclude that he was lacking in higher and nobler culture, while there is apparent a certain pride in his knowledge, laboriously acquired, and in those fine manners which were not possessed from his youth.

Physical grace and dexterity were imparted to him in the gymnasia, to which he often repaired, even in later years. On arriving at manhood he spent two years, according to law, in military service on the borders, and after this period took part in various expeditions as hoplite. The first of these, as he himself states, was to Phlius, with a division of Athenian and mercenary troops (366 B.C.). In this he won honorable notice from his superiors. Afterwards he fought with credit in the battle of Mantinea; and again, he served with distinction in Euboea, first under Diocles (357 B.C.), then in the expedition sent to aid the tyrant Plutarch (350 B.C.). In this last, Aeschines stood in a company of picked men, and so greatly distinguished himself before the eyes of Phocion that a wreath of honor was awarded to him; besides, he was chosen with Temenides, chief of the Pandionian tribe, to bear the tidings of victory to Athens. For this also the citizens again rewarded him with a wreath of honor. Well may Aeschines boast, therefore, of having discharged his duties as a citizen creditably in this respect.

III. Aeschines as Actor.

From the mouth of the orator himself we hear nothing on this subject. While at other points he repels the attacks of Demosthenes, he here receives in silence the lavish derision of his adversary — a sufficient proof that he had nothing to

say in self-defense. Since the profession of actor was not in itself disreputable among the Greeks, we must suppose either that the relation of Aeschines to the stage had been in general attended with little credit to himself, or else that he had in some particular instance met with a humiliating failure. Both, in fact, were true, and consequently he could look back on this period in his life only with a feeling of mortification.

In respect to the actors generally, we should remember that all who would take part in theatrical exhibitions at Athens were subjected to two conditions — they must be free-born Athenians, and must have properly studied the histrionic art. The three actors, who according to Athenian custom were required for each play, were distributed to the poets by lot; not however singly, but in sets, so that the first (the protagonist) chose for himself the other two (the deuteragonist and tritagonist). Thus we find, in Demosthenes, Ischander mentioned, not in a single play alone, but regularly, as the deuteragonist of Neoptolemus; and Aeschines, as the tritagonist of Theodorus and Aristodemus. Whoever had won a prize was admitted the following year without examination to a corresponding part; and it may be conjectured that in such cases they were allowed to choose the plays in which they would appear; since it is a fact that many actors appeared regularly in the plays of favorite poets. The pay they received was high, and it might be largely increased by engagements in other Grecian cities, as well as by prizes. The prize was awarded to the protagonist, but the second actor may also have received a portion of it. He was at least held in honor, and stood far above the tritagonist; since, while those who played the principal parts were regarded as artists, and were highly esteemed, the third actor received but a slender share of the honor. He was taunted with the comparatively low pay for which he was employed; while the brilliant parts, in which he often figured as king or tyrant, were held up in contrast with his sorry lot. Tritagonist is often used by Demosthenes as a term of reproach. Still, we must not assign too low a place in histrionic skill

even to this part. We know that the Athenians demanded culture and talent in the whole representation; and the parts which fell to the third actor, as for example Creon in the Antigone, though not so difficult as some others, were yet brought into immediate juxtaposition with them, and must be decently acted.

Aeschines was not lacking in talent for dramatic representation. Though not lofty in stature, he was well formed and vigorous, and by practice had acquired composure and grace of movement. Added to this, he possessed a voice of rare strength and fulness, which in his later years had a magic power over an audience. Demosthenes is never weary in warning his judges against this influence; and in setting forth with manifest bitterness the contrast between the contents of Aeschines's speeches and their charming sound. Aeschines was thus fitted for those parts which required a dignified, and sometimes pompous, bearing and a commanding voice; but the more delicate expression of the finer feelings did not lie within his province. This belonged to the protagonist. However, it was necessary for the tritagonist, equally with the other actors, to conform his voice, as well as his movements, to certain rules which the development of the dramatic art had introduced. He must learn to unite with the others in producing a certain unity of action; and hence must know how according to circumstances to elevate and depress and otherwise modulate his voice. Demosthenes often calls attention to this art as exhibited by Aeschines. Thus, in alluding to the choice which the Athenians made of an orator to pronounce the eulogy over those who had fallen at Chaeronea, he says: "They thought it becoming that the man chosen for this purpose should not deplore the fortune of the slain, like an actor, with the voice, but should grieve in heart." This is the modulation of the voice under deep emotion, the *inclinata vox*, which Quinctilian, in referring to this passage, illustrates.

Aeschines attached himself to those actors who reproduced on the stage the master works of the earlier drama. Demos-

thenes implies this in the Oration on the Embassy in this manner. Aeschines, in the oration against Timarchus, had cited a passage from the Phoenix of Euripides and used it for his purpose. In this play he had never appeared on the stage. He ought rather, Demosthenes suggests, to have selected from the Antigone of Sophocles the speech of Creon, whom he had often represented, and with whose words he was perfectly familiar; since it was customary as a compliment to the tritagonist to give him the part of the tyrants. From this passage we learn definitely in what characters Aeschines appeared. It is also suggested in the same connection with what actors he was associated. Who, then were, these actors, and what was their professional standing?

Theodorus and Aristodemus, the persons in question, are often mentioned by contemporary and by subsequent writers. Pausanias speaks of Theodorus, whose monument he saw on the sacred way to Eleusis, as the first tragic actor of his time; and not less than this is implied by the allusion of Aristotle. He lays down the rule for orators that they should not speak with an affected tone, but naturally, since the one creates suspicion, while the other convinces. And this is shown by comparing the voice of Theodorus with that of other actors; while in them it sounds foreign and affected, in him it seems to come from the soul. Again, Aristotle elsewhere mentions that Theodorus did not allow another actor, not even if he were accomplished, to precede him; since the spectators were won by the first impressions. This has been explained as meaning that Theodorus, in those plays where the principal actor did not appear at the beginning, took a subordinate part. Occasionally this may have occurred; but oftener, unless the play conformed to his rule, as the Antigone for example, he would introduce modifications, such as to give the first place to his part. That actors often took such liberties is well known, since laws were enacted to prevent them; and those who reproduced the plays, especially of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, were required to adhere strictly to the original form.

We learn from Plutarch that the histrionic skill of Theodorus was afterwards remembered. This writer mentions him, together with Polus, as the greatest of tragic actors. Aelian speaks of him in the same tenor. He relates that the tyrant, Alexander of Pherae, was once so overcome with emotion in witnessing the action of Theodorus, that he was compelled to leave the theatre. Various plays are mentioned in which Theodorus took the leading part; and it is supposed that Aeschines was associated with him in many of these as tritagonist.

Aristodemus was the associate of Theodorus on the stage, and enjoyed in his time an equal reputation, though somewhat younger, and in posthumous fame inferior. He played not only at Athens, but also at other cities; and we hear of him in the character of actor, together with Neoptolemus, at the court of Philip, even during the war between Athens and Macedonia. On their return home they were honored as bearers of dispatches, reporting to the Athenians how greatly Philip desired peace and friendship. Aristodemus was afterwards even chosen as an envoy by the Athenian people; although in the subsequent peace negotiations he withdraws to the background, and Philocrates with Aeschines become the conspicuous characters. Aristodemus, like Theodorus, was a tragic actor, of handsome person, and crowned in many cities. Among his favorite characters, Demosthenes mentions Antigone, in the well-known play of Sophocles; in which Aeschines had played with him, as well as with Theodorus, the part of Creon. A scholiast speaks of his being a native of Metapontum. If this were so, the right of citizenship must have been conferred on him by the Athenian people; since, as a resident foreigner, he could neither have appeared on the stage, nor have been chosen as envoy of the city.[1]

[1] In passing we may here mention another actor of that period, Satyrus, son of Theogeiton of Marathon, whom Lucian mentions, together with Polus and Aristodemus, as a hero and god on the tragic stage. So far as we know, this is the only mention of a tragic actor of this name. The one mentioned by Demosthenes, and highly eulogized for his courageous conduct before Philip,

To this age belong two other tragic actors of eminence, who, in addition to their professional engagements, were employed as envoys by the state. These were Neoptolemus, a special favorite with Philip, and his associate (as deuteragonist) Ischander. With the latter Aeschines stood for a while in intimate relations; and it was in performing a play with this actor that he met with the unfortunate accident which terminated his career on the stage, making the recollection of this period of his life a sore mortification. In acting the Oenomaus of Sophocles in the theatre at Colyttus, he fell down on the stage, and was raised up by Sannion, master of the chorus. We may well suppose he could not again make his appearance on the stage before the Athenian public.

Of the truth of this story there seems to be no doubt; as the particular theatre and the particular representation in which the unlucky event occurred are specified. Yet it is a matter of surprise that Demosthenes should mention the unhappy incident for the first time in the later oration. In the earlier — the Oration on the Embassy — he banters Aeschines as a practised tritagonist under accomplished actors; as one who must learn his part accurately; and who, having collected iambics, went through them in solemn tone to the end; as having of necessity resorted to other means of subsistence beyond his profession; and to all this Aeschines only says in reply, that he had never done anything dishonorable for a livelihood. Finally, Demosthenes asserts, that while Aeschines was representing as tritagonist the misdeeds of Thyestes and of those at Troy, he was driven away from the theatre with hisses and well-nigh stoned to death, so that he at last abandoned his profession. But not a word is said of Oenomaus. How different is the picture in the Oration on the Crown! We here find the choicest collection of the

was a comedian. Still there may have been another Satyrus, a tragic actor; and he may have been the same who, according to the familiar story of Plutarch, pointed out to Demosthenes wherein his delivery was defective; having first requested the desponding orator to recite a passage from a tragic poet, and then having repeated it after him with proper intonation.

most scornful invective with which a pitiable actor was ever overwhelmed. Nothing is said of his committing his part to memory, or of the kings and heroes whom Aeschines personated by the side of actors who stood first in their profession; but he appears as *the accomplished tritagonist* who devoured the iambics, who spoiled the verses. Here also we read of Oenomaus, whom Aeschines by his bad acting murdered in Colyttus; of his falling down, while Demosthenes was a spectator, and hissed at him. And not this alone, but he appears as tritagonist with Simylus and Socrates, who were nicknamed *the groaners*. With these, he collects figs and grapes and olives from the gardens of other people, like a fruit-huckster, receiving more money for the stolen fruits than from the plays which he acted at the peril of his life; since there was a war without herald and without armistice between him and the spectators. "Well may you," adds Demosthenes, with the most biting sarcasm, "reproach as coward those who are inexperienced in such dangers." In another passage, Aeschines is called "a real tragic ape, a rustic Oenomaus, a mock orator." These stinging reproaches can lay no claim to our credence. They are pure invective; not fact. Save Democharcs and Philostratus, the ancient world do not appear to have taken them in earnest.

We may therefore set these odious delineations quite aside. Still, this being done, we must yet acknowledge that Aeschines resorted to the stage, not from any peculiar fitness or fondness for the histrionic art, but as a means of subsistence, perhaps as a temporary shift. Even thus, his talent was such that the first actors of the age associated him with themselves for the third parts. By this means, he became familiar with the master-pieces of Attic tragedy, and acquired full command of his voice; all of which was exceedingly valuable to him in his subsequent career, though it sometimes betrayed him into a delivery which appeared theatrical and over-pathetic. His dignified bearing, and his intentional avoidance of numerous and violent gestures, may also be referred to the influence of the stage, where he had usually supported

the character of kings and heroes.[1] For the development of noble and exalted character the life of an actor was certainly not favorable. As at other times, so then, the majority of actors were a frivolous and sensual class, expending their earnings in Bacchanalian revels and love intrigues. In this way, Aeschines became familiar with those love adventures and erotic songs to which he alludes in the Oration against Timarchus, and for which he partly apologizes. Fortunately, no doubt, for his reputation, these are no longer extant.

IV. Aeschines as Secretary.

From the tragic stage Aeschines returned to the employment of secretary, at which he had already previously tried his hand. For this kind of labor the demand at Athens was quite extraordinary; not only in the courts, and in all departments of the general government, but also in the separate demes and tribes. Testimonies and judicial decisions, laws and decrees, official documents of the greatest variety, were to be recorded, filled out, or copied; and for all this, secretaries were required. The oftener citizens unacquainted with the public business were brought into office by lot, so much the greater was the need of a professional class who were familiar with the regular forms of business, and with the laws and ordinances of the state. But they were required and employed not merely as copyists and recorders, but also as keepers of the archives, and as clerks who read in all courts and public assemblies the various documents which were cited. Thus, for example, in the courts, each party had its clerk, who read, as occasion required, the testimonies, laws, and other documents which were called for. The rank and occupation of secretary varied of course very greatly. For many transactions, even of the state, educated slaves were used; resident foreigners also were thus taken into the service of individual citizens; but chiefly, and in a public

[1] The well-known and exquisite statue of Aeschines (sometimes, though we think incorrectly, called Aristides) from the theatre at Herculaneum, represents him with his hand enveloped in his outer garment.

official capacity exclusively, the poorer citizens were thus employed. Sometimes they were attached to orators and attorneys, or to civil magistrates; sometimes they were appointed by the council or the popular assembly, and taken into their service for a specified time. Among these last, three may be specially mentioned: the one who was chosen from the council by lot for a prytany, whose duty it was to collect and fill out the records and decrees for his period of office; the secretary of the entire council, who also kept their archives; and the secretary of the popular assembly, who, in addition to his other duties, read the documents which might be called for. A herald was also associated with him, who at his direction recited the appropriate forms of prayer and made announcements. As the services of these secretaries might at any time be required, they remained in the prytaneum, and were entertained at the public expense.

Aeschines served as secretary in various positions: first, in the inferior offices for a trifling compensation; afterwards, most likely when he withdrew from the stage, under Aristophon and Eubulus, at that time the leading men in the government. He would thus become acquainted with the laws and the decrees of the people (ψηφίσματα), as well as with all the crooks and turns resorted to in the courts and in the popular assemblies. Not unfrequently evasions or perversions were practised. Especially common was the artifice of reading the acts or laws, not entire, but in parts; such clauses being selected from them as seemed best to serve a present purpose, the remainder being left quite out of view. In this practice Aeschines is thought to have become unusually adept. It was probably through the recommendation of Eubulus that Aeschines and his brother Aphobetus were elected secretaries by the people, and were entertained at the public expense two years. From this office they rose to still more important positions, becoming orators and envoys to foreign states.

Thus much seems to be pretty well established respecting the career of Aeschines up to the period of his entrance into

the political arena. It may be seen that he had acquired much experience and varied information which would be useful to him as a politician and orator, but not a finished and artistic preparation for the duties of statesman as well as orator. We should hardly expect to hear of such a preparation in his case; yet subsequent writers represent him to have gone through a complete course in rhetoric and philosophy. Thus Demetrius Phalereus makes him a pupil of Isocrates and of Plato. Caecilius, rejecting this view, speaks of the orator Leodamas as his master; for no other reason, probably, than because Aeschines places the art of this orator above that of Demosthenes. If by this is simply meant that Aeschines took Leodamas as a model, it may all be true, but more than this is in the highest degree improbable. With as little reason it has been inferred from the style of his oratory that he had studied under the rhetorician Alcidamas of Elaea, a pupil of Gorgias, who outdid his master in pompous delivery. We can only admit, at most, that Aeschines had studied the treatise of Alcidamas on rhetoric, as Demosthenes asserts, though even this may be intended as a sarcasm.

That Aeschines had never received any systematic instruction in the art of eloquence was acknowledged in ancient times by thoughtful critics. They denied expressly that he had been under any master, asserting that he had cultivated himself by his labors as secretary, and pushed his way forward to a commanding place among his contemporaries by his native energies alone. This judgment is confirmed in many ways. Even Aeschines himself claims the credit of having become an orator through his inborn talent, and not by the aid of the schools. We must not, however, infer from this, that Aeschines had not been diligent in the study of eloquence. This point is sufficiently settled by the fact that he prepared his speeches for publication. On closer examination, also, we find in his works distinct traces of study; not alone in the fact that on one occasion he uses for his exordium part of a speech which he had previously heard, and on another, transcribes a passage entire from Andocides,

an earlier orator ; but it is nowhere to be disguised with what nice calculation he brings his materials together and shapes them to his purpose, whatever pains he may take to appear careless of the rules of art, and led on only by the subject itself. When he aims to move the feelings of his audience, his diction rises to a pathetic power, and embraces an uncommon fulness and solemnity of expression. Yet, in his sonorous and powerful words the lack of a moral inspiration is perceptible. They do not take hold of us, because they are wanting in truth. When he undertakes to anticipate and refute the arguments of his antagonist he appears heavy, and his conjectures far-sought. In general, the rythm and elastic movement which prevail in the speeches of Demosthenes are not so characteristic of Aeschines. Especially does he lack the power of Demosthenes to re-animate the debate, by interposing smart and lively questions. Thus, with all his gifts, which distinguished him above other orators, and made him the most formidable opponent of Demosthenes, he did not attain the highest place, which is awarded to art, cultivated, refined, and perfected in nobility of soul.

ARTICLE III.

CITATIONS FROM THE NEW TESTAMENT BY THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS.[1]

BY REV. WOLCOTT CALKINS, PASTOR OF CALVARY PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH.

"It would unquestionably be an argument of decisive weight in favor of the credibility of the biblical history, could it be shown that it was written by eye-witnesses, or even by persons nearly contemporaneous with the events narrated." — STRAUSS, LEBEN JESU, Vol. I. § 13.

I. THESE Fathers bear direct testimony to three of Paul's Epistles:

1. Clem. Cor. 47. "Take in your hands the Epistle of St. Paul the apostle. What did he write you when the gospel first began to be preached?[2] Truly he was moved of the Spirit to write you concerning himself and Cephas and Apollos, because even then you had begun to form factions. But this faction did not lead you into the worst sin, because you yielded to apostles so illustrious, and to a man approved by them."

The reference to 1 Cor. i. 12 is unmistakable. Paul's inspiration is also claimed.

2. Ign. Eph. 12. "Ye are partakers of the sacred mysteries with Paul, who is sanctified, crowned with martyrdom, and worthily called the blessed; whose footsteps I hope to follow when it is mine to attain unto God; who also through-

[1] In the enumeration given in this Article the so-called second Epistle of Clement and the larger recension of the Ignatian Epistles have, of course, been disregarded as spurious. The references are to: S. Barnabae Epistola Catholica (Bar.); S. Clementis Epistola ad Corinthios I. (Clem.); S. Ignatii Epistola ad Ephesios (Ig. Eph.); S. Ignatii Epistola ad Magnesios (Ig. Mag.); S. Ignatii Epistola ad Trallianos (Ig. Tral.); S. Ignatii Epistola ad Romanos (Ig. Rom.); S. Ignatii Epistola ad Philadelphenses (Ig. Phil.); S. Ignatii Epistola ad Smyrnaeos (Ig. Smyr.); S. Ignatii Epistola ad Polycarpum (Ig. Pol.); S. Polycarpi Epistola ad Philippenses (Pol.); Hermae Pastor. Visiones (Her. Vis.); Hermae Pastor. Mandata (Her. Man.); Hermae Pastor. Similitudines (Her. Sim.).

[2] ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου. Cf. the Latin version and note ad loc. in Hefele.

out his whole epistle[1] makes mention of you in Christ Jesus."

The reference to Eph. i. 9; iii. 3 is very striking:

3. Pol. 3. "Neither I, nor any other like me, can attain unto the wisdom of the sainted and illustrious Paul, who, when he was with you, taught clearly and forcibly the word of truth in the presence of men then living; and when absent from you wrote a letter,[2] by which you may be built up in the faith, if you study it attentively." Cf. Phil. i. 27.

It is possible that Polycarp also refers to the Gospels under the title of λόγια τοῦ κυρίου (Phil. 7): "Whosoever prostitutes the oracles of the Lord to his own lusts, denying that there be resurrection and judgment, this man is the first-born of Satan."

II. A few passages of the New Testament are distinctly quoted, either as the language of the Lord and the apostles, or of scriptures:

Bar. 4. "Let us beware, therefore, lest we be found as it is written[3]: 'Many are called, few are chosen'" (Matt. xx. 16 = xxii. 14).

Bar. 7. "So they," he says,[3] "who desire to see me and be received into my kingdom must reach me through afflictions and sufferings" (Matt. xvi. 24). Cf. Hefele, Sendschreiben des Ap. Barn. p. 66.

Clem. 34. "For he says: 'Eye hath not seen nor ear heard, nor hath entered into the heart of man what things he hath prepared for them that wait for him'" (1. Cor. ii. 9).

The fact that Paul quotes this passages from the Old Testament increases the certainty that Clement quotes from Paul, not from the LXX.; for Paul and Clement agree almost word for word, while they both differ from Isa. lxiv.

[1] ἐν πάσῃ ἐπιστολῇ, not "every epistle," as usually rendered. Credner's reasons for rejecting this as an interpolation from the larger recension are wholly insufficient; Einleit. 1. 395.

[2] ἐπιστολάς, plur. for sing. For similar instances in New Testament account, cf. DeWette, Einleit. Neu. Test. 150.

[3] These signs of quotation, scriptum est, inquit, are constantly employed by the PP. Ap. in citing from the Old Testament.

3, 4, in synonymes, arrangement, and everything but sentiment.

Clem. 46. "Remember the words of the Lord Jesus; for he said: 'Woe to that man; it had been good for that man if he had not been born (Matt. xxvi. 24), rather than offend one of my elect (Matt. xviii. 6); it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about him, and that he were drowned in the sea, than that he should offend one of these little ones[1]'" (Matt. ix. 42 = Luke xvii. 2).

Pol. 2. "Mindful of what our Lord said when he taught: 'judge not that ye be not judged' (Matt. vii. 1, lit.); 'forgive and ye shall be forgiven' (Luke vi. 37); 'be merciful that ye may obtain mercy' (Luke vi. 36); 'in what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again' (Matt. vii. 2); and 'blessed are the poor and those who suffer persecution, for theirs is the kingdom of God'" (Matt. v. 3 = Luke vi. 20).

Pol. 7. "The Lord said: 'The Spirit truly is willing, but the flesh is weak'" (Matt. xiv. 38, lit.).

Pol. 11. "Do we not know that the saints shall judge the world? as St. Paul teaches" (1 Cor. vi. 2).[2]

Pol. 12. "As is said in *these* scriptures: 'Be ye angry and sin not; and let not the sun go down upon your wrath'" (Eph. iv. 26). Paul quotes the first clause from Psalms iv. 5 (without express acknowledgment), and adds the second. Polycarp quotes both, and designates them as *these scriptures*. This and Clem. 34, above, are alone decisive proofs that the Old and New Testaments were even then acknowledged together to be the word of God.

These are believed to be the only examples of explicit citations with acknowledgment, except such as are quoted in the New Testament from the LXX., and may have been taken from either by the Fathers.

[1] Similar instances of citing from various Gospels under the general designation of λόγοι τοῦ κυρίου may be found in Clem. Alex. Strom. 3. 18, also frequently in Irenæus and Justin.

[2] Apparently literal, but the Greek is lost. Credner's ground for suspecting the clause *sicut Paulus docet*, is singular enough: "Because Polycarp does not usually give the name of an author cited"! Einleit. Neu. Test. p. 445.

III. Many passages are cited with substantial accuracy, but without acknowledgment:

Bar. 19. "Give to every one that asketh thee" (Lk. vi. 30).[1]

Clem. 2. "Ready for every good work" (Tit. iii. 1).[2]

Clem. 36. "Who being the brightness of his majesty[3] is so much better than the angels, as he has obtained a more excellent name" (Heb. i. 3, 4).

Ign. Rom. 3. "For the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal" (2 Cor. iv. 18).[4]

Ign. Rom. 6. "For what is a man profited if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul" (Matt. xvi. 26).[5]

Pol. 1. "In whom, not having seen, ye believe; and believing ye rejoice with joy unspeakable" (1 Pet. i. 8, with a slight omission).

Pol. 2. "Believing on him that raised our Lord Jesus Christ from the dead, and gave him glory" (1 Pet. i. 8; slight change in arrangement).

Pol. 2. "Not rendering evil for evil, nor railing for railing" (1 Pet. iii. 9, lit.).

Pol. 4. "The love of money is a beginning of all evil. Knowing therefore that we brought nothing into this world, neither can carry anything out," let us, etc. (1 Tim. vi. 7; the order of the clauses transposed). Cf. Pol. 8 = 1 Pet. ii. 24 + 22.

Pol. 5. "Lust warreth against the spirit, and neither fornicators, nor effeminate, nor abusers of themselves with mankind shall enter the kingdom of God (1 Cor. vi. 9, 10).[6]

Pol. 7. "For whosoever confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is antichrist" (1 John iv. 3).

[1] Lit., if with MSS. B K L. 131–57 δέ be omitted, and τῷ with B.; Matt. v. 42, nearly.

[2] Lit. except εἰς for πρός. [3] μεγαλωσύνης for δόξης.

[4] Lit.; but the passage is doubtful. Not found in ancient Latin versions, nor Syrian Fragm. nor Syrus.

[5] Slight change in arrangement.

[6] This citation is remarkable, because while many words in Paul are omitted, μαλακοί and ἀρσενοκοῖται, which had acquired a scandalously technical meaning, are retained; cf. the long list of sins in Clem. 35 and Rom. i. 29–32. The resemblance is too perfect to be casual.

Herm. Man. 12. 5. "If ye resist him, he will flee from you with confusion" (Jas. iv. 7).

Her. Sim. 8. "They denied the name by which they were called" (Jas. ii. 7).[1]

A list of the most accurate quotations and resemblances is given in a note below.[2]

IV. Many extended passages in these Fathers are close imitations of similar passages in the New Testament:

Clem. 9–12. The example of ancient worthies is adduced on the model of Heb. xi.; the list not only corresponds, — Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Lot, Rahab, — but many expressions agree; and the magnificent close of the chapter in Hebrews is reproduced with little change in Clem. 45. He then begins chap. 46 like Heb. xii., with a reference to these examples for our encouragement. Heb. xii. 1 is, however, reproduced still more accurately in chap. 19.

Clem. 36 is a close imitation of the beginning of Heb. i.

Her. Sim. 9–21 is a paraphrase of the parable of the sower, Matt. xiii. 5–23 (cf. Her. Vis. 3. 6; also Sim. 9. 20, and Matt. xiii. 7; xix. 23; also Her. Vis. 4. 3 and 1 Pet. i. 6–7).

Pol. 5. The advice to deacons is a remarkable imitation of Paul's charge to Timothy (chap. iii.).

Clem. 49. The praise of charity, closely following 1 Cor. xiii., with additions from Col. iii. 14; 1 Pet. iv. 8; Jas. v. 20; Gal. i. 4; John iii. 16; 1 John iv. 9, 10. There is not a thought in the whole chapter of Clement which is not to be found in the New Testament

[1] Far more exact than appears in the translation: quod super eos erat invocatum = τὸ ἐπικληθὲν ἐφ' ὑμᾶς.

[2] *Bar.* 5 = Matt. ix. 13. 7 = Acts x. 42; 2 Tim. iv. 1; 1 Pet. iv. 5.

Clem. 2 = Tit. iii. 1. 21 = Heb. iv. 12. 35 = Rom. i. 29. 48 = 1 Cor. x. 24.

Ign. Eph. 14 = Matt. xii. 33. Mag. 10 = 1 Cor. v. 7. Rom. 5 = 1 Cor. iv. 4. Smyr. 1 = Matt. iii. 15. 6 = Matt. xix. 12.

Pol. 1 = Acts ii. 24; Eph. ii. 8, 9; 1 Pet. i. 8. 2 = Matt. x. 26; 2 Cor. iv. 24; 1 Pet. i. 13; 1 Pet. iii. 9. 3 = Gal. iv. 26; 1 Thess. v. 17; 1 Tim. vi. 7, 10. 5 = Eph. v. 25; 1 Cor. viii. 9, 10; Gal. vi. 7; 1 Pet. ii. 11. 6 = Rom. xiv. 10, 12; 2 Cor. viii. 21. 7 = 1 Pet. iv. 7; 1 John. iv. 3. 8 = 1 Pet. ii. 24, 22. 10 = 1 Pet. ii. 12; 1 Pet. ii. 17. 11 = 2 Thess. iii. 15. 12 = Gal. i. 7.

Her. Man. 3 = Eph. iv. 30. 4 = Luke xvi. 18; Matt. v. 32. 12. 5 = Jas. iv. 7. *Her. Sim.* 9. 12 = John. xiv. 6.

V. Besides the above enumeration there is a mass of brief expressions, apparently taken from the New Testament; also resemblances which might appear casual if they did not recur on every page: "For in him are all things, and to him" (Bar. 12.; cf. Rom. xi. 36). "We ought in all things to give thanks unto him" (Clem. 24; cf. 1 Thess. v. 18). "Crocus hath refreshed me in all things" (Ig. Eph. 2; cf. 1 Cor. xvi. 18). This word *ἀνέπαυσεν* is one of a multitude which Ignatius has taken from Paul, and made his own. "Praying without ceasing for all" (Pol. 4; cf. 1 Thess. v. 17). "Be at peace one with another" (Her. Vis. 3. 9; cf. 1 Thess. v. 13).

These are examples taken at random. If these writers were not familiar with authors whom they imitate so constantly, their casual coincidences are the most wonderful in all literature. For, as in the case of Ig. Eph. 2, above, the agreement extends to the most peculiar and idiomatic expressions. e.g. *ἀγαθοποιΐα*, Clement and Peter; *ἀγαθησυνείδησις*, Clement and Paul; *Ἰουδαϊσμος*, Ignatius and Paul; *ἀγάπη*, Ignatius and John; *ἀῤῥαβών*, Polycarp and Paul.[1]

The following classification of the references given indiscriminately in Hefele's edition will be of service.[2]

VI. In a few instances these Fathers appear to make misquotations; i.e. thy cite as "words of the Lord," or of "scripture" what is nowhere to be found in the New Testament:

Bar. 4. "The son of God says: Let us resist all iniquity, and hold it in hatred." This has never been traced, we believe, to any apocryphal Gospel. It may have been a tradition; or the mere sentiment may have been cited from Jas. iv. 7 or 2 Tim. ii. 19 (*ἀποστήτω ἀπὸ ἀδικίας*), and Ps. cxix. 163 (*ἀδικίαν ἐμίσησα*).

Bar. 6. "Behold, saith the Lord, I will make the last things like the first." This may be a loose quotation of Matt. xx. 16; cf. Ezek. xxxvi. 11.

[1] Lists of these coincidences in expressions of each of the PP. Ap. with each New Test. writer, are given in Westcott Canon New Testament pp. 30, 40, 47, though not as exhaustive as he claims.

[1] A few which seem fanciful have been omitted; e.g. all those to 2 and 3 John.

Clem. 23. "Far from us be this scripture, which saith: Wretched are they who are double-minded and doubtful, saying, we have heard these things even from the time of our Fathers, and behold we have grown old, and none of them have happened to us." This is supposed by some to be taken from an apocryphal source.[1] Others regard it as a careless citation of Jas. i. 8 and 2 Pet. iii. 4. Both explanations are unsatisfactory. It may be a mere blunder of Clement.

Ign. Smyr. 3. "And when he came to those who were with Peter, he said unto them, take, handle me, and see that I am not a spirit without body." Eusebius[2] says he does not

Hefele's index will be of little service, as so many references are contained in the LXX.; also the references to Ep. to Diognetus, etc. are not distinguished from the PP. Ap. The second column gives the number of quotations acknowledged; the third, those unacknowledged, but literal or close imitations; the fourth, apparent allusions; and the fifth the total number.

Matthew,	6	9	53	68
Mark,	0	2	7	9
Luke,	4	1	14	19
John,	0	2	20	22
Acts,	0	1	16	17
Romans,	0	2	26	28
1 Corinthians,	2	7	39	48
2 Corinthians,	0	2	12	14
Galatians,	0	3	11	14
Ephesians,	1	3	17	21
Philippians,	0	2	8	10
Colossians,	0	1	6	7
1 Thessalonians,	0	1	3	4
2 Thessalonians,	0	0	1	1
1 Timothy,	0	1	14	15
2 Timothy,	0	0	8	8
Titus,	0	2	4	6
Philemon,	0	0	1	1
Hebrews,	0	3	20	23
James,	0	4	10	14
1 Peter,	0	12	12	24
2 Peter,	0	0	10	10
1 John,	0	3	5	8
Jude,	0	0	1	1
Revelations,	0	0	10	10
	13	61	328	402

[1] Coteler, etc. The precise source has not been indicated.

[2] Hist. Eccl. 116. 26.

know whence Ignatius quotes this. Jerome[1] conjectures that it was from the Gospel of the Nazarenes. Pierson suspects an oral tradition.[2] But the imitation of Luke xxiv. 39 is quite as close as many unchallenged quotations.

But the most remarkable fact about these false citations is, that they are not confined to the New Testament.

Bar. 9. "The scriptures relate that Abraham circumcised three hundred and eighteen men of his own household." A loose combination of Gen. xvii. 26, 27 and xiv. 14.

Clem. 8. Many sentences not to be found are inserted in quotations from the Old Testament.

Clem. 46. "For it is written: Join yourselves with the saints, because all who adhere to them will be sanctified (unscriptural, perhaps; certainly not in scripture). And again, in another place: With an innocent man thou shalt be innocent, with the elect thou shalt be elect, and with the froward thou shalt be froward" (Psalms xviii. 26, very loosely).

Bar. 7. Ceremonies are quoted from "the prophet" which are only to be found in Jewish traditions.[3]

Our conclusions from these facts are:

1. No citations of these Fathers have been traced with any plausibility to apocryphal books now in existence; a fact which goes far to determine the later origin of the latter. The conjecture that they used apocrypha now lost can never be anything but a mere conjecture — a gratuitous one at that; since the few cases where, at the worst, it is demanded, may be attributed to blunders, without dishonoring any respectable writers in these days of bound volumes. Besides, there must have been many "words of the Lord" never recorded at all (as we learn from John xxi. 25), well known in these times. Paul himself quotes from these in one instance (Acts xx. 35).

2. And yet it must be candidly admitted there is no sufficient evidence that these Fathers copied from the MSS.

[1] De Vir. Ill. Ign. p. 16.

[2] Cf. Credner, Beiträge 1. 407.

[3] Cf. Justin, Dial. cum Tryph. 40, and Tertul. adv. Jud. 14; adv. Marc. 3. 7.

of the New Testament in any instance. The citations absolutely literal are very few and brief, and of the nature of proverbs or maxims,[1] which could not be readily forgotten or varied. (e.g. Tit. iii. 1, cf. Clem. 2; 1 Cor. ii. 9 in Clem. 34; Matt. vii. 1, in Pol. 2; Mark xiv. 38, in Pol. 7; 1 Pet. iii. 9, cf. Pol. 2). Citations only from Matthew, Luke, 1 Corintheans, and Ephesians, and only thirteen in all, are expressly acknowledged; and not more than sixty out of four hundred apparent references are close imitations.

3. But the Old Testament is quoted quite as carelessly in many instances as the New. Very few books of the Old Testament are expressly named. The few texts agreeing perfectly with the LXX. are also for the most part of the nature of Proverbs (e.g. Prov. v. 5 in Clem. 30; Prov. x. 12 in Clem. 49, etc.). More citations are falsely accredited to the Old Testament than to the New. In fact, the citations of the Fathers from the Old and New Testaments both are not more inexact than those of the New Testament from the Old. Our Lord himself often varies both in synonymes, arrangement, and construction from the LXX., giving only the sentiment.

4. Therefore the same argument which would prove that these Fathers had never seen the MSS. of the New Testament would prove that neither they nor our Lord and the apostles, had ever seen the LXX. The explanation of inexact citations from the one will apply to the other. And that explanation is a very natural one. They quoted from memory. The unrolling of immense parchments, even if they carried them, was a useless trouble in hurried writing amid the pressure of missionary journeys. It was an age of intense activity, not of textual and critical accuracy.

But beyond all question they possessed these books. Incidentally, they appeal to their authority. They call them "scriptures." They are so familiar with them that they quote the Old Testament in the very language of the New,

[1] The most important exception to this rule is 2 Cor. iv. 18, which adds to the suspicion of that passage in Ignatius (Vid. p. 596, not. 4).

where this differs widely both from the LXX. and the Hebrew. They blend texts of the two indiscriminately as scriptures. They fall into the same style. They use the same expressions on every page. They paraphrase whole passages. Can it be doubted, then, that the written Gospels which Eusebius says were circulated by Christian missionaries in the reign of Trajan [1] were our present Gospels; that they were familiar to these Fathers and to their readers? The only books of the New Testament to which no certain reference is made in these writings are the second Epistle of Peter, the second and third of John, and the Epistle of Jude.

It is beyond the scope of the present Article to point out the inferiority of these writings to the models they imitate. They are mere imitations; imperfect, full of blunders, exaggerations, and omissions. The supposition that they could have been drawn from the same source and been guided by the same inspiration is more incredible than that they had never seen the New Testament. And yet they had one common purpose: "Jesus Christ is my record; my inviolable records are his Cross, his Death, his Resurrection, and faith through him." [2]

[1] A.D. 97–117. Euseb. Hist. Eccl. 3. 37.
[2] Ign. Philad. 8.

ARTICLE IV.

ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS BOTH NECESSARY, IN THEIR PROPORTION, TO TRUE REASONING.

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We may say a word of what is meant by the terms. In logic they are applied to the two modes of reasoning, — one by which you assume the conclusion and go back to the elements to prove it, as in algebra; and the other, by which you put the elements together and come to the conclusion last, as often in geometry. In both these ways wholes and parts are considered, and it is supposed that the contemplation of both is necessary to the integrity of our knowledge. In this Article, it is not so much the *method* we consider, as the importance of the two facts. What we have especially in view is:

First, When to understand a subject we dissect it into parts, and are so intent on the parts that we forget the primitive union, or when we exaggerate the separation.

Secondly, When the union is so complete as to generate a new simple idea, as the two gases in water, and we lose sight of the importance of the new unity.

Thirdly, When we affirm a thing which implies the denial of some opposite, as when it is said the soul is a chain of exercises, and it is implied we deny a continuity, and we neglect to ask what is the exact difference of the thing affirmed and denied.

And lastly, When our assertion or proposition floats between the objective and subjective, as when Locke said there was no heat in fire, or no color in the rainbow. To these four we might add, when we see a strange apparent deviation in the laws of nature which after observation harmonises, or when an all-inclusive principle takes in some

items which we at first suppose do not belong to it. In all such cases the synthesis of parts to a consequent whole gives great light, both in morals and material things.

We shall find, if we examine, that the natural course of all investigation in moral or material science leads us to exaggerate the power of analysis and to overlook the units from which we started. Thus, in dissecting a dead carcass, the first presentation is the body itself, and its constitution is to be found by dissecting it into parts. But there is always one difficulty,—life is gone, with all its active operations, before the work is begun. Hence the anatomist loses one of the essential principles whose nature he seeks. Exactly so it is with the human mind: we begin by surveying it as a totality; and the only way of advancing in our knowledge seems to be to take it apart; to arrange and inspect the elements; the laws of thought and the passions; but in all this we are departing from an instructive unity. A chemist surveys the imponderable substances. His whole effort and language is to insulate them. But they never did exist alone. Thus science in some degree deceives herself; she throws herself out of the domain of nature; she is continually tempted to depart from the first impressions of nature. Like Noah's last dove, she goes forth from the ark, to return no more. Now this is always misleading, when the primitive unity is the clearest item that we can ever afterwards find.

In the natural world it is found very difficult from the presentations of nature, to draw those minute borders to our conception which seem necessary to the precision of our ideas. What an atom is; how a vegetable differs from an animal; how a line of continuity differs from one of closely associated points, or whether points *can* touch each other, are questions which curiosity may ask, but the oldest experience can never expect to answer.

But all ideas are not of material things. These are only the designs of the Maker written with his great pencil in visible figures on a slate. There is a world of other ideas, which never can be represented by matter, and are to the

fountains of thought forever confined. Let us consider some of these. What is the nature of these ideas?

It may be well to begin with the mind itself; the Ego as it is now called. This we certainly ought to know; and a mistake here will certainly be likely to affect all our subsequent reasoning on mental subjects. Everybody knows that ever since the days of Locke the stream of metaphysical speculation has widely deviated from common sense. A common man, out of the schools and in the market, is inclined to wonder by what possible road of plausible reasoning speculative beings can arrive at so absurd conclusions. The evil it seems to me, to begin with the beginning, is the very false meaning that a man is taught to give to the first personal pronoun he ever probably used.

Dugald Stewart lays it down as a first principle that the mind never can directly see itself. Every man is himself shut up in a certain bag, and he can neither feel nor see himself, but by touching his substance from the outside. When I look for the *Ego*, I see not the naked thing itself, though I am that thing, but I see it clothed in the robe of properties. I must walk out and walk back in order to get inside of my own house. "The notions we annex," says he, "to the words 'matter and mind,' as is well remarked by Dr. Reid, are merely relative. If I am asked what I mean by matter, I can only explain myself by saying it is that which is extended, figured, colored, movable, hard or soft, rough or smooth, hot or cold; that is, I can define it in no other way than by enumerating its sensible qualities. It is not matter or body which I perceive by my senses, but only extension, figure, color, and certain other qualities which the constitution of my nature leads me to refer to something which is extended, figured, and colored. The case is precisely similar with respect to mind. We are not immediately conscious of its existence; but we are conscious of sensation, thought, and volition — operations which imply the existence of something which feels, thinks, and wills. Every man, too, is impressed with an irresistible conviction that all his sensations, thoughts,

and volitions belong to one and the same being — to that being which he calls himself: a being which he is led by the constitution of his nature to consider as something distinct from his body, and not liable to be impaired by the loss or mutilation of any of its organs."

This paragraph is striking, as it shows that two fundamental errors naturally go together. The *one* is sacrificed to the *many*; the tree is destroyed as to its trunk, and resolved totally into its branches. The same postulate that requires that the soul should be a loose bundle of totally separable properties, requires also that a tree or a drop of water should be resolved into a collection of qualities. Hence came the conclusion of denying the unity to be anything. It was wholly unknown. It was inconceivable in thought and useless in philosophy. Hence Berkeley denied the existence of all substance, and our own Emmons made the soul a chain of exercises, regulated wholly by the Almighty power. This was strong reasoning from a very bold postulate.

It seems to us, that the whole of this representation is wrong. It is not true that we are not *immediately conscious* of the soul's existence; it is not true that we find it through sensation, thought, and volition. It is much more true that we find sensation, thought, and volition through the soul.[1] Suppose I stand before a picture. I see two things — the figures and the canvas on which they are drawn. Now, do I not stand face to face to the canvas and see it as clearly as the various figures drawn upon it? Indeed, this comparison is defective; it is not strong enough. Every man knows the

[1] This is, we allow, in opposition to high authority. "We know nothing," says Sir Wm. Hamilton, "whatever of mind and matter considered as substances; they are only known to us as a twofold series of phenomena; and we can only justify, against the law of parsimony, the postulation of two substances, on the ground that the two series of phenomena are reciprocally so contrary and incompatible that the one cannot be reduced to the other, nor both be supposed to co-inhere in the same common substance." See Supplementary Dissertation on Reid, Note A, sect. II. All we mean to say is, we should never have know what an apple was by seeing its qualities apart, not even by the most complete enumeration; we must see it as a unit.

fountain of existence better than the streams; he is in it; it is himself.

Let us enumerate some of the imperfect reasonings into which these assumptions lead us:

In the first place, this doctrine contradicts our consciousness. Consciousness is not a faculty, but a general power by which we recognize our own being. When we exercise any particular faculty — when we love, hate, hope, fear, — we are conscious that this exercise is not the whole soul; it is an affection, or work of the soul; it is a part, and implies a whole; and we are just as conscious of the whole as of the part: more so, because it is near to us. When we turn the eye in different directions we are conscious that it is the same eye, nor does the exercise swallow up the agent. *I see* is a familiar phrase. We should like to ask any one whether he understands the meaning of both these words. Does he not understand the pronoun as well as the verb? the *I* as well as the *see?* and whether he is obliged to wait until he has passed through the latter, as a door, before he reaches the former, which is the house. It has been observed that in all languages, however material, there are two words whose etymological origin is not material — the personal pronoun and the substantive verb. Language is a reflection of nature.

But, secondly, this false view of the unity of the soul and not being directly conscious of it, inverts the chronology of our knowledge. What we mean is, the knowledge of the intellectual and personal *one* was before the intellectual and personal *many*. You knew yourself before you knew your properties and actions. The subjective sensation is before the active. It is very true that we cannot remember our infant history and the order of our thoughts; nor can we agree with Dr. Reid [1] and others, that it is of much importance to mental knowlege to remember this hidden history. But we can judge from the nature of things and tendencies. Let us take Lucretius's account of the new-born babe:

[1] Introduction to his Inquiry, Sect. II.

"Thus, like a sailor by a tempest hurled
Ashore, the babe is shipwrecked on the world;
Naked he lies, and ready to expire,
Helpless of all that human wants require;
Exposed upon unhospitable earth
From the first moment of his helpless birth;
Straight with foreboding cries he fills the room,
Too true presages of his future doom."

The first exercise then is pain; but pain may come through any of the five senses; it may come through the body or the mind. It is addressed to the whole man. Pain and pleasure are not the prerogatives of any section of our nature. Even the nervous system hands our sufferings and our enjoyments up to the *Ego*. Happiness is certainly personal. Though I have a weak memory, and can remember very little of the first three months of my existence, and nothing at all previous to my birth, yet some things I know with moral certainty. I know what part of speech it was that I first used; it was an interjection. It expressed probably some sensation of the whole little system; it was neither of hearing, seeing, feeling, or even tasting. Indeed the order of nature here seems in some degree to involve and presuppose the order of time. At least we may say, in an inquiry where none can recollect enough positively to *affirm* we may be justified from the only conceivable probabilities to *deny*.

But, thirdly, we will venture on a reason derived from a subject which is very puzzling, but whose very perplexity seems to us to shed light on this subject. We all know that *time* has been an object which has greatly embarrassed the metaphysicians. Augustine's remark has often been quoted: "If you had not asked me what it is, I should have known." Mr. Locke defines it to be the succession of our ideas. Cousin says it is that which is receptive of and measures this succession. But neither of these definitions exhaust the difficulty. If it is a succession of ideas merely, I can never know whether they are faster or slower. I have no standard with which to compare them; and if it is the mere receptacle of ideas it is still a very singular and recondite existence.

A few questions will bring the difficulty before us. What do I mean by equal portions of time? What do I mean by time moving faster and slower; or what do I mean by its moving equally? What is equable as applied to this subject? Where is the standard, and how do we compare the motions? Indeed what is faster and slower as applied, not to the apparent, but the absolute duration? What is absolute time? If the perception of time consists wholly in the succession of ideas, time is confined wholly to the individual, the words "slower" and "faster" have no meaning when applied to it; and the story of the Mohammedan doctor, and the Sultan who dipped his head into a tub of water, in the ninety-fourth number of the Spectator, is verified, namely, that ages may pass to one man's perception which are only and instant to another. But from this error the truth which we are seeking after emerges; namely, that we have a double consciousness; the one applicable to the exercises of the mind, the other to the mind itself; the one to the succeeding thoughts, the other to the Ego; the one more superficial, the other more deep; and hence we obtain the thing measured and the standard of measurement. We get the ideas of uniformity and diversity, of faster and slower, as applied to time. I am, suppose, in the senate chamber of Congress during some exciting debate; very eloquent speeches occupy the time; it gets to be late at night, and I am so interested that six hours seem to me like twenty minutes; and yet before I look at the clock I am conscious that my attention has been riveted, and that my ideas have flowed faster than usual; and yet I am conscious of my own deception. I know that the seeming time is not the true. How do I know it? The only answer that I can give is, the one and the many act together. The Ego is conscious of the uniform flow of time; the exercises are conscious of the apparent increase of its speed; and by comparing the one with the other we get the idea of degree — the faster or slower motion of that which cannot be faster or slower but with reference to some standard of comparison.

To illustrate, let us suppose a river and its channel to be

endowed, both of them, with a different but intermingled consciousness. The water is conscious of its flow, and the bed of its rest. If the water alone were conscious, without reference to anything else, it might flow faster and slower to any degree, and yet it would be a secret to itself never known. But as soon as a standard is introduced in a double consciousness, then the notion of degree necessarily arises. So it seems to us the Ego and its thoughts, affections, and qualities both combine in giving us the notion of time. I am conscious of duration. I am conscious of uniformity. I receive the whole idea of time; and this mysterious idea shows me the nature of my soul. My soul perceives degree in time; and time through the perception of degree shows the nature of my soul.

But, in the fourth place, we would observe this account of the soul and its faculties gives no good analysis, and no synthesis of itself or its powers. It leads to confusion both ways. When the chemist puts his two gases together to form water, and when he resolves water into the two gases, he triumphantly concludes from both the processes that he has given you the chemical composition of water. But this account of the soul leads to confusion both ways. I cannot analyze the soul, for without its properties I am taught it is nothing; and I cannot synthetically form an idea of the soul because I want a point of union. All the faculties of the mind heaped together, such as thought, design, volition, hope, fear, desire, etc., are not the Ego any more than a mob is an army, or a troop of atoms rolling in boundless confusion is a world. Besides, no union in the soul necessitates the conception of no union in the outer world. The confusion projects itself on everything about the primitive. If the soul be a collection of qualities, joined by some unproven and inconceivable tie, a thought will be a collection of simple clear ideas joined by a substratum of which neither the senses nor the reason give me a clear conception. Here is junction without union: clearness in the parts and confusion in the whole will supervene. Ac-

cordingly Locke tells us: "If any one will examine himself concerning his *notion of pure substance in general*, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us, which qualities are commonly called accidents. If any one should be asked, what is the subject wherein color and weight inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the solid extended parts; and if he were demanded, what is it that solidity and extension adhere in, he would not be in a much better case than the Indian, etc.," and then tells the well-known story, etc. He calls it an obscure and relative idea (Human Understanding, Book II. chap. 23). According to his philosophy, we first see, and with clearness, simple ideas, and then we put these together to form the complex ideas of rivers, trees, mountains, and houses; but the object becomes obscurer at every step of the combination, because the multitude is enlarged and the unity is lost. Suppose I have a row of gold beads placed tight together on a string, which they hide. I am told I may look at each bead and find in it a subject of perception and knowledge; but as to the string, it is hidden from the eye of the senses and reason, and is a proper subject of scepticism and distrust. Now, I contend, I never saw a row of beads in which the hidden string was not as obvious as the beads it held.

But, fifthly, this view becomes more doubtful from the wild conclusions we must deduce from it. It puzzled Mr. Locke himself as to personal identity, and he gave an account of it which destroyed its very existence. It led to the denial of the external world, and resolved the sun, moon, and stars, with all the choir of heaven, into a huge circle of mental phantasms. It made the soul a chain of exercises, not one of which had any certain connection. It led, we think, to the denial of power, resolving all its apparent manifestations into a series of sequences. It confused our conception of time. It was the cause of Edward's invincible motive which always governs the will, and therefore introduces an iron necessity.

For if we once separate all the parts of the soul, so as to diminish the unity in separating the faculties, the motive and the will may meet like two mental strangers, and the one may domineer over the other. The fallacy of that book is, as we conceive, that he separates the parts of the mind so completely from its unity, that the motive is an entirely different thing from the will; whereas there is a point of unity which modifies and perhaps annihilates his reasoning. In a word, the parting point between modern metaphysics and common sense, where they begin to diverge until they come to mutually astounding conclusions, it seems to us, is here, that the metaphysician when he sees a tree, thinks he has but seen a number of simple ideas, which his wisdom has put together in a manner he hardly knows how, in a union he hardly knows what, so that the tree is a sort of bundle which wants, or has, an incomprehensible string to keep it together. That string he scarcely hopes ever to find; whereas the man of common sense sees the tree, and acquieses in the first impression.

But, lastly, this view is questionable from the authorities which oppose it; and first, the authority of the scriptures. The danger is alluded to in a very simple way in the word of God. The apostle warns us (1 Tim. vi. 20), against what he calls ἀντιθέσεις τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως, opposition of science, falsely so called; the very thing we have been contemplating. Science becomes false and dangerous to religion when one of its parts is set in a total opposition to another; at once an important thought and most happy expression. The same principle is involved in the sentiment (2 Cor. iii. 14): "But their minds were blinded; for until this day remaineth the same veil untaken away in the reading of the Old Testament; which veil is done away in Christ." On which passage Rosenmuller remarks: Sola Christi doctrina verum legis Mosaicae sensum et consilium aperit: "The doctrine of Christ alone opens the true sense and design of the Mosaic law." Consider an old sacrifice as first presented in a naked ritual, and the glory that blazes around it when

its end is seen accomplished in Christ. The apostle regards all the ignorance of man (1 Cor. iii. 9) as arising from the fact that we know *in part*. In order to understand the true significance of human life we must join that part that lies this side of the grave to the infinite extension that lies beyond it; hence the Psalmist says: "When I thought to know this, it was too painful for me; until I went into the sanctuary of God" (Psalm lxxiii. 16, 17). Moses desired to see the glory of God (Ex. xxxiii. 13); not election, or sovreignty, or omnipotence, or his justice, or even his mercy; but all blended in his glory. In the first chapter of Genesis, God's creating power is not presented without his benevolence: he makes all things by a word; but when they are made, they are all very good. Our Saviour tells us: "It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing; the words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life." In a word, the Bible always recognizes a *constructive whole*, which, bearing a logical relation to the parts, gives a correlative light, and makes the subject to be competently understood. God understands better than we, because he perfectly sees both.

We have profane authority to the same point. The categories of Aristotle, the great master of logic, have not always been understood. They are substance, quantity, quality, relation, where, when, position, possession or habit, action, passion. "It would be a loss of time," says Dr. Watts (Logic c. II. sect. 5), to show how loose, how injudicious, and even ridiculous, is this tenfold division of things"; but however imperfect the division, the design was certainly a reality. What is a category? What was the design? The design was to reduce logic to its simple elements, i.e. an imcomplex proposition, of which all syllogisms must be composed; a category is an enumeration of the elements out of which a simple proposition must be made. Now mark, the enumeration begins with substance,—which is the very thing that modern metaphysicians deny, by making it a strange bundle of qualities, not knowing what ties them together — substance,

οὐσία, of which the logical parts are quantity and quality; then comes relation, πρός τι, which is another whole, of which where, when, position, possession or habit (ἔχειν, to hold or possess), action, passion, are the enumeration of relations, or the parts; and his design is to reduce all reasoning to its simplest elements. A simple proposition must present a distinct idea as the foundation of all reasoning; and the idea becomes distinct by contemplating wholes and parts. Just consider the word "relation," or the two words in Greek πρός τι, what a whole it presents! what a whole it demands! One is tempted here to assert that God is omniscient solely because he sees the relation of the atom to all things, and of all things to the atom. Such knowledge is too wonderful for us; but all subjects present to us constructive wholes, i.e. all the elements of the concept in its substance or relations which go to complete our knowledge and make it our useful inheritance.[1]

The moral and polite writers have acknowledged this principle, though they had no suspicion of its importance or extent. Rousseau was an accurate observer; but as little of a reasoner as we can imagine. The light of his mind was a flash of lightning, sudden, powerful, keen, penetrating, coming out of darkness and returning to darkness again, always surprising, never consistent; always contradicting our accredited teachers, but never contradicting any body half so often as himself. Now in his New Heloise, where he is writing of life and manners, he says (Vol. II. p. 123): "The study of the world is difficult, and I hardly know how it should be conducted. The philosopher is too remote; the man of the world is too near; the one sees too much for reflection, and the other too little

[1] The Categories of Aristotle have not always been understood. Strictly speaking, there are but two. First, *substance*, with its logical parts, quantity and quality; and secondly, *relation*, of the parts of which the rest are an enumeration, as when, where, position, possession (i.e. habit), action, passion. Here are two wholes — substance and relation, and all the rest are logical parts of these two; and the design seems to be to teach us the importance of both wholes and parts, i.e. synthesis and analysis, in forming the first elements of our reasoning.

to judge of the *whole* picture. Each object that strikes the philosopher he considers a part and is not able to discern either connections or relations it has to other objects out of his sphere; he never sees from his stand point their causes nor consequences. The man of the world sees all and thinks of nothing. The mobility of the object permits him only to glance at all, but to observe nothing; and the impressions are effaced by their mutual rapidity; and there remains to him of all he sees only a confusion that resembles the original chaos." This seems to us a very profound remark. How is it illustrated in a mitigated degree in the papers of Addison and Steel in the Spectator; Addison was the philosopher; Steel was the man of the world; Addison, modest, retiring, almost bashful, had not seen half so much of society as Steel had. Dr. Drake remarks of Steel, the vast variety of characters he introduces: fops, chamber-maids, servants, mistresses, bards, sentimentalists, bad husbands and good; but he never completes the picture; he is never profound; he is *almost* natural; *almost* pathetic; *almost* witty; and he gets sometimes *almost* down to the central motive, but never quite; hence his pathos is a little sickish, and his wit produces rather a grin than a smile. Addison was far less wide in his observation, and far more profound in sounding the motive; as to his wit, one would almost suspect that he chose Steel for a partner on purpose to set off his own perfection; just as Ole Bull filled his orchestra with common fiddlers, because he felt that the united talent of America could not rise above a contrast.

Nothing is more delightful than to find an unexpected whole where the antagonisms seemed to be complete and forms separated. A new law of nature which harmonizes opposition; the unity of a plan; the constancy of nature in some of its apparent deviations, as for example the law of sex among the bees; all these unities, presented by nature in an infinitude of parts, give us the wisdom of God in its most extensive light, and teach us the importance of the double examination.

In Dr. Holmes's Address before the Boylston Medical Society of Harvard College, 1844, we find this sentence: "The diseases now known as tuberculous, were for a long period scattered and concealed under various disguises, which prevented their real identity from being recognized. In the Sympathetic glands tubercle was known as scrofula, in the bones, as white swelling; in the lungs, as phthisic; in various other internal organs, by no distinctive name whatever. Thus the tuberculous affections were separated at their natural point of union, and became joined to various other diseases to which their relations were wholly accidental. In the year 1810, for instance, when Bayle wrote his work on Phthisis, he recognized pulmonary tubercles as only one of the six forms of the disease," etc. Now here are two fatal mistakes: a true union missed and a forced one found; and how important were both the synthesis and separation.

It seems as if this method of regarding the mind as not an immediate object of consciousness as a totality, that is, that every man is a faggot made up of a bundle of twigs, consisting only of parts, has darkened our investigations both in the material and intellectual line. In both, synthesis is nothing; analysis is all. We are always dissecting — cutting up; we never consider the living object as one, all acuteness seems to consist in contemplating parts and components. But Bishop Butler tells us (Preface to his Sermons, page xii): "Every work both of nature and of art is a system; and as every particular thing, both natural and artificial, is for some use or purpose out of and beyond itself, one may add to what has been already brought into the idea of a system, its conduciveness to this one or more ends. Let us instance in a watch. Suppose the several parts taken to pieces and placed apart from each other; let a man have ever so exact a notion of those several parts, unless he considers the respects and relations which they have to each other, he will not have anything like the idea of a watch. Suppose these several parts brought together and anyhow united; neither will he yet, be the union ever so close, have an idea

which will bear any resemblance to that of a watch. But let him view those several parts put together in the manner of a watch; let him form a notion of the relations which those several parts have to each other — all conducive in their respective ways to this purpose, showing the hour of the day; and then he has the idea of a watch. Thus it is with regard to the inward frame of man. Appetites, passions, affections, and the principles of reflection considered merely as the several parts of our inward nature, do not at all give us an idea of the system or constitution of this nature, because the constitution is formed by something not yet taken into consideration, namely, by the relations which these several parts have to each other; the chief of which is the authority of reflection or conscience." Here are two extremes: we may attend to the whole to the neglect of the parts, or we may watch the parts and overlook the whole; now the tendency of all artistic investigation is to the latter extreme. It is in this line that common sense is sometimes wiser than learning.

In estimating the powers and faculties of our minds we must go from the whole to the parts, and the whole is often the clearest conception. The finest dust you can pulverize is an aggregate of infinite atoms, and hence an absolute atom is at an infinite distance beyond our conception.

The conception of present time is a very difficult one; you cannot insulate the present moment and stop it. While you are grasping it, it is gone. As Dr. Watts says:

> "The present moments just appear,
> Then slide away in haste,
> That we can never say, they're here,
> But only say, they're past."

From this fact comes another, that we cannot distinguish between memory and consciousness; that is, we cannot fix the shifting border. Consciousness is passing into memory while you are asking what it is; and you cannot go to a dining party, or chat with a friend but this deception is passed on your mind. The qualities of the mind are misconceived the

moment you separate them too much. As a fish begins to lose its beautiful hue the moment it is taken from the water, so any quality of the mind is misapprehended when it is torn from its native combination. Take the idea of volition and power; at first view they may seem to have no connexion; the one seems purely mental, and the other seems purely physical; and yet it is doubtful whether we could form the conception of the one without the subjacence of the other. We will to do some things which we cannot do; we will to do others which we can do; we will to lift a weight too heavy for us; we will to move an arm and it moves; and volition is revealed to us in its internal exercises and its external effects. It is revealed to us in the centre of all its concomitants. Without both power and the want of power we should not be able to know what volition is. They are correlatives — opposite lamps on the gate-post, shining and exulting in each others light. But power has a more extensive combination. Metaphysicians have been greatly puzzled since the days of Hume to account for power under the name of causation. How do you get the idea? How is it revealed to us? Hume answered the question in a way by which he meant to perplex us as much as he did when he asked it; and Sir William Hamilton is the least satisfactory when he grasps this problem. He reduces it to a mental impotence of ever conceiving anything new in the line of eternal causation. It is not our purpose to review or confute his theory. But we would ask: Has not this subject been darkened by its insulation — by taking analysis and neglecting synthesis? Our first idea of power arises from the exercise of our minds on our own muscles. This Hume hints; this Cousin adopts from M. De Biran, another French metaphysician.[1] We will; we attempt a motion; it follows, or does not follow; and in either case it teaches us a lesson. But who does not see, if this be true, that the idea of power is revealed to us in its vast combination with all power? We should never know what personal power is, if it were not for resistance;

[1] Elements of Psychology, chap. IV.

and what is resistance but an opposing power? So that the idea of causation is revealed to us in our own experience; but experience looking at a synthesis: "the word is nigh thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart." We do not pretend that this clears up all mysteries; but merely to whisper a suspicion that this subject, like many others, has been darkened by that everlasting subtilty with which we have been taught to chase after truth in the analytic line.

But the worst influence that this partial method has had is on our theological investigation, in producing certain artificial antagonisms which always meet the mind in a state of exaggerated separation.

Whoever has passed out of Boston southward has seen the blue hills stretching along the horizon before him, beginning in Dedham and tapering down to the eastern sea. He must have remarked they are a ridge of eminences neither wholly one, nor wholly separate; but the lower parts mingle in one granite base; and it is obvious that the separation is different in almost every hill. The great blue hill stands apart from his fellows in sullen majesty at the head of the column; but as you proceed eastward, they lower their tops, and blend into one continuous ridge. Now suppose I want to contemplate or describe these little mountains; it is obvious, if I am just to nature, I must view them in their junction and in their separation. I should do great injustice to the great blue hill itself, if I should consider him as wholly separated from his eastern fellow. So in theology, we have no right to consider even contrasted doctrines apart any further than they are really separated.[1]

[1] Cicero taught that all the virtues, though separated in thought, were joined in nature. Atque haec confunctio confusioque virtutum tamen a philosophis ratione quadam distinguitur. Nam cum ita copulatae connexaeque sunt, ut omnes omnium participes sint, nec alia ab alia possit separari: tamen propium suum cujusque munus est, ut fortitudo in laboribus, periculisque cernatur: temperantia in praetermittendis voluptatibus: prudentia in delectis bonorum et malorum: justitia in suo cuique tribuendo (De Finibus, Lib. V. sect. 23). "This conjunction and even confusion of the virtues is yet separated by the philosophers in a certain way. For as they are all so involved and connected that all partici-

Let us record a few specimens of exaggerated antagonisms, the more misleading because they are not totally false. They are like the blue hills; they blend at the base.

The first we shall mention is one in which the separation is entirely total, and yet on one of the sides at least the parallel cannot be understood without reference to the other — we allude to matter and mind. We are told by Jacobi, in one of his late tracts, that "Nature conceals God; for, through her whole domain nature reveals only fate, only an indissoluble chain of mere efficient causes, without beginning and without end, excluding with equal neccessity, both providence and chance. An independent agency, a free original commencement, within her sphere and proceeding from her power, is impossible. Working without will, she takes counsel neither of the good nor the beautiful. Creating nothing, she casts up from her dark abyss only eternal transformations of herself; unconsciously and without an end, furthering with the same ceaseless industry decline and increase, death and life; never producing what alone is of God and what supposes liberty — the virtuous, the immortal" (as quoted in Aids to Faith, Essay I. p. 38). Never was there a truth worse expressed than this, or more adapted to make a false impression; for such a nature is a violent avulsion from its real existence. It is never thus presented to us in the visible creation. It is as if we should see a chariot pass by us, and, contemplating one of the wheels as the sole object of insulated attention, as it passed, should say: it is the nature of that wheel to be constantly revolving; it is ever turning up one spoke after another; it is conscious of nothing and pursues nothing; it neither seeks the right road, nor avoids the wrong one; it exhibits constantly the passivity of action; it is an

pate in all, and cannot be totally disjoined one from another, yet each has its own office: fortitude is seen in labor and danger; temperance, in omitting sensual pleasures; prudence, in choosing good and evil; and justice, in giving every man his own." Thus does this ancient moralist allow the advantage we receive in our conception of the virtues when we trace their separation up to a totality; and yet how inferior was *his* totality to that of Christians, whose synthesis takes in the whole government of God.

unconscious wheel in motion. And yet, after all, such a separate wheel, though seen by an eye-witness on the spot, is a delusion of the mind; for the motion of the wheel comes from the strength of the horses, and its guidance from the discretion of the driver. And so of nature, the apostle tells us, with philosophic truth as well as religious information, that, "the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom. i. 20). How accurate! We never see matter but accompanied with power, and directed power, and directed to a mental end. Organization is everywhere. Where ever nature exists there is a law of nature; and a law implies a lawgiver — a being who established and made it act to an end. Now if any one chooses to separate what God has joined together, that is, if he refuses to regard the synthesis which his mind must make, he comes to the oracle, and hears the enigmatic response without adding the indicated interpretation. Power is invisible, and directed power is a law; insomuch that some Pantheists have erred on the other side, and actually confounded the work with the workman, as the eloquent poet has said:

> "These, as they change, Almighty Father, these
> Are but the varied God."

So evidently is the mental mixed with the material in the visible creation that the ancient mythologists were obliged to invent an imaginary chaos (and Moses seems to justify them) as a point of contrast, to show what matter would be with no inscription of the mental written upon it. A perfect antagonism, where the two things are so antagonistic, seems impossible. The sands of Barca, flying in the whirlwind; the mud of the Nile in its wildest vortices, a raft blown down the Red river, are in all their circlings obeying a law; and the whole actual creation cannot afford us a momentary exception.

Some late speculations concerning the origin of species seem to us to be affected by excessive analysis to the neglect of synthesis; and the modern theories are the misleadings of

this unscientific separation. We are called to contemplate halves when we ought to regard wholes.

It is very obvious that those writers are unconscious materialists, or at least are seeking distinction and differences wholly in the material line. The material creation is never considered as being a mental transcript. It is perfectly obvious, if we look at the finest picture without regarding it as a transcrip of certain images in the artist's mind, we shall not understand it. A blind man just restored to sight would not understand it. Now one of the most startling assertions of these new speculators, such as Lamarck, Darwin, and Dr. Hooker, is, that species among plants and animals has no foundation in nature. "In the very outset of the inquiry," says Lyell, in his new work on the antiquity of man, "we are met with the difficulty of defining what we mean by the terms 'species' and 'race'; and the surprise of the unlearned is usually great when they discover how wide is the difference of opinions now prevailing as to the signification of words in such familiar use. But in truth we can come to no agreement as to such definitions unless we have previously made up our minds on some of the most momentous of all the enigmas with which the human intellect ever attempted to grapple" (p. 388). Again, "What Lamarck then foretold (i.e. in his day) has come to pass; the more new forms have been multiplied, the less we are able to describe what we mean by a variety and what by a species." Astounding! The man that reads in his Bible that "God created great whales, and every living creature that moveth, which the waters brought forth abundantly after their kind, and every winged fowl after its kind; and God saw that it was good," when a man is taught that the Supreme Intelligence saw no meaning in the words "after its kind," that all was a mass of obliterated lines and blended confusion, he wonders how our first impressions can be so completely reversed by our subsequent researches. If there is no difference between varieties and species, we see not why progressive knowledge may not deny the reality of the sexes, and throw all creation

into one heap of confusion. Now the difficulty arises, we suspect, from seeking all our knowledge in the material line. We subordinate the mental to the material, or rather we tear them asunder. All the distinctions of the mere natural world fade as we approach the borders that separate them. To a man that assumes a disintegrated materialism,[1] genus and species, in all vegetable and animal nature, become indistinct the more he tries to be accurate. But when he sees the patterns in the material design he has a new star of direction, the borders separate, and the idea brightens. He forms his kind after the pattern shown him in the mount. A sword, a bayonet, a dagger, a knife, are recognized immediately, though they are all made of iron. We see a mental intention in the material organ. So likewise in nature, the moment we see intelligence behind the animated creation we have a new element of distinction. All these classes had a pattern, which existed in the forming mind, and they comport with and execute his great design. A cow differs from a sheep because God designed them for different ends. The first effect of putting the intellectual behind the material is, it compels us to look for genus and species in centres and not in borders; in the spot where divergency is completed and not where it begins. Genus and species are creature of the mind, and it is by the mind alone that they can be judged. But when you tear creation from its unity with its great author, when you look for species and varieties wholly in material manifestations, which it is manifest never can exist alone, you have first mutilated creation, and then been led to misunderstand it. What though I cannot always draw the line between an animal and a vegetable; what though the molusces may have very insensible varieties; what though a brute may approach in power a very stupid man? I see that the central idea of man and brute, vegetable and animal, are still eternally distinct. Where the stone is erected which separates Newburyport from Newbury there may be a grain

[1] That is a materialism not united to a spiritual whole — a whole composed of matter and spirit.

of dust, which it is impossible to say to which it belongs. But who doubts for what purpose the stone was erected; and who doubts to what jurisdiction the opposite houses belong? The truth is, we never can survey creation insulated into materialism. It is an absolute nonentity. It *will* be regulated by law and governed by mind; and in that governing mind we see the best exemplification of its laws. God intended a deer for a deer; a lion for a lion. A lion and a deer are materialized ideas of an eternal mind. The intention is so blended with their natures that it is impossible to separate them. It is in this sense that it is no mysticism to say, we see all things in God. We certainly can see nothing apart from him. These were the true sages, of whom we can say:

> "One deathless unity divine they saw
> Behind the various vesture of the scene—
> The soul in nature; nature in the soul."

The peculiar duty of the gospel demanded in this age is to recognize the brotherhood of man: "Go preach the gospel to every creature." Well, scientific men have said that the difference between the higher and lowest type of acknowledged man is greater than that between the lowest man and the most exalted beast. Yet how is it that these very terms have a meaning? Do we not, while we affirm, implicitly deny? Does not a man who recognizes the line deny it? Without the aid of science (which is generally a sharpened attention to bordering ideas), how is it that a man carries a mental intuitive pattern which seldom misleads him? The impassable line is inscribed within, and is not mistaken when it appears without. Suppose a plain Christian were to be commanded to preach the gospel to every human creature; would he, in Borneo or the centre of Africa, ever be in doubt from the similarity or confusion of species? In all the blendings of nature the design is ever obvious and the mental line is ever distinct.

It was a question with the ancient philosophers whether the intellectual or material world was first,—whether our

ideas came from material patterns, or whether material things themselves were from intellectual patterns; and especially whether one could be understood without the other. Now what we contend for is this, that this recent question concerning the origin of species emerges in order to show the scope and importance of the old question. All the plausibility of the doctrine that species and varieties do not differ, or that species is an indefinite entity, comes from the silent assumption that material nature can exist apart from mental; that we are to seek the origin of species wholly in the operation of material nature. Now we deny this; for as Moses made the ark of the testimony according "to the pattern showed him in the mount," and the ark was always to be understood with reference to the celestial pattern, so we say, that all material nature is to be understood as imperfectly showing or shadowing out a primaeval pattern; and that species viewed mentally are to be viewed from their centre points, which are always distinct, and with respect to their final causes, which are often evident; and that synthesis is as necessary to our speculations on nature as it is to our best conceptions of the sublime subjects of religion.

As to the mutation of one species in another, all we can say is, that if it should be verified, it would not confound the existence of species and their eternal separation any more than the superinduction of a mind on the foetus from the womb confounds the idea of a man. The question of time and deduction would not repeal the distinctions of nature. Homer was a poet, though his genius grew from the imbecility of childhood. All the wonderful laws that are now adduced to supersede the use and the existence of miracle are only accumulated proofs of its possibility.[1] They are visible histories of the separate acts of intellect on matter.

The divine character itself is necessarily contemplated by us in its various attributes; yet Magee, in his excellent work

[1] That is, if we wished to prove the possibility of miracles, we should consider the laws of nature in their combination as the first proof.

on the atonement, thought it necessary to say: "Our error on this subject proceeds from our narrow views, which compels us to consider the attributes of the Supreme Being as so many distinct qualities, when we should conceive of them as inseparably blended together, and his *whole nature* as *one great impulse* to what is best"; and John says "God is love" (1 John iv. 8). There is a passage in Calvin, in which he anticipated a principle of Coleridge in his twenty-sixth Aphorism: "It is a dull and obtuse mind that must divide in order to distinguish; but it is still worse that distinguishes in order to divide. In the former we may contemplate the source of superstition and idolatry; in the latter, of schism, heresy, and a seditious and sectarian spirit." [1] Paul testifies to Jews and Gentiles repentance towards God and faith in Jesus Christ (Acts xx. 21). Quid igitur? says Calvin, An vera penitentia citra fidem consistere potest? Minimĕ. Verum etsi separari non possunt distingui tamen debent. Quemadmodum sine spe fides non est, et tamen fides ac spes varia sunt; ita poenitentia et fides quanquam perpetuŏ inter se vinculo cohaerent, magis tamen conjungi volunt quam confundi (Instit. Lib. III. c. iii. sect. 5). What then? Can true repentance exist without faith? By no means. But although they cannot be separated, they must be distinguished. For as without hope faith cannot exist, and yet faith and hope are different things, so repentance and faith, although joined together by a perpetual band, yet their true character is to be conjoined without being confounded.

The *glory* of God is often placed in opposition to the happiness of the creature; and for some purposes and to a certain extent, this distinction is very important. It is well that our catechism commences by saying "that man's chief end is to glorify God." The happiness of the creature is neither so grand nor so comprehensive an object as the glory of him who made us. But what is the glory of God? God is the maker of the world; God is the ruler; and surely his glory never can be totally separated from the welfare of his

[1] Aids to Reflection, Introductory Aphorism.

creatures. The glory of a righteous governor is, to make the good happy and to punish the wicked. You might as well think of separating the reputation of a painter from the beauty of all his pictures, as to separate the glory of God from the real welfare of his subjects: "Herein is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit."

Yet I think we find some acute men have made this antagonism so complete, that we almost conclude the very essence of virtue is to crush the happiness of the creature beneath the absorbing state of the divine throne. We are indeed taught to say: "Let God be true, but every man a liar"; but we are not required to say, in order to make God glorious, let every creature be miserable. "For it became him for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory to make the captain of their salvation perfect through suffering" (Heb. ii. 10).

The agency of God *versus* the agency of man is another example. One extreme of this antagonism is exhibited in the doctrine of Spinoza, who makes God the only agent, and those German writers who, on the other hand, teach that the divine nature is only awakened to consciousness in the collection of finite intelligences.

Some lines in Cowper suggest a false antagonism existing in his mind:

> "Some say that in the origin of things,
> When all creation started into birth,
> The infant elements received a law,
> From which they swerve not since. That under force
> Of that controlling ordinance they move,
> And need not his immediate hand, who first
> Prescribed their course, to regulate it now.
> Thus dream they, and contrive to save a God
> The incumbrance of his own concerns."[1]

No doubt the poet was very pious in his intention; but one wishes to ask him (what perhaps he never asked himself) how the two suppositions differ when applied to an infinite being, to whom one day is as a thousand years, and a thou-

[1] Task, Book VI.

sand years as one day? What is special interposition and what is eternal design when applied to the Ancient of Days? If when he touched the planets with his fingers, and they ran their course rejoicing, he foresaw their periods and their courses; if he merely adjusted the projectile to the centripetal force, so that ages should not produce the least deviation, if all contingencies are present to his eternal mind, how do the *semel* and the *semper* differ? In the perfection of God, this whole distinction is lost, and we must fix the opposition before we can condemn or approve the one opinion or the other. We must confess the longer we look at the two, the more we are confounded; and we resign the great problem to the discrimination of God.

In Dr. Emmons's famous sermon on Exodus ix. 16: "In very deed for this cause I raised thee up"; it seems to us the paradox arises from presenting one limb of a false antagonism. The assertion is supposed to deny something. Now what does he assert, and what does he deny; and how does the asserted proposition differ from the one denied? After all his qualifications, what is it that God did in Pharaoh?

We might mention the soul a chain of exercises versus continuity; evil spirits working miracles independent of God; verbal inspiration as opposed to an infallible inspiration not verbal; — all assume or imply an antagonism carried to an extreme.

Christ died as a sacrifice to satisfy divine justice, as the Westminster Catechism teaches; but the younger Edwards introduced what has been called the governmental theory of the atonement. But how do they differ? An overwrought analysis that has wandered from its primitive union explains. They are different poles of the same central power. The very words "objective" and "subjective" explain the systems.

The doctrine of the divine decrees is an example. How God *forms* his decrees and how he *executes* them are two distinct questions. He executes them, so far as his moral government is concerned, through the free-agency of man. Here then is an important synthesis which he who denies

the existence of those decrees either cannot or will not see.

The doctrine of the perseverance of the saints is a remarkable example. It has been generally represented by all Pelagian writers as an exceedingly dangerous doctrine, tending to supineness, presumption, false views of duty, the gospel, and the grace of God. Now, if the design in teaching it be to crowd out all responsibility of our own, all watchfulness and prayer, and to rely wholly on an impression of intimated certainty of future salvation; if it teach men to reason, "because I was once a Christian I always shall be, whatever I do or wherever I wander," that is one aspect of the doctrine; but the old, earnest advocates of the truth certainly put in another element. Their watchword was that of Peter (1 Epistle i. 2): "Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience." So in Romans viii. 29, 30. Indeed the very certainty becomes an encouragement to effort; it is the certainty of success that inspires the good man's activity. The Bible has more synthesis without analysis than our modern systems; our modern systems have more analysis with defective synthesis than the Bible.

One more example we present with trembling: The death of Christ accomplished, it is often said, not to produce our repentance but to make it efficacious. Most of the defenders of the doctrine of the atonement have felt themselves obliged to say that repentance is not enough to conciliate the favor of God; and this has been asserted, not by extreme men, but by the most moderate, such as Bishop Butler, Dr. Blair, Magee; and yet one instinctively asks: What object did Christ die for beyond repentance? and it is difficult to find one whose tendency is not to produce a deeper sorrow for sin. Did he die to satisfy divine justice; to vindicate the divine law; to support the divine government; to magnify the divine mercy; to supply the place of punishment when sin is pardoned? All these things derive their meaning (partly at least) by producing a deeper sorrow for sin. This is the objective of all the theories that have been devised. Is there

not, then, here an interlocking of our conceptions, which has not been fully recognized? Repentance is not enough; and yet the whole object of the atonement is to deepen our repentance.

Besides, there are so many passages in the scriptures where mercy is promised to him who confesses and forsakes his sins, that one is reluctant to disturb the simplicity of inspiration. And was there in fact any real repentance ever produced, but by the impression designed by the exhibition on the cross. When David says (Psalm li. 10): "The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit," and when Paul says (Gal. ii. 20): "I am crucified with Christ," do they not identify the great work in its origin and object, showing that they should not be separated any further than is necessary to complete our conception of the whole. As some say, a sunbeam never becomes luminous until it strikes on our atmosphere, so the death of Christ never becomes significant until we see its action on the sinner's heart.

In all these cases, the words of Lord Bacon are verified: "A man that is of judgment and understanding shall sometimes hear ignorant men [may we not say learned men, too] differ, and know well within himself, that those which so differ mean one thing, and yet they themselves would never agree; and if it come to pass in that distance of judgment which is between man and man, shall we not think that God above, that knows the heart, doth not discern that frail men in some of their contradictions intend the same thing, and accepteth both? The nature of such controversies is excellently expressed by Paul in the warning and precept that he giveth concerning the same: 'devita profanas vocum novitates et oppositiones falsi nominis scientiae.' *Men create oppositions which are not*, and put them into new terms so fixed as, whereas the meaning ought to govern the term, the term in effect governeth the meaning" (Essay on Unity in Religion). It is a general error. Induction versus theory, or an anticipation, is an antagonism set before us in all philosophy. The late Mr. Buckle sets deductive reasoning in opposition

to the inductive. But can they be totally separated? Did ever a man make an experiment without *some* anticipation of what it was to prove? and when he analyzed that anticipation did he not always find it a deduction from some previous induction? In a word, when we look on the operations of nature we see facts embodied in laws, and laws accounting for facts; and nature, like the Nile, conceals her commencement in a fountain never found.

The whole universe is a collection of constituents; and all true philosophy, if it recognizes the parts, contemplates also the combination. It has been remarked by Sir James Mackintosh that the word "obligation" has been imperfectly explained by metaphysicians. What is the difficulty? Is it not that they have too much insulated it; and have not surveyed its combination with that whole to which it belongs? Let us take the definition given by Hutcheson[1]; it is a part of benevolence. Put all the duties together, and they concentrate in love or benevolence. As Paul says, it is (*σύνδεσμος τῆς τελειότητος*) a knot of all perfections. A benevolent man feels obliged to fill up all the channels of usefulness by which he may benefit mankind. Benevolence in his mind is a power; a directed power, and of course a law. It is a law which if he does not fulfil, compels him to condemn himself. Benevolence is the prime matter without form, by which a lawgiver and subject, in different stations, from the same motive, must shape their purposes. Right and obligation may be correlative; where there is a *right* to command, there must be an *obligation* to obey; but they both run up to a higher unity. Suppose a God, suppose a government, and suppose benevolence in him, and *must* he not manifest it by giving a law? And, as correlative to the facts on his side, suppose subjects, they cannot recognize his right to command without recognizing their own obligation to obey; and if they have no benevolence, even its evacuation leaves its own rights behind it. Thus is obligation illustrated by the totality

[1] The Scotch Professor at Glasgow, Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, Sect. VII.

to which it belongs; and we confess we could explain this conception in no other way. It is a link in a chain; and our view is the least inadequate when the whole chain is before us.

Synthesis is important in interpreting the scriptures. It is an element of exegesis. The tendency of language is to become more and more specific, and, of course, in going back to ancient language the terms are more and more comprehensive. Take the word "prophesy" in 1 Cor. xiv. 1. What does it mean? We have no doubt it means just about what we mean now by common preaching. But how do you get at that meaning? By going back to a primitive generality. It originally meant speaking from and for God, whether inspired or not. It now floats down in the apostle's paragraph to the specific meaning of preaching the gospel. In Wetstein's Testament there is a note on 2 Cor. vii. 8 which suggests a comment. The passage is: "For though I made you sorry with a letter I do not repent, though I did repent;" on which the commentator says: Interpretes, qui putant, et consilium scribendi epistolam et ejus consilii poenitentiam, et poenitentiae poenitentiam ab afflatu spiritus s. fuisse profectam, parum consentanea dicere videntur. "The interpreters, who think that the counsel of writing the epistle, and the sorrow that he did write it, and the repenting of his repentance all proceeded from the Holy Spirit, seem to utter things very little consistent." But why so? Where is the difficulty? Surely here is assumed an opposition of science falsely so called. Do the mutabilities in the human mind disturb the divine purpose in using them? The nurse in Shakespeare changes her structure several times in her speech (Romeo and Juliet, Act II. 4); but was the writer's design disturbed? See what Bishop Butler says on the abuse of miraculous gifts rebuked by Paul, 1 Cor. xiv. The imperfection of man does not exclude the perfection of a superintending God.

Let us briefly recapitulate. We begin by a misconception of our own being. The very personality of self is reached in an inverted and artificial way. Our consciousness, accor-

ding to the common doctrine, is not a primitive intuition but a bundle of faculties; and every unity in the material creation is a collection of qualities, united by a mysterious tie which no man has dared to explain. This opposes our natural conception, is confuted by many arguments, and inverts the chronology of our knowledge. It perplexes our views of time, and it gives an exaggerated importance to analysis; it overlooks the importance of synthesis, and finally it leads to great misconception in our religious reasoning.

The conclusion from the whole subject is, that the acutest analytic power may mislead you if it tempts you to pursue truths wholly in that direction, or even to exaggerate this single department. Unless you go from the one to the parts you never can explain; and unless you go from the parts to the one you never can understand.

Some objections are obvious: two occur from opposite sources. First, it may be said, if the whole be necessary to explain each part we never can know anything, because an absolute totality is beyond our conception; and secondly, on the other hand, it may be said also, that the suggestion is superfluous, because no mortal was ever so blind as not to see that a part implies a whole. As to the first, we have already answered it, by saying, by a whole we mean a constructive whole; that explanatory unity from which your analysis begins; and as to the second, how true is it that the very principle we are most ready to acknowledge is the very one which is most apt to be absent when needed most! Where do you turn your attention? Which element are you most apt to overlook? Here are two sign-boards on opposite sides of the road; one tells you whence you came, and the other how far you may go. Which inscription do you read with the most attention and remember with the most profit? Do you remember both?

ARTICLE V.

THE SYSTEM OF THE FOUR CONJUGATIONS IN LATIN, A CLASSIFICATION OF IDEAS SIGNIFIED BY THEIR CHARACTERISTIC VOWELS.

BY JAMES P. FRENCH, M.A., ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI.

Says a distinguished Orientalist:[1] "A universal antagonism exists between the two classes of vowel-sounds [taken in the continental pronunciation of Europe, of course] *a*, *o*, *u*, and *e*, *i*; of which latter *ä*, *ö*, *ü*, are merely a further modification or development. This vowel-antagonism seems to have more particularly prevailed in the ancient and comparatively primitive languages, and is still more or less preseved in its purity in the so-called Tartar languages, and in part also in the Finnish tongues. Where this antagonism exists unimpaired we find two distinct kinds of words—those with *a*, *o*, *u*, *y*; the other with *e*, *i*—often even opposed or correlative to each other in their meanings. Thus, in Mantshoo, "*Ama*" (*father*), "*Eme*" (*mother*); in Turkish, "*Olmak*" (*to become, to be*), "*Olmek*" (*to perish, to die*), "*Durmak*" (*to remain*), "*Durmek*" (*to move on*). Even in our modern languages, such as French, Italian, etc., the difference of these two vowel-classes still appears in part in the peculiar influence they exert on the pronunciation of the guttural letters *c*, *g*."

The system of vowel-antagonism, running parallel with their harmonization, is treated in full by Mr. Roehrig, in an essay entitled: "Researches in Philosophical and Comparative Philology, chiefly with Reference to the Languages of Central Asia"; which in 1848 received the Volney Prize (for Linguistics) of the Imperial Institute of France, and formed the basis of a Turkish Grammar, published in 1856, as a text-book for the students of the Imperial Oriental School. That

[1] Mr. F. L. O. Roehrig, Member of the Asiatic Societies of France, Germany, etc.

the euphonic interchanges of vowels are so regular in some languages as to evince laws of contrariety and affinity is acknowledged; but we are ignorant if it has been admitted by any considerable number of scholars that there is ever a vital significance in the employment of one vowel to the exclusion of another. And the idea of such significance, and that the few and evanescent vowel-sounds have preserved in any language their primitive power, while the more numerous and inflexible consonants have not yet established that they ever possessed essential meanings, — such an idea, so novel to our mind, repeatedly recurring, incited us to watch for its evidence in other languages. We therefore here present our observations on the characteristic vowels of the Latin conjugations, and appeal in regard to the fact of vowel-significance to the analogy of the Oriental languages alluded to, in which we think it is clearly exhibited. But it may be objected to the force of such analogy that the preservation of the original significance of letters in a class of languages, one of whose characteristic features is that the root is never obscured, affords no presumption that such significance is preserved in the Aryan family, a distinctive feature of which is the corruption of both root and termination. To this, however, it may be answered that the characteristic vowels of the Latin conjugations seem to have had their origin in neither part of the verb which was liable to phonetic decay, and may therefore be employed in a revival of their primitive power; and that they serve a purpose more important than mere connectives appears, at least in three of the conjugations, from their quantity.

If, then, they *may* possess significance; and if, further, there is nothing arbitrary in language, so that laws of expression must conform to the laws of thought; their significance *must* correspond to the ideas of the conjugations which they respectively characterize. But, however specious in itself and from the analogy of other languages, the theory proposed must rely upon an examination of the conjugations themselves, and a correspondence shown between their several ideas and their respective vowels.

Let us, then, very briefly consider the nature and relations of certain vowel-sounds common in nearly all languages. The principal simple vowels are, *a*, *u*, *i*, the two last being extremes, of which the first is the mean. It is also generally acknowledged that *o* is a compound of *a* and *u*, and *e* a compound of *a* and *i*, as is evident in the Sanscrit, in their more frequent long sounds represented by separate characters in Greek; and even in some modern languages, as the French pronunciation of the diphthongs *au* and *ai*, and the English recognition of the relationships of *o* to *u* and *e* to *i* in its pronunciation of *oo* and *ee*. According to this classification, if there is any significance in vowel-sounds, and it shows itself in Latin conjugation, we must believe that the Second (or *e*) conjugation is intermediate in force between the First (or *a*) and Fourth (or *i*) conjugations, and represents a *union* of their ideas, whatever they may be. Now the ideas represented in Latin by the First, Second, and Fourth conjugations seem to have precisely such mutual relations as distinguish the vowels *a*, *e*, and *i*. The First and Third conjugations we conceive to express modifications of the same idea; and it hardly needs to be remarked in passing, that, presenting fewer points of contrast than the other conjugations, their difference is less perceptible and their line of demarkation less easily discerned. What then are these ideas represented in the conjugations? Of course not necessarily perfect images of truth, but reflections from the Roman mind; when first mirrored on their speech we need not now consider; it is enough at present if our portraitures are faithful to their originals. These ideas we apprehend to be as follows: The actions and conditions of the Third conjugations appear to be such as, in every successive minute part, or (indefinitely) in one complete whole conceived of as momentary, spring immediately from, or are immediately connected with, the subject; and this minute activity is well symboled by the employment of the shortest and lightest, or *no*, connecting vowels between the root, which denotes the act, and the personal termination. In like manner the First

conjugation is essentially active; but it represents actions and conditions which, though often capable of division, are always considered as in their *unbroken totality* springing from or connected with the subject, and hence are viewed less intimately with it. The Second conjugation expresses actions and conditions which either *excite other* actions and conditions, or *are themselves excited by* others, so that there is always presented a passive subject. The Fourth conjugation is still more passive in its meaning, since with it the object affected by an action is always the point of view for regarding it, and objectivity is solely presented. In a word, the ideas of the First (or Third) and Fourth conjugations are found to be respectively active and passive, represented by their peculiar vowels *a* and *i*; and the idea of the Second conjugation is found to be a union of both active and passive, represented by the correspondent *e*. Let us see whether an examination of the verbs will reveal the characters ascribed. And first, it is obvious that the proportion of verbs belonging to the several conjugations (the verbs of the First and Third conjugations being three times as many as those of the Second and Fourth) and the variations of the conjugations of certain verbs in different tenses (but one sixth of the verbs of the Second and Fourth adhering to those forms throughout), are consistent with such characters; for while comparatively few ideas admit the passive element of the Second and Fourth conjugations, fewer still contain it with such prominence as to require expression in the non-descriptive (complete) tenses. The particular phases of these variations will be viewed in their appropriate places.

We now proceed to examine the conjugations: and first, the so-called Third conjugation. In this a general active character is indicated by its primality; by its almost universal use in the non-descriptive tenses of the Second conjugation; and by its very frequent employment in those tenses of the First and Fourth conjugations; while the strict adherence of its own verbs to their peculiar forms accords with the special active character, which we suppose it to have afterward

assumed. But more particularly: this special active character is exhibited in the numerous class of *Inceptives*, which, describing the beginning, or successive beginnings, of conditions (or actions), assume the form of the Third conjugation, and are limited in their use to the descriptive tenses. It may also be seen in the smaller class of *Intensives*, denoting vehement action of an eager agent; their tendency to pass in the complete tenses into the Fourth conjugation (constituting the most prominent exceptions to the regularity of the Third conjugation) will be explained below. To illustrate still further the peculiar character conceived to inhere universally in this conjugation, a few examples only need be given, and these will require no explanation: *facere*, *ferre*, *dicere*, *currere*, *fluere*, *hiscere*, *vivere*, *esse*, etc., etc.

Next let us examine the First conjugation. It has been described as essentially active, but moreover as denoting actions and conditions which, though often capable of division, are always viewed in their integrity, and therefore less intimately with the subject. This character is not inconsistent with its general adherence to its proper forms, admitting no change except to the generic and primitive Third. And we think it is precisely exhibited by *Frequentatives*, which affixing the vowel *a* to roots denoting a completed act, indicate a repetition of that act, and express in one view their total. A comparison of this class with *Intensives* illustrates the difference of their conjugations; the former presenting to view the sum of repeated energies, the latter describing the several exertions of the eager agent. A similar comparison may be made between the small class of *Diminutives*, which possess the character of the First conjugation, denoting an action viewed as a whole, though made up of feeble efforts, and the class of *Inceptives*, referring to successive parts themselves. A few special examples are appended, which may likewise be compared with their correlatives given under the Third conjugation: *aedificare*, *portare*, *clamare*, *ambulare*, *manare*, *hiare*, etc., etc.

We pass to those conjugations which possess a passive ele-

ment: we first will consider the Fourth conjugation; which, according to our theory, presents the object affected by an action as the point of view, and its objectivity as the matter of contemplation. Although many of its verbs admit a change in the non-descriptive tenses into the generic Third, yet it includes also many verbs whose ideas are properly expressed in all the tenses by its peculiar forms.

This passivity may be either in the grammatical subject or object. Examples of verbs in which it is manifest in the subject are: *audire*, *sentire*, *scire*, *dormire*, *servire*, *sortire*, (or *sortiri*) — in which the Fates dispose — *ire*, *venire*, (compare ventum est, etc.). Examples of classes of words are the verbs denoting involuntary human actions, such as *to sob*, *hiccough*, *cough*, *cry*, *itch*, *stammer*, *swallow*, etc.; also the verbs denoting the cries of brutes; of *the horse*, *ox*, *dog*, *lion*, *hog*, *hen*, *cock*, *chick*, *raven*, etc. But if instead of referring to the passive "animal" (neuter gender) as uttering the cry, a description of the noise is given, which may even be an imitation by a human voice, the verb is always of the First conjugation; as, *gracillare* (to cluck *as* a hen), *pupillare* (to cry *like* a peacock), etc. We believe no other conjugation is primarily employed to express the cries or noises of brutes; and it is not to be wondered at if lexicographers have not always remarked the difference of these two.

This passivity in the subject is also strikingly seen in the class of *Desideratives*, which are all of the Fourth conjugation (compare the Greek *Optative* with its connecting vowel ι). And it may be seen in a remarkable manner in the verb *fio* (peculiarly, and it almost seems deliberately, changed from *fuo*) used as the passive of *facio*, which, if it be not of the Fourth conjugation, is at least formed after its analogy, as is proved by the quantity of its first vowel. Not only is the passivity of this formation evinced by its use instead of the regular passive in the descriptive tenses, but at the same time by its association with the regular passive of the other tenses; and it can even be pursued into the compounds of *facio*, in which, if the primitive meaning is retained, the

passive is formed in *fio*, but regularly if a new idea is produced.

But secondly, the passivity denoted by verbs of the Fourth conjugation may be in the grammatical object. Such verbs are few, and the passive notion with them not so prominent; but we think it is none the less real. Inspect them closely, and, unless my judgment is led captive by my imagination, the mind is involuntarily drawn by their very meaning to the object-side, and contemplates the action from that point of view. By the verbs *impedio* and *irretio* my mind is itself ensnared, and gazes through the meshes *from the inside*. From beneath the hand which polishes the brass (*polio*) the *gleaming surface* continually flashes upon my mental vision. By the verb *redimio* my eyes are fixed upon the *encircled brow*; nor do they glance at the ministering hands. When I hear the condemnation of the judicial *punio*, I find my feelings of sympathy or satisfaction are with him who suffers punishment. And disposed by the sad *sepelio*, my sorrowing thoughts enshroud the buried dead.

Such is the character which we conceive to pervade the Fourth conjugation. And if it is sometimes difficult to delineate delicate and flitting shades of thought, yet we think none of its verbs preclude this notion, and there are many which would be illumined by it.

It remains to examine the Second conjugation. And first, the character ascribed, namely a union of the active and passive elements, is consistent with its limitation to the descriptive tenses; for since in the complete tenses less precision is employed in the description of the act, the more general active notion prevails in them over the specific passive, and assumes the appropriate form of the Third conjugation. This twofold character may appear either in the grammatical subject or object. And first, in the subject it is clearly revealed in the extensive class of verbs denoting conditions; as, *aceo*, *caleo*, *clareo*, *jaceo*, etc., etc. These verbs expressly describe passive objects quickened into active subjectivity. To these may be added the peculiar verbs *audeo*, *gaudeo*,

and *soleo*, which to their strongly passive notion (prevailing entirely in the complete tenses) add so much activity as to require the form of the Second conjugation in the descriptive tenses. To them may be added also some *Intransitives*, in which the active idea is more prominent; as, *doleo*, *maereo*, *pareo*, etc. Finally, to this division belong some *Transitive* verbs; as, *video*, *habeo*, *teneo*, *timeo*, *studeo*, etc. But secondly, the union of the active and passive ideas may be visible in the grammatical object: for example, with the verbs *terreo*, *doceo*, *moneo*, *mulceo*, *suadeo*, *urgeo*, etc. And it appears in a remarkable manner with the Impersonal verbs of feeling: *miseret*, *poenitet*, *pudet*, *taedet*, *piget*, etc., construed with the Accusative of the Agents; all of which in their simple forms are of the Second conjugation.

This twofold character, we think, extends through all the verbs of the Second conjugation; but if there are a very few in which it is not obvious, it may be ultimately revealed by a better knowledge of their original meaning. Among such verbs perhaps are *mordeo* and *tondeo*, both of which, if not first spoken of brutes, are at least "animal" actions, and may therefore possess sufficient passiveness to produce by a union with their active force the form of the Second conjugation in the descriptive tenses. Indeed, there may be a few verbs in this, as also in all the conjugations, in which the vowel apparently used as a connective belonged to the original root, and the particular forms presented in them are the result of euphonic rather than significant laws.

Of course there are ideas which may be viewed differently under different circumstances, and the conjugation will vary accordingly. This we will briefly illustrate. *Desideratives* seem to exhibit the passiveness which we have thought inheres in the Fourth conjugation. But if the desire is considered as moving to action it is expressed in the form of the Second conjugation; as, *avere*, *studere*, desires which impel to pursuit. And if we overlook the passiveness of the soul, and consider only the co-operation towards the realization of the wish, or the vehemence of the desire, we may employ *cupĕre*,

though in the more indefinite complete tenses the proper passive character of the last reappears in the form of the Fourth conjugation. The tendency of *Intensives* to pass in the complete tenses into the Fourth conjugation may be explained in a similar manner; for to their hasty glances the subject is more obviously affected by the intenseness of his action than the object.

A further illustration may be seen in the verbs *fervēre* and *fervĕre* (to boil), the former having reference to the condition of the fluid as *heated* to boiling, the latter to its intense activity; and the verbs *bullīre* and *bullāre* (to bubble), the former describing the proper passive character of the lifeless liquid, the latter the aggregate appearance of the active surface.

This concludes our examination of the conjugations; in which it has been essayed to show that the ideas classified in the First (or Third) and Fourth conjugations are respectively active and passive, represented by their characteristic vowels; and in the Second conjugation a combination of these ideas, represented by the correspondent *e*. But not only is this view of actions and conditions observed in the system of Latin conjugation; it is also recognized in other languages, and in Latin in other forms of expression.

It is recognized in the distinction of voices, Active, Passive and Middle, in the Latin Deponents, in many of which the subject is not (as is usual in the Greek Middle) the receiver of his own, but another's influence; for example, *morior*, *expergiscor*, etc. Indeed, many *Deponents* of the First and Third conjugations seem to be only a variety of expression instead of the Second conjugation (compare *moror* with *maneo*, and *conspicor* with *video*); although many others seem to assume this form in order to preserve the active and passive elements in greater distinctness, the one being expressed in the conjugation, the other in a deponent form. While on the other hand *Deponents* of the Second and Fourth conjugations appear sometimes to present more obviously their proper passive meaning; as, *punior* and *sortior* (vari-

cties of expression instead of *punio* and *sortio*); at other times to express a *double* passiveness; for example, *polliceor* seems to take the form of the Second conjugation (like *spondeo* and *voveo*) to represent the subject as *induced* to make the promise, and the form of the Passive voice (like ὑπισχνέομαι) to express the reflexiveness of the obligation. Moreover, such a view of actions and conditions is recognized in the frequent use of Impersonals in the Passive voice in Latin, with which the agents are represented as instruments; and in the extensive use of the Dative of the (objective) agent with Passive participles.

Finally, this form of expressing actions and conditions has to some extent its counterpart in other languages. To this branch of proof, however, as our theory must mainly rely upon an examination of the Latin verbs themselves, we will cast but a rapid glance. Corresponding to the peculiar character ascribed to the Second and Fourth conjugations is the Greek construction of verbs with the Causal Genitive; for example, the "Genitive of the Sensible and Mental Object," in which "the *object* of sensation, thought, or emotion is regarded as its exciting *cause*."

Accordingly the use of this Genitive with verbs of hearing, expressing the passiveness of him who hears, corresponds to the use of *audio* in Latin in the Fourth conjugation; while the more frequent, and even common, exchange of the Genitive for the Accusative in Greek with verbs of sight, corresponds to the greater activity of the subject denoted in Latin by the conjugation of *video*.

And perhaps there is even in English a striking analogy of the passive element of some Latin verbs in the verbal prefix *be* (originally *by*), indicating nearness to the object; which, being spoken before the action, in many transitive verbs sends the mind, as it were, to the other side, where it may view it *coming upon* the object. Compare the English *become* with the Latin *fio; behold* with *tueor; befall* with *evenio;* and the transitives *smear* and *besmear* with *lino* and *lineo*. If this be the correct explanation of the English

prefix, its sameness with the preposition *by* answers to the use of the sign of the locative case in Latin, *i*, by verbs of the Second and Fourth conjugations to denote the passivity of nouns in construction with them.

We have now gone through with the principal arguments necessary to prove that the system of the four conjugations in Latin is a classification of ideas signified by their characteristic vowels. We have seen that such use of vowels is analogous to their use in other languages; and that the particular signification proposed is accordant with their natural relations; that the classification of ideas described is rational, and observed in other ways, not only in common with other languages, but also peculiarly in Latin; and that it is satisfactory, suiting readily a large majority of verbs in their accepted meanings, possible in the remainder, and elucidating all. Much more could be said in explanation, illustration, and corroborative proof; but we may rest the theory upon the arguments adduced; satisfied that if they do not establish the proposition for which they are advanced, they at least furnish remarkable phenomena for him to account for in some other way who denies the correctness of this explanation.

If then there be in any language a significance of vowels, does it not appear in Latin conjugation; and in the manner herein described? And is not the system of Latin conjugations, which has hitherto strangely been considered arbitrary, a classification of ideas both radical and clear?

ARTICLE VI.

HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY AS RELATED TO DIVINE AGENCY IN CONVERSION.[1]

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THE most serious difficulties of religion cluster around certain points of union of doctrines which are opposites, but not contraries, in the system of truth. They stand over against each other for a double purpose: by their differences each defines the outline and reflects the excellence of the other, and by their harmony both magnify the honor of the Author of truth, as neither could do alone.

Such correlative truths are numerous around the point of junction of Divine with human agencies. The difficulties of our faith therefore grow dense around the doctrines of Providence, of Prayer, of Predestination, and perhaps most of all around that of Regeneration. The power of such difficulties depends very much upon the spirit with which they are approached. Three principles, especially, should govern inquiry on such a theme.

First, that inquiry should be conducted with reverence for the prerogatives of God. It is as much the dictate of sober judgment as of a pure conscience to preserve that jealousy in behalf of the divine honor which the apostle expressed when he said: "Let God be true, though every man a liar." Again, in such an inquiry we should expect to come upon insoluble mystery; not absurdity, but mystery; not contradictions, but mystery. Who knoweth the spirit of a man? A child propounds questions concerning it which no man can answer. To whom then will ye liken God? Canst thou by searching find him out to perfection? When therefore from two such fountains the streams emanate which are

[1] A Discourse preached, substantially, in the Chapel of Andover Theological Seminary, on the text, Phil. ii. 12, 13.

commingled in human destiny, shall we expect to find nothing that appeals to faith? In the confluence of two such powers, is it marvellous that to our vision the waters are troubled?

Furthermore, in such an inquiry we should be content with the removal of practical difficulties. It is a principle which the wisest of men have acknowledged in respect of other things than religion, that perplexities which start out of metaphysical science should never be allowed to confuse us in the practical affairs of life. Men who have believed in the non-existence of matter have yet eaten and drunk and slept and walked like their neighbors. Men who have been unable to see the evidence of their existence have yet been very sensitive if other men were as ignorant. Yet, in religious inquiry the human mind exhibits a proneness to disregard this principle of the common sense, by wandering away from plain matters of fact, and, as Isaac Taylor has expressed it, "to beat up and down through regions of night, from which their only escape must be, by a buoyant effort of good sense, to spring up from the abyss to the trodden and familiar surface of things."

With these principles in mind, let us consider

The Responsibility of Man as related to the Agency of God in Conversion.

I. Let us, in the first place, discern clearly the reality of the difficulty which an inquiring sinner often feels respecting his own responsibility for a result which is still dependant on Almighty power. The difficulty is practical. It is felt by minds which know little, and care less, about philosophical abstractions. Every pastor is familiar with it in the popular experience. No inquiry is pressed with deeper solicitude by a certain class of minds than this: How can these things be? "You tell me," is often the language of their hearts, "you tell me that I must be born again. I must have a new heart and a new spirit. To produce this change is the work of God. You portray this change to me

in language which is itself an appalling expression of my dependence upon invisible and almighty will for its achievements. My puny faculties are affrighted at the conception of a change from darkness to light, from death to life, and from the power of Satan to that of God. Why then do you summon me to any duty in this emergency? What have I to do but to await the revelation of that eternal decree on which my destiny hangs in suspense, like that of a mote upon the law of gravitation? How can I repent? How can I believe? Am I not shut up to this one resource; to stand in dumb agony before the *Will*, as one of your own most venerable theologians has termed it, the *arbitrary Will*, of God? He hath mercy on whom he *will* have mercy." An oppressive significance is sometimes crowded into the words: What must I do to be saved? They are often the outburst of a hopeless intellect, as well as of a burdened conscience.

That this is not an extravagant statement of the practical character of the difficulties which many feel on this subject, will be obvious to any one who is familiar with the unrecorded experience of inquirers when they are made to stand face to face with the doctrine of the sovereignty of God in their salvation.

In confirmation and in illustration of this statement, I may be permitted to refer to the experience of one who subsequently became a preacher. In an unpublished communication to a friend, some years after his conversion, he wrote respecting this theme as follows: "Few subjects open to me a deeper abyss than this. The attempt to speak of it recalls to me a period of my life when I can truly say: 'The pains of hell gat hold upon me.' I think I know the difficulties of a sinner burdened by his dependence upon a power out of himself for salvation. I have been all over that land of darkness and of the shadow of death. I have seen those difficulties piled up like Alps on Alps. I recall seven months of my life in which my mind beat about that thought of dependence upon the grace of God without a ray of light or of hope. I searched the scriptures. I read books of

devotion. I conversed with theologians. I ransacked their libraries for some explanation of the mystery which appeared to me then to be a contradiction to my natural ideas of justice. The gloom it created reached at last every part of God's word: I could read no hope there. It covered all nature: I could see no justice there. Sleep became more desirable to me than waking. The morning only woke me to a consciousness of misery; and the feeling excited in me by the sight of the busy world around me was a kind of bitter compassion that so many of them must soon end their little dream of life, and then awake to a wretchedness as complete as mine."

II. Conceding, then, the practical character of the perplexities which often surround the conjunction of these two ideas of responsibility and of dependence in the way of salvation, let us observe, in the second place, the grounds on which the doctrine of man's responsibility stands, and its practical relation to the sovereignty of God in conversion.

1. Responsibility, in any development of it, must rest primarily upon a species of independent evidence which a sound mind cannot resist. A man's own consciousness is the root of the matter. God has so constituted accountable being, that *what* it is is wrought into the consciousness *that* it is. Nothing can go below this; nothing can outrun this. Reasoning here can add nothing to knowledge. Analysis of free-agency can furnish no additional evidence of the fact. Dissection of the body discovers no evidence of vitality. No man can thus demonstrate his own responsibility; yet no man can rid himself of the conviction that he *is* responsible. This is the primal conviction of our moral being. It is to moral existence what the optic nerve is to the eye. It is one of those "high instincts"

> "Which, be they what they may,
> Are yet the fountain light of all our day;
> Are yet a master light of all our seeing:
> . . . . . .
> Truths that wake
> To perish never,

Which neither listlessness nor mad endeavor
. . . . . .
Can utterly abolish or destroy."

It stays by us when we would fling it from us. It follows hard after us when we would flee from the sight of it. Something holds us to it, more vigorous than logic. We cannot escape it; it is part of us. It is wrought into the structure of every language. Philosophers have reasoned it down; they have voted it out of the world by sage majorities; but the world will not let it go, nor will it let the world go, so long as the word "ought" is intelligible to a sane mind.

On this basis of *knowledge*, then, rests the responsibility of any man, regarded as the general condition of his being. But on the very same basis rests the responsibility of an awakened sinner for instant, absolute, and entire obedience to God's commands; and this at the very hour of his perplexities on the subject of a change of heart. No mind can possess more convincing evidences of its responsibility than that mind which is aroused to ask: "What must I do to be saved?" Such a one knows his responsibility for everything that God requires of him, as with open eye he knows light. Every pang of conviction proves this; every fear proves this. He is *conscious* of guilt in having been a sinner; he is *conscious* of guilt in being a sinner; he is *conscious* of guilt in continuing to be a sinner. His want of penitence is a sin to him. His want of love to God is a sin to him. The guilt is his own; he *feels* it rankling in his own soul. God could not affirm to him his responsibility more distinctly than by the voice of that angered conscience. If that truth were written in the heavens it could be no more authoritative. A revelation of it by one risen from the dead could make it no more sacred. He never has a more imperative disclosure of it to his soul than when his convictions of sin are most homefelt and his fear of eternity most intolerable. Black as may be the abyss in which the philosophy of regeneration seems to leave him, he cannot doubt the fact of his responsibility for being there, and for ceasing to be there at God's

bidding. If he seems to himself to doubt this, he is like an insane man who questions his own existence, and recounts to you the narrative of his own death and burial. The remark of Dr. Johnson upon the philosophical question of freedom is as truthful respecting the fact of a sinner's responsibility for all that God requires of him in salvation: "A man knows it, sir, and that is the whole of it."

2. It is instructive to observe the confidence which the human mind reposes in its knowledge of its own responsibility as this confidence is exhibited in a second fact: that the common sense of men never attributes to sin, however passionate or obdurate, the power to destroy responsibility. The infatuation of guilt never even impairs, in a healthy mind, the sense of the enormity of guilt. However rooted crime becomes, as if in the very nature of the criminal, until we say of him in loose dialect: It *is* his nature to lie, to steal, to murder; he does not know how to do otherwise; evil has possession of him; he hath a devil: yet we never in such modes of speech hold a sinner guiltless; we never loosen the gripe of responsibility upon his being. We still say, with the wise man: "His *own* iniquities shall take the wicked *himself;* and *he* shall be holden with the cords of *his* sins." Penal jurisprudence in civilized law is built upon this principal. It laughs at the fiction of moral insanity as a product of guilt.

Let this principle be illustrated in an occurrence which is yet fresh in our national history. We were told, a few years ago, of a man who sat in the councils of the country, the representative, as he said, of a gallant people; we were told that, under the impulse of revenge, he violated the laws of justice, of honor, of courage, and of civilized humanity, of all that a gallant people should respect. We heard — and did not our ears tingle at the story? — we heard that he crept stealthily, and armed to the teeth, into the highest legislative sanctuary of the land, and there, awaiting his time like an assassin, he felled to the floor a solitary, unarmed, and pinioned man; a man his superior in age, in official rank, in refinement of

taste, in classic learning, in patriotism, in integrity of conscience, in all that can dignify a gentleman and a statesman. Yet the gallant assassin told us: "I meant no wrong; I was conscious of no crime; I purposed only to inflict the chastisement which I would give to a servant or a dog." But what was our answer? We said by the mouth of one of our representatives, as you may remember: "That was a brutal and cowardly and murderous deed." Yet the noble assassin condesended to say to us: "No, oh no! you do me wrong; I did not know the force of the blows I struck; it was but a reed that I held in my hand; and that first blow aroused the demon in my heart; after that, I knew not what I did; and it was well for him, yes, it was well for him, that he did not resist my fury." But again, what was our answer? We compressed it with indignant lips; we said to the august assassin: "He smote his victim as Cain did his brother."

Did we not believe those words? Did we not hold the man to *be* a man, and therefore responsible for his blindfold conscience, and his infuriated passion, and for all the consequences? Did we not hold him guilty for not knowing what he did? Did we not believe it to have been his own spirit that was the demon in his heart? Was it not a free demon? Was it not a voluntary demon? Was it not a responsible demon? Who believes that he was unable to resist the impulses of that demoniacal possession? When the eyes of twenty millions flashed fire, and their lips execrated the deed, was it in rebuke of a poor lunatic who had strayed from the tombs? When the echo of those blows came back to us from the other side of the Atlantic, in the outcry of the civilized world, from Gibraltar to Siberia, against the barbarism of American institutions, was it a mistaken cruelty towards one whose dwelling was with the beasts of the field, and who did eat grass like oxen? Oh no, no! The common conscience of the world answers, No. The common sense of the world responds, No. The reverberation of cannon and the tramp of a million armed men have protested, No. Impartial History will confirm the verdict, No. Thoughtful

men, but a few months after, stood around an open grave. They shut their mouths in awe-struck silence. That which had not been told them, they saw; that which they had not heard, did they consider. They thought within themselves: Here lies a poor, deluded, blinded, infatuated sinner, but still a deluded *sinner*, a blinded *sinner*, an infatuated *sinner*. They thought of the verdict sometimes rendered at an inquest to which death has not given up its secret: "Died by visitation of God." Christian minds, the world over, when they heard of that untimely end, remembered God's own decree: "Bloody and deceitful men shall not live out half their days." And all the people said "Amen." So impossible is it to stultify the moral convictions of the world, by the figment of a moral responsibility destroyed by the obduracy or the passionateness of guilt.

3. A third fact adds the authority of revelation to that of conscience in testimony to the truth before us. It is that the scriptures hold man responsible for a compliance with the conditions of salvation. They hold him to account for the entire character which renders salvation a fact. This has never been intelligently questioned. It is one of the points of indubitable and unbroken alliance between revelation and conscience. The word of God is here but the echo of his work. The scriptures hold a sinner, an unregenerate sinner, responsible for repentance of sin and for faith in Christ, and for everything else which is a constituent of a regenerate character. No hint is given that this responsibility is at all dependent on the gift of regenerating grace. Duties and graces are urged upon the natural consciences of men, with no qualification whatever. To an unsophisticated reader men seem to be exhorted to repent and believe, to love, to trust, to obey, to adore, to praise, to be perfect as God is perfect, with the same freedom with which they are commanded to refrain from lying, from stealing, from murder. The inspired writers treat the whole subject with a boldness which is often startling, and yet refreshing, by the side of some of the wary and diplomatic methods of cate-

chetical theology. They do not seem to have been embarrassed by their own equally bold conceptions of the sovereignty of God. One whose mind has wandered over the immensity of these themes, with no practical object by which to test its convictions, and on which to concentrate them, may be astonished at the daring with which the inspired writers use the truths at which philosophy has stood aghast. It is the usual method of inspiration to assume the responsibility of a sinner, and to urge upon him the duties of repentance, of faith, of submission, of perfect obedience, unqualified by any mention whatever of his dependence upon God. Duty is urged as if a sinner had no concern with anything else than duty. Yet turn a leaf, and we see absolute dependence and eternal decree unrolled like the scroll of fate, with no proviso to save the freedom of a man; as if decree and dependence were the only pillars of God's government. If we are timid lest our theologic formulae should be unravelled in the process, we tremble when we read: "Wash you, make you clean"; "Without me ye can do nothing": "Make to yourselves a new heart"; Our sufficiency is of God": "Repent and be converted"; "He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy": "Submit yourselves unto God"; "And whom he will he hardeneth": "Work out your own salvation"; "It is God that worketh in you": "Awake thou that sleepest"; "The Lord hath poured upon you the spirit of a deep sleep": "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ"; "God shall send them delusion, that they should believe a lie": "Turn ye, turn ye, for why will ye die!" "That they all might be dammed which believe not the truth."

Pages of these paradoxical responses might be compiled from the scriptures. Are we prompt to exclaim: This is more than paradox; it is contradiction? It is such contradiction as Paul indulges when he says: "we are deceivers, yet true; unknown, yet well known; dying, yet we live; sorrowful, yet always rejoicing; poor, yet making many rich; having nothing, yet possessing all things." Such verbal contradictions are the profoundest harmonies. They are the

index of a masculine grasp of truth. It is not the way of great souls, moved by great truths, to be content with conceptions which can be sifted clean of paradox, and their residuum measured with algebraic exactness. Great truths have caverns of thought which lie below scientific language; and great minds are ever exploring those recesses. Thus it is with inspiration, which is only the greatness of divine thought. Inspired conception holds these opposites of truth with no sense of contradiction. A serenity of faith pervades the inspired thought upon them, like the tranquility which no tempest breaks at the bottom of the Atlantic. When such thought comes to be expressed in speech it refuses qualifications and provisoes. It takes on bold and craggy forms. It loves the mind that dares to speak it outright, and then leave it in the majesty of its singlenesss. Such is the celestial calmness with which inspired minds have dealt with the responsibility of man. They betray no sense of shame at their heedlessness of the divine honor in urging the claims of duty with an importunity which seems to forget all else than duty. A doubt of the completeness of man's responsibility for the discharge of his duty, and of the whole of it, is never tolerated by them. Those difficulties of inquiry which, if they mean anything, signify an implication of injustice in holding man accountable under the law of sovereignty, are met with rebuke rather than with reasoning: "Who art thou, O man, that repliest against God?"

4. From the authoritative tone with which both the consciousness of men and the word of God thus teach the responsibility of unregenerate mind we are led, in the fourth place, to infer the ability of an unregenerate sinner to obey all the divine commands which are laid upon him. What precisely do we mean by this? That an unregenenerate mind remaining unregenerate, can obey God? No; we do not so trifle with contradiction in terms. The carnal mind is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. A man with closed eyes does not see a precipice at mid-day, neither indeed can he see it; one step therefore may plunge him to the bot-

tom. But he can open his eyes; what then? Is there no difference between a man with voluntarily closed eyes and a blind man? Is there none between a man who will not see and a man *born* blind? So we do not deny the truism that a sinner remaining impenitent cannot repent; he cannot be and not be at the same moment. But he can choose not to remain impenitent; what then? Is there no difference between a sinner who cannot because he will not repent, and a sinner who cannot because he is "disabled" to will otherwise? Is there none between one who cannot because he will not and one who is *born* disabled? We use language, then, in the strict and proper sense of it, as the common mind interprets it, when we affirm the inevitable inference from human consciousness and the word of God, that an unregenerate sinner can obey all the commands of God.

A child's book exists in our Sabbath-school literature, with the simple yet profoundly philosophic title: "I can, because I ought." The fresh mind of childhood never denied the truth expressed in those words. The conscience of a child must be awed down by authority into unnatural contortions, before it will create the feeling or the belief of guilt in that child's heart for that which he did not originate and cannot control. "I can, because I ought:" Ability — the necessary inference from obligation; obligation — the measure of ability. The central truth which gives value to the tomes of theological lore on this subject is compressed into those words. It is impossible that reasoning should go below it or around it with the purpose of evasion. It is ultimate; thought can go no further. We reason around and around the immensity of the theme, and an invisible thread conducts us through the labyrinth back to the point at which we started, and at which every child can see as far as the keenest of us. "I can, because I ought": we struggle to go by this truth; we traverse the universe in our philosophic search for something beyond it; but at the circumference of our journey we have not outrun it, any more than we can outrun the evening star in search for the horizon. We plunge into the depths of our

own being in quest of something which consciousness may have treasured up beneath it, but at the bottom of all things we find it awaiting us, "a gem of purest ray serene." "I can, because I ought": it is one of those truths which we carry with us because it is a part of us. We cannot look into any mirror of truth without seeing the reflection of it. It is like an omnipresent Deity. It is indeed the voice of God within us. We may say of it: "Thou hast beset me behind and before; thou hast laid thy hand upon me. Whither shall I go from thy spirit? whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, behold thou art there; if I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall thy hand lead me: yea the darkness and the light are both alike to thee. Thou hast possessed my reins: I am fearfully and wonderfully made."

"I can, because I ought." This, then, is the conviction with which an inquiring sinner must meet the question of his own salvation. I can obey, because God requires me to obey. I can repent, because I feel guilty for not repenting. God would not demand of me to do what I cannot do. God would never have so constituted my being that I must feel guilty for not doing what I cannot do. This is the irresistible reasoning of any unsophisticated mind. The common sense of the world reasons so without hesitation and without exception. Teach your child that he has lied to you because he could not help it, and will he justify your rod? Teach a thief that he stole because the necessity of his avaricious nature was upon him, and will he look up self-condemned to your barred windows and bolted doors and armed sentinels? Teach a murderer that he shed the blood of his victim because *he* was the victim of an insane malignity over which he had no power, and will he confess the awful excellence of justice on your scaffold? If he does, it will be simply because he knows better than your teachings.

So, proclaim to an inquiring sinner that he is a sinner because he cannot be anything else; that he hates God

because it is his nature to hate God; that he is a depraved being and a child of wrath because he was born such; that he does not repent because he is impotent to repent; that he does not obey God because the power is not in him to obey God; that therefore if he is not saved it is because God has not elected him to salvation; and will he feel the damning guilt of his condition, the equity of his doom, the awful righteousness of the coming judgment? If he does so, it will be because Conscience and the Holy Ghost are mightier than your theology. Never, never does reason draw such conclusion from such premises. The common sense of the world never reasons so.

The common sense, moreover, refuses to be mystified in its reasonings by any distinction between power in character and power in act; between power to be and power to do. To the popular mind if a man cannot he cannot; and that is the end of it. Obligation, guilt, just condemnation, remorse, punishment honorable to law — not one of these can co-exist with impotence in the being of whom they are affirmed. No matter whether the sinfulness in question be innate depravity or that of an act of murder; the reasoning of the common sense is the same. Inability to *be* all that God requires is a bar to the justice of requirement, as absolute as inability to withold the stroke of a dagger is to the justice of the gibbet. An "insane murderer" is no more an impossible contradiction in any civilized court of law than a "disabled sinner" is at the bar of God. We count it to the honor of our humane civilization that our asylums, more sacred than "cities of refuge" from the avenger of blood, are thrown open to the insane homicide, and he is reverently cared for as a brother on whom the hand of God rests. If then it be conceivable that, anywhere in the universe, there are moral beings who are "disabled unto all good," shall not He whose ways are equal and whose name is Love find, somewhere among the still planets, a retreat where those afflicted spirits may hide themselves till their tangled and broken faculties shall be allured back again into symmetry and wholeness?

Shall such beings be left to call on the rocks and mountains to hide them from the face of Him that sitteth on the throne? Whose reason would not reel if this were true?

Thus, be it repeated, thus reasons the common sense of men. There is no sense in *reasoning* otherwise. If the opposite conviction is established, it must be by authority, not by reasoning. But it is unsafe to question, on any authority, such a primal conviction of the soul. It is hazardous to the integrity of mind in all its operations. It hoodwinks perception of right and wrong. It blunts sensibility to good and evil. It deadens, therefore, the soul's response to the nature of God as a God of equity and of judgment. Moreover, such a denial of the mind's necessary belief is unphilosophical. So to use any conceivable authority as to array it by sheer power against a first principle of belief, is to defeat that very authority in the very act of its assertion; for the foundation of all authority over intelligent belief is inundated and swept away in the process. Faith has then no more bottom to stand on than reason. Both go to wreck together. If I cannot trust one necessary belief, I cannot another. I have nothing left on which to build faith in a revelation. My soul then sinks in unbelief to depths immeasurable, in which all that it knows is that it knows nothing, believes nothing, hopes nothing. To borrow a similitude, such denial of ability to obey a command of God is to the whole structure of a moral being like the magnetic mountain to the navigator in the Arabian story. As he sailed alongside of it, it drew out the clamping-irons of his vessel, and the timbers fell asunder, and the ship was wrecked, though in still waters on a summer's day.

Once more, "I can, because I ought." We cast reflection, then, upon God's honor if we deny this in respect of obedience to his commands in the way of salvation. We implicate the word of God in a collision with his works; and we involve his work, in the structure of a soul, in a more awful conflict with itself. We should be jealous for the divine prerogative in this thing. Shall the thing formed have rea-

son to say unto Him that formed it: "Why hast thou made me thus?"

5. We are prepared, then, to observe, in the fifth place, that in this view of responsibility there is no conflict with the truth of a sinner's dependence upon the Holy Spirit. Reason affirms no conflict here any more than revelation. If a sinner is not dependent on regenerating grace for ability to do his duty, he is not dependent on regenerating grace for anything that is essential to responsibility for the performance of his duty. If dependence is not for the power but for the will to obey, reason has no more difficulty than faith in determining responsibility. Not only is no contradiction proved, but none is suggested between responsibility and dependence. We cannot properly speak of reconciling these truths; we can discern no variance between them to be removed. Our conceptions of them fall into the same ease and harmony of thought in which they seem to have lain in inspired minds. The dependence of a being who is responsible because able to do all that God requires of him, is no more the dependence of necessity, but the dependence of sheer guilt. It is not the dependence of a diseased man upon the herb that shall restore him. It is not the dependence of a disabled man upon the surgeon who shall set the broken limb. It is not the dependence of the man with a withered hand upon the miracle that shall make it whole like the other. It is the dependence of a perverse man, who of himself will not be other than a perverse man, upon the power that shall incline him to obedience. It is the dependence of a liar, who of himself will not be other than a liar, upon the influences that induce him to be truthful. It is the dependence of a murderer, who of himself will not be other than a murderer, upon the friend who shall persuade him to put up his dagger into its sheath. This, which in kind and when applied to elemental changes of character, is the most profound and terrific dependence under which a moral being can exist, stands side by side with responsible being, with no collision, with not a breath of discord between them. The two thoughts

are like angels locked hand in hand, in ministering to God's will and vindicating his way to men.

Is it still said that mystery hangs over the whole conception of a being who can but will not be other than a sinner until God constrains him? True; it is the great marvel of the universe that any being *will* not obey God. Is it said that mystery covers the junction of Divine influence with human power in the change of a sinner's heart? True; and the savage fled in terror from the artist's studio when he first saw his own portrait, because he could not understand the mystery of the artist's pencil, which could so represent him on the canvas without abstracting a part of him. Is it said that mystery buries in darkness the turning-point of character at which a sinner becomes a changed being; a sinner who now, without God, will not be other than a sinner, yet then, through God, is a believer; who now will not but be a child of wrath, yet then is an heir of glory; that we cannot penetrate to the heart of this? True; great is the mystery of godliness. And not unlike this mystery is the fact that a man cannot see the power of his own vision; cannot look at the nerve which lies back of his own eyeball; cannot take in his hand the filament which connects that nerve with the spiritual seer who is behind it. But mystery is not contradiction. It is not even a seeming contradiction. An apparent absurdity *is* an absurdity to us until we believe, and have reason to believe, it to be only apparent. Mystery is not this; it is only a hint of magnitude. We must fall back, therefore, upon the conviction of responsibility for guilt, and of the dependence of guilt, as upon two of the elemental truths on which rests the government of God over our world. We may think and speak of them at our ease, without the most secret suspicion of their inconsistency, or fear of a collision. We may preach them as inspired men have preached them, with intensity of conception, with boldness of speech, with singleness of aim. These are the only methods in which they can be preached by men who are in earnest.

III. Let us then, in conclusion, observe some of the results of this discussion as they bear specifically upon the methods of the pulpit in addressing inquirers after the way of salvation.

1. The pulpit should urge upon men the performance of the conditions of salvation with the same unrestricted freedom of speech with which it would press the discharge of any other duty. Men should be invited, persuaded, entreated, commanded to repent and believe, with the same unqualified boldness with which we should teach them to speak the truth, to pay an honest debt, to befriend the widow and the fatherless. Responsibility is as perfect in the one class of duties as in the other. Duty is as absolute. The responsibility in both cases rests upon the same immutable basis — the intrinsic justice of a Divine command, and the indestructible ability of man to obey. The sinner is responsible for repentance and faith to the full extent of Divine requirement, simply because God requires them and because the sinner is able to render them. The pulpit should seek to penetrate with this conviction the soul of every man who would know what he must do to be saved. We owe it to the simplicity of the truth to clear it of contradictions in the troubled thoughts of an inquirer. We should strip it of factitious mystery. We should let the absolute sacredness of Duty, backed by the sanctions of Eternity, come home to the conscience in words simple and few, without qualification or proviso.

The fiction of inability to obey a command of God, with which an inquiring mind is often blinded, should be commonly treated as a Satanic suggestion. That conviction of inability does not exist often in such a mind in the forms of metaphysic and theologic statement in which technical definition makes the fiction a truth. A mind oppressed by fear of hell is in no mood, commonly, to appreciate our philosophical distinction between "natural" and "moral" inability. The plea of inability by which a convicted sinner parries duty, exists in the plain, homely sense of words which mean to the distracted soul just what they seem to mean in literal

speech. "Cannot" is "cannot," nothing more, nothing less. It conveys but one idea. That idea has to him no metaphysical double sense. It is intensely literal, and as intensely false. It arrays Conscience and Fact, God and Truth, in defiant hostility to each other. The sinner says to his soul: "God commands me to do this thing — I cannot; God commands me to repent — I cannot; God commands me to believe — I cannot. He commands, knowing that I cannot obey. It is as if he commanded me to restore the lost Pleiad." This conviction, we repeat, in this unscientific form in which it holds inquiring souls in bondage, should be treated as a stupendous delusion. The inquirer should be thrown back upon the imperative teachings of the scriptures and of the common sense. He should be made to feel that in cherishing such a sense of impotence he is clinging to the refuge of a falsehood. He is stultifying his own reason, defying his own conscience, and charging God with crime. We have no right, my brethren, we have no right as ministers of truth, to suffer a sinner to go from our ministrations to the bar of God in the dilemma of either falsifying his reason or repudiating his conscience, and therefore with all the forces of truth thrown into panic in his soul, through the contradiction of his necessary beliefs to our delivery of God's commands.

It is unphilosophical and unsafe, as well as unscriptural, to preach the duty of repentance less imperatively than inspired men have preached it. We have no authority to lengthen or to soften the peremptory words of the Holy Ghost. We should not so far yield to the fiction of inability as to say to the inquiring sinner: "Repent if you can; try to repent; repent of such sins as you can repent of; use the means of repentance; pray that you may be enabled to repent"; and to *say no more*. It is neither reasonable nor scriptural to entice a sinner up thus to a side-look upon his duty, and *leave him there*. He should be led around to the front, and urged to face the truth in its imperative singleness — "Repent"; and this with the full force of the impli-

cation, and if need be, the statement that he *can* repent. With Divine grace or without it, regenerate or unregenerate, elect or non-elect, his responsibility is as perfect as God can make it. Radically, it does not depend on Divine grace. Temptation does not fundamentally affect it. "God doth not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are able." The unregenerate sinner should be taught that he has the power to do anything which God has the will to command. We never get the unbroken force of Conscience over to the side of truth otherwise.

But is not the preaching of an unqualified responsibility perilous? Will not a sinner be tempted to revel in his freedom? Will he not say within himself: "My soul is my own; salvation is in my own power; I have but to will it, and Heaven is at my bidding; Soul, thou hast much goods laid up for many years in this power to repent at thy pleasure; take thine ease?" Perhaps so; what distortion will not sin prompt in evasion or in caricature of truth? Yet God does not therefore abolish the perils of probation. It were sufficient to say that He who spake as never man spake thus preached repentance in bold and unguarded words. But here, as elsewhere, truth carries it sown safeguards. For,

2. A second consequence of the principles we have considered is, that the pulpit should proclaim the dependence of a sinner upon the Holy Ghost for the will to repent as being a *more* profound reality than if it were dependence for the power to repent.

Two methods are here suggested of preaching the doctrine of Divine Sovereignty. They may have the same end in view, may be adopted with equal conscientiousness, and may be prompted by the same devout desire to honor God. Yet they are very unequal in the depth to which they penetrate truth, and the force with which they use it. They are very dissimilar also in the skill with which they avoid perversions of the truth in the result. The one method is to exalt the sovereignty of God in salvation as a work of mere Power. The other is to exalt the sovereignty of God in salvation as

a work of Moral Government. In the one case, God is made to appear sovereign of a sinner's destiny, as he is of the elements in a tempest. He can say to the passions of guilt: Be still; and they shall obey him. His sway of the soul is like his sway of the sea. Both are exhibitions of power — grand, magnificent, overwhelming it may be, but still power, and that only. The final impression of the beholder is that of the glory of Omnipotence. In the other case, God is represented as sovereign in the work of salvation under the conditions of a moral system. He ordained those conditions from eternity. They are sacred to him. His own integrity is pledged to them. He cannot violate them with impunity to his own consciousness of rectitude. They were planned in the counsels of eternity for the display of his moral glory as supreme over his natural perfections. His sway of a soul, therefore, is unique. It is like nothing else in the heavens above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth. It is not an exercise of power only. The final impression upon a beholder is not that of omnipotence supremely; but of omnipotence in the service of justice, holiness, truth, love. It is that of infinite power regulated by infinite integrity. The perspective of the system is so adjusted that the spectator shall look through the natural to the moral disclosures of the Divine glory. He sees, not unlimited Force driving before it an insensate thing, but infinite Holiness swaying a free mind, through all the sinuosities of its choice, by the delicate, intricate, and balanced working of moral laws.

Now, the difference between these two methods of representing the sovereignty of God in salvation is vital to the pulpit. It corresponds to the difference between Might and Right. It is just the difference between appeal to the sense of weakness and appeal to the sense of sin. It is vitally significant to the pulpit in several respects. In the first place, a preacher can much more easily impress upon men a sense of the sovereignty of might than that of the sovereignty of right. A fallen mind takes in the idea of a God of power more spontaneously than that of a God of rectitude. Again,

an awakened soul, agitated by fear, is specially receptive of the truth of Divine Power; yet that soul goaded by remorse, and quick to spring to anything that shall help it to fling elsewhere the load of its guilt, is specially impervious to the truth of Divine integrity. A God sovereign by might is less uncongenial with the bitterness of its spirit than a God sovereign by right. Still further, the drift of a tempted soul is to accept the conviction of God's power at the *expense* of his justice. The leanings of guilt are all one way. Subjection to an infinite tyranny is less revolting to it than submission to infinite equity.

Is there, then, no peril indicated here to our preaching of the Divine Sovereignty? Is there no danger that the scriptural proportions of truth may become distorted in the portraiture we draw of the Divine government? What if in our solicitude to exalt the power of God we so depict it that we unwittingly elevate it above his holiness? Is there no danger then? What if we so imperiously proclaim his omnipotence over a guilty soul that the practical impression upon that soul obscures all sense of his equity, his sincerity, his honor, his love? Is there no risk then? What if we so preach, as God's vicegerents, that, though unconscious of any such design, we throw out discordant fragments of the truth this way and that, and they happen to fall in with the cavils of a tempted spirit, and seem to consolidate its sense of sheer dominion at the expense of all the holy and amiable attributes of God in his moral government? Is there no hazard there? What if, to make sure that the Divine authority shall not be understated, we seem, though we should be shocked by the imputation of any such purpose, yet we seem to the common sense of our hearers to build God's government upon principles which would doom any human government on earth to execration? Is there no peril in that?

Yet, from these two methods of regarding Divine sovereignty arise corresponding methods of preaching the dependence of a sinner upon the Holy Spirit for salvation. By the one method, it is the dependence of necessity; by the other,

the dependence of guilt. The dependence is absolute in either case. No interest of truth is served by ignoring or retrenching that. So long as a sinner will not repent without Divine grace, his dependence upon that grace is as perfect in degree, though not the same in kind, as if he could not repent. But because it is not the same in kind, the moral significance of it is unspeakably the more intense. As necessity knows no law, so the dependence of necessity knows no guilt. It has no moral significance. Not so the dependence which our subject teaches. The very groundwork of this is guilt, and guilt only. Thus the pulpit should proclaim it. We should so preach a sinner's dependence upon the Holy Ghost as to keep the moral rectitude of God in the foreground of his power. The helplessness of which we seek to make the sinner conscious should be, not the helplessness of disease, but the helplessness of sin. We should picture him to his own conscience, not primarily as infirmity leaning upon infinite strength, but as guilt resting against infinite holiness. We should portray a dependence which can give him no peace so long as he remains impenitent. It should be a dependence which brings together all the elements of God's moral government to intensify the holiness of God on the one hand, and on the other the sinfulness of sin. It should heap the whole burden of sin upon the sinner's own will.

Preaching, then, should be clear and bold in its implications, and if need be in its assertions, of this dependence of guilt, and of guilt only, while impenitence holds out. Our exhortations to an impenitent sinner should imply, and if needful say to him: "You can repent; you can turn to God; you ought to do it; by every principle of equity and of honor, he holds you responsible for doing it; but this is the very head and front of your offending, that you will not do it till his grace constrains you. It depends, therefore, upon his sovereign will whether you shall be saved or lost. The more profound your guilt the more absolute is your dependence; and the more absolute your dependence the more aggravated

is your guilt. Each is the gauge of the other. Time consolidates both. Left to yourself, therefore, you must *more* surely perish, and more hopelessly, than if you could not repent. The climax of your peril is in resistance to the Holy Ghost. Years in ease are years of defiance to infinite holiness. The one sin which shall not be forgiven, neither in this world nor in the world to come, is sin against the Holy Ghost. There is a sin unto death; I do not say that ye should pray for it."

But are not such conceptions of dependence and guilt repellant? Do they not shock hope? Does not such preaching therefore invite despair? Yes, if impenitence be incorrigible. Truth and sin are implacable foes. It is one of the perils of their contact that it may hasten the catastrophe of a soul's ruin. Yet here again, the preaching of truth provides its own defences by suggesting all the alleviation of its terrors which can be beneficent to a sinner in his impenitence. Not only are his cavils against the rectitude of God's government silenced, but,

3. A third result from the principles we have reviewed is, that the pulpit is at liberty to proclaim the offer of the Holy Spirit to the sinner as being in unqualified language the gift of God's mercy. We preach it not as the gift of justice to necessity; not even as the gift of pity to misfortune; but as the gift of mercy to guilt. Were man's dependence upon God in regeneration a dependence for power to repent, regeneration could be only an act of justice — nothing more. Grace should be no more grace. If a preacher must say to an awakened sinner: "True, you cannot obey God, but the Holy Spirit can enable you to obey; you have no power to repent, but the Holy Spirit can give you repentance; you have no ability to believe, but the Holy Spirit can give you faith"; the reply is inevitable: "Then the gift of the Holy Spirit is my right in equity; I have a claim in eternal justice to regeneration, if commands are laid upon me which I cannot obey without it. Impossible duties are the demand of tyranny." To inquiring minds this reasoning is as resistless

as lightning. They are astonished that it does not strike the pulpit dumb.

But we preach the gospel of salvation with no such lurid logic in the background. We are free to proclaim the work of the Holy Ghost as the gift of Mercy to Guilt. Behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed! While we are yet sinners, grace comes to our deliverance. The sinner in the very act of sin, at the very height of rebellion, able to yield, but persistent in treason, with power calling upon guilt and guilt responding to power, is overtaken, enclosed, and subdued by regenerating love. Such is the reach of infinite mercy. Let the pulpit be jubilant in proclaiming the gift of the Holy Ghost as a token, superadded to the gift of Christ, of the sincerity of God in his desire to save lost men. Let us exult in the strains of Biblical invitation, promise, expostulation. The gift of the Holy Spirit is proof in act that they mean just what they seem to mean: "Ho, every one that thirsteth; The Spirit and the Bride say come; Whosoever will, let him come; I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked; Why will ye die?"

But after all, will not such preaching fail through want of individuality in a sinner's faith in it? Will he not say: "True, God is infinitely holy and infinitely merciful; but what is that to *me?* How do I know that he purposes to regenerate *me?* Must I not await his time for my salvation? Is not the dependence of guilt just as hopeless as the dependence of necessity? Is not the certainty of sin the certainty of damnation?" Yes; if a sinner *will* have it so. But truth benignly pursues him even to this selfish isolation in his guilt. For,

4. A fourth result of the principles we have discussed is, that the pulpit is free to assure men that they have every encouragement to immediate repentance which is possible to a state of sin. Holy encouragement is not possible to hope in incorrigible guilt. But a sinner, once convinced of sin, has all the encouragement that he *can* have to immediate action in the duty of repentance. He has the assurance of the benig-

nity of God's command to repent; of his own ability to obey; of the complacency of God in every desire he cherishes to obey; of the co-working of the Holy Spirit even in every conviction he feels that he ought to obey; of the sincerity of the Spirit in the very pressure of which he is conscious of the motives to obey; and of the possibility that even now the Spirit may overpower his guilt, and make him willing to obey. Beyond this, holy encouragement cannot extend. No honest soul will ask for more than this. If a sinner accepts other cheer than this, it is because his is not an honest soul. Anything less or more than this simple urgency of immediate duty in reliance upon the Holy Ghost, would only deepen the hopelessness of a sinner in his guilt. No other exhortation comes right home to his emergency as this does: "Work, for God worketh in thee." This is no mockery. It is intensely real, as expressing both God's sincerity and the sinner's duty. The practical force of that much-abused exhortation is simply this: Be in earnest to save yourself, because God is in earnest to save you. Salvation, then, is sure, in the act of instant repentance. This is what the sinner must *do* to be saved.

But is the inquiry still pressed: Will the Holy Spirit certainly bless my endeavors? We answer: What endeavors? The endeavors of guilt to evade the consciousness of guilt? No: When He the Spirit of truth is come, he will reprove the world of sin. But again, what endeavors? Endeavors to be saved in the indulgence of sin? No: the fruit of the Spirit is in all goodness and righteousness and truth. But again, what endeavors? Endeavors to fasten the responsibility of sin and its fruits upon the sovereignty of God's decrees? Nay, but who art thou, O man, that repliest against God? Yet again, what endeavors? The endeavors of an earnest spirit to believe and love and obey? Thus saith the high and lofty One who inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy: "I *dwell* with him that is of a contrite and humble spirit."

But, does a sinner say: "Mine is not a contrite spirit; can

I then be assured that God will give me repentance? Is that irreversible decree, formed before the world was, anywhere revealed to me that, taking me just as I am, God will change my heart?" We answer, No. God gives no such assurance. He reveals no such decrees. He has no answer to give to such inquiry. We listen, as that cry goes up to the throne of mercy, and there is silence in heaven. We hear no responses in the air; we see no handwriting in the clouds. He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy:

> "Not Gabriel asks the reason why,
> Nor God the reason gives."

This is the point precisely to which the whole bearing of the pulpit should conduct men in their search for peace to their souls — that they stand face to face with God, dependent for eternal life upon his good pleasure, with every possible encouragement, even to the assurance of salvation, in instant obedience to his commands, and with nothing but despair in disobedience or in delay. What God purposes to do respecting the regeneration of any soul he has not revealed to any mortal ear. He does not ask our attention nor invite our inquiries to that secret of his own will. He urges upon our thoughts our own doing; what we have done, what we must do. There is no secret about that; it is open and clear as the morning.

But what if such preaching of the gospel fails? What if its only fruit is to awaken the lamentation of the preacher: "To whom is the arm of the Lord revealed"? Even then, truth is its own vindication, and the ways of God are equal. For,

5. The final consequence from the principles we have contemplated is, that the pulpit should proclaim a sinner's destruction to be always his own doing. A preacher may be called to portray the history of the Holy Spirit's work on many souls in the words once dropped in tears over Jerusalem: "How often would I . . . . . but ye would not." Our proclamation should be, that it does not extenuate a lost sinner's guilt that God never decreed to regenerate him. Where is the sinner's claim to that decree? Not in defect of responsi-

bility; that has been without fracture from the first to the last. Not in default of knowledge; his knowledge and his duty have but measured each other. Not in bondage of probation; his probation never rose above the level of his freedom. Not in severity of temptation; temptation at its floodtide was but opportunity for more blessed achievement. His liberty to obey God's commands was infinitely more sacred in God's sight than in his own. Never was its awful sanctity suspended or overborne for one moment. God has guarded it as the apple of his eye. To no being in the universe, then, is the perdition of a sinner to be primarily ascribed but to himself.

But this is not all. We must proclaim the history of a lost soul in words of more intense significance. That is not a history of negative probation. God has never thrust a sinner upon trial in the sheer strength of his freedom, and *let him alone*. God has been more than just to him. By the very conditions of his being, the sinner has been the object of all the amiable affections of the Divine nature. He has been placed upon an infinitely beneficent system of trial. He has been instructed in all that God has held him accountable for; his own intuitions have taught him; the works of God have enlightened him; his own conscience has been the foreshadow of the judgment to him; there has never been an hour of his moral being when he did not know enough for his salvation. Everything that he has known of God has assumed also the benign form of a dissuasive from sin; his experience has generated countless motives to obedience; his steps have been thronged by them as by pleading spirits; but for his guilt, his conscience alone would have been an ever-present song of God's love to him; if he has had Christian training, the disclosures of redemption have opened upon him the most intense system of allurements to holiness known to the universe; the teachings of wise men, the prayers of good men, the visions of inspired men, and the ministrations of angels have stretched a cordon of holy sympathies around him; the cross of Christ has blocked his way

to destruction more impassably than by a flaming sword; intercession in heaven has been made for him with hands uplifted in which were the prints of the nails; the Holy Spirit has striven with him to turn him back, by all the devices which infinite ingenuity could frame at the bidding of infinite compassion; his history has been one long struggle against obstacles to the suicide of his soul; he has sought out, and discovered, and selected, and seized upon, and made sure of, his *own* way over and around and through them, to the world of despair. *He* has done it — *he*, and not another. Such is every lost life. Is it any marvel that a lost soul is speechless?

ARTICLE VII.

PROFESSOR HERMANN HUPFELD.

(TRANSLATED FROM THE "NEUE EVANGELISCHE KIRCHENZEITUNG," MAY 19, 1866.)

PROFESSOR HERMANN HUPFELD, D.D., who died at Halle on the twenty-fourth of April of this year, was the first-born son of the clergyman Bernhard Karl Hupfeld, who died at Spangenburg, in the electorate of Hessen, in 1823, but whose widow died only two years ago, at the advanced age of ninety-two years, after having seen all her children except her eldest son pass away before her. This son was born March 31, 1796, at Marburg, in the house of his grandfather, to which place his father — then pastor in Doernberg — had brought his wife for security, on account of the unsettled condition of things in the former place growing out of the war. Hupfeld's childhood was spent in that village; from the age of six to that of thirteen he lived in Melsungen on the Fulda, whither his father had been called as second preacher. Together with a younger brother, he pursued the study of the classics and other branches of learning under the tuition of his father. From this mild, paternal school, however, on occasion of a foot-trip to South Germany, undertaken with several acquaintances under the charge of their tutor, he was, after passing his thirteenth year, transferred to a vastly more rigorous one, taught by an unmarried maternal uncle, the pastor Sigel, at Siglingen, near Heilbronn. Here he found himself suddenly removed from a numerous circle of brothers, sisters, and playmates to a solitary room, alone with his books and tasks, and — since his uncle from lack of time attended merely to the general supervision of his studies — left almost entirely to himself. Thus Hupfeld early learned to teach himself. The subjects which he specially attended to besides ancient languages and religious studies, were mathematics, physics, logic, psychology (according to Reinhard's Ethics, Vol. I.), and ethics (among other works, Garve on Cicero de Officiis), with which were connected various useful exercises, such as the sketching of plans of well-composed books, writing out sermons that he had heard, composition of written essays (which, however, seemed to him a real torture), and the giving of instruction in subjects familiar to him both in the public school and to private persons.

"The effect of this education on my mental development," writes Hupfeld himself, in his autobiography (Justi's "Fortsetzung der Hessischen Gelehrtengeschichte," by Strieder Marburg, 1831, p. 279), "during a stay of two years was immense. The dreams and floating images that

play around the boy's head had given place to the full daylight of a clear self-consciousness, and settled into fixed ideas; from a playful boy I had grown into an attentive and critical observer of myself as well as of the human life around me; I had in my fifteenth year discovered a world within me. Moreover, the pietism of my instructor had filled me with enthusiasm for Christianity and my chosen vocation of preacher; I was, as it were, consecrated as a future champion of the oppressed church of God. Still, this style of instruction, unquestionably in many respects one-sided and unnatural, involved many disadvantages which greatly hindered my subsequent growth and happiness; especially a premature and disproportionate preponderance of the speculative and critical faculty, to the total neglect of poetry and history, by which means both my perception and presentation of facts were involved in untold difficulties ..... the disturbance of physical growth in the years most important for it, and all sorts of bad habits, which were the source of subsequent sufferings." Thus impartially did Hupfeld judge respecting himself.

In November, 1811, he left that quiet place of abode, and, after a short visit at home, entered the gymnasium at Hersfeld, where was already a younger brother of his. Here he encountered a mode of life almost the complete opposite of the other; but it was not able to exercise any considerable influence on him. Of course, however, many important gaps in his education were filled up, and his intercourse with the old classic writers assumed a more scientific character. To the boyish circle into which he had entered, the precocious youth, with his firmness of character, could not well adapt himself; he was, and continued to be, a strange phenomenon, receiving, however, ready tolerance and respect, and being even not without a stimulating influence on the literary spirit of the upper classes.

After a stay of a year and a half at Hersfeld, Hupfeld entered, at Easter, 1813, the University of Marburg, where he was matriculated as student of theology by the church historian Münscher. Active participation in the war of liberation was forbidden him by his feeble health and his short-sightedness. In accordance with the laws of the stipendiary establishment of Hessen-Cassel, in which he had become a pupil, and with his own tastes, he attended first to general science and biblical exegesis. In his philological studies he was kindly assisted by Dissel, who gave himself to the talented and ambitious youth with a veritable devotion. In this department he obtained besides, much stimulus and exercise through the philological *seminarium*, as also by the instruction in the *pedagogium*, which from his second term he imparted for several years, but especially through a philological society founded, in 1814, by himself with some elder friends — von Cölln, Münscher (eldest son of the above-mentioned professor, now director of the gymnasium at Hersfeld), Hess, and Rehm — which was later enlarged by the accession of several professors, and in which the essays on Sophocles, afterwards made over into an inaugural dissertation had their

origin. In history he was much indebted to the forcible and eloquent lectures of Wachler, who also in other respects proved himself Hupfeld's sympathizing patron. Of the philosophical lectures none attracted him except those on psychology, after he had, through the study of Krug's writings, lost respect for the profundities of philosophy. In the department of exegesis he selected as his guide the excellent Arnoldi, of the Dutch school, and attended especially the lectures on the Old Testament, for which he was already prepared by some acquaintance with the dialects, devoting himself to the study with great diligence, as is shown by a collection, still preserved, of quotations from all the sources then accessible to him. With all the partiality, however, which Hupfeld even so early had for this department, he yet did not dare to fix on it as his life vocation, because the learning of his teacher presented to the modest youth so lofty an ideal of the Old Testament exegete as seemed to him attainable by few others.

With regard to theology itself, Hupfeld fell at this time into difficulties which troubled him all the more, the more theology was to him a matter of the heart and conscience. "The philosophical difficulties," he writes, "made, it is true, little impression on me; *Christianity always seemed to me to be a philosophy of inexhaustible depth*, and on this score quite secure; but the traces of the operation of human causes in the biblical histories and religious ideas, especially the analogies with the rest of antiquity, disturbed my supranaturalistic notions all the more. My only hope rested on a comprehensive investigation of the universal ancient world, by which..... perhaps our whole view of it might be reconstructed; and this was to be for the future the point of view of my philological studies." In the autumn of 1817 Hupfeld was examined by the theological faculty, and received his first degree from the philosophical, and spent the following winter at his father's house in Spangenberg.

At this time, in consequence of his essay on Sophocles, propositions were made to him both by Dissen in Göttingen and Creuzer in Heidelberg, to take the position of teacher; but he felt constrained to decline them, because he hesitated about entering so early the academic arena. He undertook now a journey of several months in South Germany, and then accepted the position of *stipendiatenmajor* in Marburg, together with that of assistant preacher with the first Reformed preacher; which course, however, interfered seriously with his scientific projects. Hence, he complied, at Easter, 1819, with an invitation of his old teacher, Schuppius, who in the meantime had become director of the gymnasium at Hanau, to assume the position of third teacher in that gymnasium, but resigned it again in 1822, because his health had suffered too much from the exertions incident to it.

After having nearly recovered his health by a foot-trip in Switzerland and by the use of the Würtemberg mineral waters at Deinach and Kans-

tadt, Hupfeld returned home to Spangenberg, in order to resume his theological studies and to prepare himself to undertake the duties of a preacher. The beginning he made in his way with the Old Testament. Scarcely had he taken a closer and more comprehensive view of this, than he passed out of his previous state of uncertainty into a firm conviction, respecting which he himself says: "There opened itself to my view an historically developed train of religious ideas, the concatenation of which, controlling the human mind as necessarily as if they were supernaturally imparted to it, yet without annulling the unmistakable freedom of its activity, proclaims the agency of the Divine Spirit, and affords to the heart in search of something sure and certain a sufficient anchor of security against the caprice of human fancies."

After studying a year and a half by himself, he was compelled to leave home by the death of his father, and in the spring of 1824 he went to Halle, in order to perfect himself under Gesenius for his chosen vocation, and received from this scholar the most kindly assistance. Yet, not finding his wants sufficiently satisfied in the lectures, he continued here also his old course of teaching himself, the fruits of which — mostly of a lexicographical character — met with Gesenius's commendation. In the autumn of 1824 he was "habilitated" in Halle, and busied himself the following winter principally in elaborating an essay on the Ethiopic language, which was favorably noticed in the "Heidelberger Jahrbücher," and the "Hallische Literatur-Zeitung." Notwithstanding his good prospects in Halle, and cordial invitations to remain, Hupfeld returned, true to his original purpose, to his beloved fatherland; but not till after Hartmann's death, in the spring of 1827, was he appointed professor *ordinarius* of the oriental languages, retaining the professorship (*extraordinarius*) of theology which had before been conferred on him, and which was not transformed into an ordinary professorship until after 1830, on occasion of his being called to go abroad.

The first opportunity for realizing his practical ideas within his own sphere and for exercising his organizing faculty, was found by Hupfeld (by virtue of an old academic corporative university constitution, retained in Marburg more than elsewhere) in the affairs of the university, to which he devoted himself in the various branches of academic administration with fondness and zeal, and at least in part with good success. The political revolution in Hessen in 1830 occasioned him, in connection with his friend Bickell, to petition for a reform of the ecclesiastical constitution, and they succeeded in securing the appointment of members of a "Superior Church Commission" for this purpose; but the commission, though it sincerely sought to discharge its duty, accomplished nothing of lasting benefit. But the personal acquaintance thus made with Hassenpflug, who soon afterwards became leading minister, was not without its results for the two scholars and for the university. Hupfeld, notwithstanding the sharp-

ness with which he declared his opposition to the minister's whole style of thinking, enjoyed his confidence to such an extent that the latter, up to the time of his resignation (1837) allowed him a large influence in the conduct of the affairs of the university. Hupfeld in the supplement to his autobiography (O. Gerland, Fortsetzung der Strieder-Justi'schen Hessischen Gelehrtengeschichte; Kassel, 1865, I. p. 308) writes: "I hold myself all the more bound to say this to his praise, the louder and more unanimous is the condemnation which has befallen the man from whom, after his subsequent acts, I myself had to withdraw. That he was no ordinary man, I have evidence in my own experience, in the fact that he so long endured so severe and burdensome a monitor as I was (I made it a point of duty to tell him the full truth on every occasion that presented itself), while it was yet so easy for him to get rid of me. It is sad — and for Hessen has proved disastrous — that a man of such energy and talent, who in more peaceful times might have been a blessing to his country, hardened, through the passions of party strife (and that on both sides) and bad counsellors, more and more against the voice of public opinion and of conscience, should have fallen into such errors and come to such an end."

In 1843 Hupfeld accepted a call to Halle as successor of his teacher Gesenius, who died in 1842, and from whom he had received in 1834 the honorary diploma of Doctor of Theology. Hupfeld was loth to leave his loved Hessen and Marburg; but he thought himself not justified in declining the honorable call to this wider sphere of action. "I had," he writes, "to pay for my resolution with the happiness of my life; for I had been scarcely three months in Halle when my guardian angel, my true wife [he was married in 1832 to the daughter of Prof. Suabedissen], was snatched from my side by nervous fever (brought on by the extraordinary exertions incident to the removal), and left me alone in the midst of a strange world, with six little children, one of them a suckling." This heart-wound inflicted on the man of deep feeling, who loved beyond expression, in death as well as in life, his wife, who was endowed with the richest gifts of heart and mind, as also with the charms of rare physical beauty, was never closed, though this deep pain, only made less keen by time, made him for his five surviving children (two daughters and three sons) a father all the more faithful and tender.

Also in his official relations, on leaving the corporative academic life of Marburg, guarded by the Hessian love of right and order, and going to Prussia, he did not fail to meet with various disappointments, so that, though he had formerly so gladly taken part in the concerns of the academic commonwealth, he now felt constrained to withdraw from them. His conscientious spirit and love of truth was especially vexed by the now prevalent "Zeugnissunwesen" (testimonial nuisance), through which, he said, the testimonials made out respecting attendance on lectures had become a "grand lie," and he fought perseveringly against it. Mindful,

too, of how much he himself, when a student, had profited in his studies through personal intercourse with his teachers, Hupfeld generously devoted himself to studious youths, not only in the lecture-room, but also in his walks and in his hospitable house.

Although Hupfeld was master of large stores of learning, yet he was no mere book-worm. He took a deep interest in the welfare of his fatherland. Persistent especially was his participation in the great political movements of 1848 and the following years, the "Volksblatt," then published in Halle, the editorship of which he had a part in, giving him a favorable opportunity. There thus originated a valuable series of articles which gave expression to his sense of justice and his political convictions (formed especially by the study of English institutions) respecting the right and popular form of government (self-government under the control of law); the establishment of the German empire on an historical basis; the destination of Prussia to acquire a moral hegemony in the confederation, etc. And as Hupfeld in 1848–49 contended against anarchy, so he became later, as he says, a "sorrowful, dumb, but by no means uninterested, witness of the reaction which only works into the hands of revolution."

Of his literary activity Hupfeld himself says that, on account of its extent, embracing branches widely different from each other, and on account of his lack of self-control, it is greatly deficient in system. His nature being such as to impel him to give his whole mind to a specialty, and to aim at securing the highest attainable position and the broadest views in comprehensive works, he produced more monographs — and these of great value and merit — in the form of essays and sketches, than books proper (such as "Die Quellen der Genesis," and the work on the Psalms, in four volumes). It is specially to be lamented that the author whose "hebräisches Fundamentale" was justly praised by the students as a most masterly lecture, did not complete his "Kritisches Lehrbuch der hebräischen Sprache und Schrift," of which the first eight sheets appeared in 1841.

A complete list of Hupfeld's various writings may be found in Justi, l. c. 284–285, and Gerland, l. c. 315–319. Only one, the last writing of his hand, is wanting in this list — the charming "Bild zur Erinnerung," on his deceased friend Mallet (Bremen, published by C. G. Müller).

We conclude our account with a passage extracted from this pamphlet, characteristic of the departed author, and showing not only the relation of intimate friendship which he sustained to Mallet, but also that the critic Hupfeld was not destitute of the "pectus quod theologum facit." "Even the most beautiful and sacred things," he says (p. 19), "which flow from human lips may in time become mere phrases. It is a part of human weakness and defectiveness, a curse, as it were, accompanying the divine blessing, that the very richest gifts of speech are the most in danger of being used in the service of vanity, since they lead one to take pleasure in them,

to tickle by means of them, and thus to glorify one's self rather than to serve God and one's fellow-men; or the words, being through frequent use deprived of their soul, become at last 'as sounding brass.' To this danger is the clergyman more than others exposed. Since he is required by his vocation so often to hold up the word of God to others, and to have always at hand, and to give expression to, those truths and ideas which are most of all suited to move, startle, and penetrate men's hearts, it is only too apt to be the case that these truths lose for him their terribleness, so that their force and effect on his own heart is neutralized or weakened, and the constant direction of his attention to others keeps him from watching himself, so that while he works on the hearts of others he neglects his own, and lets the weeds in it grow up unheeded. ..... My later observations and experiences have only too much confirmed my opinion of the greatness of the danger, and taught me how many of the most gifted clergymen fall a prey to it, and how prevalent has become in our time the plague of using set phrases without thought, which serves more than everything else to make men insensible to the power of the truth, and disinclined to struggle after an earnest and more profound conviction, and which explains the readiness with which now, at a given signal, 'testimonies' and 'confessions' are made at wholesale, often in rapid succession and in contradictory directions. Hence so little deed Christianity, and so much mouth Christianity."

Hupfeld died an easy death at noon of the twenty-fourth of April, after fully completing his seventieth year, in consequence of a stroke of apoplexy supervening on an inflammation of the diaphragm.

ARTICLE IX.

THEORIES IN REGARD TO THE NATURE OF THE WILL.

We propose to state in the present and in subsequent Book Notices, various theories entertained by various writers more or less recent in regard to the will. The present notice is confined to two works, which differ widely from each other in various particulars, but agree with each other in the theory that *choice is not an act of the will.* The first of these books is entitled:

Essay on Catholicism, Liberalism and Socialism, considered in their Fundamental Principles. By Don Juan Donoso Cortès, Marquis of Valdegamas; from the original Spanish. To which is prefixed a Sketch of the life and works of the author. From the Italian of G. E. De Castro. Translated by Madeleine Vinton Goddard. 12mo. pp. 335. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co. 1862.

The introductory sketch states that the author of this work was born at Valdegamas, May 6, 1809; pursued the study of the law at the University of Salamania; received a high political office in 1832; was active as a political journalist and author at Madrid; was the Spanish minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Prussia in 1848; became a religious man at the age of forty; and the present work is the result of his religious meditations. He commences the work with the words of M. Proudhon: "It is surprising to observe how constantly we find all our political questions complicated with theological questions" (p. 17). "Sophisms," he says, "produce revolutions, and sophists are succeeded by hangmen" (p. 20). He divides his volume into three books. In the first and second chapters of the second book he discusses the subject of the will. He says: "The opinion generally entertained respecting free-will is in every respect false. The will does not consist, as is commonly supposed, in the power of choice between good and evil, which importune man with contrary solicitations. If free-will consisted in this faculty, the following consequences would necessarily result, the one relative to man and the other relative to God, and both evidently absurd. The consequence respecting man would be, that the higher the degree of excellence he attained the less free he would become, as he could not advance toward perfection without becoming subjected to the influence of good, and he could not yield to the sway of truth without removing himself from the rule of evil." "Man being free, and at the same time aiming at perfection, he cannot preserve his freedom without renouncing perfection, neither can he become perfect without losing his liberty." "As relates to God, the consequence of this hypothesis would be this, that God, not being subject in his nature to contradictory solicitations, would not be free, if freedom consisted in the full power to choose between opposing solicitations; and if, according to this supposition, he must have the power to choose between good and evil, between sanctity and sin, in order to be free, then there exists between the nature of God and liberty, thus defined, a radical contradiction and an absolute incompatibility. And, as it would be an absurdity to suppose, on the one side, that God cannot be free if he is God, and that he cannot be God if he is free; and on the other that man cannot attain perfection without losing his liberty, nor be free without renouncing perfection, it follows that the idea of liberty that we have just examined [of liberty as consisting in choice] is altogether false, contradictory, and absurd" (pp. 94–96).

Choice, then, according to this theory, is not an act of the will; and if so, the soul must be divided into the intellect, sensibilities, the power of choice, and the will, four departments instead of three. The formal freedom of the will does not consist in choice; still less does the material freedom. Where is liberty then? The author proceeds: "The error that we have just exposed consists in placing freedom in the faculty of choice, when it really rests in the faculty of will, which supposes the faculty

of understanding. Every being endowed with understanding and will is free, and his liberty is not a distinct thing from his will and his understanding, but the two united. When we affirm of a being that he has will and understanding, and of another being that he is free, we assert with regard to both the same thing, expressed in two different ways.

"If liberty consists in the faculties of will and understanding, then perfect liberty consists in a perfect will and understanding. These are the attributes of God alone, from which it follows, as a necessary inference, that God alone is perfectly free.

"Again, if liberty consists in the faculties of understanding and will then man is free, because he is endowed with will and intelligence; but he is not perfectly free, as he is not endowed with an understanding and will infinite and perfect. The imperfection of his understanding is, that it is limited on the one hand, and on the other subject to error. The imperfection of his will is, that he does not desire all that he ought to wish for, and that he may be importuned and conquered by evil. From whence it follows that the imperfection of his liberty consists in his power of choosing evil and embracing error; that is to say, the imperfection of human liberty lies in precisely that faculty of choice which, according to the vulgar opinion, constitutes its absolute perfection" (pp. 96, 97).

"If the above is true, it is certain that the faculty of choice bestowed upon man, far from constituting a necessary condition of freedom, endangers liberty, since through it arises the possibility of a renunciation of good, and of falling into error; of a denial of God, and of a subjection to tyranny. All the efforts of man, with the assistance of grace, should be directed to the keeping of this faculty under, so that he may even lose it, if possible, by inaction. He alone who loses it understands good, desires it, and performs it; and he alone who does this is perfectly free; and he alone who is free is perfect; and only he who is perfect is happy. None of the blessed have this faculty of choosing between good and evil, neither God, nor his saints, nor the choirs of angels" (p. 99).

Throughout this volume are found frequent contradictions of the statement that liberty does not consist in choosing, as on pp. 150, 273. The volume abounds with acute remarks, rich apothegms, but is on the whole declamatory, rather than scientific. It is an earnest defence of the Roman Catholic dogmas, and a spirited attack upon the theories of Socialism. In its tone and style it is signally unlike the second work which we here notice, and which is entitled:

FREEDOM OF THE MIND IN WILLING; or, every Being that wills, a Creative First Cause. By Rowland G. Hazard. 12mo. pp. 455. New York: D. Appleton and Co.; London, 16 Little Britain. 1864.

The author of this work is an enterprising manufacturer in the State of Rhode Island. He certainly merits our respect for his interest in moral,

as well as in physical science. He has evinced in the present volume a sharp and vigorous mind. His style is not always clear, and is too redundant. He does not always conform to the established usage of words, but is satisfied with his own nomenclature. His speculations are the more interesting as they are pursued from a point of departure not commonly taken. He has divided his work into two books. The first book he devotes to an explanation and proof of the "Freedom of the Mind in Willing." He is a stout advocate of human liberty. Hence it is the more singular that he should exclude the act of choice from the sphere of will. He considers choice as "the perception, the knowledge, that one thing is superior to another," and is, therefore, antecedent to the act of willing; and he regards all liberty as consisting in the mind's willing, and not at all in the mind's choosing. He strenuously and persistently objects to "the confounding of choice and will" (p. 440). "Will is the power or faculty of the mind for effort" (p. 24), and in this effort consists the mind's freedom. Freedom is "that condition in which the mind directs its own action or movement." He considers the moral character also as residing, not in the choice, but in the effort, the willing. If a man wills to do an act which is good and noble, it matters not concerning his virtue whether his effort be successful or otherwise; the effort is, itself, the triumph in him of the good and noble over the bad and base" (p. 152). "As in the *moral nature* the willing, the persevering effort is itself the consummation, there can in it be no such failure [as there may be in his external relations]; and the mind in it is therefore not only a creative, but a supreme creative first cause" (p. 152). "As the moral quality of the action lies wholly in the will, and no other being can will for him [man], to be morally good without his own efforts is an impossibility; all that any other being can do for him in this respect is to use means to excite his wants and increase his knowledge; and thus induce him to put forth his own efforts. Even omnipotence can do no more than this; for doing more, the making man virtuous without voluntary effort of his own, involves a contradiction" (pp. 153, 154). "A man habitually holy, who has eradicated the conflicting wants, loses the power to will what is unholy; and as he cannot be unholy except by his own voluntary act, he has then no power to be unholy" (p. 158). Mr. Hazard still maintains that the mind is free in willing to be holy, even when it has no power to will otherwise.

Mr. Hazard devotes his second book to a review of Edwards on the Will. Of course he differs radically from this divine; for Edwards considers free-agency as consisting, not in imperative volitions, but in choice; whereas Mr. Hazard considers free-agency as consisting, not in choice, but in imperative volitions. We do not think that the interpretation which the author of this volume puts upon Edwards is correct; still it is similar to that which is sanctioned by many other critics. Quite a remarkable passage in the second book is found on pp. 393–395. We subjoin a few

passages illustrating Mr. Hazard's independence in thought and in style.

The Faculties of the Mind. "The mind has but one real faculty or power to do anything, and this faculty is designated by the term *will*" (p. 15). Thus memory "is but a condition, and a necessary condition, of knowledge of the past. Without it such knowledge could not exist. In this sense it is only an expression of one form of our knowledge. To say *I remember an event*, is to say *I know an event in the past.* If from any cause an event of the past comes before the mind, it is then a simple mental perception. When we make an effort to bring an event of the past into the mind's view, we call it an exercise or *effort* of *memory*, and this of course is an act of will, a *trying to do this thing*" (pp. 11, 12). It is the will only which makes an effort. An effort of the mind in forming a judgment is an act of the will. "The same may be said of reasoning, imagining, conceiving, etc. In the sense in which these are spoken of as faculties or powers, they are but names of varied modes of effort, or of efforts for *different objects*, made by the same unit — mind, manifesting its power to produce change by its efforts or acts of will" (p. 12). "As the mind cannot act except by exercising some of its powers, every act of the mind is an effort or act of will, and the phrases, 'acts of will,' 'acts of mind,' and 'mental action,' are really synonymes" (p. 424). According to Mr. Hazard, then, there is no *involuntary* effort. But do we not necessarily ascribe every act to a power of acting — an act of remembering to a *power* of memory, for instance; and is not the strenuous acting of any power rightly called an *effort* of that power?

"*We may know what is not true.*" (?) "In strict propriety" the term *knowledge* is "applicable only to those ideas or perceptions of the mind of which we entertain no doubt, and it is applicable to such even though they are not conformable to truth" (p. 18). Like most other words in frequent use the word *knowledge* has a variety of significations. It is often used to express a mere undoubting assurance. But, *distinctively*, it expresses the undoubting assurance of a fact, of a truth. Distinctively, it implies that the reality is as it is believed to be. When we have believed a proposition to be true, and afterwards discovered that it is false, we are apt to say, "We thought we knew it to be true, but we did not know so much as we thought we did." The omniscience of God is not his mere assurance of *propositions*, but his assurance of *truths.*

The human mind is a creator. "The finite mind of man, made in the image of God, has finite powers corresponding to omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, and other creative attributes of the Infinite; and, so far as we know, exerts these powers in the same mode and under the same conditions" (p. 49). "This creative power is exerted by the finite in the only way in which we can conceive of its exercise by the Infinite Intelligence, and under the same conditions" (p. 45). It is true, that we often speak of mental creations, the creations of genius, etc., but in the

proper sense we mean by creation, the bringing of some material or mental *substance* into existence. Some of the most eminent artists have recoiled from the use of this term in application to their works, and have insisted on limiting the word *creator* to Him who causes the beginning of substances.

We need not add, that while we cannot adopt the theories of the will which are contained in the two works here noticed, we still must regard them, and other theories hereafter to be noticed, as suggestive of many important truths.

ARTICLE X

THE TOPOGRAPHY OF JERUSALEM.

BY REV. SAMUEL WOLCOTT, D.D., CLEVELAND, OHIO.

THE Dictionary of the Bible edited by Dr. William Smith, and published in England in three large octavo volumes, is about to be republished entire in this country, under the editorial supervision of Professor Hackett of Newton, whose special qualifications for this service will be recognized by all. It is but fair to add that the paper here offered has grown out of an Article prepared by the writer, at his request, for the Dictionary — it being his purpose to render the American edition even more complete than the English. More than sixty of the eminent scholars in Great Britian, and a few in our own country, have contributed to its pages, and it embraces the fruit of more learned research than any other work of the kind which has been issued. It is, consequently, a necessity to every thorough student of the Bible, and an invaluable auxiliary to all who seek a fuller acquaintance with the word of God.

In most of the Articles we are presented with the latest *results* of Biblical science — ascertained facts, and not mere speculations and theories. On controverted or unsettled questions we are, in most instances, furnished with the facts or reasonings on each side, from a fair statement of which the reader is left to draw his own conclusion.

A portion of the Article on "Jerusalem" is an exception to this rule. More than forty pages with double columns are given to the general topic, and its importance justifies this extended treatment. It is mainly divided between two writers, one of whom presents *The Annals of the City*, from its foundation to its destruction by Titus (with a brief sketch of its later history by another pen), and the other devotes seventeen pages to *The Topography of the City*, of this portion the whole warp and

woof is the development and defence of a new theory. The writer is James Fergusson, Esq., Fellow of the Royal Institute of British Architects. It is understood (indeed it is evident) that he has never visited Jerusalem; but he challenges the attention of Biblical critics to views which he has carefully elaborated, and which are based on the published researches of travellers and authors.

The Article is very discursive; and we are unable to select a few compact sentences or paragraphs which embody the substance of its reasonings. We shall state the writer's views fairly as we proceed in the discussion, and we offer the following extracts as exhibiting his leading positions as clearly, perhaps, as any passages which can be selected.

"So little has this been done hitherto, that there are at present before the public three distinct views of the topography of Jerusalem, so discrepant from one another in their most essential features, that a disinterested person might fairly feel himself justified in assuming that there existed no real data for the determination of the points at issue, and that the disputed questions must for ever remain in the same unsatisfactory state as at present.

"1. The first of these theories is the most obvious, and has, at all events, the great merit of simplicity. It consists in the belief that all the sacred localities were correctly ascertained in the early ages of Christianity; and, what is still more important, that none have been changed during the dark ages that followed, or in the numerous revolutions to which the city has been exposed. Consequently, inferring that all which the traditions of the Middle Ages have handed down to us may be implicitly relied upon. The advantages of this theory are so manifest, that it is little wonder that it should be so popular and find so many advocates.

"The first person who ventured publicly to express his dissent from this view was Korte, a German printer, who travelled in Palestine about the year 1728. On visiting Jerusalem he was struck with the apparent impossibility of reconciling the site of the present church of the Holy Sepulchre with the exigencies of the Bible narrative, and on his return home published a work denying the authenticity of the so-called sacred localities. His heresies excited very little attention at the time, or for long afterwards; but the spirit of inquiry which has sprung up during the present century has revived the controversy which has so long been dormant, and many pious and earnest men, both Protestant and Catholic, have expressed with more or less distinctness the difficulties they feel in reconciling the assumed localities with the indications in the Bible. The arguments in favor of the present localities being the correct ones are well summed up by the Rev. George Williams, in his work on the Holy City, and with the assistance of Professor Willis all has been said that can be urged in favor of their authenticity. Nothing can exceed the ingenuity of the various hypotheses that are brought forward to explain away the admitted diffi-

culties of the case; but we look in vain for any new facts to counterbalance the significance of those so often urged on the other side, while the continued appeals to faith and to personal arguments do not inspire confidence in the soundness of the data brought forward.

"2. Professor Robinson, on the other hand, in his elaborate works on Palestine has brought together all the arguments which from the time of Korte have been accumulating against the authenticity of the mediaeval sites and traditions. He has done this with a power of logic which would probably have been conclusive had he been able to carry the argument to its legitimate conclusion. His want of knowledge of architecture and of the principles of architectural criticism, however, prevented him from perceiving that the present church of the Holy Sepulchre was wholly of an age subsequent to that of the Crusades, and without a trace of the style of Constantine. Nor was he, from the same causes, able to correct in a single instance the erroneous adscriptions given to many other buildings in Jerusalem, whose dates might have afforded a clue to the mystery. When, in consequence, he announced as the result of his researches the melancholy conclusion, that the site of the Holy Sepulchre was now, and must in all probability for ever remain a mystery, the effect was, that those who were opposed to his views clung all the more firmly to those they before entertained, preferring a site and a sepulchre which had been hallowed by the tradition of ages, rather than launch forth on the shoreless sea of speculation which Dr. Robinson's negative conclusion opened out before them.

"3. The third theory is that put forward by the author of this Article in his 'Essay on the Ancient Topography of Jerusalem.' It agrees generally with the views urged by all those from Korte to Robinson, who doubt the authenticity of the present site of the sepulchre; but instead of acquiescing in the desponding view taken by the latter, it goes on to assert, for reasons which will be given hereafter, that the building now known to Christians as the Mosque of Omar, but by Moslems called the Dome of the Rock, is the identical church which Constantine erected over the rock which contained the tomb of Christ." — p. 1018.

"*Zion.*—One of the great difficulties which has perplexed most authors in examining the ancient topography of Jerusalem, is the correct fixation of the locality of the sacred Mount of Zion. It cannot be disputed that from the time of Constantine downwards to the present day, this name has been applied to the western hill on which the city of Jerusalem now stands, and in fact always stood.

"Notwithstanding this it seems equally certain that up to the time of the destruction of the city by Titus, the name was applied exclusively to the eastern hill, or that on which the temple stood.

"Unfortunately the name Zion is not found in the works of Josephus, so that we have not his assistance, which would be invaluable in this case,

and there is no passage in the Bible which directly asserts the identity of the hills Moriah and Zion, though many which cannot well be understood without this assumption. The cumulative proof, however, is such as almost perfectly to supply this want.

"From the passages in 2 Sam. v. 7, and 1 Chron. xi. 5–8, it is quite clear that Zion and the city of David were identical, for it is there said, 'David took the castle of Zion, which is the city of David.' 'And David dwelt in the castle, therefore they called it the city of David. And he built the city round about, even from Millo round about, and Joab repaired the rest of the city.' This last expression would seem to separate the city of Jerusalem which was *repaired*, from that of David which was *built*, though it is scarcely distinct enough to be relied upon. Besides these, perhaps the most distinct passage is that in Psalm xlviii. 2, where it is said, 'Beautiful for situation, the joy of the whole earth, is Mount Zion, on the *sides of the north*, the city of the Great King,' which it seems almost impossible to apply to the modern Zion, the most southern extremity of the city. There are also a great many passages in the Bible where Zion is spoken of as a separate city from Jerusalem, as for instance, 'For out of Jerusalem shall go forth a remnant, and they that escape out of Mount Zion' (2 Kings xix. 31); 'Do good in thy good pleasure unto Zion; build thou the walls of Jerusalem' (Psalm li. 18); 'The Lord shall yet comfort Zion, and shall yet choose Jerusalem' (Zech. i. 17); 'For the people shall dwell in Zion at Jerusalem' (Isa. xxx. 19); 'The Lord shall roar out of Zion, and utter his voice from Jerusalem' (Joel iii. 16; Amos i. 2). There are also numberless passages in which Zion is spoken of as a holy place in such terms as are never applied to Jerusalem, and which can only be understood as applied to the holy Temple Mount. Such expressions, for instance, as 'I set my king on my holy hill of Zion' (Psalm ii. 6); 'The Lord loveth the gates of Zion more than all the dwellings of Jacob,' (Psalm lxxxvii. 2); 'The Lord has chosen Zion' (Psalm cxxxii. 13); 'The city of the Lord, the Zion of the Holy One of Israel' (Isa. lx. 14); 'Arise ye, and let us go up to Zion to the Lord' (Jer. xxxi. 6); 'Thus saith the Lord, I am returned to Zion' (Zech. viii. 3); 'I am the Lord thy God, dwelling in Zion, my holy mountain' (Joel iii. 17); 'For the Lord dwelleth in Zion' (Joel iii. 21), and many others, which will occur to every one at all familiar with the scriptures, seem to us to indicate plainly the hill of the Temple. Substitute the word Jerusalem for Zion in these passages, and we feel at once how it grates on the ear; for such epithets as these are never applied to that city; on the contrary, if there is a curse uttered, or term of disparagement, it is seldom applied to Zion, but always to her unfortunate sister, Jerusalem. It is never said, The Lord dwelleth in Jerusalem; or loveth Jerusalem; or any such expression, which surely would have occurred, had Jerusalem and Zion been one and the same place, as they now are, and generally supposed to have been.

Though these cannot be taken as absolute proof, they certainly amount to strong presumptive evidence that Zion and the Temple Hill were one and the same place. There is one curious passage, however, which is scarcely intelligible on any other hypothesis than this; it is known that the sepulchres of David and his successors were on Mount Zion, or in the city of David, but the wicked king Ahaz for his crimes was buried in Jerusalem, 'in the city,' and 'not in the sepulchres of the kings' (2 Chron. xxviii. 27). Jehoram (2 Chron. xxi. 20) narrowly escaped the same punishment, and the distinction is so marked that it cannot be overlooked. The modern sepulchre of David (*Neby Daûd*) is, and always must have been in Jerusalem; not, as the Bible expressly tells us, in the city of David, as contra-distinguished from the city of the Jebusites.

"When from the Old Testament we turn to the Books of the Maccabees, we come to some passages written by persons who certainly were acquainted with the localities, which seem to fix the site of Zion with a considerable amount of certainty; as, for instance, 'They went up into Mount Zion, and saw the sanctuary desolate and the altar profaned, and the shrubs growing in the courts as a forest' (1 Macc. iv. 37, 60); 'After this went Nicanor up to Mount Zion, and there came out of the sanctuary certain persons' (1 Macc. vii. 33), and several others, which seem to leave no doubt that at that time Zion and the Temple Hill were considered one and the same place. It may also be added that the Rabbis with one accord place the Temple on Mount Zion, and though their authority in matters of doctrine may be valueless, still their traditions ought to have been sufficiently distinct to justify their being considered as authorities on a merely topographical point of this sort. There is also a passage in Nehemiah (iii. 16) which will be alluded to in the next section, and which, added to the above, seems to leave very little doubt that in ancient times the name of Zion was applied to the eastern and not to the western hill of Jerusalem." — p. 1026.

"The Prætorium where Christ was judged was most probably the Antonia, which at that time, as before and afterwards, was the citadel of Jerusalem and the residence of the governors, and the Xystus and Council-house were certainly, as shown above, in this neighborhood. Leaving these localities, the Saviour, bearing his cross, must certainly have gone towards the country, and might well meet Simon or any one coming towards the city; thus every detail of the description is satisfied, and none offended by the locality now assumed.

"The third class of evidence is, from its nature, by no means so clear, but there is nothing whatever in it to contradict, and a great deal that directly confirms, the above statements. The earliest of the travellers who visited Jerusalem after the discovery of the Sepulchre by Constantine is one known as the Bordeaux pilgrim; he seems to have visited the place about the year 333. In his Itinerary, after describing the palace of David,

the great synagogue, and other objects inside the city, he adds, 'Inde ut eas *foris murum* de Sione euntibus ad Portam Neopolitanam ad partem dextram deorsum in valle sunt parietes ubi domus fuit sive palatium Pontii Pilati. Ibi Dominus auditus est antequam pateretur. A sinistra autem parte est monticulus Golgotha, ubi Dominus crucifixus est. Inde quasi ad lapidem missum est cripta ubi corpus ejus positum fuit, et tertia die resurrexit. Ibidem modo jussu Constantini Imperatoris Basilica facta est, id est Dominicum mirae pulchritudinis.' From this it is evident that passing out of the modern Zion gate he turned round the outside of the walls to the left. Had he gone to the right, past the Jaffa gate, both the ancient and modern Golgotha would have been on his right hand; but passing round the Temple area he may have had the house of Pilate on his right in the valley, where some traditions placed it. He must have had Golgotha and the Sepulchre on his left, as he describes them. In so far, therefore, as his testimony goes, it is clear he was not speaking of the modern Golgotha, which is inside the city, while the very expression 'foris murum' seems to indicate what the context confirms, that it was a place on the verge of the city, and on the left hand of one passing round the walls, or in other words the place marked on the accompanying map."—p. 1031.

"It only remains, before concluding, to recapitulate here that the great difficulties which seem hitherto to have rendered the subject confused, and in fact inexplicable, were (1) the improper application of the name of Zion to the western hill, and (2) the assumption that the present Church of the Holy Sepulchre was that built by Constantine.

"The moment we transfer the name Zion from the western to the eastern hill, and the scenes of the passion from the present site of the Holy Sepulchre to the area of the Haram, all the difficulties disappear; and it only requires a little patience, and perhaps in some instances a little further investigation on the spot, for the topography of Jerusalem to become as well or better established than that of any city of the ancient world."—pp. 1034, 1035.

It will be seen from the preceding that the two points in the topography of Jerusalem which Mr. Fergusson regarded as demanding special elucidation are, the site of Mount Zion, and the site of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. With reference to both, he has advanced theories which are original — theories which not only have not been broached before, and are unsupported by a single tradition, but which, so far as is known, contradict the previous impressions of the Christian world. Speculations so novel respecting localities so prominent in the history of the sacred city, naturally awaken the reader's surprise, and suspiscion, and demand a candid scrutiny.

I. *Mount Zion.*—Mr. Fergusson's theory is, that the Mount Zion of the sacred writers is not "the western hill on which the city of Jerusalem

now stands, and in fact always stood," but "the eastern hill, or that on which the temple stood."

The sacred historian says, "As for the Jebusites, the inhabitants of Jerusalem, the children of Israel could not drive them out, but the Jebusites dwell with the children of Judah at Jerusalem unto this day" (Josh. xv. 63). Four hundred years later, "David and all Israel went to Jerusalem, which is Jebus, where the Jebusites were, the inhabitants of the land. And the inhabitants of Jebus said to David, Thou shalt not come hither. Nevertheless, David took the castle of Zion, which is the city of David. And David dwelt in the castle; therefore they called it, The city of David" (1 Chron. xi. 4, 5, 7). Here was his citadel, and here his residence; and hence the frequent allusions in the Bible to the towers, bulwarks, and palaces of Zion. A few years later, "David made him houses in the city of David, and prepared a place for the ark of God, and pitched for it a tent." "So they brought the ark of God, and set it in the midst of the tent that David had pitched for it" (1 Chron. xv. 1). Thirty years after, "Solomon began to build the house of the Lord at Jerusalem, in Mount Moriah" (2 Chron. iii. 1). Seven years later, "Solomon assembled the elders of Israel unto Jerusalem, to bring up the ark of the covenant of the Lord, out of the city of David, which is Zion" (2 Chron v. 2), and then follows the account of their removing the ark and depositing it in the temple.

From this it is clear that the Jebusite stronghold which David stormed, and where he dwelt, was Zion, or the city of David; that the ark of the covenant was brought to this spot, and from it was transferred to the temple on Mount Moriah; and that Mount Moriah, the site of the temple, could not have been identical with Zion, the city of David. This view appears on the face of the narrative, and there is not a passage of scripture which conflicts with it, or which it renders difficult or obscure.

Josephus does not use the word *Zion;* but his paraphrase of the scriptural narrative accords entirely with the above: "David took the lower city by force, but the citadel held out still" (Antiq. xiv. 4, 2), with the other particulars as already given. He also says, "The city was built upon two hills, and that which contains the upper city is much higher, and accordingly it was called *the citadel* by King David" (Antiq. xiv. 15, 2). In the siege by Pompey, one party within counselling resistance and the other submission, the former "seized upon the temple and cut off the bridge which reached from it to the city, and prepared themselves to abide a siege, but the others admitted Pompey's army in, and delivered up both the city and the king's palace to him" (Antiq. xiv. 4, 2), and, having secured these, he laid siege to the temple, and captured its occupants. In the siege by Herod, "When the outer court of the temple and the lower city were taken, the Jews fled into the inner court of the temple and into the upper city"; and when the latter was carried by assault, "Antig-

onus came down from the citadel" (Antiq. xiv. 16, 2). In the siege by Titus, after the lower city had been taken, and it became necessary to raise an embankment against the upper city, "the works were erected on the west side of the city, over against the royal palace" (Bel. Jud. vi. 8, 1). Describing the temple, Josephus says, "In the western parts of the enclosure of the temple were four gates, one leading over to the royal palace; the valley between being interrupted to form a passage" (Antiq. xv. 11, 5).

Nothing can be plainer than that the upper city of Josephus is identical with the Zion, or city of David, of the sacred scriptures; that the citadel and the royal palace were on this western hill; that the temple was on the lower eastern hill, separated from the western by a deep valley, which was spanned by a bridge; and that the site of the temple is identical with the Mount Moriah of the Bible, and distinct from Mount Zion. This view which is in harmony with the scriptural view already given, accords also with every other allusion in Josephus to these localities. And the substructions of the bridge above referred to are the most striking feature in the remains of the modern city.

We come now to the Christian Itineraries, etc., and the testimony is uniform and unbroken. Except one or two wild speculations, no other Mount Zion has been known, from the days of Eusebius down, than the high western hill of Jerusalem which now bears the name. So late as 1852, Professor Robinson referred to this as one of the few points "yet unassailed" (Bib. Res. 206).

The term *Zion* came, naturally, to be employed both by sacred and profane writers, as the representation of the whole city, of which it formed so prominent a part. It was thus used by the later prophets, quoted above, as also in the Book of the Maccabees, where it evidently *includes* the temple and adjacent mount.

Mr. Fergusson says: "There are numberless passages in which Zion is spoken of as a holy place in such terms as are never applied to Jerusalem, and which can only be applied to the holy Temple Mount." Sureley, no strains could be too elevated to be applied to the mount on which the tabernacle was pitched, and where the ark of the covenant abode; the seat of the theocracy; the throne alike of David and of David's Lord; the centre of dominion and of worship. Indeed, the verse quoted, "Yet have I set my king upon my holy hill of Zion," could *only* be affirmed of that western hill which was the royal residence. The same may be said of the verse quoted as specially difficult, on the received theory, in its allusion to *the sides of the north*, the reference here being to the lofty site of the city; and to one who approaches it from the south, the precipitous brow of Zion invests the description with a force and beauty which would be lost by a transfer to the other eminence.

It is, moreover, a mistaken impression that greater sanctity is ascribed

to Zion than to Jerusalem, or that the two names are, in this respect, carefully distinguished. What passage in the Bible recognizes greater sacredness in a locality than the plaintive apostrophe: "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning; if I do not remember thee, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth; if I prefer not Jerusalem above my chief joy"? The Song of songs sets forth the divine beauty of the bride, or loved one, by the similie, "comely as Jerusalem"; and the call of the evangelical prophets is, "Awake, put on thy strength, O Zion, put on thy beautiful garments, O Jerusalem, the holy city." The localities are thus constantly identified, "To declare the name of the Lord in Zion and his praise in Jerusalem." The names are, and may be, used interchangeably, without "grating on the ear"; and the extraordinary assertion, "It is never said, The Lord dwelleth in Jerusalem, or loveth Jerusalem, or any such expression," we meet with the inspired declarations from the Chronicles, the Psalms, and the Prophets, "I have chosen Jerusalem that my name might be there"; "The God of Israel, whose habitation is in Jerusalem"; "Blessed be the Lord out of Zion, who dwelleth at Jerusalem"; "Thus saith the Lord, I am returned unto Zion, and will dwell in the midst of Jerusalem." Our Saviour expressly forbade the profanation of the name; and through the force of the same sacred associations, the beloved disciple could find no more fitting type of heaven itself, as he beheld it in vision — the New Jerusalem of the saints in glory.

Mr. Fergusson remarks "that the sepulchres of David and his successors were on Mount Zion, or in the city of David, but the wicked king Ahaz for his crimes was buried in Jerusalem, 'in the city,' and 'not in the sepulchres of the kings.' Jehoram narrowly escaped the same punishment, and the distinction is so marked, that it cannot be overlooked." The burial of King Ahaz is thus recorded: "And they buried him in the city, in Jerusalem, but they brought him not into the sepulchres of the kings" (2 Chron. xxviii. 27). That of King Jehoram is as follows: "He departed without being desired, howbeit they buried him in the city of David, but not in the sepulchres of the kings" (2 Chron. xxi. 20). That of King Joash (which Mr. Fergusson overlooks) is as follows: "They buried him in the city of David, but they buried him not in the sepulchres of the kings" (2 Chron. xxiv. 25). Mr. Fergusson assumes that there is a "marked distinction" between the first and the last two records. We assume that the three accounts are, in substance, identical; and we submit the point to the judgment of the reader, merely adding, that of the three monarchs, Jehoram was apparently the most execrated, and Josephus, who is silent about the burial of Ahaz, describes that of Jehoram as ignominious.

Mr. Fergusson says: "There are a great many passages in which Zion is spoken of as a separate city from Jerusalem," and adduces instances in which the Hebrew scholar will recognize simply the *parallelism* of Hebrew poetry; no more proving that Zion was a separate city from Jerusalem,

than the exclamation, "How goodly are thy tents, O Jacob, and thy tabernacles, O Israel," proves that Jacob was a separate people from Israel.

Much more might be written respecting this theory, but its claims have been fairly met: and the reader will judge whether the argument which accepts and supports the modern Zion as the ancient site is not as firm as the mountain itself, "which cannot be removed, but abideth forever."

II. *The Church of the Holy Sepulchre.* — Mr. Fergusson's theory is, "that the building now known to Christians as the Mosque of Omar, but by Moslems called the Dome of the Rock, is the identical church which Constantine erected over the rock which contained the tomb of Christ."

He concedes the conclusiveness of the argument by which Dr. Robinson has shown that the present church does not cover "the place where the Lord lay." *This* has been the battle-ground of recent writers on the topography of the city, and the concession renders it unnecessary to adduce here the proofs which the Professor has brought together, and which may be found in his Biblical Researches (in 1838, II. 64–80; in 1852, 254–263, 631–633). The "power of logic" with which they are presented is not affected by any theory which may be held respecting the identity of any other spot. The argument reaches "its legitimate conclusion," alike whether the reader accepts some other site, or whether he regards the true site as beyond the reach of modern discovery. The theory here offered, like the one which we have examined, is novel and startling, and like that, is put forth with much confidence by a writer who has never examined the localities. We submit our reasons for rejecting it; and as we agree with Mr. Fergusson that the site of the church is not the place of our Lord's burial, our interest in the question is purely historical.

Eusebius, who was contemporary with Constantine, and his biographer, represents the church which he built over the supposed sepulchre, as having an open court on the east, towards the entrances, with cloisters on each side and gates in front, "after which, in the very midst of the street of the market (or in the middle of the broad market-place) the beautiful propylea (vestibule) of the whole structure presented to those passing by on the outside the wonderful view of the things seen within" (Vit. Const. iii. 39). Along the street of the bazaars, east of the present church, which would make their site identical with "the market-place" of Eusebius, and correspond with the position of the propylea, are three granite columns, the apparent remains of an ancient portico, and which can be referred to no other structure than the church of Constantine. Mr. Fergusson admits that the propylea of the church "had a broad market-place in front of it," but fails to show how this would be possible on his theory which identifies it with the "golden gateway" of the temple-area. The market-place might have been, naturally, in the city, where the bazaars now are, but this hypothesis would locate it on the western slope of the

Valley of the Kidron, outside of the city, "where a market-place," to use the words of Professor Willis, "is ludicrously impossible" (Edin. Rev. 1860, p. 225). The *critique* of Prof. Willis here quoted, we have not seen.

The testimony of another contemporary writer, the Pilgrim of Bordeaux, describing some objects which might be seen on the right and left in passing from Zion to the present Damascus gate, is quoted by Mr. Fergusson, with the remark, "From this it is evident that passing out of the modern Zion gate, he turned round the outside of the walls to the left." Now no visitor would have passed out of that gate to go to the opposite side of the city, either to the right or the left, and especially not to the left. Not only would such a circuit have been difficult, in the absence of any thoroughfare or path, but a glance at a plan of the city will show (what one can understand more fully on the spot) how unnatural and improbable such an excursion would have been.

The suggestion is encumbered with the further difficulty, that "the modern Zion gate" did not then exist (Adam. ex Arculf. I. 1). It involves, further, the absurd supposition that the governor's house, where the Saviour was arraigned, was in a valley, unprotected, outside of the city, "where some traditions placed it" (?) when in the preceding paragraph the writer has asserted that the residence of the governor and the probable scene of the trial was the castle of Antonia.

The natural course of one who passed out of the city northward, going from Zion to the Neapolis gate, would have been formerly, as now, between the temple-area and the site of the church of the Sepulchre, near to the latter, and the objects seen would have been in just the relative position in which this traveller describes them. The contemporary testimony, therefore, so far as is known, is concurrent and conclusive against this theory.

A considerable share of Mr. Fergusson's reasoning is professional and technical. As an architect he gives his decision on points which many of his readers are incompetent to judge of, with an authority which, for that reason, few are inclined to dispute. This professional judgment is entitled to respect, but it cannot set aside historical evidence. It is challenged, moreover, by members of his own profession; and an able critic in the Edinburgh Review (Oct. 1860), who, if not an architect, is familiar with archaeological researches and architectural canons, rejects this theory on the identical grounds on which its author asserts it — deducing from the same data opposite conclusions. He also notices other points which we have passed over, one of which is, that in thus appropriating this celebrated mosque, the writer omits "to account for the magnificent building which, indubitably, was reared by the Caliph Abu el-Melek, but which, according to his theory, must in some strange way have disappeared." It may be added that he equally fails to account for the present church of the Sepulchre, an edifice which cannot wholly have parted

with its history. Were we convinced by the reasoning before us, we should be tempted to suggest the theory of a double transfer. Having proved that the original church is the present mosque, would Mr. Fergusson's genius be unequal to the proof that the original mosque is the present church?

There remains an objection to this theory, as decisive as any, which can be best appreciated by those who have been on the ground. The site of the so-called Mosque of Omar could not have been, in our Saviour's day, outside of the walls. The theory would break up the solid masonry of the ancient substructions of the temple-area, still existing, making one portion modern and the other ancient, leaving one without the city, and retaining the other within it, in a way which is simply incredible. Whatever may have been the bearings and dimensions of the temple, with its courts and porticoes, in the enclosure above, the massive foundations of the area are one work, and that a work of high antiquity. The immense beveled stones in the southeast corner were laid at the same time with the stones in the southwest corner. They are of the same magnitude, and it does not need the eye of an architect to assure us that they are of the same age and style of workmanship. They were the two extremities of the ancient southern wall, as they are of the modern, stretching, as Josephus informs us, from valley to valley, and laid with stones "immovable for all time;" and to-day they confirm his testimony, and contradict this theory. "We are led irresistibly to the conclusion," said Dr. Robinson, on his first visit, "that the area of the Jewish temple was identical on its western, eastern, and southern sides, with the present enclosure of the Haram." "Ages upon ages have rolled away, yet these foundations endure, and are immovable as at the beginning" (Bib. Res. I. 427). The investigations of his second visit confirmed the conclusion of his first, — from which we see not how any visitor who has inspected this masonry can withhold his assent, — that in the southwest corner, in the southern part of the western wall, in the southeast corner on both sides, and along the southern wall, we have before us "the massive substructions of the ancient Jewish temple. Such has been the impression received by travellers for centuries, and such it will probably continue to be so long as these remains endure" (Bib. Res. 220).

We have now presented our main reasons for dissenting from the theory of Mr. Fergusson's Article on the Topography of Jerusalem, in its two principal points; and if these points are untenable, almost the entire reasoning of the Article falls with them.

ARTICLE X.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

BIBLICAL COMMENTARY ON THE BOOKS OF SAMUEL. By C. F. Keil, D.D., and F. Delitzsch, D.D., Professors of Theology. Translated from the German by the Rev. James Martin, B.A., Nottingham. 8vo. pp. 512. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

BIBLICAL COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF JOB. By F. Delitzsch, D.D., Professor of Theology. Translated from the German by the Rev. Francis Bolton, B.A., Elland. Vol. I. 8vo. pp. 453. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

Both of the volumes above named, as well as the other works of Drs. Keil and Delitzsch, are remarkable for their extent and variety of exegetical lore. They are of great value to the clerical scholar. We feel a new indebtedness to the Messieurs Clark for their long-continued enterprise in making the researches of German divines accessible to English and American scholars.

COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPELS; intended for popular use. By D. D. Whedon, D.D. Luke, John. 16mo. pp. 422. New York: Carlton and Porter.

This Commentary, not less than the previous volume on Matthew and Mark, evinces the acuteness and perspicacity of its author. We are happy to perceive that Dr. Whedon intends to "complete an entire exposition of the New Testament" on a plan similar to that of the first two volumes. He adds: "There is a fair prospect that a Commentary on the Old Testament will be furnished, before a very long period shall close, in uniform size and style with these two volumes."

THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO MARK. By John Peter Lange, D.D., Professor of Theology at the University of Bonn. Revised from the Edinburgh translation, with additions, by William G. T. Shedd, D.D., Professor in Union Theological Seminary, New York. First edition.

THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO LUKE. By J. J. Van Oosterzee, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Utrecht. Translated from the second German edition, with additions original and selected, by Philip Schaff, D.D., and Rev. Charles C. Starbuck. First edition. New York: Charles Scribner and Co.

These two Commentaries are published in one octavo volume of four hundred and five pages, forming the second volume of Prof. Schaff's edition of Lange's Critical, Doctrinal, and Homiletical Commentary on the Holy Scriptures. In his Preface to Oosterzee's Commentary, Dr. Schaff. writes: "I cannot conclude without publicly expressing my profound

gratitude for the hearty, and even enthusiastic, welcome with which the first volume of this Commentary has been greeted in all the evangelical churches of America." The second volume seems fitted to enjoy an equal popularity. The peculiar features of the plan on which the work is written will commend it to some minds, while Dr. Schaff's enthusiasm, energy, and perseverance will secure for it various qualities which will engage the interest of others.

PROPHECY, viewed in respect to its Distinctive Nature, Special Function, and Proper Interpretation. By Patrick Fairbairn, D.D., Principal of the Free Church College, Glasgow; author of "Typology of Scripture," "Ezekiel and the Book of his Prophecy, etc." 8vo. pp. 524. New York: Carlton and Porter.

A judicious work on prophecy has long been a *desideratum* among Christian laymen as well as clergymen. Dr. Fairbairn has given us such a work. The present volume resembles his previous treatise on the Typology of Scripture, and unfolds reasonable theories in a sober style.

THE PROPHETS OF ISRAEL AND JUDAH during the Assyrian Empire. By Rowland Williams, D.D., Vicar of Broad-Chalke, Wilts; formerly Fellow and Tutor of King's College, Cambridge. 8vo. pp. 450. London and Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate.

Dr. Williams writes in a racy and vigorous style. He often compresses lengthened trains of thought into a single apothegmatic sentence. Sometimes his love of terseness leads him into obscurity. We are not always certain that we understand him. We often disagree with him. He is familiar with the German commentators, among whom he seems to honor Gesenius as the most reliable. His theological views may be best learned by comparing the present volume with his other writings, of which the titles are: "Rational Godliness"; "Christianity and Hinduism"; "Christian Freedom"; "A Letter to the Bishop of St. David's"; "A Critical Appendix on his Lordship's Reply"; "An Essay on Baron de Bunsen" [one of the "Essays and Reviews"]; "Persecution for the Word"; "An Introduction to Mr. Desprez's Daniel," etc.

MAN'S AGE IN THE WORLD according to Holy Scripture and Science. By an Essex Rector. 8vo. pp. 264. London: Lowell Reeve and Co.

The "Essex Rector" maintains that Geological and Anthropological facts prove a greater antiquity of the human race than is ordinarily assigned to it; that the Mosaic narratives of the creation, paradise, etc., were traditions, some of them merely symbolical, which Moses was inspired to collect and preserve; that from these traditions we may learn all that we need to know concerning the work of God in creation, and the work of Christ in redemption. We may learn *religious* truth from the old symbolical *traditions*. The "Rector" seems predisposed to find a symbol where he might more naturally find a literal statement.

THE STRUCTURE OF ANIMAL LIFE. Six Lectures delivered at the Brooklyn Academy of Music in January and February, 1862. By Louis Agassiz, Professor of Zoölogy and Geology in the Lawrence Scientific School. 8vo. pp. 128. New York: Charles Scribner and Company.

This treatise, like every other work of Agassiz, suggests interesting topics of reflection. For instance: he requested "one of our great mathematicians" to solve the problem: "How to execute with the elements given, — with a vertical axis, around which are arranged parts of equal value, — all the possible variations involved" in the plan of radiation. This mathematician "was entirely ignorant of natural history, and could not, therefore have obtained his knowledge from the animal structures"; yet he devised three plans "as the only essential plans which could be framed upon the idea of a radiated structure around a vertical axis." Now, the radiated animals are divided into three classes, corresponding with these three plans; the classes differing as the plans differ one from the other; yet the various species under these three classes exhibiting the same general plans in a rich variety of specific forms, and with great freedom from the monotony of mere mathematical figures. Thus the structure of some of even the lowest animals indicates the same *kind* of "thought, plan, and deliberation" which a mathematician exercises, and "the *nature* of the intelligence is the same, whether it be human or divine, finite or infinite." Lect. VI. pp. 111–128.

ELIJAH THE PROPHET. An Epic Poem, by G. Washington Moon, Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature, Author of "The Dean's English." pp. 150. London: Hatchard and Company. 1866.

Our readers are already familiar with Mr. Moon as a master of prose. His contoversy with Dr. Alford on the "Queen's English," will not soon be forgotten. "Coming out for wool, in fact," says the Record, "the Dean went back shorn; rushing forth to teach, he went home taught." Mr. Moon is less widely known as a poet than as a literary critic. He has published a volume of "Minor Poems," which is characterized by an easy and pure style. The present Epic is replete with elegant sentiment, expressed in well-turned verse. The lines on pp. 7, 8, and 148–150 are particularly neat and felicitous. Mr. Moon agrees with Dr. Stanley in regarding Elijah "the grandest and most romantic character Israel ever produced."

THE HOLY COMFORTER: His Person and his Work. By Joseph P. Thompson, D.D. 18mo. pp. 210. New York: Anson D. T. Randolph. 1866.

Although this volume is largely of a practical character, yet it is also doctrinal, and contains many important suggestions in regard to the nature of Inspiration, of the Trinity, of Human Freedom. It is written in a clear and forceful style.

INDEX.

A.

Aeschines, Ancestry and Education of, article on, 565.

Agassiz's Structure of Animal Life, noticed, 698.

Allgemeines über die Hebräische Dichtung, und über das Psalmenbuch, von Heinrich Ewald, noticed, 525.

Analysis and Synthesis both Necessary, in their Proportion, to True Reasoning, article on, by L. Withington, D.D., 603; meaning of terms, 603; statement of the object of the article, 603; tendency to exaggerate the power of analysis, 604; many ideas impossible to be represented by matter, 604; the mind or the Ego, 605; we are immediately conscious of the soul's existence, 606; the opposite doctrine contradicts our consciousness, 607; it inverts the chronology of our knowledge, 607; the idea of time, 608; the soul, on this opposite doctrine, gives no good analysis and no synthesis of itself or its powers, 610; it leads to wild conclusions, 611; it is at variance with authorities, the scriptures, 612; Aristotle, 613; moral and polite writers, as Rousseau, 614; this doctrine has darkened our investigations both in the material and intellectual line, 616; necessity in estimating the mental powers of going from the whole to the parts, 617; impossibility of distinguishing between memory and consciousness, 617; bad influence of the doctrine in question on our theological investigation, 619; exaggerated antagonisms, matter and mind, 620; late speculations concerning the origin of species, 621; the authors of these speculations unconscious materialists, 622; the attributes of God, 625; the glory of God wrongly placed in opposition to the happiness of the creatures, 626; the agency of God, against the agency of man, 627; theories of atonement and the divine decrees, 628; the death of Christ as related to repentance for sin, 629; all true philosophy a combination of the constituents of the universe, 631; importance of synthesis in interpreting the scriptures, 632; recapitulation, 632.

Ancestry and Education of the Orator Aeschines, The, article on, by Prof. James R. Boise, 565; opinions hitherto respecting Aeschines, derived chiefly from his enemy Demosthenes, 565; the views of Arnold Schaefer, 566; family connections of Aeschines, 566; descended from the family of the Butadae, 566; account by Aeschines of his father, 567; by Demosthenes, 568; particularly on the oration on the crown, 569; the mother of Aeschines, 571; account by Aeschines, 571; by Demosthenes, 572; his mother, not a slave, 573; motives of Demosthenes in slandering the parents of Aeschines, 574; the parents of Aeschines Athenian citizens, 576; his other family connections prove his Athenian descent, 578; early education of Aeschines, 579; his father's instruction, 580; not trained in low and rude society, 580; Aeschines as actor, 582; necessary qualifications of an actor, 583; Aeschines not lacking in talent as an actor, 584; attached himself to those who reproduced the master works of the earlier drama, 584; character of his associates, Theodorus and Aristodemus, 585; the accident which befell Aeschines on the stage, 587; became an actor as a means of subsistence, 588; Aeschines as secretary, 589; had never received systematic in-

struction in the art of eloquence, 591.
Andrews, Rev. N. W., article by, 108, 252.
Angus's, Rev. Joseph, Bible-Hand-Book, noticed, 176.
Apologetische Beitrage, von Dr. F. Düsterdiech, noticed 342.
Apostolische Glaubenskenntniss, für die Gemeinde erklärt, noticed, 344.

B.

Baader's characteristik der Theosophie, noticed, 526.
Bascom, Prof. John, articles by, 1, 435.
Bascom's, Prof. John, Philosophy of Rhetoric, noticed, 174.
Bible Hand-Book, noticed, 176.
Bible Doctrine of Divorce, article on, by Joseph Tracy, D.D., 384; divorce as mentioned in the Bible, not a judicial act, 384; divorce in the Jewish sense at present impossible, 385; our Saviour's instructions concerning divorce as imperative to us as to those who first heard them, 386; the law of divorce, as given by Moses, not a perfect standard of righteousness, 387; legislators sometimes required to act in a similar manner, 387; conformity to the law of the land, not always a sufficient defence, 387; how the hardness of the Hebrew heart made the prohibition of divorce inexpedient, not known, 388; the husband under Jewish law could put away his wife, 389; the wife could divorce her husband, 389; Christ's conversation in Matt. xix. in regard to divorce of the same import substantially with the conversation in Mark, 391; do the clauses referring to the marriage to another of the one put away have the same meaning? 391; provisions of modern law in reference to divorce, 397; divorce except for adultery, not to be made impossible, 398; law of divorce as applicable to a plurality of wives, 399; cases of polygamy in heathen lands, 399; polygamy was practised under the law of Moses, 400; instruction of Christ as to polygamy in his time, 401; objections to Christ's doctrine, 403; the doctrine that the husband of two wives may after conversion keep them, not too indulgent, 404.
Biblical Notes, article by Prof. H. B. Hackett, 515; Queen Candace, 515; Emmaus, 516; Capernaum, 518; place of Bethabara in the Harmony, 519; the Quarries near Gilgal, 521.
Boehm's, Rev. Henry, Reminiscences, noticed, 175.
Boise, Prof. James B., article by, 565.
Boardman, Rev. G. N., article by, 73.
Brainerd's, Rev. John, Life, by Thomas Brainerd, D.D., 163.
Brücke's Physiology of Speech, article on, by Prof. Lewis R. Packard, 257; progress of the science of language, 257; purpose and character of Brücke's work, 257; the work divided into two parts, the physiology and the classification of sounds, 258; the larynx and its sounds, 259; description of the larynx, 259; whispering, 260; the proper sounds of language, the simple vowel-sounds, 260; every such sound has three parts: strength or loudness, height or pitch, quality, 260; experiments by which the different causes of height and quality have been ascertained, 261; the position of the organs in pronouncing the different vowels, 263; the vowels *u*, *i*, and *a*, 263; the other vowel-sounds produced on the way from one to another of these three, 264; according to Brücke, three vowel-sounds between *i* and *a*, and three between *a* and *u*, 264; imperfectly formed vowels, 266; the undefined or neutral vowel, 266; the question whether long and short vowels differ both in quantity and quality, 267; Brücke's conclusions on this matter, 267; his treatment of the dipthongs unsatisfactory, 268; the nasal tone, 268; the distinction between vowels and consonants, 269; four classes of consonants, 270; another division into three classes according to the part of

the mouth in which the passage of air is checked, 271; mode of uttering the consonants, 272; those whose place of articulation is at the extreme point of the mouth, 273; those produced at the tip of the tongue pressed against some inner part of the mouth, 275; those produced by stopping the air at the middle or back part of the tongue, 277; the sound of *k* as thus produced, 277; the sound of *g*, 279; the sound of *b*, *d*, and *y* after consonants, 279; Brücke's general defence of his system, 281; his account of the compounded consonants and of the softened vowels, 282; consonants softened or made liquid, 283.

Büchsel's, Rev. D., Ministerial Experiences, noticed, 172.

Buck's Massachusetts Ecclesiastical Law, noticed, 352.

Bushnell's, Dr. Horace, Vicarious Sacrifice, noticed, 345.

C.

Calkins, Rev. Wolcott, article by, 593.

Catholic Apostolic Church, The, article on, by Rev. W. W. Andrews, 108; review of the facts connected with the origin and progress of the Christian dispensation, 108; oneness of the church, 108; appointment of four ministries, 109; apostles, 109; prophets, 110; deacons, 111; elders or presbyters, 112; Paul, the apostle to the Gentiles, 113; at the death of the apostles the church without visible bond of unity, 115; the civil power invoked in vain to heal divisions, 116; the bishop of Rome made vicar of Christ in vain, 116; the Reformation not a perfect work, 118; the triumph of Protestantism checked by the Jesuits, 119; Puritanism and Methodism in England and Pietism in Germany, 120; tokens of reviving life in the increase of the power of godliness rather than the form, and the deeper unfolding of doctrine, 121; the importance of prayer more deeply felt, 122; answer to prayer in the form of tongues and prophesyings, 123; import of the prophetic utterances, 124; revival of the apostolate in 1832, 125; organization of the Catholic Apostolic church, 127; nature of the apostolic office, 127; prophets, 128; evangelists, 129; angels or chief pastors, 129; the necessity of this fourfold ministry, 129; the fourfold ministry in each individual church, 130; agreement between the polity of the apostolic church and the New Testament and with other churches, 131; doctrine of the church, 133; Christian doctrine set forth by Peter on the day of Pentecost, 133; the duty of the restored apostles, to teach the doctrine of Christ, 135; belief of the apostolic church in regard to tradition, 135; the incarnation of Christ, the root of all the peculiar doctrines of Christianity, 136; Christ's progressive work as man, 136; his resurrection, 138; ascension, 138; descent of the Holy Ghost, 139; visible ordinances, 140; election and predestination, 141; purposes of election, 144; second coming of the Lord, 144; worship, 145; two facts — the authority of the Bible and the continued existence of the church — assumed, 145; two respects in which worship should be scriptural, 146; the church a holy priesthood, 146; the church appears as priest in the eucharist, 147; the great errors of the Romanists in regard to the eucharist, avoided and the common omissions of Protestants supplied by the Apostolic church, 148; the ministers of the church, priests, 149; the eucharist has a central place in worship, 150; order of this part of worship, 150; daily services, 154; difference between these daily services and the eucharist, 155; services at Christmas, Easter, Ascension, and Pentecost, 156; a ritual used, 156; extemporaneous prayer, private confession, and absolution, 157; principle of symbol used in all the services, 158; re-

lations of the Apostolic church to other existing churches, 252; design of the Apostolic church to bring all churches into the true order of God's house, 252; the special work of this church to prepare the way of the Lord to return and establish his kingdom, 254; this work certain to be accomplished, but the process to be gradual, 255; God's work of vengeance to be carried forward in two stages, 255.

Christliche Klänge aus den griechischen und römischen Klassikern, noticed, 342.

Christliche Sittenlehre, von C. F. Schmid, noticed, 337.

Christianity and Islamism, article on, by Rev. George F. Herrick, 406; relation of Islamism to Christianity in its origin, 408; Mohammed's knowledge of our scriptures obtained through Jewish sources, 409; references to Old Testament history in the Koran, 410; references in the Koran to New Testament history less in number and in detail, 412; Christians warned against extravagances in religion, 413; the Koran, regarded as concurrent with, and auxiliary to the scriptures, 414; the fundamental truth of Islamism borrowed from Jews and Christians, 415; Mohammed assumes a divine commission and compromises with evil, 417; first successes of Mohammed, 418; religious system of Mohammed, 420; existence of God and revelation, 420; decrees, sin, and atonement, 421; resurrection and angels, 422; practical duties, prayer and fasting, 423; Mohammedan sects, 424; orthodox sects, 424; heterodox sects, 425; present relation of Islamism in Turkey to Christianity, 427; present attitude of Mohammedans in relation to their own faith and material reform, 429; Mohammedans in Turkey divided into two parties, 430; the liberal party, 430; attitude of Mohammedans towards Protestant Christianity, 432.

Christologie des neuen Testaments, von Prof. Beyschlag, noticed, 522.

Citations from the New Testament by the Apostolic Fathers, article on, by Rev. Wolcott Calkins, 593; the Apostolic Fathers bear direct testimony to three of Paul's epistles, 593; a few passages of the New Testament are distinctly quoted either as the language of the Lord and the apostles or of scriptures, 594; many passages cited with substantial accuracy, but without acknowledgment, 596; many extended passages in these Fathers, close imitations of similar passages in the New Testament, 597; misquotations by these Fathers, 598; conclusions: no citations by the Fathers from apochryphal books, and yet they did not copy from the MSS., 600; the Old Testament quoted as carelessly as the New, 601; they quoted from memory, and yet possessed the MSS., 601.

Commentar über das neue Testament, von H. A. W. Meyer, noticed, 343.

Congregationalism, what is it? etc., noticed, 165.

Conjugations, Latin, article on, 634.

Conversion, its Nature, article on, by Prof. Austin Phelps, 48; guilt, the distinctive idea in the condition of this world, 48; man's need of being changed, 48; Pantheism even acknowledges this need, 49; the belief of the necessity of conversion universal, 50; nature of the change needed by man, 50; representations of the nature of this change in the Bible, 51; the Bible speaks of it as like natural birth, 51; as like the change from death to life, 51; the change from darkness to light, 52; conversion like a change in the chief organ of physical vitality, 52; as a transfer from the dominion of Satan to that of God, 53; the doctrine of conversion pervades the system of biblical teaching, 53; meaning of the language which teaches man's need of conversion, 54; the scriptural emblems represent a change of character as distinct from all variety of change by ceremonial

observance, 54; conversion possible in a disembodied state, 55; conversion distinct from a constitutional change, 55; a constitutional change of less profound significance than a change of character, 56; miracles not the grandest disclosure of omnipotence, 56; law a more majestic thought than the suspension of law, 57; conversion different from re-creation, 58; Christian experience proves no other change than that of character in conversion, 58; the unregenerate man feels no other change to be reasonable, 59; on any other supposition the sinner's reason and conscience at war with each other, 60; the doctrine of a constitutional change seldom preached consistently, 61; conversion an intelligible change in distinction from a mystical change, 62; nature of God's working in the soul mysterious, 63; the change itself not mysterious, 63; conversion the most radical change of which human character is susceptible, 66; a change of external deportment not the chief result of conversion, 67; conversion not synonymous with an increase of seriousness, 68; conversion not the abandonment of any single passion, 68; conversion not the development of character by natural germination in the heart, 69; conversion brings into existence a character which before had no existence, 69; the fixedness of character, 70; the tendency of character to fixedness not invincible, 71; but one change which meets all the peculiarities affirmed of religious conversion — the change from sin to holiness, 72.

Conversion, Human Responsibility in, article on, 646.

Cortès's Essay on Catholicism, Liberalism, and Socialism, noticed, 679.

Cyril the Patriarch, Life of, article on, 452.

D

Delitzsch's Commentary on the Books of Samuel and on the Book of Job, noticed, 696.

Dexter, H. M., D.D., on Congregationalism, noticed, 165.

Dictionary of the Bible, noticed, 170.

Die philosophisch-kritischen Grundsätze der Selbstvoraussetzung oder Religionsphilosophie, von G. Mehring, noticed, 338.

Difficulties in the Writings of Paul, by Whately, noticed, 173.

Divorce, Bible Doctrine of, article on, 384.

Dunn, Prof. R. P., article by, 235.

Dutch Reformed Church, its History and Theology, article on, 177.

E

Economy, Political, and the Christian Ministry, article on, 73,

Elijah the Prophet: an Epic Poem, noticed, 698.

English Literature, its Study, article on, 235.

F

Fairbairn's Prophecy viewed in in respect to its Distinctive Nature, etc., noticed, 697.

Fergusson's Article on Jerusalem, criticised, 684.

Fisher's, Prof. G. P., Essays on the Supernatural Origin of Christianity, noticed, 347.

Freedom of the Mind in Willing, by Hazard, noticed, 681.

French, James P. article by, 634.

Froude's History of England, noticed, 168.

G

German Publications, noticed, 333, 522.

Gillett's, E. H., History of the Presbyterian Church, noticed, 175.

Gospels, Origin of the, article on, 353, 529.

Grout's, Rev. Lewis, Zulu Land, noticed, 176.

Guthrie, Thomas, D.D., on the Parables, noticed, 174.

H

Hackett, Prof. H. B., article by, 515.

Handbuch der christlichen Sittenlehre, von D. A. Wuttke, noticed, 333.

Handbuch über die Offenbarung Joannis, von Dr. F. Düsterdieck, noticed, 526.

Hazard's Freedom of the Mind in Willing, noticed, 681.
Hedge's Reason in Religion, noticed, 171.
Hengstenberg's Commentary on John's Gospel, noticed, 349.
Herrick, Rev. George F., article by, 406.
History and Theology of the Reformed Protestant Dutch church, article on, by Elbert S. Porter, D.D., 177; friendship between the Puritans of England and the Calvinists of Scotland, 177; origin of the title of the Dutch church, 179; introduction of the Dutch church into America, 180; causes of the slow growth of the Dutch church in America, 182; dependence of the denomination on a foreign ecclesiastical jurisdiction, 184; two parties on the question of ordination, 184; statistics of the church, 185; government, 187; all authority in the church committed first to the people, 188; classes or presbyteries, 188; synods, 189; general synod, 189; educational institutions, 190; Rutger's College, 190; New Brunswick Theological Seminary, 191; benevolent institutions, 192; genius, culture, and worship of the church, 193; its genius characterized by tenacity, 194; by liberality, 195; its culture elevated, 196; order of worship prescribed, 197; customs peculiar to the Dutch church 198; middle ground held in regard to a liturgy, 199; views of the Sabbath, 200; theology, 200; some liberty and diversity of utterance, 201; the theology of the church shaped by the Belgic Confession, 202; by the Heidelberg Catechism, 205; the Synod of Dordrecht, 207; Thomas Scott on the Synod of Dordrecht, 207; doctrines announced in the canons of this synod, 208.
Holy Comforter, The: His Person and Work, noticed, 698.
Hosford, Rev. B. F., article by, 309.
Human Responsibility as related to Divine Agency in Conversion, article on, by Prof. Austin Phelps, 645; most serious difficulties clustering around doctrines which are opposites but not contraries, 645; principles by which our inquiries on such themes should be regulated, 645; the reality of the difficulty felt by a sinner as to his responsibility for his own conversion, 646; the ground of human responsibility and its relation to the sovereignty of God, 648; responsibility rests on a species of evidence which cannot be resisted, 648; the common sense of man never attributes to sin the power to destroy responsibility, 650; the authority of revelation, 652; the ability of man to obey the divine commands inferred, 654; common sense affirms this ability, 655; no conflict between the sinner's ability and his dependence on the Holy Spirit, 659; inferences — the performance of the conditions of salvation to be urged on men as freely as any other duty, 661; the duty of repentance to be preached as imperatively as inspired men have preached it, 662; such preaching not perilous, 663; dependence of the sinner on the Holy Ghost for the will to repent more profound than for the power to repent, 663; divine sovereignty in salvation not to be represented as a work of mere power, but as a work of moral government, 664; the difference between these two representations vital to the pulpit, 664; the pulpit should boldly assert the sinner's dependence as one of guilt, 666; it should proclaim the offer of the Holy Spirit as the gift of God's mercy, 667; men have every encouragement possible to immediate repentance, 668; a sinner's destruction always his own doing, 670.
Hupfeld, Prof. Hermann, article on, 673; birth and education, 673; joins the University of Marburg, 674; studies at Halle under Gesenius, 676; appointed professor at Marburg, 676; at Halle, 677; his literary activity, 678; his death, 679.

I

Instrumentality of Truth in Regeneration, The, article on, by Prof. Austin Phelps, 485; importance of distinguishing the curiosities of theology from its essential facts, 485; biblical modes of representing truth as an instrument of God, 486; neither recondite nor dogmatic statements of doctrine the favorite forms of inspiration, 486; the fact of the instrumentality of truth established in the Bible, 488; truth employed in distinction from physical power and falsehood, 489; religious truth in distinction from all other truth, 489; the instrumentality of truth never dispensed with, 490; the evidence of such dispensation must be a matter of pure revelation, 490; scriptures silent as to any such dispensation, 491; mode of the regeneration of infants, 492; mode in which the truth operates in regeneration, 494; coincidence of the operation of truth with the laws of the mind, 494; simplicity of the work of God in the change of the heart, 496; this view a corrective of certain fatal prejudices, 496; the rational nature of all trustworthy evidences of a religious character, 499; the importance of truthfulness in theological opinions, 500; the life of Christian institutions in a great degree independent of the auxiliaries of fine art, 502; the scriptural theory of preaching suggested by the instrumentality of truth in regeneration, 504; the pulpit sometimes undeservedly censured for its raciness, 506; the sacredness of truth not to be buried beneath artistic skill, 508; there should be no affectation of elegant literature, 508; the art of churchly etiquette condemned, 509; nothing beautiful but truth, and nothing respectable which is not true to God's thought, 511; all preaching to be tried by the test of its fidelity to truth, 512.

Intuitions of the Mind by M'Cosh, noticed, 174.

Intuitive Ideas, and their Relation to Knowledge, article on, by Rev. John Bascom, 1; increasing tendency in modern times to recognize ideas not arising from experience, 1; their number, their relation to each other and to science, not yet determined, 1; necessity of recognizing a distinct intuitive faculty, 2; the idea of existence the first among our intuitive ideas, 2; the idea of resemblance, agreement, and disagreement, 3; the idea of truth included under that of resemblance, 4; the idea of space, 4; the idea of number, 5; that of time, 5; that of cause, 6; the ideas of cause and effect define and measure each other, 6; no necessity of a seventh regulative idea, that of relation, 7; formative ideas of thought, 8; first, the idea of consciousness, 8; second, that of beauty, 10; third, that of right, 11; proof that the idea of right is an intuitive idea, 11; the fourth idea, that of liberty, 13; the idea of the infinite, 14; the infinite not to be confounded with the indefinite, 14; the infinite a wholly separate idea, 15; the notion of the infinite accompanies that of time, 16; the infinite as applied to power includes the absolute, 16; a cause and a first cause, notions quite distinct, 17; a cause, finite; a first cause, infinite, 17; the idea of the infinite later than our other intuitive ideas, 17; is the idea of the infinite negative? 18; the infinite and the finite mutually involve each other, 20; the infinite a positive idea, as shown by the manner in which we deny of it exposition, 21; affirmative statements of the infinite possible, 22; our symbols of the infinite not all illusory, 22; the infinite as an object of faith simply, 23; the idea of at least a modified presentation and apprehension of God necessarily presupposed in revelation, 23; God can be known, but not conceived, 25; an increasing knowledge of God possible, 25; difficulties arising

from a denial of the possibilities of positive though inexplicable ideas of the infinite, 26; relation of intuitive ideas to knowledge, 27; some of the intuitions, the sources of sciences strictly demonstrative, 27; the presence and action of thought in matter alone render matter an object of thought and rewarding study, 28; a principle of order among the phenomena of matter necessary to arrest thought, 28; this order instituted in the line of definite enduring forces, 29; these permanent forces must include design, 29; the world partly apprehended through the idea of causes working towards an end, and therefore rationally, 30; the steps through which the mind ascertains the ends and means for and by which all order is secured, laborious and rewarding study, 31; in physical inquiry, an ever increasing tendency to reach the absolute, 32; resemblance and cause the two ideas under which disorder passes into order, 33; effort to discover the order and limit of knowledge and the faculties disciplined, 33; the discovery not of mere resemblance, but of resemblance springing from similarity of forces, a real step in the progress of thought, 34; a finished work a balance of active forces and liable to disturbance, 34; the identity of living forces always sought, 35; all physical science issues in cause and effect, 37; no cause, as a cause merely, is apprehensible, 37; the more simple and apprehensible the effect, the more obvious the cause, 38; the ease with which mechanical action is understood a source of mischief in complex problems, 38; forces equally diverse with the effects which they produce, 39; causes wisely defined only through an inquiry into effects, 39; the powers of observation first disciplined by science, 39; observation impotent without the anticipatory theory, the completing deductions, 40; what space is to physical phenomena, consciousness is to those of mind, 41; liberty proved by consciousness, 41; respects in which choice differs from cause and effect, 41; no pause in the pursuit of causes except in God, 42; nature the recipient, not the source, of order, 43; principles for the guidance of choice furnished by the diversity of means and ends, 43; the notion of liberty fundamental, 44; the supernatural gives rise to the natural, 44; the two ideas of liberty and law complementary to each other, 44; the idea of causation has most frequently overpowered that of liberty, 45; the relation of the sciences to each other in the discipline of the mind, 46; the infinite Spirit apprehended, not comprehended, 47; the logical powers strengthened by the demonstrative sciences, 47.

J

Jerusalem, Topography of, article on, 684.

K

Keil's Commentary on the Books of Samuel, noticed, 696.

L.

Lange's Gospel according to Mark, noticed, 696.

Life of the Patriarch Cyril, article on, by Dr. A. G. Paspati, 452; reason for writing this life, 453; sketch of the fall of Constantinople in 1453, 454; prominent part acted by Constantinople in the history of the Christian world, 457; birth of Cyril, 458; his education, 458; ordination, 459; goes to Poland, 459; becomes Patriarch of Constantinople, 460; establishment of a school at Galata by the Jesuits, 460; Cyril's correspondence with many Jesuits, 461; becomes Patriarch of Constantinople, 465; attempt to establish a printing press in Constantinople, 471; Cyril draws up a confession of faith, 478; deposed from the patriarchate, 482; re-election and death, 483.

Lindsley's, Dr. Philip, Works, noticed, 348.

M.

Manetho': the Beginning of our History and Chronology, by D. Anton Heine, noticed, 341.

Mann's, Horace, Life, noticed, 172.

Man's Age in the World according to Holy Scripture and Science, by an Essex Rector, noticed, 697.

Martyrdom in the Apocalypse, article on, by Rev. B. F. Hosford, 309.

M'Cosh's Examination of J. S. Mill's Philosophy, noticed, 528.

M'Cosh's, James, LL.D., Intuitions of the Mind, noticed, 174.

Methodist Church, History of the, noticed, 176.

Mill's Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, noticed, 350.

Ministerial Experiences, by Büchsel, noticed, 172.

Mombert, J. I., D.D., article by, 353 529.

Moon's Elijah the Prophet, noticed, 698.

Murphy's Commentary on Genesis, noticed, 349.

N.

Neutestamentliche Studien, von Dr. I. C. Laurent, noticed, 527.

O.

Origin of the Gospels, The, article on, by J. Isidor Mombert, D.D., 353.

Osterzee's Gospel according to Luke, noticed, 696.

Our Place in History, article on, by Prof. Julius Seelye, 211; necessity of considering where mankind has thus far been, 212; the past condition of the countries east of the Mediterranean, 212; characteristics of the Grecians and their colonies, 214; combination of Grecians and Orientals effected by Alexander, 217; the Western Roman Empire, 220; the Dark and Middle Ages, 222; Reformation as arising in Germany rather than with a Romanic or Celtic race, 223; the future, as the past, likely to be regulated with a view to the growth of Christianity, 226; the doctrine of the church likely to form the next great topic of discussion, 228; the said problem now everywhere pressing for a solution, 230; American history, having its whole meaning in reference to this doctrine of the church and of society, 233.

P.

Parables, by Dr. Guthrie, noticed, 174.

Paspati, Dr. A. G., article, by, 452.

Phelps, Prof. Austin, articles by, 48, 286, 485, 645.

Philosophy of Rhetoric, by Bascom, noticed, 174.

Political Economy and the Christian Ministry, article on, by Rev. George N. Boardman, 73; political economy, related to the Christian ministry, 73; political economy considered as an intellectual discipline, 74; natural theology, illustrated by political economy, 76; Christianity a power elevating society in temporal comfort, 77; the ordinance of the Sabbath, 78; the mutual dependence of classes in the community, 79; the preacher should understand the nature of exchangeable value and the meaning of the word "property," 82; the preacher should understand and teach the nature of wealth, 85; religion a remedy for the evils of great wealth and of great poverty, 93; theology gives the best explanation of the foundation of society, 95; the explanation of this matter by physical and intellectual philosophers, 96; the state of life in which men most naturally become Christians, the family, 99; the question of the aim of governments, 100; the clergyman in the best position to settle this question, 102; the question of the worth of man, 104; the question best answered by Christianity, 106.

Pond's, Dr., Pastoral Theology, noticed, 348.

Porter, E. S., D.D., article by, 177.

Praktische Auslegung des Briefes an die Colosser, von Theophil Passavant, noticed, 344.

Presbyterian Church, History of, by E. H. Gillett, noticed, 175.

R.

Reason in Religion, noticed, 171.
Regeneration, the Work of God, article on, by Prof. Austin Phelps, 286.
Reid's Voices of the Soul, noticed, 160.
Robertson's, F. W., Life and Letters, noticed, 173.
Römische Lehre von der unbefleckten Empfängniss, von Dr. Edward F. Preuss, noticed, 343.
Ruth, The Book of, by C. H. H. Wright, noticed, 338.

S.

Schöpfungsgeschichte nach Naturwissenschaft und Bibel, von Prof. W. Schultz, noticed, 340.
Selbstzeugnisse Jesu, von Prof. Held, noticed, 524.
Seelye, Prof. J., article by, 211.
Silliman's, Prof. Benjamin, Life, by Prof. Fisher, noticed, 528.
Smith's, William, Dictionary of the Bible, noticed, 170.
Speech, its Physiology, article on, 257.
Spring's, Dr. Gardiner, Reminiscences, noticed, 348.
Stevens's, A., D.D., History of the Methodist Church, noticed, 176.
Stevens's, A., D.D., Centenary of American Methodism, noticed, 350.
Stevens's, A., D.D., Women of Methodism, noticed, 350.
Structure of Animal Life, The, noticed, 698.
Study of English Literature, The, article on, by Prof. R. P. Dunn, 235.
Supernatural Origin of Christianity, Essays on, by Prof. G. P. Fisher, noticed, 347.
System of the Four Conjugations in Latin, a Classification of Ideas signified by their Characteristic Vowels, The, article on, by James P. French, M.A., 634.

T

Thompson's, J. P., D.D., Holy Comforter, noticed, 698.
Topography of Jerusalem, The, article on, by Samuel Wolcott, D.D., situation of Mount Zion, 689; the church of the Holy Sepulchre, 693.
Tracy, Joseph, D.D., article by, 384.

U

Utilitarianism, article on, by Rev. John Bascom, 435.
United States, their Place in History, article on, 211.

V

Verfassung und gegenwärtiger Bestand sämmtlicher Kirchen des Orients, von Prof. I. Silbernagl, noticed, 526.
Vicarious Sacrifice, by Dr. Bushnell, noticed, 345.
Vindiciae Lucanae seu de itinerarii in libro Actorum asservati auctore, by A. Klostermann, noticed, 525.
Voices of the Soul, noticed, 160.
Vorlesungen über die christliche Dogmengeschichte, von Dr. F. C. Baur, noticed, 527.

W

Wayland's, Dr. F., Moral Science, noticed, 161.
Whately's Difficulties in the Writings of Paul, noticed, 173.
Whedon's Commentary on the Gospels, noticed, 696.
Williams's Prophets of Israel and Judah, noticed, 697.
Will, Theories in regard to the Nature of the, article on, 679.
Wissenschaft der Religion, von W. Tölle, noticed, 524.
Withington, Leonard, D.D., article by, 603.
Wolcott, Samuel, D.D., article by, 684.
Wunderthaten des Herrn in Bezug auf die neueste Kritik betrachtet, von Prof. F. L. Steinmeyer, noticed, 523.

Z

Zulu Land, by L. Grout, noticed, 176.

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